Muhammad Najib Azca

AFTER JIHAD

A Biographical Approach to Passionate Politics in Indonesia

University of Amsterdam

Universiteit
van Amsterdam

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Passionate Politics in Indonesia

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AFTER JIHAD

A Biographical Approach to Passionate Politics in Indonesia

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UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM

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Glossary and Abbreviations

Abangan	nominal or non-devout Muslim
AJI	Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (Alliance of Independent Journalists)
Bai'ah	Muslim religious oath
BAKIN	Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (National Intelligence Coordination Agency)
Bappeda	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Development Planning Board)
BBM	Buginese, Butonese and Makasarese
BH-PBB	Brigade Hizbullah Partai Bulan Bintang (God's Army Front of Crescent Moon Party)
Bid'a	misguided innovation
BKPMD	Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Daerah (Coordinating Body for Regional Investment)
BKPMI	Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren seluruh Indonesia (Islamic Boarding School Cooperative Council of Indonesia).
BKPRM	Badan Koordinasi Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid (Coordinating Body of Mosque Youths and Teenagers)
BKPSI	Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren seluruh Indonesia (Islamic Boarding School Cooperative Council of Indonesia).
Brimob	Brigade Mobil (Police Mobile Brigade).

BUMN	Badan Usaha Milik Negara (State Owned Company)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies.
CSPS	Centre for Security and Peace Studies
Daurah	gathering
Da'wa	proselytizing
Daulah	nation-state
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islam Propagation)
Densus 88	Detasemen Khusus 88 (Special Counter Terrorism Police Detachment 88)
Dewan Syura	Advisory Board
DI	Darul Islam (literally 'Islamic Abode', rebellion movement)
NII	Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia)
DMI	Dewan Masjid Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Mosques)
DoC	Dynamics of Contention
DPD	Dewan Pimpinan Daerah (District Executive Board)
DPP	Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Central Executive Board)
DPW	Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah (Provincial Executive Board)
FKAWJ	Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama'ah (Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet)
FKM	Front Kedaulatan Maluku (Moluccan Sovereignty Front)

FKPK	Forum Komunikasi Pedagang Kakilima se-Pekalongan (the Communication Forum of Street Vendors in Pekalongan)
FPI	Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front)
FSUI	Forum Silaturahmi Umat Islam (Communication Forum of Muslim Community)
Gerindra	Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia Movement)
GKST	Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah (Central Sulawesi Protestant Churches)
GMNI	Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (National Student Movement of Indonesia)
Golkar	Golongan Karya (Functionalist Party)
GPI	Gerakan Pemuda Islam (Youth Islamic Movement)
Hammas	Himpunan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim antar-Kampus (Collaborative Action of University Muslim Students)
Hanura	Hati Nurani Rakyat (People's Conscience)
Hijra	migration
HIPMI	Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia (The Young Businessmens Association)
Hizbiyya	partisan politics
HMI	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Muslim Student Association)
HMI-MPO	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam-Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi (Muslim Student Association-the Assembly of the Saviour of the Organization)
HRW	Human Right Watch
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Party of Liberation)
I'dad	preparation for Holy War

ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association)
Iman	faith
IRM	Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth Association)
ITB	Institut Teknologi Bandung (Institute of Technology of Bandung)
Jama'ah	community
JI	Jama'ah Islamiyah (Islamic Community)
Jihadism	jihadi ideology
JIL	Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network)
JIM	Jama'ah Ikhwanul Muslimin [Indonesia] (Community of Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood)
Kafr	unbelievers
KAMMI	Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (United Action of Indonesian Muslim Students)
Karamah	miracles
KBH	Kantor Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Office)
KB-PII	Association of ex PII activists
Khilafah	Transnational-state leadership
KISDI	Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Muslim World)
Komji	Komando Jihad (Jihad Command)
Komnas HAM	Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (National Commission of Human Rights)
Kompak	Komite Penanggulangan Krisis (Committee for Overcoming Crises)
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Army Forces)
KOSTRAD	Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command)

KPPSI	Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (Committee for the Preparation of Islamic Law Implementation)
KUIS	Koalisi Umat Islam Surakarta (Coalition of Muslim Communities in Surakarta)
LDK	Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (University Da'wa Organization)
LDMI	Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam (Da'wa Institute of Islamic University Students)
LIPI	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Science Institute)
LIPIA	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (Institute of the Study for Islam and Arabic)
LJ	Laskar Jihad (Jihad Militia Force)
LM	Laskar Mujahidin (Mujahidin Force)
LMI	Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Holy Warrior Force)
LP3K	Lembaga Pendidikan Pengembangan Pesantren Kilat (the Institute of Education and Development of Pesantren Kilat)
LPBA	Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (Institute of Arabic Teaching)
LPI	Laskar Pembela Islam (Defenders of Islam Force)
LPMS	Lembaga Penguatan Masyarakat Sipil (Civil Society Empowering Institute)
Masyumi	Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Consultative Assembly)
Menwa	Resimen Mahasiswa (University Student Regiment)
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly)

MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
Mu'min	A man of faith
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Indonesian 'Ulama')
Musholla	prayer house
NII	Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State)
NKK/BKK	Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus-Badan Koordinasi Kampus (Normalization of Campus Policy-Campus Coordination Board)
NSM	New Social Movement
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (Association of Muslim Scholars)
OSIS	Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah (Internal School Student Organization)
P4	Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guide to Comprehension and Practice of the Pancasila)
PADMA	Pusat Advokasi Masyarakat (Center of Community Advocacy)
Paku	Pasukan Khusus (special paramilitary forces)
Pam Swakarsa	Pasukan Pengamanan Swakarsa (Voluntary Security Force)
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
Pancasila	The Five Principles of State Ideology
Parmusi	Partai Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party)
PAS	Public Area Service
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon Party)
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)

Persis	Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union).
Pertamina	Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Negara (State Owned Oil Company)
Pesantren	Islamic Boarding School
PII	Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students Association)
PK	Partai Keadilan (Justice Party).
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party).
PKPU	Posko Keadilan Peduli Umat (Justice Command Post for Caring for the Umma)
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperity and Justice Party)
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia (The Indonesian National Party)
PON	Pekan Olahraga Nasional (National Sport Festival)
PP	Pemuda Pancasila (Youth Pancasila, a paramilitary group)
PPMI	Persatuan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Workers)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PPT	Political process theory
Preman	petty criminal, thug
RIDEP	Research Institute for Democracy and Peace
RMS	Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas)
Salafis	Salafi activists
Santet	black magic
Santri	devout Muslim

Sayyid	decent of the Prophet
SDI	Sarekat Dagang Islam (Muslim Merchant Union)
SDIT	Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu (the Integrated Islamic Primary School)
SI	Sarekat Islam (Islamic League)
SPMM	Radio Suara Perjuangan Muslim Maluku (the Voice for Struggle of Maluku Muslims)
SPMP	Suara Perjuangan Muslim Poso (the Voice for Struggle of the Poso Muslims)
STAIN	Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (State College of Islamic Studies)
Syaria	Islamic law
Tadarrus Qur'an	recitation
Tabligh akbar	mass gathering
Takhyul	superstition
Tandzim sirri	underground movement
TKIT	Taman Kanak-kanak Islam Terpadu (Full-day Islamic Kindergarten)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)
TPA	Taman Pendidikan Al-Qur'an (Qur'an Learning School)
TPM	Tim Pembela Muslim (Muslim Defense Team)
TPQ	Taman Pendidikan al-Qur'an (Qur'an Learning School)
UGM	Universitas Gadjah Mada
UII	Universitas Islam Indonesia (Islamic University of Indonesia)
Umma	Muslim Community
UMY	Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta)
Unpatti	Universitas Pattimura (Pattimura University)

UNSFIR	United Nation for Support Facility of Indonesia Recovery
Usroh	nuclear family
Ustadz	Islamic cleric, term of address for Islamic teacher
YAKPI	Yayasan Kesejahteraan Pemuda Islam (Youth Muslims Welfare Foundation)
Yon Gab	Batalyon Gabungan (Military Combined Battalion)

Map 1:
The Indonesian archipelago: an overview

Source:
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/indonesia_pol_2002.pdf

Map 2:
Maluku islands, an overview

Source: Gerry van Klinken (2007: xx)

Map 3:
Central Sulawesi: an overview

Source: Gerry van Klinken (2007: xix)

Map 4:
The Indonesian archipelago: the flow of jihad actors

Modified from Gerry van Klinken (2007)

Part One:

Introduction, Theory, Methodology

Photo 1: Religious communal violence in Ambon 1999
(Photo: courtesy of Baghdad)

CHAPTER 1

From Local Brawl to (Global) Jihad: Introduction

Introduction

Indonesia witnessed the mushrooming of communal violence during the early stages of a transition towards electoral democracy after the fall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime in 1998 (Tadjoeddin 2002; Varshney, Panggabean & Tadjoeddin 2004). Of these, the religious conflicts in Ambon-Maluku and Poso-Central Sulawesi have been the most massive, severe and protracted cases of communal violence in Indonesia. Thousands of people were killed and wounded during the series of deadly violent conflicts between Muslims and Christians in the two areas and thousands more houses, offices and religious buildings were burnt and destroyed. Furthermore, the conflict also attracted thousands of non-local Muslim fighters (jihadists) to join in what they perceived as a 'religious war'. Thus, it became an arena of jihad for Muslim warriors from different parts of the archipelago, and even—though very few in number—from overseas.

This research will focus on non-local jihadists who participated in the communal violence in two areas in the post-jihad period. By the "post-jihad period" I mean the period after their involvement in the violent conflict in either one or two areas. Applying a biographical approach, I scrutinize how people from different Islamic networks joined the jihad movement, had different experiences and roles during the jihad and eventually took different trajectories in the post-jihad period. In this introductory chapter, I will start by describ-

ing how a local brawl developed into a wider mobilization for jihad. To explain the mobilization I shall provide the historical context of Islamic movements in Indonesia and describe its transformation as well as the national political setting of the democratic transition. In the next sections I will also introduce the non-local jihad actors who became the main focus of this research as well as some of the main arguments of this research.

So, I begin with the question: how did the conflict, which began as a local brawl, then shift to become an arena of (global) jihad?

I will commence by narrating the story from Poso, "a sleepy seashore town in rural Central Sulawesi province" as Van Klinken (2007: 72) describes it.[1)] It was Christmas Eve, the 24th of December 1998, the day before the Christian holy day of Christmas, when a drunken young man, Roy Runtuh Bisalemba, aged 18, assaulted Ahmad Ridwan Ramboni, aged 23, with a machete resulting in a light injury on his right shoulder and hand.[2)] The detailed narrative of the incident is unclear, but it was a simple youth brawl nothing out of the ordinary for Poso—or any other city in the archipelago. What made it extraordinary was the nexus between the identity of place and actor as the story developed: the incident took place in the area of the Darussalam mosque in the ward of Sayo whilst the assailant was a Christian male from the ward of Lambogia, a Christian area of Poso. Rumors were quickly sparked within the Muslim community that a drunken Christian youth had attacked a young Muslim man inside the mosque! A further false rumor further stirred up emotions

1) This construction of the narratives of the first Poso riot is based on three types of sources: partisan, journalist or academic. These accounts can be found in Kontras (2006), HRW (2000), Ecip and Waru (2001), Lasahido et al (2003), Damanik (2003), Aragon (2002), van Klinken (2007), Karnavian et al (2008), and McRae (2008). Of these, McRae's (2008) dissertation entitled *The escalation and decline of violent conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi, 1998-2007* contains the most complete and detailed narratives, comparing and contrasting the different accounts of the conflict. I refer in some parts of this chapter to McRae's work.

2) A Muslim account of the incidents, rife with rumour and speculations, circulated among Muslims at the time was accessed at http://tragediposo.blogspot.com/2006/06/kronologis.html [3 January 2009]. photographs of the wounded Ridwan and of other following incidents were available at http://www.fica.org/hr/poso/pictures1.html [3 January 2009].

that the *Imam* of the mosque had been attacked and required hospitalization… Community passions were quickly ignited due to the two religious festivals falling in the same period: it was the Muslim fasting month of Ramadhan and the Christian Christmas season. Religious fervors were further boosted for mass mobilization by the political context; it was the initial stages of local and national political election. The national election was scheduled for June 1999 and the contending parties were employing religious sentiments to marshal political support from Muslim and Christian groups (McRae 2008: 36-49). The rapid escalation of community violence can be better understood once we learn that the nexus between religion and politics at the local level dated back to colonial times and was well developed in the New Order era as discussed by van Klinken (2007: Chapter 5).

In the next three days after the Christmas Eve incident the town of Poso was in turbulence. The very timing of the brawl was also really critical for mass mobilization: Christmas Day that year fell on a Friday, the day Muslims collectively perform the noon Friday prayer. Thus there were mass gatherings on both sides: Muslims for Friday prayers, Christians for Christmas Day. Yet the petty incident would never have developed into a mob brawl without favorable conditions: the already spreading collective anxiety, uncertainty, and tension between the two communities, especially linked with communal and political issues. Thus, the incident took place within the context of rising communal tension between the two communities that led to riots. The three-day riot led to seventeen people being heavily injured, 139 lightly wounded (including 15 security personnel), 158 houses set alight and another 100 destroyed, 14 cars and 20 motorbikes were burnt—though nobody was killed (the report of Bupati Poso on 7 August 2001, as cited by Kontras [2006: 3]). The perpetrators of violence were civilians and its militias who made use of only very simple weapons such as rocks (as missiles), machetes, or, at the most sophisticated, a fire arrows launcher (McRae 2008: 49; Kontras 2006: 3).

In the aftermath there was a lull in Poso for about sixteen months—before the second wave of riots took place in April 2000.

The April violence occurred over a short 5-day period (15-20 April) and remained within the town limits. Instead of the religious zest of the first wave of riots, this one had the stronger political flavor of the electoral campaign. In December 1999 the new Major of Poso had been elected, Abdul Muin Pusadan, a local Muslim academic turned politician, despite strong rumors of 'money politics' (Damanik 2003: 12-13; McRae 2008: 53-55). The next step of the political battlefield was: who would be his number two, the executive secretary of the mayor's office. Different political factions played their game and pressured to get the position.[3)] Amidst such political tension and public anxiety the new series of violence unfolded, again incited by a local youth brawl on Saturday night, 15 April 2000. The petty fight quickly escalated to the new course of violence that lasted five days and had more devastating results: 37 people were killed, 34 people were injured, and 267 buildings, houses and churches were damaged and burnt (Karnavian et al 2008: 60). In these two series of violence the casualties and victims were mostly Christians.

In contrast to the short period of riots in the first and the second round of violence, the May-June 2000 violence denoted a shift to protracted violence conflict in the Poso district (McRae 2008: 4). It was also a shift from a more or less spontaneous riot to a more premeditated kind of violence, or a pogrom if we follow Brass (1996) and Sidel (2006a, 2006b). Taking place for two weeks, it brought about an almost total collapse of law and order in the area and resulted in the murder of at least 246 people, mostly Muslims, while ten of thousands of people fled the district by land and sea. The centerpiece of this period was the massacre of hundreds of Muslims in the Sintuwulemba village adjacent to the Walisongo Islamic boarding school,

3) One of the strongest candidates was Damsyik Ladjalani, the District Head of the Development Planning Board (Bappeda), a Muslim from the coastal area of Poso. One of the key political forces behind Damsyik's candidacy was the Islamic party PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party). Chaelani Umar, a PPP member in the provincial parliament, threatened provocatively that if Damsyik were not be elected it could lead to a bigger riot. His statement was published by local newspapers: "I predict there will be another riot in Poso. And it might be bigger than what has gone before." (McRae: 54; Klinken: 82, footnote 9) However, Karnavian et al (2008: 57) describe Ladjalani as a Christian.

located in a Poso suburb, which took place over four days from 28 May onward.[4] On the consequences of this dramatic violent episode McRae (2008: 4) writes:

> The violence created a group of angry young Muslim men who had seen family members killed or their houses destroyed, and who later recalled that their only thought after this period of the conflict was of how they could take revenge. News of the violence, including gruesome photos of the remains of murder victims, also drew in mujahidin from other parts of the country, who trained and fight with local Muslim men.

It was the beginning of the call for jihad to the Poso violence, what McRae (2008: 152-168) calls the fourth (June-July 2000) and the fifth (November-December 2000) period of the conflict that was characterized by the remarkable involvement of non-local Muslim fighters.[5] It was a shift in the pattern of violence from *pogrom* to *jihad* as suggested by Sidel (2006a, 2006b). Yet the call for jihad to the Maluku violence had taken place earlier, in particular following the massacre of hundreds of Muslims in Tobelo, North Maluku, in the last days of 1999.

I will now narrate the story of communal violence in the island of Ambon, the capital of the province of Maluku, also in eastern Indonesia. The incident began on 19 January 1999—during the lull in the Poso violence, less than three weeks after the first outbreak of

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4) There were different acounts of the exact number of Muslims killed in the incidents. The Islamic magazine *Hidayatullah* estimated at least 300 Muslims were murdered (cited by Alkatiri, 2008, published in http://musliminsuffer.wordpress.com/2008/10/20/memperingati-tragedi-bom-bali-pembantaian-muslimin-di-tobelo-galela-dan-pesantren-walisongo/ retrieved on 28 January 2008). Ngabidun Djaelani, the Sintuwulemba village chief, who testified in the murder trial of Tibo, Dominggus and Marinus, estimated 191 residents of his village were killed. MacRae (2008: 103 footnote 108) suggests that 191 casualties as a reasonable upper limit for the death toll.

5) McRae (2008) distinguishes five periods of conflict as follows: the first (December 1998); the second (15-20 April 2000); the third (May-June 2000); the fourth (June-July 2001) and the fifth (November-December 2001). Aragon (2001) distinguishes four phases of the conflict, similar to McRae except for the fourth: beginning in April and continuing to August 2001, the date he ended his observation. Karnavian et al (2008) divides the conflict into only three episodes, with the third one covering the period May 2000 to December 2001. See Karnavian et al (2008) chapter 4.

Poso riots. Interestingly the two conflicts shared a similar pattern of timing and triggering incident: the Ambon riot also began on a religious holy day (it was Idul Fitri, the holiest day of the Islamic calendar, at the end of the Ramadhan fasting period)[6] and was provoked by a petty fight between local youths. The distinction was the speed with which the Ambon conflict grew and spread to many other parts of the island, continuing for several weeks until mid March.

It commenced in the afternoon of 19 January, when most Muslims in Ambon were celebrating Idul Fitri by visiting families, relatives, and friends. As a place that had achieved prominence as the so-called model of harmonious inter-religious relations during the New Order, it was also common for Ambonese Christians to exchange religious greetings with their Muslim fellows on that special holiday. But it was a very different day: a trifling dispute between two youngsters, a Christian Ambonese and a Muslim Buginese, led to a clash at the Batumerah terminal which was, strangely, followed immediately by massive fights in almost all over Ambon city.[7] Initially, the conflict was marked by strong ethnic elements, Christian Ambonese versus Muslim immigrants—often called BBM (Buginese, Butonese and Makasarese)—but it then developed quickly into a religious conflict between Muslims and Protestants, especially after the destruction of places of worship on both sides.

As in Poso, the Ambon conflict took place in several rounds.[8] After a break in the conflict of some months, the next round of con-

6) *Idul Fitri* is the main Muslim festival in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia, but *Idul Adha* is the main festival in most of the rest of the Muslim world.

7) There are contrasting accounts of this incident. It is described in HRW (1999), Kusuma (2000: 120-5), Suaedy et. al (2000: 89-93), Trijono (200a: 37-45). The Christian version argues that Yopie, a Christian Ambonese driver, was the victim of extortion by Salim, a Muslim Bugis *preman*. The Muslim version contends that Salim was the victim of pressure by Yopie, a thug from Aboru, Saparua. The HRW Report presents a chronology of the conflict in quite a detailed and balanced way, referring to both Muslim and Christian sources.

8) There are many ways to describe the different stages of the conflict. Ambonese people, according to Trijono (2001a: 36-37), commonly distinguished four stages: the first, from January to early April 1999; the second, from the end of July to October 1999; the third, November to December 1999; the fourth, April 2000 to April 2001. Trijono (*ibid*.) himself prefers to describe it in three stages: the first, 19 January 1999 to April

flict happened in July. It was set off initially in Saparua Island, when hundreds of Muslims and Christians in the Sirisori village and the surrounding area clashed on 15 July, resulting in dozens of people killed and injured, dozens of buildings burnt and hundreds of people displaced (Kontras & Lerai, 2000: 17). Waves of conflict spread after a huge clash erupted in Poka, a middle-class suburb of Ambon on 24 July. Although in the first round of conflict, Poka had been insulated from the clashes with its population remaining heterogeneous, in the subsequent incident the fighting significantly worsened the prospect of reconciliation among the Ambonese (van Klinken, 2001: 4; Trijono, 2001: 47). In the aftermath of the Poka clash, tensions spread quickly throughout the island of Ambon as the smoke of burnt houses could be easily seen by people at other locations.

The conflict in 1999 reached a climax on 26 December when the Silo church and the *An Nur* mosque, both located on the same road, were burnt following an incident triggered by a traffic accident close to the Trikora monument. In the incident, a Muslim teenager named Fauzan was crushed by a local transport and died, but his body then disappeared. Muslims accused Christians of concealing his body in a cover-up (Trijono 2001: 44-45; Crisis Center Keusukupan Amboina, 2001: 9). This incident then led to major clashes between the two groups resulting in the burning down of the Silo church and the *An Nur* mosque. As noted by Kontras and Lerai (2001: 23), the burning of the Silo church provoked Christians throughout Maluku, including North Maluku that was formally declared a new separate province in October 1999.[9)] Christian anger intensified because of the histori-

1999; the second, 24 July to 26 December 1999; the third, from 26 April 2000 to April 2001. His rationale is that, from July to December 1999 there was ongoing conflict and therefore there was no need to distinguish different phases for this period. Kontras and Lerai (2000: 1) present three phases: the first, from 19 January to March 1999; the second, from June 1999 to mid-December 1999; the third, from 16 December to January 2000. Van Klinken (2001: 3-5) describes four stages: the first, starting19 January; the second, from 24 July; the third, commencing 26 December; and the fourth, from June 2000 to May 2001.

9) The interesting political process in which North Maluku formally became a new separate province only few days before President Habibie lost his presidency through the Law 46/1999 is discussed in van Klinken (2007: 111-113).

cal significance and strategic location of the old Silo church. It was perceived to be a significant symbol of the presence of the Protestant religion in Maluku. Also Christian anger grew as a result of the overt involvement of particular groups in the military supporting Muslim militias in the attack (*Crisis Center Keusukupan Amboina*, 2001: 9).

Therefore, in the aftermath of this clash, other conflicts soon broke out after, both in Ambon as well as in surrounding islands. The most ruthless results, however, were felt in the Tobelo sub-district, North Maluku, in the days that followed. The massacre of hundreds Muslims,[10] including significant numbers of people hiding inside the Al Ikhlas mosque in Togaliwa village, occurred in Tobelo on 28-29 December 1999—again during the fasting month of Ramadhan. Wilson (2008: 114) describes an episode of the violence as follows:

> The *Pasukan Merah* [Christian militia] advanced through Gorua destroying houses and several mosques and attacked Popilo. This village was also quickly overrun, and many Muslim men escaped into the forest. Some joined the large number of women and children hiding inside the village mosque. The Christian militia attacked the building, several men claiming they were forced into this action because the Muslims continued to fire arrows from inside. The attack against the mosque continued throughout the night until resistance from inside had been quelled. Upon entering the mosque, which was now strewn with bodies, the Christians discovered a pit underneath the pulpit where a large group of Muslims were hiding. A militia member dropped a bomb into the recess. Approximately 160 people were killed in Popilo, bringing the deaths in the two villages to around 250. It took several days for those Muslims who had managed to flee from Gorua and Popilo to travel through the mountainous forested area between Tobelo and Galela to reach Soasio. Christian militia also searched the forest to undertake (in the words of one militia member) a 'cleansing operation' of Muslims.

10) The real number of the casualties was disputed. Some Muslim sources estimated the number at between over one thousand—up to 2,800, as appears at http://musliminsuffer.wordpress.com (accessed on 28 January 2008). The North Maluku district government estimated the death toll in northern Halmahera between 26 December to 22 January 2000 at 880 (as cited by van Klinken 2007: 120, footnote 21). ICG (2000: 8) estimates at least 500 Muslims were killed and more than 10,000 survivors expelled.

The news of the massacre quickly spread throughout the country via newspapers and magazines that soon provoked Muslims outside Maluku to be involved directly in the conflict. A video recorded by a medical emergency team of Mer-C who went to the area to take care of the casualties had further enflamed the emotions of Muslims living outside the area. As suggested by Spyer (2002: 33) in her analysis on such VCDs of the conflict, "these VCDs provide little perspective on events and often make no pretension to having a narrative, besides, that is, the insistent, repetitive narrative of victimization resurrected on and out of body parts." The violent incident was then followed by a period of mobilization of thousands non-local Muslim fighters to the conflict area from various networks of Islamist movements. A big mass gathering was held on 7 January 2000 at the *Lapangan Merdeka* (Freedom Square), Jakarta, attended by prominent Muslim leaders.[11)]

The deployment of thousands of non-local Muslim fighters to Ambon, however, only began to happen later in April-May 2000, especially those who joined the Laskar Jihad. Besides Laskar Jihad, who sent the largest number of several thousands of non-local mujahidin to the areas, other Islamist networks (commonly called "Laskar Mujahidin") had also sent Islamist militias to the same locations, but in much fewer numbers (approximately few hundreds in separate groups at different periods) and with less publicity. I will discuss the different networks of non-local mujahidin in the next sections. The massive mobilization of non-local Muslim fighters to Ambon and Poso shifted the conflict into a prolonged stage and marked it as exceptional because such a colossal mobilization of non-local fighters was without precedent in Indonesia's modern history. This exceptional phenomenon of the involvement of non-local fighters in the conflict led me to choose it as my research focus as I will elaborate later.

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11) Among the national leaders who attended the gathering were Amien Rais, the then Chairman of the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly) and the leader of the National Mandate Party (PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional), and Hamzah Haz, the leader of the United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) who would later become Vice President under the government of Megawati Soekarnoputri. For further information on the event and the mobilization processes see Fealy (2001), ICG (2002), Hasan (2002, 2006), Noorhaidi (2005), Shoelhi (2002).

Returning to the question raised in the early passage: how did the conflict that began as a local brawl shift to become an arena of (global) jihad? I argue that the massive mobilization became possible because of the contextual setting of Indonesia's democratic transition since 1998. It would have been unimaginable to carry out such mobilization in the context of authoritarian rule of the Soeharto New Order regime. Yet the transitional context was only a necessary condition for mobilization, not in itself a sufficient condition. Here I argue that Islamist movements developed considerably in the New Order era, particularly in the 1980s. Their historical roots can be traced back to the early period of Indonesia's independence. The critical turn taken by Soeharto in his late period to approach Islamic groups led them to move further to the center of the stage. Therefore, when the New Order's authoritarian regime collapsed in 1998, many Islamist movements were already 'ready to act' should the situation require it. Yet the puzzle remains: how could such a massive mobilization occur? I argue that such colossal mobilization became possible not merely due to the capacity of Islamist movements but also due to the support provided by elites, parts of the fragmented state, during the early period of democratic transition.

I will present my arguments in the next three sections: first, on the genealogy and transformation of Islamist movements; second, on the democratic transition and the mobilization processes; and third, on variants of Islamic activism that mobilized non-local Muslim fighters to the conflict areas. I will continue by explaining the research focus and main arguments, a caveat on the use of term *jihad* and names in this dissertation, and finally a brief overview of the dissertation.

Radical Islamic movements in Indonesia: genealogies and transformations

I argue that the massive mobilization of thousands non-local Muslim fighters to join the jihad movement in Ambon and Poso during Indonesia's democratic transition can be understood by tracing

back its genealogy in the wake of Indonesia's independence and its transformation during the Soeharto New Order era. I share Van Bruinessen's (2002) contention that the historical root of the contemporary radical Islamic movement can be traced back to two main 'indigenous' Islamist movements, namely the Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) party and the Darul Islam (DI, the Abode of Islam) movement. Although the two were separate political entities they were nevertheless linked in certain ways.

Masyumi was the umbrella of all Muslim organizations created by the Japanese colonial forces that later transformed into the only Islamic political party in the early days of Indonesian Independence in 1945. Furthermore, as argued by Lucius (2003: 3), in the early 1950s Masyumi was not only the most important Islamic political party but also the most important political party of all the parties. In 1952, following an internal dispute regarding the distribution of government positions, the traditionalist Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) left Masyumi and established an independent political party (*ibid*, p.120). This weakened Masyumi's superior position as reflected in the 1955 election result where Masyumi was ranked second largest party (with 21.0% of the votes) and NU as third (18.05%) while the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) gained the largest portion of 22.5% of the votes and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) came fourth one with 16.5%. Of the four parties, however, Masyumi was the only one who had a stronghold in the outer Islands (Feith 1971; Ufen 2006). This is why Ward (1970: 13) suggests that Masyumi was perhaps the only truly national party during the period as indicated by its vast support from both Java and the outer islands.

The DI movement, on the other hand, erupted in March 1948 following the unpopular Renville agreement (January 1948) between the national government and the Dutch which ordered the withdrawal of the national armed forces, including the guerilla groups, from West Java to Central Java.[12)] The DI was led by a local charismatic

12) Many scholars have written on the DI movements including Boland (1970), Hor-

political leader, Sekarmadji Maridjan (S.M.) Kartosuwirjo, a former Masyumi activist and leader of the Brigade Hizbullah in West Java (Horikoshi 1975: 66). On 7 August 1949 the movement declared the Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia*, NII) a step which was later followed by its affiliates in South Kalimantan (1950), South Sulawesi (1952) under Kahar Muzakkar and Aceh (1953) under Daud Beureueh. By 1953, there was an agreement to establish a united front of the NII which elected Kartosuwirjo as its first leader. The DI movement declined significantly following the capture and execution of its *imam*, Kartosuwirjo, in August 1962 (ICG 2002a: 4, 2005a: 2). Thus besides some of their leaders and activists sharing a similar background, Masyumi and DI also shared the political objective to establish an Islamic state and geographic basis of their supporters, namely Java and the outer Islands. But the two took different pathways for their struggle: Masyumi chose to fight through the parliamentary democratic process while the DI decided to launch violent rebellion in the villages and jungle.

Yet later, after continuous conflict with President Soekarno, some Masyumi leaders changed direction and followed their DI fellows by taking part in the PRRI/Permesta regional rebellion which was, ironically, supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Kahin and Kahin 1995). It led to the disbandment of Masyumi by Soekarno in 1960 and the imprisonment of its leaders in 1962. Soeharto was given political endorsement as the new President in 1966, yet the New Order regime continued to reject the rehabilitation of Masyumi, choosing instead to endorse the establishment of the new party Parmusi (Partai Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Party) designated to cater for Masyumi's constituents (Ward 1970). However, many Masyumi leaders, including its charismatic figure Mohammad Natsir refused to support Parmusi, instead turning their energy to conduct *da'wa* through establishing the Dewan

ikoshi (1975), van Dijk (1981). For an interesting historiographical literature review on DI and Kartosoewirjo using three sources: New Order publications, Western scholars' works, and Indonesia Islamists' publications of the post-Soeharto era; see Chiara (no date) *Kartosuwiryo's Darul Islam (1948-1962, West Java): An Historiographical Review.*

Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation) in 1967.[13)]

The former Masyumi activists who founded the DDII,[14)] as Van Bruinessen (2002: 123) suggests, shared the common beliefs characteristic of a group: "a belief in the superiority of Western-style democracy over the neo-patrimonial forms of rule adopted by both Soekarno and Soeharto, an almost paranoid obsession with Christian missionary efforts as a threat to Islam, and an increasingly strong orientation towards the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia." Through Natsir, the DDII established close relations with the Islamic World League (*Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami*), of which Natsir became one of its leaders. When the Saudis commenced deploying their wealth to finance the expansion of the Salafi-Wahabism movements following the oil boom in 1980s, the DDII had the privilege to become one of its main channels. With its privileged access to resources, Noorhaidi (2005: 35) contends that the DDII began to occupy a vital position on the map of Islamic organizations in Indonesia by serving as a bridge between Saudi Arabia and Muslim organizations, especially those from such modernist wings, as Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad and Persis.

Discussing the transmission process of Islamic revivalism from the Middle East to Indonesia, especially through the activists of Tarbiyah, Salafis and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Imdadun Rahmat (2005: 79) argues that the DDII and Natsir played a crucial role. Furthermore Rahmat (2008: 90; 2005: 161) contends that the DDII has been the 'nursing mother' (*ibu susuan, umm ar-radha'ah)* of the activists of Tarbiyah, HTI and Salafis, although each have different ideological lineages and thought genealogies. Rahmat (2005: 80-81) presents four proofs to support his argument as follows. First, the DDII was the first Islamic group to seriously and intensively

13) Explaining the decision to establish the DDII, Natsir (as quoted by Noorhaidi 2005: 32) said, "Previously we carried out *da'wa* through politics but now we run politics through *da'wa*".

14) For a further discussion on the DDII, see Asna Husin (1988), *Philosophical and Sociological Aspects of Da'wah: A Study of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, PhD Dissertation, Columbia: Columbia University.

carry out a program to send students to the Middle East with support from *Rabitah Alam 'Al-Islami* and the Saudi government. The program was later taken over by the Department of Religious Affairs. The DDII even opened a representative office in Riyadh to handle this program in 1970s. The DDII has sent about 500 students to the Middle East and Pakistan up to 2004. These alumni of the Middle Eastern universities became the main actors of the spread of Islamic revivalism to Indonesia, especially those of the Tarbiyah and the Salafi movements. Second, the DDII and Natsir became the initiator and the mediator of the establishment of *Lembaga Ilmu Islam dan Arab* (LIPIA, Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies, formerly LPBA) which was a branch of the Islamic University of Muhammad Ibn Saud in Riyadh. LIPIA has graduated thousands of alumni who became important actors and agents of the Tarbiyah and the Salafi movements. Third, the DDII initiated the foundation of the campus *da'wa* movement through the network of *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* via the program Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (LMD, Training of *Da'wa* Fighter) in the ITB Salman mosque of Bandung. This movement, he suggests, was the embryonic stage of the establishment of the Tarbiyah and Hizbut Tahrir and also facilitated the development of the Salafi movement. Finally, the DDII played an indirect role in encouraging the translation of works by major Islamic revivalist thinkers from the Middle East, such as Hasan Al-Banna, Yusuf Al-Qardawi, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu A'la Al-Maududi.

One of the main targets of the DDII *da'wa* activities was the university campuses. Through a program named 'Bina Masjid Campus' (University Mosque Development), the DDII sponsored projects for building mosques and Islamic centers in locations around twelve universities throughout Indonesia, some of them in Java.[15)] It took place in the setting of the New Order's policy of de-politicization of university campuses through *Normalisasi Kehidupan Kam-*

15) The list includes the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, the Gadjahmada University in Yogyakarta, the Diponegoro University in Semarang, and the Andalas University in Padang. A complete list is available in Hakiem and Linrung (1997, as quoted by Noorhaidi 2005: 36) *Menunaikan Panggilan Risalah: Dokumentasi Perjalanan 30 Tahun Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia.* Jakarta: DDII.

pus-Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaaan (Normalization of Campus Policy-Campus Coordination Board, NKK-BKK). The strict restriction of student activism stimulated, as observed by Noorhaidi (2005: 37), many students to turn toward Islamic activism. This trend increased dramatically in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution which erupted in 1979 and the subsequent Saudi policy response. According to Noorhaidi (2005: 31), the intensification of the Wahhabi movements throughout the globe can be seen as a response to the Iranian Revolution. The success story of Iranian Revolution, which brought Ayatullah Khomeini to power, has become a model for the successful creation of an Islamic state for Islamist activists across the world. The anxiety that such a revolution might possibly take place in Saudi Arabia haunted their monarchy. Their response was to intensify the campaign to spread Wahhabism throughout the globe which thus meant the expansion of non-revolutionary Islamic activism to tame the influence of the Iranian Revolution. Anti-Shi'a sentiments, as contended by Schwartz (2002: 148-9), were the important ideological elements of Wahhabism in its global expansion.

While the emergence of radical Islamist movements began to occur in early 1980s,[16] it experienced a major boost in the late 1980s with a shift in the elite political game, especially following tension between President Soeharto and segments of the military camp.[17] In order to gain political support from Islamic groups, Soeharto made the significant change of embracing Muslim groups through some symbolic and political gestures including introducing some Muslim-friendly policies and, most strikingly, endorsing the establishment of the *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se Indonesia* (ICMI, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) led by Bachruddin Jusuf (B.J.)

16) For a further discussion on the emergence of radical Islamist movements in 1980s, especially in the university campuses, see Van Bruinessen (2002: 131-4), Noorhaidi (2005: 36-40, also Hasan 2006).

17) The critical episode of this political tension happened when President Soeharto nominated Soedharmono, a titular army general and State Secretary, as Vice President during the General Session of the MPR in 1988. The military camp, led by the former czar of the intelligence service, General Benny Moerdani, proposed to nominate General Try Sutrisno, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, to be the Vice President candidate. See the Editors of *Indonesia* (1992: 93).

Habibie, the then Minister of Research and Technology (Hefner 1993, 2000; Liddle 1996; van Bruinessen 2002). It is an over-simplification, however, to view the phenomena merely from political elite perspectives. As demonstrated eloquently by Hefner (1993), the foundation of ICMI also reflected the significant change and development of urban middle-class Muslims in Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s.

The next critical stage in Islamist fundamentalism was the flourishing of a form of Muslim street politics that gradually became more prominent over the course of the 1990s. Such phenomena were, as suggested by van Bruinessen (2002), unlikely without the endorsement and protection of certain faction within the regime. One of the leading actors on the street was KISDI (*Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas terhadap Dunia Islam)*, the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the World of Islam, led by Ahmad Sumargono, a leading DDII activist.[18)] Though KISDI claimed 1987 as its founding date, its prominence was achieved in 1990, in the caravan revival of Islamist groups—in the same period when ICMI was established. The increasing tension in the final months of Soeharto's rule and the dynamics of the transition period inflicted a major shift on political Islam. Some groups of Muslim politicians stayed loyal to Soeharto until his last days, including some DDII leaders—those who Hefner (2000: 151) calls "regimist Islam".[19)] These groups, as Van Bruinessen argues (2002: 139), feared that *reformasi* might result in a loss of access to the power they had gained just very recently.

The worsening economic crisis mixed with massive popular and student movements demanding Soeharto's resignation eventually led to Soeharto standing down on 21 May 1998. Habibie,

18) Ahmad Sumargono was one of the vice-chairmen of Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), the new version of the Masyumi which was founded on 17 July 1998 and led by Yusril Ihza Mehendra. Sumargono published a book entitled *Saya Seorang Fundamentalis, Renungan Ideologis* (I am a Fundamentalist: Ideological Reflection) in 1999, by Global Cita Press, Cimanggis Bogor.

19) Dr. Anwar Harjono, a senior Masyumi figure andlater DDII Chairman, identified seven Soeharto directed policies indicating this more 'Islamic' shift, including new laws on the Religious Court, National Education, National Banking, the disbandment of the SDSB (Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah)-lotto, permission for female students to wear *jilbab*, and the establishment of ICMI. See Mubarak (2008: 100-2).

Chairman of ICMI, and Indonesian Vice President replaced him as President. The pro-*reformasi* movement camp that were previously united in opposition to Soeharto eventually fragmented; the major secular wing perceived Habibie as an extension of Soeharto's New Order and thus to be rejected. Concerned that Habibie's presidency would further empower radical Muslims, a broad spectrum of secular and pro-*reformasi* Muslim groups created a new front to oppose him. In November 1998 the MPR convened an extraordinary session in response to a massive popular movement asking for 'total reform,' including the replacement of Habibie's government with an ad hoc presidium consisting of *reformasi* leaders. During this critical period, the national military commander recruited about several thousand civilians, many of them affiliated with radical Muslim groups, as auxiliary security guards or the *Pam Swakarsa* (O'Rourke 2002, van Dijk 2001). It was during this tense situation that several Islamist paramilitary groups were established including the notorious Front Pembela Islam (FPI) led by Habib Rizieq which was founded on 17 August 1998 (Jahroni 2008: 18; Rosadi 2008: 25).

The fall of the New Order regime opened up a new realm which had previously been controlled and dominated by the state: that of the political party. On the eve of the *reformasi* era about 200 new political parties emerged, though eventually only 48 were allowed to participate in the 1999 general election, some of whom were Islamic political parties (Ufen 2006). Of the 48 parties, at least four claimed to be the successor of Masyumi, namely, Partai Umat Islam, Partai Masyumi Baru, Partai Politik Islam Masyumi and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB). Of these four only PBB successfully gained sufficient votes above the electoral threshold of two percent, to be entitled to participate in the 2004 election.[20)] Gaining 2,049,708 votes (1.95%) for 13 parliamentary seats in the 1999 election, PBB increased its votes to 2.7 million (2.62%) in the 2004 election but failed to pass

20) PBB was fully endorsed by former Masyurmi and DDII senior leaders, including Dr. Anwar Harjono, KH. Rusyad Nurdin, and Mohammad Soleiman. Among its leaders were Yusril IhzaMahendra, Hartono Mardjono, Cholil Ridwan, Abdul Qadir Djaelani and Ahmad Sumargono. The complete list of the first PBB functionaries is available in Tumpal (2005: 62-64).

the increased threshold of 3%.[21] Its votes declined to 1,864,752 (1.79%) in the 2009 election. On the other hand, Partai Keadilan (PK, later changed to PKS), which based on the Tarbiyah movement of Ikhwanul Muslimin and classified by Rahmat (2008: 4) as "the continuation of the ideological mission of Masyumi", has become the 'miracle' of Indonesian politics. Founded in August 1998, it trawled only 1,436,565 votes (1.36%) for seven seats in the 1999 election but jumped dramatically to 8,325,020 votes (7.34%) for 45 seats in the 2004 election (Rahmat 2008: 1).[22] In the 2009 election it kept its votes at the same level of 8,206,955 (7.88%).

While the successors of Masyumi only gained a small portion of votes during the election, where did the majority of ex-Masyumi supporters most likely go? One likely explanation is that ex-Masyumi supporters and young Islamic activists associated with Masyumi joined Golkar since 1970s as argued by Van Bruinessen (2002: 123). Their engagement with Golkar, and especially the involvement of many young Islamic activists of the Muslim Student Association, HMI, seemed likely to have contributed to the increasing role of Islamic factions within Golkar in the 1990s.

This was the narrative of transformation of Masyumi up to the post-Soeharto era. What about the DI? Some scholars have written excellent accounts of its transformation, such as Al-Chaidar (1999, 2000), Wasis (2001), Abduh (2001), Van Bruinessen (2002), Barton (2004), Ridwan (2008) and especially ICG reports (2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2006,

21) In the 1999 election PBB was saved by its seat numbers which were above 10, even though its vote percentage was slightly less than the electoral threshold of 2% (Tumpal 2005: 87).

22) In certain ways, to a certain extent, PKS had a link with DI as indicated by the key role played by KH. Hilmi Aminuddin, a son of Danu Muhamammad Hasan, a former leader of DI, as the chairman of Majelis Syura PKS (2005-2010). Danu was allegedly recruited by Ali Murtopo to be an agent of BAKIN in 1966-67. Another version revealed that Hilmi was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of DI when he was arrested by Kopkamtib in 1980 and imprisoned without charge until 1983-4. After his release Hilmi, under the supervision of Soeripto, a senior leader of BAKIN, was sent to the Middle East to study Ikhwanul Muslimin. This issue was discussed by Ridwan (2008: 143-6).

2007a, 2007b).[23] I will highlight some critical issues of DI transformation that have contributed to the recent development of radical Islamic movements in the post-Soeharto era.

Soon after the arrest and the execution of Kartosuwirjo in 1962, DI had an acute crisis of leadership particularly following the signed loyalty oath by several DI leaders to the Republic of Indonesia.[24] With many of them receiving financial support and behaving cooperatively with the military, ICG suggest that the "DI became leaderless for a decade" (2005c: 2). During the period, some groups of DI activists worked closely with the military especially in helping fight against the communist party (PKI) in 1965-66 (*ibid*, 3; van Bruinessen 2002: 128). It is important to notice that since this period some DI leaders developed a close relation with an intelligence officer named Ali Moertopo, a former activist of Hizbullah during the Japanese occupation, who later became the czar of the intelligence agency in the New Order era.[25]

The DI returned to the political stage later in 1970s with the rise of a radical Islamic movement named *Komando Jihad* (Komji). The group launched several terror actions such as the arson and bombing of churches, night clubs and cinemas in the period prior to the 1977 election. The facts that some of the DI leaders were closely associated to Ali Moertopo led to an interpretation that the actions were orchestrated to discourage Muslims from voting PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, United Development Party), the

23) The person behind these excellent reports is Sidney Jones, the Director of the South East Asia Poject of the ICG from 2002 to 2006, who later became a senior advisor. Her expertise on radical Islamic movements in Indonesia began in 1984 when she worked for Amnesty International defending cases involving some DI activists, including Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. She later became the Director of Asia for Human Right Watch (HRW) from 1989-2002. See her profile in http://spinprofiles.org/index.php?title=Sidney_Jones [13 May 2010] and elaborated further in Ridwan (2008).

24) Included among them were Adah Djaelani Tirtapraja, Ateng Djaelani, Ules Sudjai, Djaja Sujadi Wijaya, Danu Muhamad Hassan, Zaenal Abidin, Toha Mahfud and Dodo Mohamad Darda.

25) Some DI activists, including Danu Muhammad Hasan, even believed that Murtopo has saved the DI leadership from the eradication in 1966 when Soeharto considered using the moment for the annihilation of some political enemies, including DI. See ICG (2005: 3).

only remaining Muslim party (van Bruinessen 2002: 128). By mid-1977, the government had arrested 185 people associated with DI and allegedly involved with *Komando Jihad*. Yet the perception of *Komando Jihad* as merely "the creation of Ali Murtopo" as argued by previous ICG report (2002c: 5), was later revised by suggesting that some DI members were actively involved in the creation of *Komando Jihad*, perceiving it as "the first real opportunity since the defeat of the 1960s to mount a guerrilla war against the Indonesian government" (ICG 2005a: 6).

Although some important figures from the DI underground movement were allegedly closely linked with the intelligence officers, there were some newcomers who remained committed and militant to the struggle. Among them were Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, both of Yemeni descent, who co-founded the later notorious Islamic boarding school in Ngruki, Solo, in 1973 (see ICG 2002c on the "Ngruki Network). Sungkar and Ba'asyir were former activists of the GPII (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia), the Masyumi affiliated youth movement, and Sungkar in particular was closely linked with the DDII (van Bruinessen 2002: 129; 2002a: 3; ICG 2002c: 6). In the 1980s they engaged with the increasingly active Islamic student movements, including those engaged in organizing Islamic activities in the Sudirman mosque within the Colombo complex, Yogyakarta. Three of them, Irfan Awwas, Fihiruddin alias Abu Jibril, and Muchliansyah, later became prominent as leading figures of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), founded in 2000. Sungkar and Ba'asyir engaged with this group in activating *usroh*[26)] as the method of recruitment for rejuvenating the DI movement. The method combined with *pesantren kilat,* an intensive short-term Islamic study course, which was later institutionalized by establishing the Lembaga Pendidikan Pengembangan Pesantren Kilat (LP3K, the Institute of Education and Development of *Pesantren Kilat*) in

26) *Usroh* is a Javanese word originating from the Arabic word *usra* meaning nuclear family. It was a method of *da'wa* pionered by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt, to build a small group of dedicated members as a building block for eventually establishing Islamic state.

1982 (ICG 2005a: 12-14). Yet by the end of 1983 the government-launched operation to crack down on the retransformed DI network, which included the banning of the newsletter *Ar-Risalah*, a publication run by a group of radical Islamic students in Yogyakarta and the jailing of its editor-in-chief, Irfan Suryahardi (ICG 2002c: 9).

In early 1985, due to the possibility of being arrested by the security apparatus, Sungkar and Ba'asyir and some other followers decided to leave for Malaysia, in a religiously-inspired emigration or *hijrah* (ICG 2002c: 11-13). During their term in exile in Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba'asyir remained actively engaged with DI through also participating in arranging the deployment of many activists to join the military academy of Afghanistan Mujahidin in the borderline with Pakistan. Later in 1992 they opened an Islamic boarding school named Lukmanul Hakim in Johor with Mukhlas as its first director. It adopted the system and the curriculum applied in the Pondok Ngruki Solo, founded twenty years earlier. Many of its teachers were alumni of Ngruki, including Mukhlas. In early 1993, following internal dispute regarding DI leadership with Ajengan Masduki, Sungkar founded Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI) and transformed the school to become the nerve center of Mantiqi I. All the most prominent figures of JI—Hambali, Amrozi, Ali Imron, Zulkarnaen, Dulmatin, Imam Samudra, Azhari and Noordin M. Top–spent time there either teaching, lecturing or studying (ICG 2006: 2).

After the fall of Soeharto, Sungkar, Ba'asyir and other JI activists returned to Indonesia. Sungkar died one month after his return in November 1999 while Ba'asyir went back to Pondok Ngruki, Solo. Following the death of Sungkar, Ba'asyir was named as his successor as the leader of JI. Yet some younger and more militant cadres of JI—including Hambali, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas—were very reluctant to accept the leadership transfer considering Ba'asyir to be "too weak, too accommodating, and too easily influenced by others" (ICG 2002a: 3). The fragmentation deteriorated following the establishment of MMI in August 2000 in which Ba'asyir was elected as the 'commander' or *Amir ul-Mujahidin* of the governing council,

Ahlul Halli wal 'Aqdi.[27] The radicals criticized the concept of MMI as a deviation from Sungkar's aims. According to them, it betrayed Sungkar's *ijtihad politik* that JI should remain covert until the time was ripe to launch overt actions toward an Islamic state. Ba'asyir, on the other hand, argued that the collapse of Soeharto had offered opportunities to advance, thus not taking advantage of the opportunities was not just wrong but also sinful. It was in the context of this internal JI leadership crisis that some radical groups launched a series of terrorist actions, including the Christmas Eve bombing in 2000 and the first Bali Bombing in 2002.[28]

Democratic transition and jihad mobilization

As explained above, the radical Islamist movements, which dated back to the early post-colonial period, have survived and transformed themselves into the post-Soeharto era. Thus, I argue that they were quite ready to mobilize for collective action when the religious conflict erupted in Ambon and Poso. However, I suggest that their capacity and capability for mobilization only become viable in the aftermath of the collapse of the authoritarian regime which opened up new political space and opportunity structure. In this section I will briefly show how radical Islamist movements have successfully utilized the new political space and opportunity structure offered by the transitional period to mobilize thousands non-local mujahidin to the conflict areas. To discuss the mobilization process, I chose Laskar Jihad as a case study because of its great success in con-

27) Irfan Suryahardy Awwas was appointed as the chairman of the executive committee while his elder brother Fikhiruddin alias Abu Jibril was appointed to the department in charge of strengthening mujahidin resources (*Departemen Peningkatan Sumber Daya Mujahid*).

28) The two operations were associated with Hambali, a leading figure of the radical wing of JI who allegedly played the role as the hub with Al Qaeda. The first action utilized more than 30 bombs delivered to churches or priests in eleven Indonesian cities across six provinces. The latter, far better planned and more dramatic in its effect, occured on 22 October 2002 in Bali. It resulted in the death of about two hundred people, mostly Westerners, and several hundreds more severely injured. (ICG 2002b, Imron 2007).

ducting massive mobilization in this period recruiting an estimated approximately 7,000 mujahidin (Noorhaidi 2005: 197). It was also a striking case since Laskar Jihad was originally part of the Salafi/ Wahhabi movement which is usually characterized by quietism and apolitical stance. I will begin by giving a short introduction on how democratic transition opened new political space and opportunity structures for collective action and will then describe how Laskar Jihad carried out its mobilization process from the perspective of social movement theory.

Let me start briefly with a conceptual framework of democratic transition. "Democratic transition is an interval between an authoritarian and a democratic regime," as Ethier (1990: 4) argues. Each transition period, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, IV: 6) suggest, based on their extensive comparative study on transition in various countries, is characterized by uncertainty: They write: "Transitions are delimited, on the one hand, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other hand, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative." Such a transition period is commonly characterized by the drastic decline of government ability to deal with the many problems that arise in the context of a sort of vacuum of authority. The risk of an outbreak of communal conflict, as suggested by Snyder (2000: 310), increases in the early phases of democratization. Based on his comparative work on the rise of ethnic conflict during transition period in many places, Snyder contends, "Nationalist and ethnic conflicts are more likely during the initial stages of democratizations than in transition to full consolidations of democracy."

After making a comprehensive study of the nationalist conflict during Indonesia's transition period, Jacques Bertrand (2004: 216) presents an argument that sounds parallel to Snyder's conclusion: "Ethnic violence is more likely to rise when insecurities are high, and groups fear exclusion or unfavorable terms of inclusion." In his analysis, Bertrand (2004: 20) proposes the key concept "critical juncture" which refers to a historical moment when the griev-

ances of ethnic groups tend to surface, a political system comes under tensions and, therefore, political institution and the principles of national models are renegotiated. He suggests that ethnic violence erupted in Indonesia at such a critical juncture in the 1990s. "When the regime fell suddenly in May 1998, these fears and insecurities reached high levels, as the basic institutions of the state and fundamental principles of the national model were open for renegotiation," Bertrand argues (216).

This portrait of the growing communal violence during the early stages of transition was demonstrated nicely in two reports by the UNSFIR written by Tadjoeddin (2002) and by Varshney, Panggabean & Tadjoeddin (2004). They confirm Synder's hypothesis on the likelihood of eruption of ethnic and communal violence during the initial stages of democratization (see Figure 1.1 below). The burgeoning of communal violence was not typical of a multi-ethnic and multicultural country such as Indonesia. Such phenomena were part of another global trend Mary Kaldor names as "New Wars" (1999).



	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Deaths	10	25	7	25	14	23	51	1,059	1,442	3,546	2,585	1,615	245	111
Incidents	30	46	62	60	63	79	123	244	432	523	722	523	406	295

Figure 1.1. Death and incidents of non-secessionist collective violence in Indonesia 1990-2003 (Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeddin 2004: 23)

This 'critical juncture' of Indonesia's modern history, when "the basic institutions of the state and fundamental principles of the national model were open for renegotiation", as suggested by Ber-

trand certainly implicated what Sidney Tarrow (1998: 19-20) calls 'political opportunity structure' in explaining the emergence of social movements. According to him, the rise of social movements is frequently prompted by critical changes occurring in a political structure. For Tarrow, this sort of change can provide opportunities that become incentives for social actors to start new stages of what he calls 'contentious politics' and promote people to involve in it. Here we come to the issue of mobilization in the social movement theory. Following the suggestion made by McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), the discussion will attempt to combine three key variables in the study of social movements namely, political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. In discussing the case of Laskar Jihad I will refer mainly to an excellent work of Noorhaidi (2005) (see also Noorhaidi Hasan [2006]) entitled *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in the Pos-New Order Indonesia.*)[29)]

Noorhaidi (2005: 97) argues that the Salafis began their engagement with the political discourse of the state in the late Soeharto period by organizing a *tabligh akbar* (mass preaching session) in Solo, Central Java, in February 1998 and establishing the *Ikatan Taklim Salafi* (Salafi Religious Teaching Association) in its aftermath. The opportunity to play an active role in the political arena came later following Habibie's arrival to power in the aftermath of the resign of Soeharto in May 1998. Facing strong pressure from the opposition camps, Habibie tried to mobilize political support from the hard-line Muslim organizations including the Salafis. The Salafi engagement with the political game was enhanced further by the rise of Megawati Soekarnoputri, the leader of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, PDI-P), known for the political icon of secular-nationalist and non-Muslim groups, to challenge Habibie in the next general election in June 1999. For Habibie's supporters, their struggle to endorse their candidate was essentially meant to "defend Islam and guarantee a course in the direction of the Islamization of the state" (2005: 100). The Salafis' mobilization

29) Noorhaidi (2005: 90-129) discusses the mobilization process of Laskar Jihad at depth in Chapter IV 'Toward Political Activism and Mobilization'.

towards political activism and militancy intensified with the eruption of religious communal conflict in Ambon since January 1999. The prolonged nature of the conflict and the large number of Muslim casualties in such incidents as the so-called Tobelo massacre in late December 1999 forced the Salafis to move further.

What the interesting was how the series of violent incidents were framed by the Salafis. From the point of view of social movement theory, framing is a critical condition for the success of mobilization efforts (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 74). It relates to the process of production, arrangement and dissemination of discourse that may reverberate among those being targeted for mobilization. According to Tarrow (1998: 110), it can be carried out "through accentuating devices that either underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral state affairs." Snow and Benford (1992: 138), suggest the crucial role of a master frame in the construction of social protest which they compare to the function of linguistic codes in that "they provide a grammar that punctuates, and syntactically connects patterns or happenings in the world." In the context of collective action, framing plays a crucial role in the making of collective identity among social movement actors. As suggested by Alberto Melucci (1996: 70-4), the successful realization of collective action is greatly influenced by a strong sense of collective action.

In order to mobilize people to join jihad, the Salafis published the *Seruan Jihad ke Maluku* (Call for Jihad to Maluku) which formulated their conflict-driven grievances such as the killing of thousands of Muslims and displacement of hundreds of thousands more from the area (FKAWJ 2000, as quoted by Noorhaidi 2005: 108). They blamed the government for inaction and indifference to the fate of Muslims in Maluku who, from their point of view, were facing genocidal attacks from the enemies of Islam. They argued that the roots of injustice were located in the government's policy of siding with Christians and overlooking the intervention of the Zionist-Christian international powers through the RMS (*Republik Maluku Selatan,* Republic of the South Mollucas).

In order to attain 'frame hegemony', Noorhaidi (2005: 108-111) argues that the Salafis craftily exploited and captured the discourse existing in the Islamist media articulated by radical Muslim leaders and politicians. He identifies three main frames that were utilized by the Salafis to marshal public support for their call to jihad as follows. The first frame was a discourse of separatism condemning the RMS, a mutinous movement that had unfolded in Ambon in 25 April 1950, as the mastermind behind the conflict. The second frame was a discourse on Muslim genocide, depicting the Maluku Christians as launching deliberate operations to expel Muslims from the islands. The third frame was the accusation that Zionist forces were behind the Maluku Christians in an attempt to disrupt Indonesia, the biggest Muslim country in the world. These frames received wider currency following the Tobelo massacre of hundreds of Muslims in late December 1999. It was followed by the mass gathering called *Tabligh Akbar Sejuta Umat* (literally religious gathering of a million Muslims) held in Jakarta in early 2000 in which a number of leading Muslim leaders and politicians participated.

The Salafis also moved fast by issuing a jihad resolution and declaring the establishment of FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah) in the *tabligh akbar* held in Yogyakarta only one week after the Jakarta gathering. Soon after the Salafis, through FKAWJ, began to launch a massive mobilization to attract support, recruit masses, persuade potential *mujahids*, and collect money from donors. As described nicely by Noorhaidi (2005: 112), at the grass-root level they opened tents to register the would-be *mujahids* at public venues, including at street intersections, markets, and mosques. Intensive efforts were also conducted by their leaders to convince civilian and military elites to provide support as well as to hold public gatherings in a number of cities in Indonesia. All the efforts were commanded by FKAWJ, a bureaucratic decision-making organization which was structured hierarchically from its headquarters in Yogyakarta down to lower structures in remote villages. All the mobilization endeavors were facilitated by the existence of the Salafi *da'wa* network which had been developed since 1980s as a re-

cruitment network. As Melucci (1989: 31) suggests, the recruitment network played an important role in attracting participants since the mobilization process does not start from a vacuum. To understand the participation of individuals in collective action, the recruitment network comprises an important intermediary which in this case was played by the *ustaz*s of the Salafis (Noorhaidi 2005: 123).

Not only utilizing its social network at the grass root and elite level, the Salafis also mobilized its transnational network by requesting *fatwa*[30] from six religious authorities in the Middle East, all of whom were linked to Bin Baz, the former head of the Saudi Arabian Council of Senior *Ulama*.[31] The six *muftis* issued the *fatwas* which then in its Indonesian translation was disseminated through various media, including on the deactivated Laskar Jihad website (www.laskarjihad.or.id/risalah/fatwa), the periodical *Salafy* and various interviews given by Ja'far Umar Thalib. Some of the six *muftis* deemed the Muslim engagement in the Maluku conflict to be an individual duty (Ar. *Fard 'ayn)* for Indonesian Muslims and to be a collective duty (Ar. *Fard kiyafa)* for Muslims outside Indonesia, as argued by Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi, a *mufti* in Yemen. He furthermore asked the Salafis "to arise and conduct jihad in the name of God and overthrow Christians who occupy Muslim territory" and suggested that all Muslims "assist the *mujahids* by contributing property and any valuable thing, because God will bestow guidance on those who helped each other" (Noorhaidi 2005: 118-9, translated by Noorhaidi). Based on these *fatwas*, Laskar Jihad Commander Ja'far Umar Thalib confidently proclaimed the Maluku conflict to be a holy war against Christian enemies fighting Muslims. There was little doubt

30) A *fatwa* is a religious decree specifically issued by qualified persons (*muftis – Muslim legal scholars)* in response to questions requested their opinions. Although not binding, the position of *fatwa* is important and has become integral part of the legal practice and discouse of Muslims (Noorhaidi 2005: 118). For a further discussion on the dynamics of *fatwa* in the context of Indonesian Islam, see Hooker (2003) and Kaptein (2004).

31) Among those asked for the *fatwa* were Abd al-Razzaq ibn Abd al-Muhsin al-Abbad, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi'i, Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, Salih al-Suhaymi, Ahmad Yahya ibn Muhammad al-Najm, and Wahid al-Jabiri. For further discussion on the fatwa on jihad to Maluku see Noorhaidi (2005: 117-123).

that the successful massive mobilization of non-local *mujahidin* to the conflict areas by Laskar Jihad held a deep debt to the *fatwas*.

The last, but not the least, factor contributing to the great achievement of Laskar Jihad's mobilization was the support provided by political elites, both civilians and military. As I have shown in my previous work (Azca 2003, 2004, 2005b, 2006), the mobilization of non-local jihad actors took place in the context of increasing tension between President Abdurrahman Wahid and the military.[32)] Wiranto and his allies responded to President Wahid's maneuvers to undermine his political position by supporting the Laskar Jihad as a vehicle to weaken the authority of Wahid's government. As a consequence, President Wahid's verbal order to stop Laskar Jihad going to Ambon was ignored by the police and the army (ICGd 2002: 6). Noorhaidi (2005: 128) also mentions that some elites allegedly gave financial support to Laskar Jihad, including Fuad Bawazier, the former Minister of Finance in the last Soeharto's cabinet, and General Djaja Suparman.[33)]

From this account of jihad mobilization, I move now to profiles of various Islamic movements that deployed their troops to jihad's locations, either to Ambon-Maluku or Poso-Central Sulawesi.

Islamic activism and non-local jihad actors

Who were the non-local Islamic activists who joined in the jihad mobilization? Of the more than five thousand non-local Muslim fighters, there were two large groups of non-local jihad actors who

32*)* This tension reached its climax when the National Human Rights Commission for East Timor named Gen. Wiranto and some army and police officers as people to be investigated. President Wahid finally suspended Gen. Wiranto as Coordinating Minister on 14 February 2000, and then Gen. Wiranto formally resigned from his position on 16 May (Editors 2001: 145-147; Said 2001: 338-347).

33*)* The financial scandal surrounding the foundation of Kostrad during Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman's era as Commander, which was exposed by his successor Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, was suspected to be the source of funds for the formation and the development of the LJ (Editors 2001: 144).

joined in the jihad, namely Laskar Jihad and Laskar Mujahidin. [34] As mentioned earlier, Laskar Jihad was the most well-known and largest Muslim militia group and had recruited thousands of members. While Laskar Jihad is a single group, the so-called Laskar Mujahidin consisted of several militia groups which are linked to different movements, such as Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesia Mujahidin Council), Laskar Jundullah, Mujahidin KOMPAK (*Komite Penanggulangan Krisis*, Committee for Overcoming Crisis), and some splinter or offshoot groups of Darul Islam (DI). Although coming from different movement backgrounds, they shared some commonalities and networks and at times commonly worked together. This group recruited about several hundreds people, but some of them had previously trained and fought in other war zones, such as Afghanistan and Mindanao (Azca 2003; ICG 2005c; Fealy and Borgu 2005; Noorhaidi 2006). Besides the two large groups, there was also a much smaller number of 'Other Mujahidin', a cluster of *non-militia groups* who were primarily concerned with humanitarian, medical and *da'wa* issues, such as PKPU (*Posko Keadilan Peduli Ummat*, Centre for Justice and Care for Society), Mer-C (Medical Emergency Rescue Committee), and other groups and individuals.

To discuss non-local actors who joined *jihad* movement, I have developed a categorization of Islamism or Islamic activism, informed by the distinction between three types of Islamism proposed by ICG (2005b)[35] based on different world views, modus

34) The distinction between the two is just a simple division widely used among local people regarding the non-local jihadists in the communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso. ICG (2002) also applied this distinction.

35) In a report no. 37 entitled *Understanding Islamism*, ICG Middle East/North Africa (2005b: 1) defines Islamism as "the active assertion and promotions of beliefs, prescriptions, laws or policies that are held to be Islamic in character." While there are various currents of Islamism, they share a common view in that "they found their activisms in traditions and teachings of Islam as contained in scripture and authoritative commentaries." The definition of Islamism is a revision of the previous one which generally defined Islamism more narrowly as "Islam in political mode" or political Islam. It criticizes the prior definition as having shortcomings for at least two reasons: "First, it presupposed that Islam per se is not political, whereas insofar as Islam is inherently interested in matters of governance, in fact it is. Secondly, it presupposed that all forms of Islamism are equally

operandi and characteristic actors, in three main variants, namely, *pious*, *jihadi*, and *political*.[36] By *pious* what is meant is Islamic activism characterized as follows: not aimed at political power; being mainly concerned with the safeguarding of the Muslim identity and the Islamic faith and moral order against the forces of non-Muslims; its characteristic actors being Salafis.[37] By *jihadi* what is meant is Islamic activism focusing on armed struggle (*al-jihad*) based on *jihadi* ideology (jihadism) with its characteristic actors being *jihadi* activists (*al-mujahid).* By *political* what is meant is Islamic activism which is characterized as follows: involvement in the political process, either direct or indirect, and a general acceptance of the nation-state, working within its constitutional framework; articulating a reformist rather revolutionary vision and referring to democratic norms; its characteristic actors being paramilitary and party-political activists. There is a degree of variation among them in the use of violence; some basically avoiding its use while others occasionally using it for vigilante action against what they perceive as 'moral vice'.

Beside their differences in worldview, modus operandi and characteristic actors, I argue that different types of Islamist activism also apply different patterns of membership affiliation. Following the distinction between *exclusive affiliation* and *multiple affiliations* as suggested by Della Porta and Diani (1999: 119-20), I contend that both *pious* and *jihadi* activism tend to apply *exclusive affiliation*, meaning that its members usually affiliate only to their own group. Regarding this pattern of affiliation, Della Porta and Diani (1999: 119) describe their typical organizational context as "self-referential community or sect whose main characteristics are closure in the face

political, whereas in fact, there are significant distinctions in this regard between those forms that privilege political activism, missionary activity or violence."

36) ICG (2005b) distinguishes three variants of Islamism, namely, *missionary*, *jihadi*, and *political*. I found two problems with this conceptualization. First, its definition of the *missionary* type is biased toward the *Tablighi Jama'a* movements, although it also includes the Salafi movement, as reflected particularly in its definition of the characteristic of its actors, namely missionaries (*du'ah*) and the *ulama'*. Second, its conceptualization of the political type seems to me as overly narrow, national-centric, and rather simplistic in its approach to the use of violence.

37) By using term Salafi here and its followings I refer mainly to Wahabi activism.

of the outside world, a totalitarian structure, incompatibility with other forms of collective engagement and the view that the adherents are the repositories of truth. Though not necessarily residential communities, the lifestyle of this group is usually markedly." It is also suggested that membership of this groups tend to lead to "a radical personality transformation." On the other hand, I contend that *political* activism tend to apply *multiple affiliations*, meaning that its members usually affiliate to different kinds of groups. Multiple affiliations, Della Porta and Diani (1999: 120) suggest, play an important role in integrating different areas of movement and creating bridges between organizations.

This distinction between three types of Islamic activism, of course, is not meant to be comprehensive and exhaustive, nor to represent fixed or final categorizations, instead a somewhat loose taxonomy to guide the analysis based on its main characteristics. A reflective note on this categorization will be made in Chapter 7. By using this analytical framework of Islamism, I focus this research on the three variants of Islamic activists who joined *jihad* movement in Indonesia as follows: Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI) as the representative of *jihadi* activism*;* Laskar Jihad as the representative of *pious* activism*; s*ome activists affiliated with different kinds of Islamic groups as the representative of *political* activism. As will be portrayed later in Chapter 6, *political* activism is represented by three Islamic activist groups who come from different networks, namely, Front Pembela Islam (FPI, the Islamic Defender Front), Brigade Hizbullah of Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, the Crescent and Moon Party) and Posko Keadilan Peduli Umat (PKPU, the Justice Post for Caring Islamic Community).

Although they have differences in worldview, modus operandi and characteristic actors, the three kinds of Islamic activism share at least three commonalities, namely, the importance and the virtue of Muslim solidarity, the primacy of Islamic law (*syari'a),* and the justification and urgency for conducting jihad in order to defend their fellow Muslims which they perceived as being under persecution in eastern Indonesia, particularly in Ambon-Maluku and Poso-Central Sulawesi.

In the next section I will give a short description of some Islamic groups related to the informants associated with this research, namely, Laskar Jihad, Jama'ah Islamiyah, Brigade Hizbullah of PBB, PKPU, PKS, and KOMPAK.

- ***Laskar Jihad***

Laskar Jihad is the paramilitary division of the FKAWJ, a Salafi group founded in January 2000 in Yogyakarta. It was led by Ja'far Umar Thalib, a man of Yemeni descent born in Malang on 29 December 1961. After graduating from *pesantren* al-Irsyad in Malang, Thalib continued his study in LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab – Institute for Islamic Knowledge and Arabic) in Jakarta and later at the Maududi Institute, in Lahore, Pakistan. Thalib joined jihad in Afghanistan during the Soviet Union invasion in 1987-89, before later continuing his study with Muqbil ibn-Hadi al-Wadi' in Yemen from 1991 to 1993. After returning home in 1993, he established the *pesantren* Ihyaus Sunnah in Degolan, Yogyakarta, that later became the headquarters of the FKAWJ-Laskar Jihad (Fealy 2001; Jamhari & Jahroni 2004; Noorhaidi 2005).

FKAWJ has a relatively modern structure topped by its Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (DPP, Central Executive Board) led by Ayip Syafruddin, a graduate of the Psychology Faculty at the Muhammadiyah University in Solo. There are five divisions under this board, including Financial Division, Social Division, Health Division, Advocacy Division, Information Division and Special Task Force or the Paramilitary Division. Thalib's critical and important position of leader of the Special Task Force is indicated by the fact that he is also Chairman of the Advisory Board, the supreme religious board of the FKAWJ. Under the central executive board, there were the provincial (Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah, DPW) and district (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah, DPD) executive board. The FKAWJ also claimed to have overseas representatives, including Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and Yemen (Noorhaidi 2005: 124-5).

- ***KOMPAK***

KOMPAK was founded by the DDII on 1 August 1998 as a Muslim charity to assist Muslims affected by natural disaster, conflict and poverty.[38] It was led by Tamsil Linrung, a businessman-politician from Makassar who used to be the national treasurer of the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN) before moving to PKS and elected as a member of parliament in the 2004 election. Although officially just a Muslim charity organization, KOMPAK eventually played a critical role in the course of the conflict by establishing its paramilitary wing named Mujahidin KOMPAK. It mobilized Muslims from many groups associated with DDII to join the jihad in Ambon and Poso, include those who affiliated with JI. Some of my informants, who come from different social background and networks, including from Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Front Defender), Brigade Hizbullah PBB and JI, joined the jihad through KOMPAK. The close link between KOMPAK and JI was evident in the crucial role played by Sobih alias Aris Munandar as the head of the Solo branch of KOMPAK. Aris Munandar was a graduate of Pondok Ngruki in 1989 and then joined the jihad in Afghanistan in 1991 in the same contingent as Ali Imron and Imam Samudra. He was also a functionary of the DDII in Solo (Imron 2007, ICG 2004b). According to ICG (2002a, 2004b) the close link between KOMPAK-DDII and JI dates back to the JI founder Abdullah Sungkar who was also a DDII activist in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

- ***Jama'ah Islamiyah***

Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI) was founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 1993 following internal conflict within DI re-

38) As displayed in the website (http://dewandakwah.org) it has three major program fields, namely, *emergency aid*, *recovery aid*, and *participation aid*. The first takes care of casualties of social conflict and natural disaster, the second responds to the failure or the collapse of economic activities of *umma*, and the third attempts to empower *umma* especially in connection with political and education aims. In a report of the KOMPAK 1998-2005, it claimed to collect and channel IRP 16,378,849,444 (approximately 1,432,610 euros), mainly to emergency aid.

garding its leadership. During the period, Sungkar and Ba'asyir were in exile in Malaysia where they lived until the collapse of New Order in 1998. In the aftermath of the eruption of the Ambon conflict in January 1999, there was internal dispute regarding JI's participation: one group with a cautious stance, the other being inclined to move fast. Although JI eventually decided to send a team to Ambon, some JI members had become impatient and joined KOMPAK which was also led by a JI activist. According to ICG (2004b: 5) JI had a few troops in Ambon, never more than around twenty at one time. Yet its role was greater than member numbers indicated due to its military skills and weapons as well as its link with Mujahidin KOMPAK and other groups that provided the foot soldiers. When they joined the jihad in Ambon and/or in Poso, some JI activists had already been trained either in Afghanistan or in Mindanao. JI also established a leadership structure in Poso, considering that it could be developed as its basis. However, as described by ICG (2004a: 7-10), there was growing tension between JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK in the later stages. The strong presence of the JI in Poso led to the prolongation of violence until 2007.

- ***Brigade Hizbullah***

Brigade Hizbullah (BH) is a paramilitary group affiliated with Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), the successor of the legendary Islamic party Masyumi in the aftermath of the fall of Soeharto. *Hizbullah* is an Arabic term meaning army of God. The history of the Brigade Hizbullah dated back to the 'revolution period' when Muslims were organized as a militia group under the same name to fight against the Dutch colonials. The new Brigade Hizbullah was founded on 21 August 2001 with two functions, namely, "as the means for struggle and cadre development (*pengaderan)* as well as the main pillar of PBB" and "as the guardian of party ideology" (Buku Panduan Brigade Hizbullah, no date: 20). Its national commander was Drs. HMA. Salam, As., MBA. It claimed to have 46 thousand members throughout Indonesia, divided in 18 provincial command structures.

Brigade Hizbullah was structured like a military institution, from its national headquarters to the village level. For example, at the national headquarters it is led by the *Komandan Pusat* (national commander) and *Wakil Komandan* (vice commander) assisted by the *Deputi Umum* (deputy for general affairs), *Deputi Operasional* (deputy for operational affairs), *Deputi Administrasi Personalia* (deputy for administration and personnel), *Deputi Diklat* (deputy for education and training), and *deputi intelijen* (deputy for intelligence) (*ibid*, 10-12). Secularism and communism were among the main concerns and potential threats perceived by Brigade Hizbullah. One of its main ideologues was Abdul Qadir Djaelani, a leading Islamist activist and former political prisoner of the New Order. He contributed two articles in the *Buku Panduan Brigade Hizbullah* (no date), entitled 'Sejarah Perjuangan Politik Umat Islam Indonesia' (the history of political struggle of the Islamic community in Indonesia) and 'Ideologi Non Islam versus Ideologi Islam' (non-Islamic ideology versus Islamic ideology).

During the conflict in Ambon and in Poso, Brigade Hizbullah did not establish a particular group but joined other militia in participating in jihad movements. Due to its historical background and close relationship with the DDII as the extension of Masyumi struggle in the realm of *da'wa*, some Brigade Hizbullah activists joined jihad through Mujahidin KOMPAK.

- ***Front Pembela Islam***

Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defenders Front or FPI) was founded on 17 August 1998 at a commemoration of Indonesia's Independence Day, just few months after the fall of Soeharto. The event was held in the *pesantren* Darul al-Um, Ciputat, led by KH.Misbachul Munir, and attended by hundreds of Muslims south of Jakarta and some local leaders and Islamic preachers such KH. Cecep Bustomi, KH. Damanhuri, Habib Idrus Jamalullail, and Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab. The establishment of the FPI was aimed at establishing a movement to defend Islam and to uphold the honor of Muslims.

Similar to the FKAWJ, the FPI then established its paramilitary wing named the Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI) led by Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, who was also the chairman of the executive board of the FPI. Syihab is of Hadrami descent born in Jakarta on 24 August 1965 to a family of *sayyids* who claimed to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, as indicated by his title as *habib* (pl.*habaib).* Raised in a circle of *sayyids* in Jakarta, he graduated from the LIPIA Jakarta and then continued his education at the Ibn Saud University in Riyadh (Jamhari and Jahrono 2004; Noorhaidi 2005; Jahroni 2008).

FPI attained its later prominence following its involvement in PAM Swakarsa, the civilian security unit sponsored by some segments of the military and government, in response to the growing movements opposed to President B.J. Habibie. Its reputation further developed for its range of attacks or 'sweeping operations' on the so-called places of vice such as nightclubs, cafes and pubs. Their vigilante actions were commonly based on their interpretation of *amar ma'ruf nahy munkar,* a Qur'anic phrase meaning performing good deeds and opposing vice. The FPI developed quite quickly and claimed to have established its structure in eighteen provinces throughout Indonesia. Besides its close link with the security forces, especially the police, the loose and open membership of FPI seemed likely to contribute to its rather quick development, including participation by mere jobless youths and even *preman* (Yunanto 2003; Noorhaidi 2005).

Another interesting feature of the FPI is the varied social backgrounds of its members. While some its elite members were of *sayyid* origin with strong Salafi influence, others were Muslim leaders from Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), traditionalist Muslim background. Misbachul Anam, the secretary general of FPI from 1998 to 2002, for an example, comes from a *pesantren* NU background and is even a leader of a Sufi order *Tijaniyah* (Jahroni 2008: 52). Jahroni also suggests (2008: 58) that the FPI has nothing to do with Masyumi, the DDII or other Islamist transnational movements. "It is a simply an expression of Indonesian Muslim disillusionment with the existing social and political situation."

- ***PKPU***

The Posko Keadilan Peduli Ummat (the Center for Justice and Care for Society or PKPU) is a humanitarian agency established by the Tarbiyah movement activists on 10 December 1999 to respond to the multi-dimensional crisis that struck Indonesia in 1997. It was managed in quite a professional way so that it was approved as a charity organization by the Indonesian government in September 2000. It also claimed to be a "NGO in special consultative status with the economic social council of the United Nations".[39] Instead of articulating its Islamic attributes and identities, PKPU calls itself a "national humanitarian institution." There is no clear track nor association with the Tarbiyah movements if we observe the professional look of the bi-lingual PKPU website. Yet its Islamic character, of course, remains visible as indicated in its product and program. It presents seven kinds of programs, namely: rescue (emergency), rehabilitation, community development, educational program, health program, economic program and *da'wa.* The website also shows a vast network, developed both domestically and internationally. In addition to 14 office branches in many cities throughout Indonesia, including Ambon, Manado, Aceh and Kendari, the PKPU has partners in other countries include the international Islamic charity group www.zakat.org.

While the tie between PKPU and Tarbiyah movement and PKS seems to disappear on the website, it is linked very closely on the ground. The narrative of a PKPU volunteer who happened to be a leading PKS activist in Maluku, as I will relate later in this dissertation, provides a striking example.

Focus of the research

This research focuses on non-local jihad actors (*mujahidin*) who participated in the religious conflict in Ambon and Poso during the post-jihad period. As mentioned earlier, one of the most unique

39) See the website www.pkpu.or.id (retrieved on 10 August 2010).

features of the communal conflict in Ambon and in Poso was the remarkable role played by non-local actors. Several studies which pay attention to non-local jihad actors, interestingly, mostly dedicated their focus on one of these networks, either on Laskar Jihad or on Laskar Mujahidin. Studies by Noorhaidi Hasan (2002, 2005, 2006), Badrus Sholeh (2003), Sukidi Mulyadi (2003), Mohammad Shoelhi (2002), Kirsten Schulze (2002), and Michael Davis (2002) are examples of those who focus their attention on Laskar Jihad, the biggest network of non-local jihad actors. Studies on Laskar Mujahidin, on the other hand, tend to focus on those who joined transgressive activism or underground movements, especially JI or DI splinter or offshoot groups. This is the case with several ICG reports and those who claimed expertise on terrorism issues such Gunaratna (2002), Abuza (2002, 2007). As far as I know, no research has paid attention to 'Other Mujahidin', either those who stayed in the area or who returned. Based on this observation, I have attempted to move further by researching non-local jihad actors who joined jihad through different networks, comparing their role and experiences during jihad and, more importantly, their trajectory in the post-jihad period.

As implicitly articulated in the last statement, the next aspects to become a major focus of this research are two-fold: the 'jihad experience' and 'post-jihad trajectory'. By 'jihad experience' I mean the set of experiences that occurred during participation in the jihad movement. By 'post-jihad trajectory' I mean pathway(s) taken in the aftermath of jihad participation by the actors. I assume that the two are not disconnected; instead I argue that 'jihad experience' influences the 'post-jihad trajectory'. Based on this consideration, with a major focus on 'after jihad', I chose to take a biographical approach to study non-local jihad actors. By taking a biographical approach, I focus on three stages of the non-local jihad actors' life story: *before*, *during*, and *after* jihad participation. By observing the three stages of life story of non-local jihad actors, I will discuss three research questions as follows: (1) How did non-local jihad actors who come from different Islamic activism networks become jihad activists?; (2) What did jihad's experience mean to the actors?; (3) How did the

jihad experience influence the life trajectory of the non-local jihad actors in the post-jihad period?

By focusing on the three different stages of life story and by discussing three sets of questions, I will engage with three theoretical issues, namely, first, participation in the movement; second, experience in the movement; third, post-participation of the movement. I will discuss these three issues from the social movement theory approach later in . I will apply a 'passionate politics' approach of social movement theory which pays attention to the link between identity, narrative, and emotions.

Main arguments

After laying out the focus of the research, I will present my main arguments which structure the dissertation and will be elaborated later in a theoretical chapter (Chapter 2) and three empirical chapters (Chapter 4-6). I will present the arguments in similar line with thee research questions presented previously as follows.

My first main argument is that informants in this research become jihad actors after experiencing 'radical reasoning'. By 'radical reasoning' I mean a set of micro-sociological process that involves both cognition and emotion through either 'moral shocks' (Jasper 1997, 1998, see also Jasper and Poulsen 1995) or 'cognitive opening' (Wiktorowicz 2005) or both which eventually lead to participation in jihad as an 'act of identity' (Marranci 2006, 2009b). Radical reasoning often occurs in the context of, and as a response to, identity crisis (Erikson, 1968) experienced by the actor. I suggest that the decision to join jihad involving radical reasoning because it ruptures the 'normal' daily life of the actors.

My second main argument is that, jihad participation consists of what I call 'radical experience'. By 'radical experience' I refer to Sartre's notion of the existence of a 'pivotal event' (as cited by Denzin 1989: 64-7) in a human's life that bring about "a pivotal meaning

structure that organizes the other activities in a person's life." Jihad participation as a 'pivotal event' eventually, I contend, influences the life trajectory of the actor in the post-jihad period.

It links to my third main argument that, jihad participation as a 'radical experience' informs the 'after jihad' life of the actor in combination with two main factors, namely biographical traits and social networks. Although jihad participation alone is a very meaningful experience and becomes a 'pivotal event' in the formation of *movement identity* as a jihad activist, the way the experiences are interpreted is, however, significantly influenced by ideological framework which is furthermore maintained and developed through their social networks. I furthermore argue that informants interpret their experience based on ideological framework associated with their particular type of Islamic activism as previously discussed, namely, *pious, jihadi,* and *political* Islamism. I also argue that social networks influence the life trajectory of the actor through the dynamics of three kinds of social network, namely, *core-network, tactical-network,* and *extended-network. Core-network* is a social network through which the actor joins jihad; *tactical-network* is a social network of jihadist networks which occur temporarily during the jihad period; and *extended-network* is an extension of social networks which develop in the aftermath of jihad participation. Of the three networks, I argue that *core-network* is the most important network which provide *ideological framework* to the actor and functions as an '*ideological network*' to the actor.

Caveat: on plot, names, and term

I would like to raise three caveats concerning my focus on *plot-driven narratives*, the term *jihad* and the use of names in this dissertation. I will start with the first.

First, the life story narratives presented in this dissertation, particularly in Chapter 4-6, are basically *plot-driven narratives*. Re-

ferring to Poletta (2006), I argue that *plot*, the logic of the story, plays a critical role in the making of narrative, as will be discussed in Chapter 2. It is through a *plot* that events are structured and configured by narrators to be meaningful; otherwise events would be mere occurrences, discontinuous and separate moments rather than episodes in an unfolding story. The use of such concept, although it appears neat and compact, is not without cost: it tends to overlook *fragments*, a cluster of events or a cluster of interpretations of events, which are characterized by the absence of plot and logical sequence of events. Fragments are merely lightly narrated by the narrators, as an interruption or interlude, between 'major narratives' which are commonly based on *plot*, or a logical sequence of events, which help the narrator to make sense of events and experiences.

During the interviews, I occasionally encountered such *fragments*, or 'minor narratives', in between 'major narratives' of *jihad* told by the narrators. While 'major narratives' present meaningful events or experience from the point of view of normative and religious teachings, for instance, 'minor narratives' display marginal themes such as trouble, or fear, or fun, or romance, or even sexual affairs, which may be considered as less crucial, or even as a distortion, so they tend to be overlooked, or even concealed, by the narrators in narrating *jihad* events and experiences. As a consequence of my choice to explore *plot-based narratives* I have, unfortunately, sacrificed another side of *jihad* as reflected in its *fragments,* or its 'minor narratives'. While admitting that a particular focus on *fragments* would be interesting and valuable, it is unfortunately beyond the aim and scope of this dissertation project.

Second, on the use of the term *jihad*. Since term *jihad* is one of the keywords in this research, I shall give a brief explanation of its general meaning and how it will be used in this research. It is obvious that the term *jihad* (a verbal noun or gerund of the verb *jahada*, meaning "to strive, to exert oneself, to struggle") is one of the most prominent Arabic terms in the Western world due to its vital influence in the Muslim world, particularly with the emerging trend of Islamist movements in many parts of the globe. It is important

to note that *jihad* is a highly contested concept/discourse by which different groups attempt to define and construct their authority and power over "other" groups and people (Azca 2008).

The origin of the concept dates back to the history of the Prophet Muhammad (570–632), as reflected and written in the Qur'an and the notes of his speeches, sayings, and behavior (*hadith* and *sunnah*). The word is generally used to denote an endeavor toward a praiseworthy aim. However, the term has various and ambiguous meanings, as reflected in its different interpretations. Although in the contemporary context the word *jihad* is more widely associated with acts of violence and terror ("holy war"), the "*jihad* of the sword" was originally called "the smaller *jihad*," in contrast to the peaceful form that is "the greater *jihad*," signifying the interior *jihad* or personal struggle to rid one's soul of greed, hatred, and egotism (Peters 1999, Khadduri 1955).

In this research, however, term *jihad* is used basically to refer its particular empirical meaning, namely, participation of Muslim fighters in the communal conflict in Indonesia, either in Ambon or Poso. In some other cases, it also refers to terrorism actions carried out by *jihadi* groups. It is important to note that term *jihadi* has a particular meaning, namely, referring to the ideology of *jihadi* or *jihadism* which justifies the use of violence to achieve its political goals, include the establishment of the Islamic state (Hassan 2009).

Finally, in this research I use both real names and pseudonyms for various reasons. Although at the beginning of all my interviews I promised the informants the right to remain anonymous, at the end of the interview I asked some of them for permission to use their real names. Five of the informants gave me permission to use their real names, namely, Ali Imron, Fauzi, Surahman, Abu Ayyash and Awod Umar. Three of them are *political* activists, the other two are respectively *pious* and *jihadi* activists. It is interesting to note that some *political* activists tend to be more open and relaxed, and perhaps even enjoy the possibility of publicity and coverage. On the other hand, it seems quite common among *pious* activists to seek distance from the media and publicity, especially regarding their ji-

had experience. Fauzi is an exceptional case—as will be discussed further in Chapter 4. A similar tendency is apparent among *jihadi* activists, with the additional reason of their engagement with the underground movement. Yet Ali Imron is obviously an exceptional case as is manifested in the publication of his autobiography in 2007.

I chose not to ask permission to use the real names of two *jihadi* activists, whom I refer to by the pseudonyms, Fauzan and Hendro, as I considering that some parts of their life narratives could bring them into trouble and difficulties. I also did not ask for permission to use the real names of all *pious* core informants—again with the exception of Fauzi—including some not presented in this dissertation, by considering and respecting their puritan life style as reflected in their rejection to have photographs taken. I have also used pseudonyms for some other informants for similar considerations: to protect them from any possibility of difficulties and troubles and in respect for their puritan life style.

Structure of the dissertation

This dissertation consists of seven chapters divided into three parts. Part I consists of three chapters, Chapters 1-3. Chapter 1 presents the context, theory, and methodology of the research. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical framework of the research. In this chapter I will examine a particular approach of social movement theory, namely the so–called 'passionate politics' approach, that is used as the analytical framework to discuss the topic of the research. It begins with a critical review of the study of communal violence and Islamic movements in Indonesia as well as an overview of some approaches of social movement theory. It ends with an elaboration of the theoretical arguments of this research.

Chapter 3 presents methodological issues and how the fieldwork research on non-local jihad actors in Indonesia was conducted. I will explain two main strategies in conducting this research, name-

ly, "following the flow of actors" and "digging the depth of their experiences". I followed the flow of actors because the non-local post-jihadists lived in different areas during the fieldwork, most of them returning home whereas few of them stayed on. A few of them even remained in prison for their involvement in terrorist actions. The next major step was to dig for the deep meanings of their jihad experience through life story interviews. A methodological discussion on combining social movement research, life history, and interpretive biography is also presented.

Part II consists of three empirical chapters: Chapters 4-6. It presents the life story narratives of non-local jihad actors divided into three chapters, based on different types of Islamic activism. Chapter 4 deals with the narratives of former Laskar Jihad fighters; presenting four actors: two who returned home, while another two stayed on in the (post) conflict area in Ambon and Poso, respectively. Three of them were 'ordinary' Salafis who follow the life style of most of former Laskar Jihad activists by living in a sort of 'enclave community'. While another one, although remaining committed to Salafism, performs as a maverick Salafi, including by taking part in political affairs in the post-jihad period.

Chapter 5 presents the narratives of non-local jihad actors who come from the JI network. It presents three actors with different life trajectories: two of them are serving in prison but have taking different choices; one chose a cooperative approach with the police and became their partner, another one behaves less cooperatively and seems to remain 'radical'. Another one has been released from jail, but has no fixed job and seemed to have ambiguous relations with the police and other JI fellows.

Chapter 6 presents the narratives of non-local jihad actors who come from *political* Islamic activists. They joined through different networks during the jihad (two with KOMPAK, one with PKPU) but took a similar trajectory in the post-jihad period: involving local politics. Their activism careers also resemble each other: they were promoted to get a higher position after their jihad participation. One became Chairman of the PBB in Solo, another one was elected as

Chairman of the FPI in Pekalongan, while the last was appointed Vice Chairman of the PKS in Maluku.

Part III consists of the concluding chapter. It presents the main findings of the research while revisiting its main arguments and drawing theoretical reflections on the topic. It also presents the contribution of the research both empirically and theoretically.***

CHAPTER 2

Jihad as 'Passionate Politics': A Theoretical Framework

Introduction

The focus of this thesis is jihad and its aftermath in Indonesia. As discussed in the previous chapter, the term *jihad* is here used to refer in particular to participation in religious communal conflict that took place in Ambon-Maluku and Poso-Central Sulawesi in Eastern Indonesia. As was also explained earlier, this research focuses on non-local jihad actors (jihadists or mujahidin) who participated in the course of the conflict. As a consequence of the biographical approach chosen in this research I have examined three stages of the life story of jihad actors: *before*, *during* and *after* their jihad participation. Thus, this research begins by presenting the personal background and social profile of the jihad actors and then discussing the social process by which they became involved in the movement *pre* jihad; their roles and experiences *during* the jihad; and, finally, most critically, their later life trajectory *post* jihad. In this chapter I will present some of the arguments as to *why* and *how* I apply a 'passionate politics' approach of social movement theory as a theoretical framework to study jihad movements, actors' experiences and the aftermath.

I begin with the premise that *jihad*, namely participation in 'religious holy war' from the viewpoint of its actors, is an instance of social movement. jihad movement, as described in Chapter 1, meets some of the characteristics of social movement as formulated by

Snow, Soule and Kriesi (2004: 11), namely, (1) collective, or joint, action; (2) change-oriented goals or claims; (3) extra-or non-institutional means; (4) some degree of organization; (5) some temporal continuity. As indicated, the conflict was a sort of social movement in which religious identity became a major cause and trigger. Thus, it could be referred to as a religious social movement.

Secondly, the jihad movement can be seen as an instance of 'high-risk' activism, based on the distinction proposed by Doug McAdam (1986) between 'low-risk' and 'high-risk' activism. In his study on the recruitment processes of the Freedom Summer in the USA, McAdam distinguished two kinds of activism based on the 'costs' and 'risks' of participation in activism. He used the term 'costs' to refer to "the expenditure of time, money, and energy required of a person engaged in any particular forms of activism," while the term 'risks' refers to "the anticipated dangers—whether legal, social, physical, financial, and so forth—of engaging in a particular type of activity." (1986: 67) Looking through the two lens of 'costs' and 'risks', participation in a jihad movement can be clearly classified as 'high-risk' activism because it requires both a high level of costs and risks.

I have applied a social movement theory approach to the study of the jihad movement because I was intrigued by the fact that phenomena of Islamism, or Islamic activism, had been so far excluded from investigation under the mode of inquiry developed by the social movement theory in the West, as observed by Asef Bayat (2005: 892). According to Bayat, Islamist movements are frequently viewed as highly homogenous and coherent social units which are to be associated with the discourse of their ideologues. On the other hand, many narratives of Islamism are either simply categorized as religious revivalism, an expression of primordial adherence, or are just thrown into the black box of 'anonymous', unable to be analyzed by a conventional social science approach. A similar observation was also made by Roel Meijer in his review essay on the contemporary Islamist movement: "Few subjects have attracted as much attention as the Islamist movement but have been so little understood." (2005: 279).

In an effort to enhance understanding on contemporary Islamist movements, especially the jihad movement, I have attempted to employ the strategy of approaching the subject by focusing on the links between identity, meaning, and emotion. These issues have been marginalized by the burgeoning social movement studies in the recent period which have been developing under the 'hegemonic' approach of the 'political process theory' (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004a: vii). Instead of taking the hegemonic 'political process' approach, which assumes and emphasizes the primacy of 'structure' and the rationality of its actors, my approach will devote attention to the dynamics of the 'micro-sociological' aspects, and in particular the crucial role of identity, meaning and emotion in the jihad movement. Thus, following the term proposed by Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta (2003) to refer to a cultural approach that emphasizes the critical role of emotion and passion in social movement, I refer to the jihad movement as 'passionate politics'.

Back to the research questions presented in the previous chapter, this chapter shall engage with three main questions, namely, first, "how did they become jihad actors?"; second, "what did the jihad experiences mean to the actors and how?"; and third, "how did the jihad experience influence the life trajectory of actors in the post-jihad period?" So I shall engage with three theoretical issues, namely, first, on participation into movement; second, on experience in movement; third, on post-participation of movement. I will discuss these three issues theoretically in the last section of this chapter.

I will begin this theoretical chapter with a literature review on communal violence and Islamist movements, two related topics in the studies of democratic transition in Indonesia. This is important since the jihad movements took place as a response to the religious communal violence that erupted in Eastern Indonesia in the context of the revival of Islamist movements during Indonesia's democratic transition. By doing so I will show how my research on jihad movement will contribute to the study of both communal violence and Islamist movements in Indonesia. I will follow by presenting a literature review on social movement theory in order to situate my the-

oretical approach. Finally I will present a theoretical framework of the 'passionate politics' of social movement theory for the study of jihad movement in Indonesia. After presenting the theoretical framework I will articulate the three main arguments of this research, that were briefly introduced in the previous chapter, in order to contextualize the research questions posed in this project.

On communal violence and Islamic movements: a review

The topic of this research is located at the intersection of two related topics in the studies of democratic transition in Indonesia: communal violence and Islamist movements. I will start with a literature review on communal violence, followed by Islamist movements.

I will begin by discussing the paradox of the democratization process. While democratization has been a global mantra in the late twentieth century and marked by its 'third wave' of democratization since 1970s as prominently argued by Samuel Huntington (1999), it has led to a sort of paradox, i.e., the increasing possibility of the eruption of ethnic and communal violence during its initial phase. The end of an authoritarian regime and beginning of the democratization process does not diminish the likelihood of violence, instead serves rather to increase it. This paradox is nicely reflected in Jack Snyder's (2000) influential book entitled *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict.* He contends that the relations between the two are quite compelling, especially during the transition's early stages. After making a comparative analysis of political transition and the rise of nationalist and ethnic violence in various settings and countries, from Sri Lanka to Malaysia from Rwanda to Burundi, Snyder concludes: "Thus, democratic consolidation rescued ethnic conflict, but the initial steps in the rocky transition to democracy increased it" (Snyder 2000: 29).

Snyder's thesis was confirmed by Indonesia's experience during its transition period following the collapse of the Soeharto au-

thoritarian regime, as briefly covered in Chapter 1. The increasing number of violent incidents and casualties in the archipelago during the transition period was followed by the growing number of studies of violence in the post-Soeharto era.[1)]

At the same time, Indonesia also witnessed the revival of Islamist movements in the wake of *reformasi* era which manifested in different arenas, from political parties to paramilitary forces, from social-religious organizations to '*jihadi*-terrorist' groups. Post-Soeharto Indonesia has attracted worldwide attention particularly for its two most remarkable faces of the paradox: as the world's biggest democratic Muslim country and simultaneously the hotbed of some radical Islamist fringe groups, such as Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI). Following the fall of the New Order regime, Indonesia has shifted dramatically by developing a newly democratic system that includes the implementation of direct political election to government offices from national to local levels as well as decentralization of political authority from the national to the district level. The same period has also been marked by the emergence of Islamist paramilitary groups, actively playing roles in the public sphere, such as FPI and Laskar Jihad, as well as the more radical fringe groups, such as JI. The eruption of religious communal violence in Ambon-Maluku and Poso-Central Sulawesi in 1999 mobilized thousands of activists from these groups to join jihad movement in the areas.

In the next few pages, I will discuss five books recently published on the related topics of communal violence and Islamist movements in Indonesia, by Jacques Bertrand (2004), Noorhaidi

1) Glen Smith and Helene Bouvier-Smith (2003) published a working bibliography on conflict and violence with a special reference to Indonesia, consisting of a long list of studies on conflict related issues both by Indonesians and foreigners. It was part of a collaborative project between *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* (LIPI) and the Laboratoire Asie du Sud-Est et Monde Austronésien (LASEMA), part of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) of France, which began on 1 September 2001. In November 2001 they launched the website www.communalconflict.com which was later moved to www.conflictrecovery.org on 6 November 2006. The website states that the website's change of name was made to better reflect the changing focus of conflict research and mitigation activities in Indonesia, where many areas are now undergoing post-conflict recovery.

(2005, also Noorhaidi Hasan 2006), Gerry van Klinken (2007), John T. Sidel (2006a) and Zachary Abuza (2007). While Bertrand and van Klinken studied the rise of conflict (Bertrand used the term 'ethnic conflict' while van Klinken preferred 'communal violence') in the archipelago in comparative fashion by examining some cases of conflict in different areas, Sidel and Noorhaidi focused on the religious dimension of the conflict: Sidel on the link between religious violence and structural backdrops from the colonial era up to recent developments; Noorhaidi on the emergence of the notorious Salafi paramilitary group Laskar Jihad and its quest for political identity, especially during the transitional period. Abuza, in a policy-oriented security studies perspective, focused his work on the link between political Islam and violence in Indonesia.

I start with Bertrand's book, the earliest published and "the most comprehensive of the many recent studies of ethno-religious violence in Indonesia," as praised by Robert Hefner (2008: 690). Bertrand took up and examined the social roots and context of ethnic conflict in various places in Indonesia; among the Dayaks and Madurese in Kalimantan; Christians and Muslims in the eastern Indonesia of the Moluccas, Flores, and East Timor; local Papuans and Indonesian authorities in Irian Jaya (later renamed Papua); the Acehnese independence movement and the nationalist government in Aceh; and Chinese and "indigenous" Indonesians in Java. Bertrand chose to study the conflict through what he terms the "historical institutionalist" approach by tracing the violence back to the "institutional context that defines and shapes ethnic identities, the official recognition of the groups, their representation in state institutions, and their access to resources." (2004: 4). He contends that a nation's national model, which formulates "the principles that define a nation" and "establish the inclusion/exclusion of its members and the terms of inclusion" is manifested in state institutions (*ibid.*).

In his analysis, Bertrand (2004: 20) puts forward the key concept 'critical juncture' to refer to historical moments when a political system comes under tension and, therefore, political institutions and the principles of national models are renegotiated. Furthermore he

argues that ethnic conflict is likely to happen at such 'critical junctures.' He suggests there were three 'critical junctures' in Indonesia's institutional history, namely, the period of 1965-66, 1974-75, and 1997-98, where several ethnic conflicts erupted. Regarding the third 'critical juncture' which provided the context for the series of ethnic conflicts to unfold in the late 1990s, Bertrand (2004: 3) suggests that some elements of the national model were renegotiated: "the role of Islam in political institutions, the relative importance of national and regional governments, the access and representation of ethnic groups in the state institutions, as well as the definition and meaning of the Indonesian "nation."

In the case of the Maluku conflict, where the religious element was a crucial factor in the conflict, Bertrand argues that the late Soeharto policies had disturbed the balance between Muslims and Christians, which led to a decline of the 'traditional' Christian domination over bureaucratic seats and associated patronage and privileged Muslims to gain new positions and resources. When the Soeharto regime collapsed and the new President Habibie began to launch political reform over state institutions and the electoral mechanism, Bertrand (2004: 114-5) suggests that it made Muslims anxious over the likelihood of losing their recent gains while Christians were anxious over the likelihood of further losses.

Although Bertrand's framework has been quite successful in understanding and analyzing the institutional context and period in which ethnic conflicts are likely to erupt, his macro-structural and historical approach hindered him from answering some key questions such as why a particular kind of violence occurs and how does it escalate to the scale that occurred. Filling in some gaps left by Bertrand, Gerry van Klinken (2007) arrived with a comparable project to help explain some cases of communal violence that occurred during Indonesia's transition period. Yet van Klinken chose to focus on a particular area: the towns beyond Java. He also took up some violent cases which were characterized by both 'ethnic' (between Dayaks and Malays against Madurese in West and Central Kalimantan) and

'religious' (between Muslims and Christians in Poso, Ambon and North Maluku) conflict which he termed 'communal' (2007: 13).

Unlike Bertrand, Van Klinken (2007) adopted a 'contentious politics' approach of social movement theory to study the phenomena. Following the *Dynamics of Contention* (DoC) analytical framework developed collaboratively by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001), van Klinken devoted his analysis to five key processes in contentious politics, namely, *identity formation, escalation, polarization, mobilization,* and *actor constitution.* A central question was posed to each key process respectively as follows: "how does a sense of bounded identity grow in a group?"; "how does a conflict that starts small escalate to involve many more actors?"; "how does the political space between rival claimants widen as they gravitate towards the extreme?"; "how do you get normally apathetic people onto the streets?"; and finally "how does a previously unorganized or apolitical group become a single political actor?" (2007: 11). Van Klinken chose to discuss each DoC process through a case study, thus, he elaborates *identity formation* in West Kalimantan, *escalation* in Poso, *polarization* in North Maluku, *mobilization* in Ambon, and *actor constitution* in Central Kalimantan.

This choice led to both positive and less positive results: on the one hand, it has allowed him to employ his rich fieldwork materials to discuss a particular episode of the conflict in a particular area within the solid theoretical framework. In discussing the process of escalation and mobilization of the conflict in Poso and Ambon respectively, for example, Van Klinken has successfully combined both strong data and sophisticated theoretical framework in an eloquent and convincing way. Yet, on the other hand, the choice has hindered and limited him from any critical engagement and further contribution to developing social movement theory.

Van Klinken took the further step of discussing the important role played by actors, especially the local elites, in the course of the conflict. While this choice is welcomed and seems closer to revealing the complexity of the true situation, rather than those who tended to blame national actors as orchestrating the conflict, his over-emphasis

on the political aspects of the conflict and the rationality of the actors was problematic. As closely analyzed by McRae (2008: 10-11) in the case of Poso, Van Klinken's conviction that the violence was essentially political led him to become "less sensitive to shifts in the motivation and dynamics of violence during the conflict," and to his "depiction of local elites as avowedly rational, cool-headed, wholly politically motivated actors who appear dispassionate in mobilizing the rank-and-file for violence."

Although like Van Klinken I will be applying social movement theory, I have chosen to apply a distinct approach with a strong emphasis on emotion and passion rather than on structural factors as well as cognition and rationality as he did. I shall elaborate on this issue in the later section of this chapter.

While Van Klinken answered the puzzles regarding the dynamics and the process of escalation of the conflict quite convincingly, and paid attention to political actors in his analysis, especially the local elite actors and to some extent the non-local actors in the case of Ambon and Poso, he nevertheless left unanswered the question of how different patterns of violence emerged. John T. Sidel (2006a) attempted to answer the issue by formulating the shift in patterns of religious violence in Indonesia during the transition period as follows: from riots to pogroms to jihad.[2)] According to Sidel (2006a: xi; 2006b: 10), there was a shift in religious violence in Indonesia over a ten-year period from *riots* (1995-1997) to *pogroms* (1998-2001) to jihad (2000-2005). The term riots, he used to refer to social upheavals in provincial towns and cities mainly in Java; pogroms refers to anti-witchcraft campaigns in Java and inter-religious violence in Central Sulawesi and Maluku; while jihad refers to paramilitary mobilization and terrorist bombings under the banner of Islam. He argued that the

2) Sidel follows the distinction between 'riots' and 'pogrom' made by Paul Brass (1996) as editor in the book *Riots and Pogroms*. Although emphasizing the critical and distinct elements of organization and planning in 'pogrom', Brass (1996: 33) was less confident of the two terms' capability to capture the dynamics of most violent events involving large crowds. In practice, he suggests, there is virtually always some degree of organization and planning prior to riots and pogroms. Thus he warns that it is sometimes quite unrewarding to aim to define a particular situation as either a riot or pogrom.

shift from one form of religious violence to the other was indicated by the different locations, perpetrators, targets, processes of mobilization, forms of agency, and outcomes associated with each stage.

Informed by post-structuralist scholarship, Sidel developed an explanatory framework that links the changing forms of religious violence to identity uncertainty against the backdrop of changing political and economic structures at the national level. In his review essay, Aspinall (2008: 566) summarized Sidel's thought-provoking thesis as follows: "the changing place of Islam in the nation's politics and power structures produced changing uncertainties and ambiguities about Islamic identity and authority and, thus, changing forms of violence." To a certain extent, the shift in backdrops of the position of Islam in public life at the national level echoes what Bertrand has called a 'critical juncture' in Indonesia's modern history.

Although Sidel's analytical framework on the link between the changing faces of religious violence to identity uncertainty looks fascinating, his task was undermined by his failure to substantiate his bold thesis with strong empirical evidence. Unfortunately, in applying the framework, Sidel relies mostly on secondary sources and from-a-distance observation, especially for the narratives and descriptions of the context of local violence. Such shortcomings frequently lead to vagueness in making and drawing big narratives at the national level which are certainly open for further examination. I was particularly keen to examine and elaborate on his thesis with respect to jihad, a topic directly relevant to my present study. He describes jihad as a 'notable narrowing of religious violence' (Sidel 2006a: 197), that assumed two forms of violence, namely, 'armed paramilitary assaults on Christian neighborhoods and villages in Maluku and Poso in 2000-2001' and 'terrorist bombing elsewhere in the country from 2000 to 2004' (Sidel 2006a: 196). I will discuss these two kinds of religious violence later in detail in Chapters 4-6 through the life story narratives of the informant local actors.

Reflecting back on the three books reviewed, it appears that they all tend to focus their analysis on macro-structural context and factors as the main explanatory means. Although van Klinken

ventured further by discussing the conflict actors, his analysis was limited by focusing on local elite factors. While this effort proved to be fruitful in his analysis, there is "the absence, or the lack of emphasis, of the experiences or voices of the 'foot soldiers' in communal violence," as rightly identified by Aspinall (2008: 570) in his concluding remark of his review essay. While warning of the moral and analytical risk of focussing on perpetrators of violence, Aspinall suggests attention be turned on them in order to develop persuasive theories and an explanation for violence. Despite the risks, he argues, it is important to take seriously the ideologies, motivations and experiences of ordinary perpetrators since "they are the connective tissue that links general theories about violence to the lived experience of particular violent episodes." (2008: 571)

To some extent, the work of Noorhaidi (2005, see also Hasan 2006) on Laskar Jihad fills part of this gap. In his book Noorhaidi analyzes the formation and development of Laskar Jihad, the largest group that succesfully mobilized thousands of non-local jihadists to the conflict area, primarily to Ambon-Maluku. Led by a flamboyant figure of Hadrami descent who was also a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, Ja'far Umar Thalib, Laskar Jihad also marked a significant shift of the Salafi-Wahabi movement from its traditional apolitical-salafism toward jihadi-activism against the backdrop of Indonesia's political transition (2005: chapter 5) . In addition to his coverage of the emergence of Laskar Jihad as a national political phenomenon during the transition period, Noorhaidi (2005: Chapter 2) also eloquently demonstrated the global expansion of Wahabism led by Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the oil boom in 1970s and the perceived threat of the emerging Syi'a movement following the success of the Iran Revolution in 1979.

Following the social movement theory framework, Noorhaidi (2005: 17) focused his analysis on the emergence of the movement and how it mobilized its followers to participate in the jihad movement. He applied the 'political process theory' of social movement theory using a rational choice paradigm to explain how the Laskar Jihad emerged by mobilizing its resources and structures as well as

by using strategic frames to recruit people against a backdrop of political turmoil which provided the political opportunity structure. I have described this process in the previous chapter to demonstrate how a local brawl perpetrated by youngsters in Ambon and Poso shifted to become an episode of protracted communal violence and arena of (global) jihad.

Noorhaidi (2005: Chapter 6) also sketched the social composition of Laskar Jihad activists based on interviews with 125 informants during his extensive fieldwork for more than a year in several cities and town in Indonesia. A simple profile of them follows: their ages ranged between 20 and 35 years old; almost half were university students, dropouts and graduates from a dozen universities, particularly in Central Java. Many came from lower class and *abangan* families, besides those from *santri* and upper-middle and middle class homes, and they were generally enrolled in prestigious science and engineering departments, such as Physics, Electronics and Biology. The life story narratives of some activists in their acquaintanceship with Islam and the movement were also presented in the same chapter including those who had experienced being "reborn as true Muslims." He ends his book by briefly covering the delicate internal tensions and fragmentation of Laskar Jihad prior to and soon after its disbandment in October 2002.

Although Noorhaidi's work has nicely contributed to an understanding of the peculiar phenomenon of the Salafi movement which emerged during Indonesia's political transition, its rational choice approach seems to ignore the rich motives and narratives of the 'foot soldiers' of the movement. Although successfully portraying the rational and political dimensions of the elite, and especially its leader Ja'far Umar Thalib, he missed the colorful emotional dimensions of the movements to be reflected in the narratives of the ordinary and low rank activists. He also left some puzzles accurately articulated by Jemma Purdey (2009: 437) in the concluding remarks of her review: "where are these men today and in what cause or community are they finding their sense of purpose?"

It is such questions, actually, that have driven me to carry out my present research on this short-lived jihad movement by focusing attention on their post-jihad activism: on their current situation and networks, their ideology and identity, and their activities and life trajectory. Lack of attention on the post-movement situation has led us to know very little about the impact of jihad activism on both individual activists and groups as well as the recent dynamics and transformation of Islamic activism in the post-jihad period. However, I go further by expanding the number of units analyzed in my research: not just a single network of actors as focused on by Noorhaidi, that is the Laskar Jihad, but also other networks, less prominent but not necessarily less influential on the post-jihad situation and development, such as the Laskar Mujahidin and 'Other Mujahidin' networks—the latter those who focused their activism on non-paramilitary issues, such as medical, *da'wa*, and other social activities. Sharing a comparable range of Islamic activism networks as the subject of analysis, Abuza's (2007) recent work dedicated his attention to the close link between political Islam and violence in the post-Soeharto Indonesia.

Abuza's recent book was praised by reviewers such as Hefner (2008) and Barton (2007) as a better work than his previous *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2003) which was "edgy and uneven" as Barton (2007: 383) suggests. His focus on a broad spectrum of Islamist movements, from "political Islam" to "militant Islam" and "Islamist terrorism", was also deemed good by Barton. After discussing the three variants of Islamist activism in different chapters, Abuza present a scenario of the future of Islamism in Indonesia (Chapter 5). He basically argues that those variants of Islamist activism have "common motives, divergent methods" so that "[w]hile people and organizations in these categories differ in terms of their willingness to use violence, they are all committed to, at the very least, establishing syari'a courts and having Islamic laws apply to all Muslims." (2007: 84) He even furthermore contends that the rise of Islamist political violence and Islamic parties is not coincidental: "Political Islam's

rise has created the context in which at the very least state authorities have had limited political support to crack down on violence and, more alarmingly, senior government officials have directly interfered with law enforcement and the judicial process" (2007: 3).

Abuza's alarmist approach was criticized by several scholars, including Hefner (2008) and Sidel (2007). For Sidel (2007: 450), Abuza's arguments are "profoundly one-sided and unconvincing," since he chose "samples on the dependent variable" by "drawing selectively from election results, survey data, media coverage, and other sources to depict a broad set of worrying trends: political parties with Islamist agendas are gaining ground in parliament and in local government, and their agenda is being assiduously promoted." Sidel also criticizes Abuza for his lack of attention to an historical comparative analysis of Islamist movements and, furthermore, being "guilty of anti-Islamist and anti-Muslim bias in his one-sided depiction of patterns of violence in Indonesia," by seeing that "the aggressors are found among devout Muslims alone" (2007: 451). In fact, Sidel argues that "most of the worst large-scale atrocities in 1999–2001 were committed by armed Christian groups against Muslim communities in Poso, Maluku, and North Maluku, and it was partly in response to perceived Muslim weakness in the face of Christian attacks in these areas that Islamist paramilitaries like Laskar Jihad were mobilized in the first place" (*ibid*.)

Sidel's last statement was accurately reflected in the case of mobilization for jihad that I discussed in the previous chapter. Following Sidel, I will also challenge Abuza's alarmist conclusions on Islamist groups in contemporary Indonesia by presenting a variety of pictures and flows of Islamist movements based on different trajectories taken by former jihad actors in the post-jihad period. I will show that his static view of Laskar Jihad as an example of a "high violence" movement as presented in his figure on "objectives and tactics of Indonesian Islamic groups" (2007: 10) is certainly out of date and misleading. His analysis in locating KOMPAK as a group aimed at establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia can also be shown,

through the narratives of some former KOMPAK activists, as wrong and inaccurate.

After reviewing some works on communal violence and Islamist movements in contemporary Indonesia, I move forward by presenting a theoretical framework for the study of jihad movements in Indonesia. Although following the pathway taken by Noorhadi Hasan and Van Klinken in the use of the framework of social movement theory to study the phenomena, I head in a different direction by applying a 'cultural approach' which focuses on the dynamics of identity, experience, and emotion of the actors. I will present and discuss my theoretical approach in the next section, starting with a brief review of the literature of social movement theory.

On social movement theories: from collective behavior to 'passionate politics'

The study of social movements has been one of the most lively and interesting areas of sociology, as suggested by Louise Ryan (2006: 169) in her review essay *Rethinking Social Movement Theories in the Twenty-first Century.* Providing a framework for comprehending the dynamics of various social issues, including civil rights, feminism, environmentalism and religious movement, it has been a rich channel for empirical research and theoretical analysis since the 1960s. Reflecting the movements it studies, social movement theory is fragmented, highly charged and argumentative, allowing various concepts, paradigms and priorities to compete.

In this section, I will briefly describe some main theoretical perspectives of the social movement from the old fashioned approach of Collective Behavior that gained prominence in the 1960s up to the recent 'Passionate Politics' approach. The reason for presenting the different streams of social movement theory here is to make sense of the development of key notions and approaches which have informed the choice of my theoretical framework. This is not

intended to be a comprehensive review but instead a laying-out of some key concepts of each approach and how emotion was treated by each thus leading to alternative concepts and paradigms. Here I will present four main theoretical perspectives of social movement study, namely, Collective Behavior, Resource Mobilization, Political Process, and Cultural Approach.[3)]

The Collective Behavior approach, based on the structural-functional school, basically considered social movements to be the side effects of over-rapid social change. According to Neil Smelser (1962), one of the key thinkers, in a system made up of balanced subsystems, collective behavior indicates tensions which homoeostatic rebalancing mechanisms cannot accommodate temporarily. The rise of collective behaviors at times of rapid and large-scale transformations had a double meaning: "reflecting, on the one hand, the inability of institutions and social control mechanism to reproduce social cohesions; and, on the other, attempts by society to react to crisis situations through the development of shared beliefs, on which to base new foundations for collective solidarity" (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 4).

During this period, collective behavior tended to be seen under the same rubric of phenomena such as crowds, panic, mobs, manias, fashions, and so on, that characterized as irrational forms of behavior actions commonly classified as a kind of deviance. Until the 1960s many students of collective behavior had focused their attention on emotion which had been perceived as a key element for understanding all political actions that took place outside ordinary political institutions. Emotion, however, was basically regarded in negative and pejorative ways, as in studies conducted by Gustave Le Bon on crowds and Sigmund Freud on flawed personality. Goodwin and collaborators (2000: 69) argue the flawed ways in which emotion has been treated by two social science traditions, the crowd and the

3) I share Della Porta and Diani's (1999: 3) contention that such a distinction of social movement theory perspectives should be considered as arbitrary. First, there is variety in each perspective which cannot be simply merged; second, scholars are able to borrow concepts and insights from different theoretical perspectives; and finally, some scholars have subsequently transformed the perspective/s through their research.

Freudian, as follows. The crowd tradition portrays emotion as coming directly from crowds (or demagogues), having little to do with individuals' own lives and goals, and only responding to the occurrence in the immediate surroundings with little significance. The Freudian tradition, on the other hand, see emotions as the outcome of individual personality conflicts rather than as responses to the social environment, thus only few flawed people are attracted to movements.

In contrast to Collective Behavior, the Resource Mobilization approach sees collective mobilization as rational action. By the early 1970s many scholars who had studied social movements had either become activists or sympathizers of the movement they engaged with. Throwing away pathological explanations, sociologists turned to rational-actor and organizational models, shifting from motivational "why" to strategic "how" questions (Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta 2000: 70). Thus they proposed a new way to see collective movement as an "extension of the conventional forms of political action; the actors engage in this act in [a] rational way, following their interests; organization and movement 'entrepreneurs' have an essential role in the mobilization of collective resources on which action is founded" (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 7). Collective action, hence, is seen simply as "politics by other means."

Some principal scholars of Resource Mobilization, namely Mayer Zald, Anthony Oberschall and Charles Tilly defined collective actions as a "rational, purposeful and organized action" (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 8). According to this perspective, protest actions stem from a costs and benefits calculation and are affected by the availability of resources. Paying particular attention to the transformation of discontent into mobilization, it views the capacity for mobilization as relying on either the material resources (such as work, money, concrete benefits, services) or on the non-material resources (such as authority, moral engagement, faith, friendship) belonging to the group.

Formulating an influential "mobilization model", Charles Tilly (1978) portrayed collective action as a function of interests, organization, the mobilization of resources, power, repression (or facilita-

tion) and opportunities (or threats). In his framework, these variables were presented as "structural" in nature, independent of the individuals' beliefs and feelings (Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta 2000: 70). Therefore, although implicitly recognizing that emotions matter for people's interest and their collective identities, as well as emotional reactions mediating between repression, opportunities, and threats, and actual collective action, Tilly's rationalistic and organizational idioms and formulas dampened sustained analysis of emotions.

The Political Process approach shares Resources Mobilization's view of the rationality of the actors in social movement. Yet it pays more systematic attention to the political and institutional environment in which social movements occur, with 'political opportunity structure' as one of its key notions. Sydney Tarrow (1983: 28; 1989: 35; see also Della Porta and Diani 1999: 10) developed a theoretical framework that integrates some variables, namely, the degree of openness or closure of formal political access, the degree of stability or instability of political alignments, the availability and strategic posture of potential allies and political conflicts between and within elites.

Dissatisfied with resource mobilization's ignorance on the issues of grievances, sociologist Doug McAdam's proposed a notion of "cognitive liberation" which was intended to capture the subjective processes by which people suddenly come to believe in the likelihood of protest. McAdam (1982: 49) defines the concept as capturing how "the altered responses of members to a particular challenger serve to transform evolving political conditions into a set of 'cognitive cues' signifying to insurgents that the political system is becoming increasingly vulnerable to challenge". This notion, however, was criticized by Goodwin's collaborators (2000: 71) as purely cognitive, so whereas the term "liberation" implies stimulating emotions yet the term "cognitive" then rejects that possibility. Thus, albeit the term seems to entail a radical change in perspective, cognitive liberation was merely an instrumental means to comprehend available information about the possibility of repression.

Sharing the "instrumental approach to questions of collective action" (Calhoun 2001: 49), Resource Mobilization and Political

Process approaches of social movements have been 'hegemonic' in recent English-language social science. As argued by Goodwin and Jasper (2004: 3-4), political process theory (PPT) has developed its tradition and dominated the field of social movement research by, "powerfully shaping its conceptual landscape, theoretical discourse, and research agenda." There were at least two critical achievements of this approach as formulated in two influential books, namely, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements; Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing* edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald published in 1996 and *Dynamics of Contention* written collaboratively by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, published in 2001. The former attempts to develop a synthesis of social movement studies by taking into account and emphasizing the importance of the same three broad sets of factors to analyze the emergence and development of social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framing. The latter, even more ambitious and bold in objective and scope, formulates eloquently a synopsis of the book in a quite long passage on the back cover:

> Dissatisfied with compartmentalization of studies concerning strikes, wars, revolutions, social movements, and other forms of political struggle, Mc Adam, Tarrow and Tilly identify causal mechanisms and processes that recur across a wide range of contentious politics. Critical of the static, single actor models…that have prevailed in the field, they shift the focus of analysis to dynamic interaction. Doubtful that large, complex series of events such as revolutions and social movements conform to general laws, they break events into smaller episodes, and then identify recurrent mechanisms and processes within them. *Dynamics of contention* examines and compare eighteen contentious episodes drawn from many different parts of the world since the French Revolution, probing them for consequential and widely applicable mechanisms, for example brokerage, category formation, and elite defection…The authors spell out the implication of their approach for explanation of revolution, nationalism, and democratization, then lay out a more general program for study of contentious episodes wherever and whenever they occur.

There have been, however, some criticisms articulated toward this dominant approach. Goodwin and Jasper (2004: 3-4) argue that the most important weakness of this perspective derives from the same sources as its popularity, a particularly strong bias in favor of metaphors of 'structure.' Thus, PPT sees and emphasizes 'structural' factors (i.e., factors that are relatively stable over time and outside the control of movement actors) more readily than others. Despite its extensive influence, nevertheless, PPT remains conceptually tangled insofar as political process theorists have been unable to reach agreement about the definitions of its basic concepts. As a consequence, "this imprecision has allowed PPT to be applied in diverse settings, but it has hindered the testing and refinement of theoretical propositions."

Political process theorists have actually attempted to include and combine cultural elements into their framework, namely 'mobilizing structures,' which contain much that is not structural, and 'cultural framing' as presented by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996). However, as criticized by Goodwin and Jasper (2004: 4-5), they tend to treat and analyze 'non-structural factors' as though they were structural factors. As a consequence, they "tend to wash the meaning of and fluidity out of strategy, agency, and culture so that they will look more like structures."

The deficiencies of PPT in approaching cultural issues have also been discussed and criticized persuasively by Poletta (2004). Poletta critiques the distinction built up between 'objective' 'structural' opportunities and 'subjective, cultural' framings as argued by McAdam (1994), in which culture is located in the actor's framing efforts. Poletta (2004: 98) suggests that such a division between structure and culture has proven unhelpful in sociological analysis generally and in social movement analysis in particular. Such an argument, Poletta (2004: 99) contends, produces two confusions: *first,* since the 'structure' is counterposed both to agency and to 'culture', the latter two are often implicitly aligned; and *second,* culture is perceived as merely a sphere of activity and target of protest rather than as a dimension of all structures and practices, including political ones.

Here we come to the Cultural Approach of social movement theory. Goodwin and Jasper (2004: vii) describe the simple distinction between the 'cultural approach' and PPT as follows: while the latter emphasizes economic resources, political structures, formal organization and social network, the former, drawn partly from symbolic interactionism, focuses on frames, identities, meaning, and emotions. This distinction, or simple division, to a certain extent parallels those in the discipline of sociology at large: the latter reflected in such approaches as Marxism or system theory, whereas the former is reflected in micro-sociological, constructionist approaches such as interactionism, pragmatism, and ethnomethodology.

The rise of the cultural approach in social movement theory echoes a 'cultural turn' in social science. Kate Nash (2001: 77) suggests two forms of 'cultural turn' in social theory: "the 'epistemological' case in which culture is seen as constitutive of social relations and identities; the 'historical' case in which culture is seen as playing [an] unprecedented role in constituting social relations and identities in contemporary society." Furthermore, Nash (2001: 79) contends that one of the main reasons for the 'cultural turn' in sociology is the stress on agency and subjectivity and the repudiation of deterministic models of society associated with structuralist-functionalism.

One of the important issues of related to the 'cultural turn' in social movement studies is that of bringing passion/emotion back into the study of social movements. As argued by Deborah B. Gould (2004: 157), attention to emotions generates a new landscape for social movement research by revealing important insights and illuminating participants' subjectivities and motivations, and, furthermore, helping in building forceful accounts of a movement trajectory, strategic choices, internal culture, conflicts, and other movement processes and characteristics. Gould (2004: 158) rejects the political process theories' approach to "domesticate the emotional components by emphasizing the strategic uses of emotions and thereby incorporating them into a rational actor model," as it "would strip them of all of their non-cognitive, non-instrumental attributes, thereby depleting them of some of their most interesting characteristics

and sapping them of a large component of their conceptual force" (2004: 160).

Gould (2004: 161) criticizes political process theory as emphasizing rationality and strategic thinking as it often creates a picture of protesters as "exceptionally cognitive" and "unusually dispassionate" and "providing no insight into why such dispassionate people would ever be motivated to disrupt their daily routines and engage in collective action." Furthermore, Gould shares with scholars from a wide range of disciplines that have challenged the dichotomy of thought/feeling and the equation of emotionality with irrationality, the contention that feeling and thinking are indivisibly intertwined, each necessary to the others. To restate this, Gould (2004: 162) argues, "emotions shape people's notions of what is politically possible and desirable."

As part of a concert of efforts to incorporate emotions into social movement theory, Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta (2001) co-edited a collection of articles in a book entitled *Passionate Politics; Emotions and Social Movements.* They argue that emotions, like other aspects of culture such as cognitive meaning or moral principles, can be seen as an aspect of all social action and social relations, formed by social expectations as much as the product of individual personalities. Opposed to the false dualism of cognition and emotion, they (2001: 16) suggest that "emotions are important in all phases of political action, by all types of political actors, across variety of institutional arenas." Following the 'passionate politics' approach, I will show in the rest of this chapter how it has been used to study jihad movements in Indonesia.

Jihad as 'passionate politics': theoretical framework

The 'passionate politics' approach comes as a critique and an alternative to the hegemonic 'structural approach' and 'rational action' perspective in social movement research. Following this approach, instead of viewing jihad movement as the product of struc-

tural strain or an instance of rational choice action, I argue that the jihad movement is a collective action involving both cognitive and affective processes in the taking of action, in the dynamics of the action, and its repercussions. Without necessarily rejecting the roles played by structural factors and rational aspects in social movements, this approach emphasizes the critical roles played by emotions in different stages of collective action: in the making of the jihad movement, in the ongoing and dynamics of the jihad movement, as well as in the aftermath of the movement. Combined with the life story approach, it assumes that the dynamics of identity and emotions are reflected in the life story narratives of the actors. At the level of the life story narratives of the jihad actors, it suggests that emotions play an important role in the process of becoming a jihad actor in the *pre*-jihad, in making meaning *during* the jihad participation, as well as in shaping the life trajectory of the actors in the *post*-jihad period.

Following the passionate politics approach, I also discuss the important role of network and ideology in the different stages of the jihad movement: in the recruitment process, in the ongoing movement's participation, and in the aftermath of participation in jihad movement. I argue that the social network and ideological framework play an important role in the recruitment process which leads to participation in jihad movement; it is the social network which bring the actor closer to the movement and then it is its ideological framework which bring causes and reasons for the participation. As presented in the previous chapter, I distinguish three types of Islamic activism, namely, *pious*, *jihadi*, and *political* Islamism. I contend that each type of Islamic activism contains a particular kind of social network and ideological framework which influence the ways in which a jihad actor interprets their jihad experiences and, eventually, influence the life trajectory of the actor in the post-jihad period.

How do social networks influence the life trajectory of the actor? I argue it happened through the dynamics of three kinds of social network, namely, *core-network*, *tactical-network*, and *extended-network*. Core-network is a social network through which the actor joins the jihad; tactical-network is a social network of jihadist networks

which occur temporarily during the jihad period; and extended-network is an extension of social networks which develop in the aftermath of jihad participation. I use the concept of social network in two meanings: first, the social network as the link between concrete actors through specific ties as articulated by a 'realist' view; and second, social networks as "phenomenological realities" and "networks of meaning" as suggested by phenomenologists, such as White (Diani 2003: 6; Passy 2003: 27). I furthermore argue that the *core-network*, the social network through which the actor joins the jihad, is the most important network that provides the actor with an *ideological framework* and acts as '*ideological network'* for the actor. Here I propose a sort of hypothesis: the stronger relationship between actor and its *core-network* the more likely actor will sustain engagement with the network of activism through which actor becomes involved in joining jihad. The converse applies, the weaker the relationship between the actor and their *core-network* the more likely the actor will disengage from the network of activism through which actor might join jihad.

I continue the analysis by combining the dynamics of social networks of the actor and pattern of membership affiliation that apply within the group with which the actor engages. As explained in Chapter 1, I follow the distinction between *exclusive affiliation* and *multiple affiliations* suggested by Della Porta and Diani (1999) and contend that the different types of Islamic activism apply different patterns of membership affiliation: *pious* and *jihadi* activism commonly apply *exclusive affiliation* while *political* activism commonly applies *multiple affiliations.* Here I propose the hypothesis: the more extensive the *extended-network* of the *political* activist the more likely the activist will play a larger role within its *core-network;* the more extensive the *extended-networks* of *pious* or *jihadi* activist the more likely the activist will have trouble with its *core-network.* I will show how these hypotheses are substantiated in the life story narratives of the actors in the next empirical chapters (Chapters 4-6).

In the next sections, I will present some key concepts of the passionate politics approach, namely identity, emotion, and narrative, and how I will use them to discuss jihad movements in Indone-

sia. I will also elaborate two critical concepts, namely social network and ideology, and how it will be used in this research.

- ***Identity in social movement studies***

Identity had been a minor issue in social movement studies until the rise of the so-called "New Social Movement" (NSM)[4] in the late 1960s, especially in the aftermath of the 1968 student movement in France and the following waves of actions. It claims that what is 'new' in this movement was its shift of central issues from 'class and ideology' as the character of working class and labor movements to 'ethics, life style and identity' as the character of the new movements in the post-industrial society (Touraine 1981), the information society (Melucci 1989, 1996) and the network society (Castells 2004). The main attention is primarily paid to the complicated relationship between identity and collective action of the social movements in the radical shift of the society. The notion of identity, as argued by Melucci (1996: 45), refers to three features: "the continuity of a subject over and beyond variations in time and its adaptations to the environment; the delimitation of this subject with respect to others; the ability to recognize and to be recognized."

Collective identity is a crucial concept in social movement study because it is the basis for the making of collective action. As argued by Della Porta and Diani (1999: 86), it happens through "the identification of actors involved in conflict, the activation of trusting relationship among them, and the establishment of connections linking events from different periods." I will use the definition of collective identity formulated by Poletta and Jasper (2001: 285):

> [I]ndividual's cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of shared status or relation, which may be imagined

4) The claim of the "newness" of NSMs was problematized and criticized by Calhoun (1993) by demonstrating that some elements of NSMs could also be found in social movements in the late eighteenth and especially early ninteenth centuries.

> rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a personal identity.

This definition stresses simultaneously the cognitive, moral and emotional connection of the individual to a broader social entity; furthermore it also emphasizes identity as fluid and relational rather than a fixed category. Following Della Porta and Diani (1999: 85, emphasis added) I approach identity *not* as "an autonomous object" or "a property of social actors" but "the process by which social actors recognize themselves—and are recognized by others—as part of broader groupings. On the basis of such *allegiances*, they give *meaning* to their own *experiences* and to their *development* over time." Della Porta and Diani consider the relationship between the individual and collective dimension in defining identity involves an intricate process. On the one hand, individuals define and redefine individual projects and possibilities for action through the construction, maintenance, and revitalization of identities. On the other hand, the production of identity always involves a social process and cannot be simplified merely as a psychological mechanism. In sum, there is always a constant tension and interplay between personal and collective dimension in the making of collective identity.

Before moving forward, it is important to notice some problematic paradoxes entailed in the use of the concept of identity. There are at least three crucial problems to be recognized as suggested by Della Porta and Diani (1999: 86), namely, first, the concurrently static and dynamic nature of social identification; second, the existence of multiple identities or "individuals' feelings of belonging to several different collectivities"; third, the paradox of the role of identity within the framework of rational interpretations of collective actions. The last paradox is the most complicated issue to deal with and where the passionate politics attempted to go beyond the rejection of such a dichotomy between thought/feeling and reason/emotion. However, such a contention was just the beginning of a long endeavor to develop a more powerful framework through a series of systematic studies rather than the final resolution of the paradox.

In studying the relationship between identity and social movement, I will follow Jasper's (1985: 85-6) suggestion to distinguish three kinds of identity: *personal identity, collective identity,* and *movement identity. Personal identity* is defined as a sense of self, combining attributes, activities and interests, and identification with collectivities that emerge from the personal biographies of individuals, whilst making use of wider cultural meanings. *Collective identity* "consists of perception of group distinctiveness, boundaries, and interests, for something closer to a community than a category."Although defined as independent by both individuals and movements, collective identity strongly links to personal identity. On the other hand, collective identity varies from *movement identity,* "which arises when a collection of groups and individuals perceive themselves (and are perceived by others) as a force in explicit pursuit of social change." Yet both collective and movement identities can be a factor to personal identity, which usually consists of a complex blend of identifications. Thus, Jasper concludes as follows: "*personal identities exist on the biographical level; collective identities are part of the broader culture; the movement identities arise from the interaction between internal movement culture and the broader culture.*" (1985: 87; emphasis in original)

From these abstract definitions I will present a concrete example through the biographical data of a life history informant named Awod Umar, a jihad activist from Solo. Here is part of Awod's *personal identities*: a young man born in Solo in 1980 from a Gujarati descent father and an Arabic descent mother. Grown up in a Muslim devout (*santri)* family, he went to Islamic school from primary to high school. Due to his misbehavior, he dropped out from high school. Up to here his *personal identity* intersects with his *collective identity:* son of Gujarati-Arabic parents who grew up in the city of Solo, the heart of Javanese culture, under strong Islamic traditions. Gujarati-Arabic blood manifests in his appearance: a quite dark skin color with sharp-edged nose; but the way he speaks reflects the strong influence of Javanese culture: besides using the low-level Javanese (*ngoko),* he occasionally employs upper middle-level Javanese (*kro-*

mo madya) words—something which *not* all Javanese-born, like me, are able to use. Boundaries between identities are never fixed and clear-cut; it is the subject of negotiation and reinvention. It also reflects the existence of multiple identities of an individual. Rather than a fixed category, *identity* is the result of a set of social process of identification: to the self, the collectivity, and the movement.

While Awod's *ethnic identity*, as a Gujarati-Arabic descent who speaks excellent Javanese, is somewhat ambiguous from the very beginning, his *religious identity* seems a little bit more obvious: Awod is a Muslim who was educated in Islamic schools from early childhood. But that did not mean that his story was a linear one. While a teenager, his behavior seemed at odds with his *santri* family culture: drinking alcohol, using drugs, gambling, and stealing—all things which were forbidden by conventional Islamic teachings. Anyhow, he remained identifying himself as a Muslim man—though with 'bad behavior'. Nevertheless he had eventually turned his life trajectory when he was 18 years old following a period of identity crisis in the wake of *reformasi:* attracted by the festive season of the rising of new political parties he left his 'street-bad boy' subculture and joined a paramilitary group affiliated with the Islamist party, Brigade Hizbullah. Thus he enhanced drastically his identification to the Islamic group and his personal commitment to Islamic teachings in a process of shifting toward a new *collective identity*: being or becoming a Muslim activist. One year later he was elected leader of the Brigade Hizbullah and then joined the jihad movement in Ambon in 2000. Hence, a *movement identity* was formed through his affiliation with Brigade Hizbullah and furthermore through his participation in jihad movement in Ambon.

I also share Jasper's (1985: 87) framework in making the distinction and breaking down of *movement identity* into levels: *organizational identity* (identification with a particular group of protest), *tactical identity* (identification with the use of particular tactic-like direct action or being in some wing of a movement, like the radical vanguard), and *activist identity* (identification with a broader activist subculture that might nourish several distinct movement). In the

case of the conflicts in Ambon and Poso, some jihadists attributed either *organizational identity* such as participants of Laskar Jihad or Laskar Mujahidin; or *tactical identity* such as participants of "*pasukan bakar"* (the arsonist troops) or "*pasukan linggis"* (the looting troops); or with *activist identity* as a jihad activist.

- ***The link of identity and emotions in social movements***

But how does, then, identity link to emotion? "Emotions do not merely accompany our deepest desires and satisfactions, they constitute them, permeating our ideas, identities, and interests." They are, as Jasper (1998: 399) suggests by quoting Collins (1990: 28): "the ''glue'' of solidarity—and what mobilizes conflict." Suggesting the primary role played by emotions in social life, Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta (2001: 10) argue: "Emotions are part of the "stuff" connecting human beings to each other and the world around them, like an unseen lens that colors all our thought, actions, perceptions, and judgments."

Jasper (1998: 399-400) describes that recently sociologists have rediscovered emotions, by emphasizing how emotions are culturally constructed rather than being automatic somatic responses. In contrast to older schools of thought that viewed emotions as natural sensations, originating in the body and hence potentially less controllable or less "rational", the constructionist view emotions as constituted more by shared social meanings than automatic physiological states. Some theorists, as Jasper described, argue that bodily changes must be interpreted before they shift to become emotions; while others take the stronger view that bodies change only in reaction to cultural situations associated with particular emotions. Unlike the previous negative and pejorative interpretation of emotions, the new approach views emotion in a more sympathetic way.

While rejecting the supremacy of the rational choice approach in shaping human action, it attempts to build a conceptual bridge with cognition and moral values. On the link of emotions to moral values, Jasper (1998: 400-1) argues that emotions often arise from perceived infractions of moral rules. By referring to de Sousa's (1976) notion

of "paradigm scenario", Jasper describes how emotions commonly unfold in the context of common human narratives such the death of a friend leading one through several predictable emotional phases while other unexpected and unpleasant events may lead to surprise, sadness, anger, and outrage. Goodwin and collaborators (2001: 10) refer to Thomas Scheff and others who contend that "the emotions most directly connected to moral sensibilities, such as shame, guilt, and pride, are especially pervasive as motivators of action." Jasper (1998: 400-1) also suggests that emotions involve beliefs and assumptions open to cognitive persuasion. Emotions rely at least partly on cognitive understandings and appraisals of objects as indicated by the fact that emotions normally have objects, for example, of which we are afraid, surprised, or we enjoy. Thus, he argues, this allows learning and adaptation to one's environment.

Let's say that emotions are important aspects of collective identity in the course of social movement. But the next question is: how? It is obvious that emotions are complex phenomena and exist in every corner of social life, including social movements. So, how do emotions play a role in social movements? To discuss this issue I follow a conceptual framework proposed by Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta (2004) in distinguishing four kinds of emotional dimensions in social movements, namely, *reflex emotions*, *affective emotions*, *moral emotions*, and *moods.* As will be discussed later in this chapter, I found that the first three kinds of emotional dimensions of social movements formulated above are useful concepts to explain the dynamics of identity and emotions as reflected in the life story narratives of the informants. Before explaining how they work I will describe briefly the three concepts below.

Goodwin and his colleagues define *reflex emotions* as certain emotions that "arise suddenly, without conscious cognitive processing, in an involuntary fashion." (2004: 416) They suggest that these emotions involve the processing of information beyond normal cognition mechanism: "quicker, more primitive neurological routes that allow us to respond immediately." They list six kinds of main reflex emotions, namely, fear, surprise, anger, disgust, joy and sadness,

and, by referring to Elkman (1972), claim that the expression of these emotions is similar across cultures. These emotions are often perceived by people as the exemplar of all emotions, being also mistakenly associated with irrationality: "out of control, with attendant bodily changes, causing us to act in ways that feel automatic and irrepressible, and passing quickly" (2004: 416).

Unlike reflex emotions, *affective emotions*, such as love and hate, respect and trust, normally persist over a long period of time. Goodwin and collaborators (2004: 418) define affects as "positive and negative commitments and investments that we have toward people, places, ideas and things." By referring to Kanter (1972) and Zurcher and Snow (1981), they contend that commitment to a group or cause may be based on affection, as well as rational calculation and morality. They also suggest that affects give people basic orientations toward the world, especially what people care most deeply about, and mention trust and respect as examples of crucial factors in politics.

Goodwin and collaborators (2004: 422) define *moral emotions* as "emotions arise out of complex cognitive understandings and moral awareness, reflecting our comprehension of the world around us and sometimes our place in it." They suggest moral emotions as perhaps the largest group of emotions in social movements which reflect cultural variations and constructions much more than reflex emotions do. They also suggest that some of these moral emotions reflect, frequently implicit, in our own actions. For example, people feel pride when they follow what they perceive to be sound moral rules and, conversely, feel shame or guilt when they do not. Other emotions involve judgments about actions of others, such as outrage or jealousy. Moral emotions sometimes are used by an organizer to define a movement, such as gay right movements often underscore pride, animal rights groups highlight compassion while the oppressed movements focus on dignity. Jasper (1997, also Jasper and Poulsen 1995) propose 'moral shocks' as a critical episode which often lead to inclination to action. Goodwin and collaborators state that as cultural deeds, moral emotions are especially closely tied to cognition, which are created and reinforced through narratives and discourse (2004: 423).

I will also use the distinction of emotions generated within a social movement as proposed by Jasper (1998). He distinguishes two kinds of emotions as produced and developed within a social movement, namely, *reciprocal* and *shared* emotions. The earlier emotions concern "participants' ongoing feelings toward each other," while the latter are "consciously held by a group at the same time, but they do not have the other group members as their objects" (Jasper 1998: 417). *Reciprocal emotions* consist of the close affective bounds of friendship, love, solidarity, and loyalty, and other specific emotions they induce which together engender what Goodwin (1997) calls the 'libidinal economy' of a movement, generating many of the pleasures of actions, sometimes in forms of ritual of a movement. *Shared emotions*, significantly influenced by ideological framework of the movements, foster anger and hostility toward enemies and antagonists, or resentment and cynicism over government policies and actions, et cetera. These two kinds of emotions reinforce each other, nurturing solidarity among movement activists, and thus building a movement's culture. Jasper suggests, "They are key sources of identification within a movement." What is also interesting is that attention to emotion cultures may help in explaining, as suggested by Poletta and Amenta (2001: 309), trajectories of movements and eventually, I argue, of its activists.

If the crucial role of emotions in identity-based social movement is recognized, the next challenge is methodological since "the subject matter of emotions also poses unique methodological dilemma," as suggested by Poletta and Amenta (2001: 310). Here I assert the contention that the dynamics of identity and emotions are reflected in the life story narratives of the actors. I turn to the issue of narratives in social movement in the next section.

- ***On narratives in social movements***

Why is there a need to link social movements to narratives, and how? Here, we come to the 'narrative turn' in social movement studies. According to Jasper (2004: 241), it is part of the 'cultural turn' in

social movement studies which took, first, the form of frames (Snow et al. 1986), then collective identity (Taylor and Whitier 1992; Gamson 1995), eventually as discourse (Steinberg 1998, 1999) and later narrativity (Poletta 1998). This development, as suggested by Davis (2002: 3), is clearly part of a renewed emphasis in these fields on human agency and its efficacy, on context and the embeddedness of human experience, and the centrality of language to the negotiation of meaning and the construction of identity in everyday life. It is interesting, however, to notice that narrative "has barely been explored by social movement researchers," as Gary Alan Fine (1995 as quoted by Davis 2002: 4) has observed. The abandonment of narrative seems a likely consequence of the continued swing of theoretical orientations that focus on structural and interest-oriented explanations, thus overlooking ideational factors. According to Davis, such negligence is quite surprising because "social movements are dominated by stories and story-telling, and narrative goes to the heart of the very cultural and ideational interpretation, public discourse, movement culture, and collective identity."

The analysis of narrative, Davis (2002: 4) suggests, resolves key limitations in the framing perspective and elucidates interior features of identity building and meaning-making in social activism. It also illuminates another side of movement growth, internal dynamics, and public influence, and attends to the cultural dimensions of activism that have been disregarded in movement research. Furthermore, Davis (2002: 10) advocates a linkage between 'cultural turn' and 'narrative turn' in social movement studies: "the cultural turn in social movement research has opened the way for, and would greatly benefit from, another development: a new focus on narrative as a social practice."

How does social movement link to narratives? I will start by presenting the concept of narrative used in this research. To answer the question "what makes a story a story?" Poletta (2006: 8) argues that a story, like a speech or a song, but unlike a chronicle, a frame, or an ideology, "has an identifiable beginning, middle, and end." Using

the term *story* and *narrative* interchangeably,[5] Poletta suggests that stories usually begin by instituting a setting, a time, and place where an event will unfold. She furthermore argues that "All stories have characters and a point of view or points of view from which the events in story are experienced." (2006: 9) She introduces the important role of *plot*, the logic of the narrative, in the making of story. More than chronology, she argues, events are configured by plot, "the logic that makes recounted events meaningful. Plot is the structure of the story." By referring to Polkinghorne (1988), she suggests that without plot, events would be mere occurrences, discontinuous and separate moments rather than episodes in an unfolding story (Poletta 1998: 421).

Linking narrative and identity, she contends that the two operate in everyday context. Referring to narrative psychologist, Poletta (2006: 12) suggests that action occurs, "not on the basis of identities defined in categorical terms but by locating events within an unfolding life-story." Yet the stories that we tell ourselves, she contends, bring our actions into line with our identities, either personal or collective ones. "In telling the story of our becoming, as an individual, a nation, a people, we define who we are," she asserts. On collective identity, she argues that narratives may be used strategically to enhance its entity or may pave the way for the development of collective action. Here she suggests that emotions play role. She explains how stories of exodus, revolution, enemies defeated, threats obviated enhance national identities by "stimulating emotions of fear, pride, longing, replaced by determination, grief replaced by joy" (2006: 12).

Of course, the dynamics of identity and emotions in the course of social movements as reflected in the narratives do not occur in a social vacuum. They are closely linked to social networks and the

5) She refers to Charles Tilly's (2002) concept of 'standard stories' as similar to what she calls 'everyday stories': "sequential, explanatory accounts of self-motivated human action." (see *Stories, Identities, and Social Change*). She also refers to the definition made by Lewis P.Hinchman and Sandra K.Hinchman (1997) *Memory, Identity, Community: The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences*. See footnote no. 9 in chapter 1. In conclusion (pp. 180-1), she discusses further some reasons why she refuses the distinction made by some scholars regarding the two, including the notion that story is descriptive while narrative is explanatory.

ideological framework of the actors. I move to this issue in the next section.

- ***Network and ideology in social movements***

The important role of social networks in the making of social movements is prominent and less debatable (Swain, 2001, McAdam 1986, Gould 1993). The puzzle specifically is, as Passy (2003) suggests: how does it matter? One of the most important factors explaining an individual's recruitment is previous contact with someone in the movement as suggested by Snow, Zurcher, Jr., and Eckland-Olson (1980), and includes prior activism in other causes, especially participation in 'high-risk' activism (McAdam 1986). Some scholars distinguish two kinds of links to the movements, namely, *formal* and *informal* ties (Della Porta 1988; Kriesi 1993; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). While the former refers to membership in organizations, the latter are defined as interpersonal links such as family, friendships, and social contacts. As will be evident in this research, all the informants had previously engaged with Islamist activism, though through different networks and at a different level of engagement. In the process which led to their engagement with particular Islamic activism, *informal* ties were crucial factors especially the *peer-network* and *family-network.* After being involved in a particular Islamic movement, following a particular ideological framework, in the later stage they became involved in the jihad movement in various ways: for some 'moral shocks' played a crucial role while for another *fatwas* made by Salafi clerics were the most powerful factors. In some cases, the social network of particular Islamic activism played a role in maintaining commitment in between the two periods of jihad movement, as the case of some *jihadi* activists.

Yet most studies on the role of social networks in social movements primarily focus on the mobilization process, particularly on the recruitment process leading to participation. The role of social networks in the aftermath of collective action or in the post-movement period has been significantly overlooked. This research, in contrast,

pays deep attention to this issue. As mentioned earlier, I argue that the dynamics of social networks play a significant role in influencing the life trajectory of the jihad actor in the post-jihad period through three kinds of social networks: *core-network*, *tactical-network* and *extended-networks*. Moving in this direction, I use the concept of social networks not merely as the link between concrete actors through specific ties, as articulated by the 'realist' view, but also as 'phenomenological realities' and 'networks of meaning' as suggested by some phenomenologists (Diani 2003: 6; Passy 2003: 27). As argued by Jasper and Poulsen (1995: 495; emphasis in original), "networks are important *because* of the meanings they transmit." It is through the shared meanings that emotions flow and experienced by the actors. Here ideology comes into movement.

Ideology is a crucial element but has so far been quite overlooked in the studies of social movements.[6] Buechler (2000: 200, as cited by Ahmad 2005: 19) even contends that "ideology has become an orphan in social movement theory." Oliver and Johnston (2000: 45) in a review article on the link of frames and ideologies in social movement research suggest that the turn toward framing theory and away from ideology was mainly because of the legacy of pejorative theories of ideology which tied up the social movement studies in the early 1970s. While appreciating frames and framing process as powerful and productive concepts in studying social movement, they suggest that the distinction should be made between the two concepts: "framing points to process, while ideology points to content."

Oliver and Johnston (2000: 37) summarize the distinction between the two as follows: "Frame theory is rooted in linguistic studies of interaction, and points to the way shared assumptions and meanings shape the interpretation of events. Ideology is rooted in

6) In a quick scan of some recent publications on social movements I found that there is no index of *ideologies* entry in the Index of *Dynamics of Contention* (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Moevements* (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald eds. 1996), *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (Kriesi *et al* eds. 1999) and *Global Movements* (McDonald 2006). Yet there are a few *ideology(ies)* entries in *Social Movements, An Introduction* by Della Porta and Diani (1999) and *The Social Movements Reader* by Goodwin and Jasper (2003).

politics and the study of politics, and points to coherent systems of ideas which provide theories of society coupled with value commitments and normative implications for promoting or resisting social change." Thus, they suggest that ideology is a larger conceptual tool than frame: ideologies can function as frames and can embrace frames. While frame theory offers a relatively shallow conception of the transmission of political ideas as marketing and resonating, ideology covers the social construction processes of thinking, reasoning, educating, and socializing.

I follow the line of argument of Oliver and Johnston and their definition of ideology as "systems of ideas which couple understandings of how the world works with ethical, moral, and normative principles that guide personal and collective action" (2000: 44). By this definition, Oliver and Johnston assert that ideology links a 'theory' about society with a cluster of values and norms. By 'theory', they mean, in a broad sense, "systems or sets of beliefs that explain how social arrangements came to be and how they might be changed or strengthened." While values and norms consist of what is morally right and wrong as well as norms about what to do. Although this definition seems to lack emphasis on affective aspects, its stress on moral elements bridge the realm of moral emotions.

Linking this definition of ideology to the cases of non-local jihad actors from three types of Islamic activism in this research, I argue that there is a cluster of values and norms which they share as commonalities, at least three, as mentioned in the previous chapter, namely: the importance and the virtue of Muslim solidarity, the primacy of Islamic law (*syari'a),* the justification and the urgency of 'defensive jihad' in response to persecution of Muslims in eastern Indonesia. Yet they each has different 'theory' to 'change' the world around them, as reflected in the three types of Islamic activism: through political struggle for *political* activism; through cultivating and disseminating piety for *pious* activism; through armed struggle and the use of violence for *jihadi* activism.

Linking the nexus between social network and ideology, I develop an argument on the relationship between particular types of

Islamic movement and particular patterns of membership affiliation. Following the distinction between *exclusive affiliation* and *multiple affiliations* suggested by Della Porta and Diani (1999) I contend that the three types of Islamic activism apply different patterns of membership affiliation: *pious* and *jihadi* activism commonly apply *exclusive affiliation* while *political* activism commonly applies *multiple affiliations.* While exclusive affiliation means that its members usually affiliate only to its own group, multiple affiliations means that its members usually affiliate to different kinds of group. The different pattern of membership affiliation to the group also link to the dynamics of social networks to influence the life trajectory of actor in the post-jihad period as suggested earlier.

- ***Identity and emotions in jihad movements: analytical framework***

Here I attempt to link the passionate politics approach which link identity and emotion in social movement to my fieldwork data. First, I develop an analytical framework of *Muslim identity*. Following the distinction made by Jasper (1985), I distinguish three kinds of Muslim identity, namely Muslim as *personal identity,* as *collective identity,* and as *movement identity.* Muslim as *personal identity* means a sense of self based on identification to Islam as religion and faith which reflects in range of personal loyalties and commitment to religious teachings and symbols; Muslim as *collective identity* means identification to the Muslim community as a social group with distinct boundaries and interests; Muslim as *movement identity* means identification to a particular movement based on religious values, identity and symbols. Muslim as *collective identity* can be a basis of mobilization for social movement; for example when a Muslim group or interest was attacked or harmed by 'others'. The call for *jihad* movement, or holy war in the name of Islam, in Indonesia was based on the perception that a group of Muslims were persecuted by 'other' groups, namely Christians in Ambon-Maluku and in Poso-Central-Sulawesi.

Although the call for *jihad* was oriented toward all Muslims in Indonesia, which numbered approximately about two hundred millions at this period, it eventually only successfully mobilized less than ten thousand Muslims. Many of them were Muslims who were already engaged with a particular Islamist movement, or *Muslim activists*, or Muslim as *movement identity*. As discussed in the previous chapter, those who participated in jihad movements come from different types of Islamist activism, namely, *pious*, *jihadi,* and *political* Islamism. As also discussed previously, the jihad movement can be seen as an instance of 'high-risk' activism since it involves high 'risk' and 'cost'. Hence, those who participate in such activism usually have some particular qualification, as argued by Doug McAdam (1986: 71), namely, (1) have a history of activism; (2) be deeply committed to the ideology and the goals of the movement; (3) be integrated to activist network; (4) have a 'biographical availability', meaning being relatively free from personal constraints that would make participation especially risky.

By joining the jihad movement, the actors enhanced their *movement identity* as Muslim activists while simultaneously inventing new *organizational identity, activist identity,* and *tactical identity.* As described in the previous section, in the case of the Ambon and Poso conflict, some jihad actors invented *organizational identity,* meaning identification with a particular jihad group, such as activists of Laskar Jihad or Laskar Mujahidin or Mujahidin KOMPAK, et cetera. In the same period, some might invent *tactical identity,* meaning identification with a particular tactic or being in some wing of a movement, such as members of "*pasukan bakar"* (the arsonist troops) or "*pasukan linggis"* (the looting troops) or "*pasukan khusus"* (the special paramilitary forces) including the non-combat sections such as the education and *da'wa* section. They might also invent *activist identity,* meaning identification with a broader activist subculture that might nourish several distinct movements, as jihad activists, or as they were commonly called *mujahidin pendatang* (non-local mujahidin) during the conflict period. The variation and

transformation of movement identity by non-local jihad actors can be displayed categorically in the table below.

Table 1.
Transformation of "movement identity"

Movement Identity	Pre-jihad	On jihad	Post-jihad
Activist identity	Muslim activist:	Non-local mujahidin	Muslim activist
Organizational identity	FKAWJ, JI, FPI, PBB, Tarbiyah, etc.	Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahidin, Mujahidin KOMPAK, PKPU, etc.	Salafi, JI, FPI, PBB, PKS, etc.

In the post-jihad period, the non-local jihad actors returned to their movement network and recaptured their movement identity, generally returning to their *activist identity* as Muslim activists and to their *organizational identity* either as Salafi or JI or FPI or PBB activists. There is the case of Surahman, a former *da'wa* activist of PKPU from Jakarta, who shifted to become a PKS politician in Maluku. Yet the PKPU and PKS are actually two faces of the same *tarbiyah* movement: the former works in the area of humanitarian issues while the latter works in the political realm. So we could say that he moved from one room to another in the same house.

Like identity, emotions also play a dynamic role in different stages of jihad movement. Of course, a complex set of emotions are involved in each different stage of the movement. Based on a framework of emotional dimensions of social movement by Goodwin and collaborators (2004) and Jasper (1998), I make the following arguments on the role of different kinds of emotions in different stages of movement.

First, I argue that *moral emotions* are the most important 'motivating factors' for joining jihad movements. These emotions, particularly *solidarity, outrage* and *compassion*, emerge based on moral convictions originating from religious faith concerning the

unity of the Muslim community (*umma*) as reflected in the well-known Prophet's saying, that the Muslim community is united like a body; thus "if one part of the body hurts, the rest of the body will also suffer." Thus, an attack on a Muslim community by Christians in Ambon/Poso was perceived as an attack on their own body as the symbol of the unity of *umma.* It was why the news that circulated of the massacre of hundreds of Muslims in Tobelo, North Maluku, in late December 1999, or in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in May 2000, created 'moral shocks' which sparked *outrage* toward Christians, built a strong sense of *solidarity*, and developed *compassion* to help and to defend Muslim fellows in the areas of religious conflict. All these emotions eventually led to the rise of jihad movements.

Second, the dynamics of micro-sociology of *moral emotions* among Muslim activists that eventually led to participation in jihad movement should be situated against the macro-sociology background of *collective anxiety* among Muslim communities in Indonesia in the wake of *reformasi* era. I argue that the sudden collapse of the Soeharto New Order regime, which had expressed friendly political gestures toward the Muslim community in its late period, incited *collective anxiety* among Muslim groups, including the rise of nationalist-secular movements as symbolically represented by the presence of Megawati Soekarnoputri at the center of the political stage. It was a turbulent period, as Sidel suggests (2006a: xii), when "the Islamist networks…began to lose…[their] position of influence, access, and security within the national political class."

Third, I argue that jihad as 'high-risk activism' involves strongly emotional experiences, which manifested in the two clusters of emotions, namely, first, *moral and reflex emotions* as a consequence of being involved in the violent conflict situation; and second, the combination of *reciprocal emotions* (mainly *affective* ones) and *shared emotions* (mainly *moral* ones) as a consequence of being involved with the jihad movement. Although those who joined the jihad movement had a great variety of roles and experiences during the jihad period, they shared a similar engagement with strong emotional experiences as a consequence of jihad as 'high-risk activism'. I fur-

thermore argue that the jihad experience became the 'pivotal event' that brought about 'pivotal meaning structure' for the life story of the jihad actors because it consisted of highly emotional experiences.

Fourth, I argue that the dynamics of emotions in the post-jihad period was significantly affected by two main factors: the dynamics of particular networks of Islamist movements and the life trajectory of individual post-jihadists. The fragmentation of leadership which occurred both in the JI and the ex LJ community in the post-jihad period led some informants to take different position and affiliations and eventually damaged *affective bonds* among some of them. For those who came from *political* Islamist activism, jihad participation enhanced their credibility as Muslim activists and strengthened their *moral emotions*, especially the feelings of pride and dignity.

Theoretical arguments

Based on the concepts of the passionate politics approach and an analytical framework of identity and emotions in jihad movement presented above, I put forward my final theoretical arguments to address the three research questions posed in the initial section of this chapter.

- ***How did they become jihadist?***

I argue that informants in this research became jihad actors after experiencing 'radical reasoning'. By 'radical reasoning' I mean a set process involving both cognition and emotion through either 'moral shock' (Jasper 1997, 1998, see also Jasper and Poulsen 1995) or 'cognitive opening' (Wiktorowicz 2005) or both which eventually led to participation in jihad as an act of identity (Marranci 2006, 2009b). Radical reasoning often occurs in the context of, and as a response to, identity crisis (Erikson, 1968) experienced by the actor. I suggest that the decision to join jihad involved radical reasoning because it ruptures the 'normal' daily life of the actors: taking part in a deadly

violent conflict, putting their one and only lives at a huge risk, leaving families and relatives—sometimes job and occupation—far away, and being prepared to face hard experiences and even suffering.

To explain 'radical reasoning', I present the link between 'cognitive' and 'affective' approaches in explicating recruitment process in the social movement. As reflected in the use of the term, Wiktorowicz (2005) emphasizes the 'cognitive' aspect in the process of involvement into the radical Islamist movement that he calls 'high-risk Islamic Activism'. He suggests that 'cognitive opening' is a critical step taken by activists through which they may join an extremist Islamic group, which usually occurs following a crisis that may have unsettled their certainties, including their identities, thus they become more receptive to the possibility of new ideas and world views (2005: 85). Yet, while many people experience 'cognitive opening' in different ways and contexts, only a few then join the movement. Wiktorowicz suggests that, "Those who are most likely to be drawn to a movement…. find these interpretations and their representative institutions wanting… [thus] religious seekers extend their search for meaning to perspectives outside the mainstreams" (2005: 86).From an ideological point of view, cognitive opening can be seen as an 'ideological opening', meaning a critical step to accept a particular ideological framework of Islamic activism.

While 'cognitive opening'[7] highlights cognitive process which are likely to lead to involvement in the movement, 'moral shock' underscores the emotional process, or more precisely dimensions of *moral emotions*, which are often the first step toward recruitment into social movements. According to Jasper (1997, see also Jasper and Poulsen, 1995), 'moral shocks' occur when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action, whether or not she has acquaintances in the movement. As Jasper suggests (1998), the triggers may be varied: from highly publicized

7) It seems that Wiktorowicz was inspired by McAdam's notion of 'cognitive liberation' as argued in his book *Freedom Summer* (1988; New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press).

public events to personal experiences such as the death of a child. Although admitting the term when first used by Jasper and Poulsen (1995) was primarily cognitive, it evokes the emotional power of these experiences as reflected in the term 'shocks'. "Whether the underlying image is a state of shock or an electrical shock, it implies a visceral, bodily feeling, on a par with vertigo or nausea. Strong emotions should flow from this," Jasper contends (1998: 409). Based on Jasper's thesis, I contend that moral shocks particularly bring about a particular *moral emotion of solidarity*, which becomes the main basis of participation in the *jihad* movement.

Like 'cognitive opening', 'moral shock' does not necessarily imply people's participation in the movement. Yet I argue that the two processes, either both or one of them, are crucial steps taken by the core-informants leading to their decision to join jihad. According to Wiktorowicz (2004: 1), cognitive opening is usually followed by a series of mainly cognitive processes: religious seeking, frame alignment, and socialization. Emphasizing emotional dynamics, Jasper (1997, 1998) suggests that while most people remain in their inactive stance, some others, through complex emotional processes, guide their fear and anger into moral resentment and participation in social movement. In an effort to bridge the crucial role of emotion in the formation of identity, Marranci (2009b: 22) suggests that Wiktorowicz' 'cognitive opening' is the product of a 'moral emotion'.

In most cases for the core-informants, the two processes of 'cognitive opening' and 'moral shocks' were experienced, either together or separately, either cognitive first and emotions following or vice versa. Ali Imron and Fauzan, for example, had the two processes in a 'package': when they took part in a religious study session where participants watched videos on "Muslim wars in some places in the world" accompanied by a series of lectures on the ultimate values of jihad. In the case of Reza, 'cognitive opening' came first: his religious seeking led him to engage with Salafi activism. He was eventually moved to join jihad after attending a mass Salafi gathering campaigning for jihad by showing the massacre of Muslims in Poso. For those who experienced 'moral shocks', the news or the

video screenings of the massacre of Muslims in Tobelo, North Maluku, and Poso, Central Sulawesi, are frequently mentioned in addition to the news and videos of Muslim persecutions abroad, such as in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. There is also an exceptional case which did *not* involve 'moral shocks': for Taufan, his participation in jihad is merely a moral consequence of his engagement with the Salafi movement. He claimed to not pay attention to the narratives of violence that unfolded; what mattered for him was the *fatwas* made by some authoritative Salafi clerics to conduct jihad.

Following Marranci (2006, 2009b), I refer to jihad an 'act of identity' because it is a consequence of, or a response to, a deep identity crisis experienced by the actors. Marranci (2006: 51; 2009b: 20) argues that an act of identity is a sort of self-correcting mechanism which is usually a response to *schismogenesis*, drastic changes in the environment, which produces a deep crisis between the autobiographical self and identity. By conducting an act of identity as a self-mechanism correction, the person can again experience his or her autobiographical self as meaningful.

On identity crisis, I refer to Erikson's (1968: 16-7) notion of identity crisis as "a necessary turning point, a crucial moment, when development must move one way or another, marshalling resources of growth, recovery, and further differentiation," which is usually applied to the age of adolescence and young adulthood. Erikson has furthermore suggested that personal growth and societal change, as well as identity crisis in individual biography and present-day crises in historical transformation cannot be taken apart because the two help to delineate to each other—as he tried to demonstrate in *Young Man Luther* (1958). Identity crisis, hence, may also happen at different stages of the life cycle.

Most of the core-informants began to engage with the Islamist movement, or even to take part in the jihad action, when they were in the age of adolescence or young adulthood; it was during the last years of senior high school or the early university period. In many cases, the shift of their collective identity, from Muslim non-activist to Muslim activist, happened in the turbulent years of Indonesian society: prior

or after the collapse of the authoritarian regime in 1998. So it confirms Erikson's contention on the close connection between the identity crisis in personal life history and contemporary crises in the history of society since the two help to circumscribe one to another.

I call jihad an *act of identity* because it is a consequence of, or a response to, *schismogenesis*, drastic changes in the environment, that took place during Indonesia's transitional period, producing a deep crisis between the autobiographical self and identity. At the society level, *schismogenesis* manifested in the rise of various new Islamic movements, either societal groups or political parties, the emergence of open political and ideological contestation, and increasing tensions between antagonistic political and ideological groups. The most dramatic case was the eruption of 'religious wars' in Ambon and Poso of Eastern Indonesia—which created such 'moral shocks' to informants it led them to join the jihad movement. The *schismogenesis* coincided with identity crisis at a biographical level, which mostly took place in the period of adolescence and young adulthood. Thus, a decision to join jihad can be seen as *act of identity* because it was taken to resolve the deep crisis between the autobiographical self and identity, both in the personal and societal context.

In some cases, 'radical reasoning' can be seen as a sort of *conversion*, meaning personal transformation which coincided with a transformation of one's basic meaning system (McGuire 2002: 73). As McGuire argues, conversion transforms "the way individual perceives the rest of society and his or her personal place in it, altering one's view of the world." (2002: 73-74). There is a variety of meanings of conversion among different people. Based on the degree of personal transformation that occurs, McGuire (2002: 74; emphasis in original) distinguishes three kinds of conversion: *radical transformation of self, consolidation of previous identities*, and *reaffirmation* of elements of one's previous identity. While the first one is an extreme case, and usually rarely occurs, the next two types are more likely to happen among people.

Following the life story narratives of the informants on becoming a jihadist, some of them it seemed had experienced *radical self-*

transformation, as manifested in the case of those who come from *abangan*[8] (non-devout) family backgrounds, such as Hendro (who later joined the JI) and Taufan (who later joined the Salafi). Some other cases, however, just followed the trajectory of parents or an older brother, as in the cases of Fauzan and Ali Imron. In these cases, what happened might be called "a *reaffirmation* of elements of previous identity," a less extreme type of conversion as argued by McGuire (2002: 74). This type of conversion, McGuire suggests, often does not involve change in one's religious affiliation but produce real changes in the individual's personal religious behavior and sense of identity.

- ***What did the jihad experience mean to the actors?***

I argue that the jihad experience means a 'radical experience' to the actors. By 'radical experience' I refer to Sartre's notion of the existence of a 'pivotal event' (as cited by Denzin 1989: 64-7) in a human's life that brings about "a pivotal meaning structure that organizes the other activities in a person's life." Thus, I argue that jihad participation means a 'pivotal event' to the jihad actors that eventually shape their life trajectory in the post-jihad period. Jihad participation becomes a 'pivotal event' to the actors because it consists of at least two key elements, *first,* the nature of 'high-risk' activism, which involves high levels of 'costs' and 'risks', brings about powerful meanings to the actors through involving high level of emotions in it; and *second,* the use of religious symbols and meanings during the events, as reflected in the use of term *jihad,* producing powerful symbolic effects which embody in the actors. The combination of both elements lead to the creation of "a pivotal meaning structure" as reflected in the use of a marker or a signifier to call those who participate in *jihad* movement a *jihadist* or a *jihad* actor/activist or *mujahid* (Arabic: plural, *mujahidin).* Furthermore, *jihad* participation also marks the phase of life of the *jihad* actor/

8) The term *santri* (devout Muslim) and *abangan* (nominal Muslim) is part of the trichotomy of santri-abangan-priyayi described by Clifford Geertz in his book *The Religion of Java* (New York: The Free Press, 1960).

activist by symbolically making the distinction between *before* and *after* the *jihad*.

Although people who joined the jihad movement had a great variety of roles and experiences, they shared at least two things: involvement in a violent conflict situation and involvement in a certain kind of jihad activism. Viewed from the conceptual framework of the emotional dimensions of social movement, I argue that being involved in a violent conflict situation leads to engagement with a great deal of *moral* and *reflex emotions*, whereas being involved in a certain kind of jihad activism leads to engagement with a significant part of *reciprocal* and *shared emotions.*

- ***How did the jihad experience influence the life trajectory of the actors?***

I argue that jihad participation as a 'radical experience' informs the later life trajectory of the actors in combination with two main factors, namely their biographical traits and their social networks. Although jihad participation alone is a really meaningful experience and is such a 'pivotal event' in the formation of *movement identity* as a jihad activist, the way the experiences are interpreted is, however, significantly influenced by the ideological framework which is furthermore maintained and developed through their social networks.

I further argue that informants interpret their experiences based on ideological frameworks associated with a particular type of Islamic activism, namely, *pious*, *jihadi*, and *political* Islamism. Thus, jihad experiences were interpreted and then informed the actor according to a particular ideological framework of a certain social network: for *pious* activists it was an action and expression of *pietism;* for *jihadi* activists it was action and expression of *jihadism;* for *political* activists it was an action and expression of *political Islamism.* Therefore, jihad participation is seen in different ways by different types of Islamist activism and brings about different kinds of actors in its aftermath: the making of *pious* actor by *pious* Is-

lamism*;* the making of *jihadi* actor by *jihadi* Islamism*;* the making of *political* actor by *political* Islamism. As we have seen in the life stories of the narrators in this dissertation, jihad participation has created different kinds of Islamist actors: Fauzan, Ali Imron and Hendro as *jihadi* activists; Reza, Fauzi, Taufan and Adang as *pious* activists; Awod Umar, Abu Ayyash and Syueb as *political* activists.

I also argue that social networks influence the life trajectory of the actor through the dynamics of three kinds of social network, namely, *core-network*, *tactical-network*, and *extended-network*. *Core-network* is a social network through which the actor joins jihad; the *tactical-network* is a social network of jihadist networks which occur temporarily during the jihad period; and the *extended-network* is an extension of social networks which develop in the aftermath of jihad participation. I furthermore argue that the *core-network* is the most important network which provides the actor with an *ideological framework* and acts as an '*ideological network'* to the actor. Thus, if the relationship between actor and *core-network* was strong it would most likely lead to sustaining participation with a particular activism. On the other hand, if the relationship between actor and *core-network* was weak it would likely lead to disengagement with a particular activism.

I will discuss the issue of sustainment and disengagement, particularly in the case of JI activists, through the theoretical lens of disengagement and identity transformation in social movement in Chapter 5. From a social movement theory perspective, Klandermans (1997) elaborates the issue of disengagement in social movement by distinguishing two kind of disengagement from activism: *passive defection* or *neglect*, and *active defection* or *exit*. While the former usually occurs in the case of once-only activities, the latter commonly happens in the case of enduring forms of participation (Klandermans 1997: 98) I will examine Klanderman's concepts with a framework of identity transformation, especially following the period of imprisonment experienced by JI activists.

Finally, some questions are left unanswered concerning how identity, emotions, experiences, and meanings are captured through

the life story narratives of the actors. How does a study of contemporary Islamist social movements combine with an oral history approach? There are also some queries (sometimes raised as doubts!) regarding the possible access to the life story narratives of such actors. I will deal with these issues in the next chapter.***

CHAPTER 3

Following the Flow, Digging Deep: Doing Fieldwork on (post-) Jihadists

Introduction

After laying out the landscape and focus of the research in Chapter 1 and the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, I present the narratives of how the fieldwork research was conducted in this chapter. As explained earlier, the focus of this research is former non-local jihad actors who participated in the religious violence that took place in eastern Indonesia, namely in Ambon, Maluku, and Poso, Central Sulawesi. When I did the fieldwork, most of the non-local jihad actors had left the conflict area, having either returned to their hometowns, moved to another place to live or been imprisoned for their involvement in terrorist actions in the post-jihad period, while a few of them had decided to stay, either in Poso-Central Sulawesi or in Ambon-Maluku. So my first crucial step in doing the fieldwork was to find out "where they then lived". Thus, instead of staying and conducting fieldwork in one particular site or area, my first strategy was "to follow the flow of the actors" to various places and locations: from big and medium size cities like Jakarta, Surabaya, Solo and Yogyakarta in Java to remote areas such as Pandan Jaya village in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and Gemba village in Western Seram Island, Maluku Province.

In doing the research, I applied a life history approach by collecting the biography of the jihad actors through conducting a series of life history interviews with them. In conducting these oral history

interviews, I divided the life story of the actors into three main periods: *before*, *during*, and *after* their participation in the course of the conflict. Thus, my next strategy was "to dig *the deep* of the personal life stories and life experiences of the actors" in the three respective episodes: before, during, and after their participation in jihad. Here I refer to Denzin's distinction between the two levels of life lived by a person, namely *the surface* and *the deep* (1989: 28-9, see also 1984: 80-85). Whereas at the surface level, the person is reflected in their individual everyday doings, routines, and daily tasks, at the deep level, the person is a feeling, moral, sacred, inner self. According to Denzin (1989: 29, see also 1984: 159), the deep, the inner self, may only rarely be displayed to others, but may be captured in autobiographical or biographical documents and narratives. Poletta (2006: 13; emphasis in the original) also argues that narratives provide a *deeper* understanding of emotions than logical explanations and non-narrative accounts.

Following an interpretive format of "making sense of an individual's life" in studying biography as proposed by Denzin (1989: 59, 64-67), I will discuss the biography of the jihad actors to make sense of the individual's life by focusing on the turning point moments in their lives. It assumes, following Sartre, the existence of a pivotal event in a person's life. Furthermore, Denzin contends (1989: 66), it also assumes that "this event will be a pivotal meaning structure that organizes the other activities in a person's life." As presented in Chapters 1 and 2, in this research, participation in *jihad* action was seen as a pivotal event which has gained a pivotal meaning structure that shaped the other activities in the actor's life. Thus, it is assumed that *jihad* participation has marked the lives of the jihad actors so that there is a distinction between the life 'before' and 'after' the *jihad*. I will furthermore examine how participation in *jihad* movement comes to occupy a crucial place in the lives of the jihadists and how its meanings changes over time.

During the fieldwork I carried out life history interviews with 21 core-informants (see Table 1 in the appendices). I have classified the interviews into three categories: six are considered *successful*, nine are *quite successful*, and six are *unsuccessful*. Of the fifteen

interviews classified as *successful* and *quite successful*, I chose ten key life stories to be presented and discussed in this dissertation. In the next section I will describe the two main steps in carrying out the fieldwork, namely, *first*, finding and selecting the core-informants; *second*, carrying out the life history interviews with informants. Finally, I describe how to select, interpret and present the life story narratives of the informants based on the collected interviews. In between the narratives I also discuss some methodological issues concerning oral history, interpretive biography, and the link between life history methodology and the sociology of social movements.

"Following the flow of actors": finding and selecting informants

How to find and select informants in this research? Before I present the narratives of how I found and selected informants to be interviewed in this research, I will map out the post-jihad period situation and features of the non-local actors who had participated in the jihad movement. Although sharing Della Porta's (1992: 182) contention that "in the life-history research, it is virtually impossible to work with strictly representative samples," I contend that sufficient knowledge of the landscape of the research subject helped me to get informants who reflected the complexity of the phenomena. There are four features of post-jihadists situation and movements which guided me in finding and selecting the informants during the fieldwork as follows.

First, of the more than five thousand non-local Muslim fighters who joined the *jihad* movement during the conflict came from different Islamist networks. As described in Chapter one, I distinguish three main networks of non-local jihad actors who participated in *jihad* movement: the Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahidin, and Other Mujahidin. Thus, in order to cover and reflect the variety of the networks, informants should be selected from each of the different Islamist networks identified. Second, those who joined in the

jihad movement came from various social profiles in terms of family backgrounds, social economic class, education level, et cetera. Thus, the selected informants should reflect the variations of social profiles of the non-local jihadists.

Third, when the research started the conflict had ended and peace agreements had been achieved and signed by the conflicting parties, both Muslim and Christian groups: the Malino I Peace Accord for Poso in December 2001 and the Malino II Peace Accord for Maluku in February 2002. So, most of non-local jihadists had left the area and returned home, and only few of them stayed on in the (post) conflict area, either in Ambon or in Poso. Thus, in order to reflect different trajectory taken by them, informants must include both those who left and those who stayed on.

Finally, those who had joined the *jihad* movement took different social pathways in the post-jihad period: some of them joined *jihadi* activism and took part in terrorism, some joined political parties, others joined paramilitary group, while others returned to their jobs or went back to study. Thus, informants should reflect the variety of social pathways taken by the post-jihadists.

Based on this mapping out of the features and situations of the non-local post-jihadists, I carried out fieldwork research for sixteen months in two different periods: the first one for a year from July 2007 to 2008 and the second one from September to December 2009. There were three steps to be taken: first, finding out where the actors lived; second, selecting who would be interviewed through the life history method; and finally, gaining the willingness and approval of the prospective interviewees.

The three different steps were, of course, not clearly distinct processes but were instead three consecutive stages that took place over a certain period of time: it could be either a quite short or rather long process that led either to success or simply failure. The most crucial and also most difficult step was certainly the last: gaining the approval and willingness of the prospective informant. Since only after the informant was willing and agreed, could the interview start.

At the start of the interview, I promised the informant anonymity if desired. I also asked permission to record all the interviews by using a digital recorder for the sake of academic purposes.

- ***The double-face: the academic and the activist***

Before presenting the detailed stories of finding and selecting informants, I will explain some of the strategies I applied during the fieldwork. The first main strategy concerned how I presented myself to informants or to prospective informants. I usually presented two sides of myself: I am a lecturer-and-researcher and I am a Muslim. The fact that I work as a lecturer at the Department of Sociology of Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), a respected state university, was an advantage for me during the fieldwork. The generally good image of a university lecturer helped me to make and develop contacts with various kinds of people, including radical Islamist activists. The lecturer's link to education programs and the institute generally provides a better image than a 'pure' researcher since research is something not generally familiar and directly linked to public needs.

The fact that I am a Muslim is strongly reflected in my Arabic name. Furthermore, I also come from a *santri* (devout) family with a long track record as a Muslim activist from junior high school to my early university period. I began my career as a Muslim activist by joining *Pelajar Islam Indonesia* (PII, Indonesian Muslim Student Association) when I was a junior high school student in the early 1980s. Later I was elected Chairman of the PII in Pekalongan when I was a senior high school student in the mid 1980s. During the period, PII was quite well known as one of the so called 'fundamentalist student movements' especially for its tough opposition toward the New Order policy of '*Asas Tunggal Pancasila*'.[1)] My career as a Muslim activist continued to my time at university, by joining the

1) Through the policy, the New Order regime forced all social and political organizations to place "Panca Sila" (The Five Principles of State Ideology) as its sole ideological base, replacing religious or other forms of ideology. For further discussion see, for example, Karim (1999), especially Chapter 5.

Musholla[2)] of the Faculty of Social and Political Science (Fisipol) of UGM while continuing my involvement with the PII. Thus, many of my friends from the period recognized me as a Muslim activist, including some of those who later became core-informants.

During the fieldwork, in order become closer and accepted by the Islamist activists, I occasionally utilized some symbolic gestures and attributes, including using simple spoken Arabic words and wearing the so-called 'Islamic dress'. Some simple Arabic words I used to speak with informants were *assalamualaikum* (greetings), *ana* (I, me), *antum* (you), *afwan* (sorry), *syukran* (thanks). On the other hand, I also occasionally wore Islamic attributes such as the Islamic shirt (*baju koko)* or white skull cap (*peci haji*), especially when attending a preaching session or other religious gatherings.[3)]

Furthermore, I also utilized both sides of my network to find prospective informants: my professional and personal network. By professional network, I mean the network of researchers, journalists, and NGO activists, with whom I work in my capacity as a lecturer and a researcher. By personal network, I mean the network of school and university friends, families and relatives, as well as Islamic fellow activists which I have developed throughout my life as a person since childhood to adulthood. In some cases the two sides merged: for instance, one of my university friends was also my colleague when I worked as a journalist; one of my cousins is also a leading NGO activist in Yogyakarta, and so on. By utilizing the two kinds of network simultaneously, I conducted my fieldwork for this research. Here the story.

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2) The Musholla was a transformation of the HMI Fisipol UGM following a fragmentation in the aftermath of the *Asas Tunggal* policy. Instead of taking part in the fragmentation and taking side with the pro-or-anti *Asas Tunggal* factions, some activists of HMI Fisipol UGM chose to have their own way by centering their activities on the *Musholla.*

3) For some researchers of Islamist movements, growing a beard was another common strategy. So that they joked about the 'beard of the project', meaning a beard allowed to grow only for the duration of the project. Since I cannot grow a full beard, I did not consider it to be an important strategy.

- ***The rocky start from Yogyakarta***

In July 2007 I began the first steps of my fieldwork in Yogyakarta, the place where I and my family have lived for years, Yogyakarta is a strategic site of the fieldwork since it was the location of the headquarters of both the Laskar Jihad and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) during the mobilization period for jihad. So I assumed that it would be quite easy to find (and then to select) informants there. But the story proved to be different. Although I started the fieldwork with ample confidence, it did not run as smoothly as I had previously imagined.

So, the first three months of my fieldwork (from July to September 2007) brought rather terrible news: I failed to make any single life history interview with post-jihadists in the period. Of course, I met many of them during the period, such as during the annual national gathering of the Salafis (*Daurah Ilmiyah Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah)* held in Bantul, Yogyakarta, on 18-20 August 2007. The event was attended by more than two thousand Salafi activists from throughout Indonesia, including from Papua, Aceh, Poso and Maluku. I attended the event, met and had chatted with plenty of them during the breaks, succeeded in getting the contact details of many of them, including those from Ambon and Poso, during the occasion. But I failed to get even one single person who was willing to become one of my core informants.

What happened? Why did it happen?

Reflecting back to the period, I think that one of the important causes of my 'failure' was that I chose to be too low profile and less aggressive in developing relationships with the potential informants I met during the period. Based on my understanding of the sensitive nature of the research topic (some might think that I was doing research on 'Islamic terrorism' as perhaps part of the 'counter-terrorism' projects being carried out, or at least supported, by western institutes) as well as the nature of life history approach I had chosen (which relies on the trust and willingness of informants to share their life stories with the interviewer), I focused on building

trust and confidence in the potential informants and their community and attempted to be accepted as a 'friend' of the movements. That is why I usually restrained myself from asking for an interview in the first or early encounters and meetings with them. Only later, after I considered I had succeeded in developing a certain level of trust and confidence with the prospective informants, that I would ask them if they were willing to be interviewed.

Building trust is, of course, not an easy task. Sometimes such trust and confidence could only be developed after quite a long process of relationship and interaction. At least in my case, I failed to find one willing core informant to agree to a life history interview after meeting or approaching many potential core informants over a period of three months! I had actually identified at least two potential life story informants with whom I had made initial contact even before I started my doctoral project. But I failed to persuade them to be interviewed, and even failed to meet one of them within six months!

One of the two was Ja'far Umar Thalib, the notorious former Commander-in-Chief of Laskar Jihad. I met him at his home in the Degolan village, the northern part of Yogyakarta, in August 2007. It was also the location of the *Ihyaus Sunnah Tadribud Duat* Islamic boarding school led by him, a veteran of the Afghan war. Surprisingly, it was easy to meet him. I just sent him an SMS informing him of my status as a UGM lecturer who was doing research on Islamist movements (*harakah Islamiyah)*. He soon replied inviting me to visit his place. Perhaps, my status as a researcher of the Centre for Security and Peace Studies (CSPS) of UGM, that had invited him to participate in a public discussion on the conflict of Ambon during the peak crisis, held a plus point for him. There was also the fact that he had been abandoned by the Salafi mainstream in the aftermath of the Laskar Jihad disbandment. Thus, when I visited his home there was no sign of activities except for about ten pupils gathered in one room.

After listening to a brief explanation of my research project on the life history of post-jihadists, he responded it was a lucky coincidence: "I am currently in the middle of writing my own biography." He said that it would cover the period of his childhood to his recent

activities in the aftermath of the jihad war in Maluku. He told me that the forthcoming book was planned to be published simultaneously in three languages: Indonesian, English and Arabic! Listening to his tale and statements, I got the impression that the sense of pride and prominence from the flamboyant former public hero remained with him. Unfortunately, he refused my request for the interview since it would certainly take a long time; instead he promised to let me know when the book was completed—which was expected to be at the end of 2007.[4)] Although I felt somewhat disappointed, his reason sounded quite plausible. Although he was no longer Commander-in-Chief of the Laskar Jihad he remained a prominent Salafi preacher with a number of followers and fans. He told me about a series of preaching programs in several cities, including in Sumatra, planned for the next month. Unfortunately, he also declined my request for him to recommend one of his pupils to be interviewed, saying "they are still quite emotional and not ready yet to be interviewed." Although it might be true, it sounded to me more for his personal objective and interests rather than his pupils'.

Another rocky and unique story was my approach and relationship with Reza, a former LJ activist who is a cousin of Rahmi (pseudonym) a colleague of mine at UGM. Although not personally close, I have known Reza for years and met him several times, either when he visited his aunt at her office or when I visited Rahmi at home. Since I started my fieldwork in July 2007 I had tried several times to contact him, either by SMS or phone call, but I was not able to meet him until six months later. In fact, it was Reza who gave me the information about the Salafi annual national gathering in Bantul, Yogyakarta, in August 2007. Although he suggested I attend the event he did not promise to meet me there. So I went to the event and met many Salafi activists, including those from Ambon and Poso, and attended the sessions for two days—from morning to

4) The draft of the book still had not been completed at my last meeting and conversation with him in November 2009. I have also not received any information regarding the publication of his autobiographical book up to the date of writing this dissertation (July 2010).

late afternoon—but failed to meet him. I sent some SMS and called him during the breaks but he did not reply to my messages or accept my calls. Perhaps, he was just very busy with the programs or meeting old friends from different part of the archipelago who attended the gathering. Yet I guessed he did not feel comfortable meeting me there for one or reason or other.[5] After that I continued to make contact to him but remained unsuccessful.

A big surprise occurred early morning on Sunday 23 December 2007 when a message arrived in my mobile from Reza: he offered to meet in the UGM Mosque at 8 a.m. I certainly agreed—though I had actually planned for a family trip out of the town that morning. I used that precious opportunity to explain carefully about my research topic, what I had been doing with my research so far, and the nature of the life history interview which would most likely require several sessions. At the end of the meeting I gave him a three-page of interview guidelines to read (see the interview guidelines in the appendices). "Please read it first, I will call you again later. If you agree, we can arrange for the interview." The first interview took place on 12 January 2008, followed by two other interviews and a quite short casual conversation.

Although I did not know the real story behind his decision to agree to the interviews, I guessed it related to his up-and-down relationship with Rahmi, my personal contact to him. Although Rahmi did not play the role of 'gate-keeper' with authority to, directly or indirectly, 'force' him to be my informant, she had helped me to stay updated with what had happened to Reza, including when changed his mobile number so that I lost contact with him for a while. Rahmi also told me about other sides of Reza's life story, including his

5) Although I tried to dress quite 'properly' among the Salafis by putting a white skull cap on my head, wearing a white shirt or *baju koko*, and rolling up my trouser a bit above ankle, I think I still looked different amongst them. I had also made the mistake of openly taking pictures of the events with my digital camera. When I took pictures inside the mosque during a preaching session, I was eventually told by a security guard of the organizing committee not to any further photograph.

adolescence when Reza stayed with her and their recently improved relationship leading to Reza's agreement to be interviewed.[6)]

In addition to Reza, I also interviewed Fauzi. He was a medical doctor from Yogyakarta who had joined jihad in Ambon through the LJ, whom I interviewed over a series of interviews from February 2008 to late 2009. I had met and interviewed him some years before when I conducted research on multiculturalism in Yogyakarta.[7)] I first met him again for this series of interviews in Solo where he was on call duty at the local hospital, staying at his second wife's house. From the very beginning process ran smoothly: he still remembered me slightly and our previous interviews. He also expressed interest in my topic and was surprised that I had met some respected Muslim leaders from different groups, including the two opposing leading figures: Ja'far Umar Thalib and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. The next meetings and interviews took place in Yogyakarta where he lived with his first wife and children.

- ***Stuck in Yogyakarta, Smooth in Pekalongan***

While my efforts over the first few months to find informants in Yogyakarta became stuck, the process ran quite smoothly in my hometown Pekalongan, the place where I was born and grew up as a Muslim activist. I went to Pekalongan to celebrate the end of the Ramadhan fasting month on Idul Fitri 12/13 October 2007 with my extended family.[8)] Besides the usual family gatherings and visits to

6) There was a clear contrast life trajectory between the two: during the period Reza quit university after his participation in jihad in Ambon, Rahmi went to the USA to study. While Reza became further and deeper involved in Salafi activism, Rahmi moved in the opposite direction eventually removing her veil during day to day activities.

7) An article based on the research entitled "Social Resources for Civility and Participation: The Case of Yogyakarta" published in *The Politics of Multiculturalism in Southeast Asia*, edited by Robert W. Hefner (University of Hawai'i Press, 2003). The article was co-authored with Mohtar Mas'oed and Rizal Panggabean.

8) While the Indonesian government declared that the Idul Fitri began 13 October, Muhammadiyah, one of the biggest Muslim organizations in Indonesia stated that it in fact it began one day earlier. For further explanation, see http://indrapr.blogspot.com/2007/10/selamat-hari-raya-idul-fitri.html (accessed 12 July 2010). There is some-

friends and relatives, I attended a reunion held by my high school friends. It was at that event I got a mobile number for Jodi, an old high school friend who had joined the jihad in Afghanistan. He had been my colleague as a PII activist at high school. Unfortunately, he had not attended the reunion nor come home during Idul Fitri. Yet we were in touch and agreed to meet few weeks later in Pekalongan for a series of interviews on 29-30 October. So it was Jodi, my high school friend and fellow PII activist, who became my first life history informant almost four months after my fieldwork began.

The initial interview did not run that smoothly actually. We started with a little debate. As a brilliant student, Jodi had obtained a scholarship to study aeronautics in the Netherlands soon after graduating from high school. Due to some personal troubles he failed to finish his studies and later joined the jihad movement in Afghanistan. When we met he began by questioning my reasons for studying in the Netherlands and even expressed some regret over my choice: "Why did you agree to enter into their [foreign, non-Muslim] trap?" I replied by trying to convince him that what I had been doing was also a struggle for the sake of Muslim interests, namely to fight against stereotypes in the western world about *jihad* doctrine and *jihad* activists. He eventually accepted my arguments and agreed to be interviewed. Unfortunately, I later discovered that he had not participates in jihad movements either in Ambon or in Poso.[9] Since my research focus was limited on those who participated in *jihad* movements in Indonesia, Jodi's life story is not included in this dissertation.

Besides Jodi, I also met and conducted a series of life story interviews with Nizam, an old friend at the junior high school of *Ma'had Islam* in Pekalongan. I met Nizam firstly in Yogyakarta when he and other Pekalongan Salafi activists attended the *Dau-*

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times a discrepancy of one day for the start of this celebration depending on whether the first sighting of the new moon or the calendar is used to determine the date.

9) Jodi told me in an interview that he was keen to join jihad in Ambon after taking part in a jihad mobilization session held in Pekalongan. He had even been enlisted to the organizer. He eventually canceled his participation after his mother did not give him approval.

rah Nasional in August 2007. It was during the afternoon break on the second day when I heard an announcement from the organizing committee that "all participants from Pekalongan are asked to gather in the front of the organizing committee tent." I was very surprised to hear the announcement and quickly moved to the meeting place. It was there I first met Nizam again—after more than twenty years perhaps: wearing the typical white Salafi robe and a very long beard, almost four inches long, I estimated. My attempts to persuade Nizam to participate were soon effective: it was in the first meeting in his house in Pekalongan that Nizam agreed to be interviewed—after thinking it over for only about ten seconds. While both Jodi and Nizam quickly agreed to be my informants through their personal friendship with me as well as my reputation as a (former) Muslim activist, Abu Ayyash, the FPI leader in Pekalongan, most likely made his decision based on the second factor.

I had first met Ayyash when I had been invited to speak at a discussion forum held by an Islamic Study group led by Aris Kurniawan, a junior member when I was Chairman of the PII in Pekalongan. Aris, who later also became Chairman of the PII in Pekalongan, was one of the founders and a leading activist of *Forum Silaturahmi Umat Islam* (FSUI, the Hospitality Forum of Islamic Community) in Pekalongan. Both Ayyash and Aris were actively involved with the FSUI. Following a casual conversation after the discussion, I approached him asking for his approval to be interviewed to which he quickly agreed. It seemed to me that he was quite being proud to be interviewed for my doctoral research and was very helpful in providing me with some documents of his own as well as the FPI. Ayyash went to jihad in Ambon through *KOMPAK*—though, he claimed, the banner was not used openly in public.

Yet it was not all success stories in Pekalongan. I failed to meet and interview Said Sungkar, the leader of *Dewan Syuro* of FPI Pekalongan, who was prominent for his key role in mobilizing people to jihad in Ambon as well as his vast connections with Islamist movements at the national level, particularly associated with JI. Two FPI Pekalongan activists had been sentenced to jail for their role

in hiding Noordin M. Top, allegedly after being connected in some ways by Sungkar (ICG 2006, 2007a). Later he played a leading role in the funeral ceremony of some jihadi activists involved in terrorism, including Urwah and Dul Matin. Some reports linked him to Abdullah Sungkar, the founder of JI. Yet ICG (2006) argues that there is no strong evidence of his membership of the JI. Sungkar was always out of the town on the few times I paid a call on him.

- ***A series of confessions in Jagat Mulya***

Another success story came from Jagat Mulya (pseudonym of a town in East Java). There I met Baghdad, a young NU activist from a strong Sufi tradition, and conducted a series of interviews over three days in his house and surroundings. He is another informant whom I had known years before when I was a university student in Yogyakarta. I had even made a casual interview with him before commencing my doctoral project when he went to Yogyakarta to do research for his master thesis. Another personal link is that my cousin, Jazir, a leading young NU activist in Yogyakarta, was a very close friend of Baghdad and family. This fact helped me to get approval for the interviews, including from his mother. The approval was crucial because Baghdad had experienced a sort of post-traumatic mental disorder for about three years after his participation in jihad.

Baghdad was also an exceptional case. He had joined jihad mainly for mystical reasons: he had dreams and other mystical experiences of mystical encounters with holy people, including his grandfather, who had passed away a long time ago, advising him to join jihad. “Please bring *Ahad* to the land of Ambon,” said Baghdad in the whisper he had heard in his dreams. *Ahad* means The One or God or the blessing of God. As a young NU activist from a liberal tradition associated with Abdurrahman Wahid, his participation in the *jihad* movement in Ambon was not to fight against Christians but as a way to search for peace. Baghdad was among those who believed that the conflict was instigated, and even orchestrated, by the political elite associated with the old regime in order to sabotage

the *reformasi*. Instead of joining the battle, he went to Ambon to investigate what had really happened and who were allegedly the real players behind the scene. So, rather than joining established Islamist networks such as Laskar Jihad or Laskar Mujahidin, Baghdad went to Ambon following his personal network, including the help of his fellow Ambonese Muslim friends who were studying in Surabaya, East Java. This brought some unique features to his stories: engagement with ordinary lives, including drug users and drug traders, and another side of social life during the jihad period, including casual sexual relationships and prostitution.

The series of interviews with Baghdad was conducted in various unique places, from his home to the mosque and then two different cemetery sites. The interviews ran deep into the history of his family, childhood, adolescence, jihad experience as well as his three-year period of mental disorder. At the end of the interview series he said that it felt like a series of confessions: he became a sinner who made a confession to a priest… In addition, I also gained another view of Baghdad's life from Jazir and Fairuz, two good friends of his. Together we attended Baghdad's rather posh wedding held in a big convention hall in the city of Jagat Mulya. After the wedding, Baghdad moved to Surabaya, where his wife, a master's graduate from an Australian university, worked as a lecturer at the Airlangga University, a prestigious state university. I visited him once in their new house in Surabaya for an interview.

- ***Hanging out with post-jihadists in Solo***

Another important base of (post) jihadists is the city of Solo or Surakarta, the heart of Javanese culture as well as the hotbed of both Nationalist and Islamist movements (Shiraishi 1990). Large numbers of jihadists were sent from this area, both from Laskar Jihad and Laskar Mujahidin. There was a compound located in the Cemani ward belonged to Laskar Jihad, where thousands of prospective of jihadists were prepared and trained before deployed to jihad. For those associated with Laskar Mujahidin, *Gedung Ummat Islam* (The House of

Islamic Community), located in the Kartopuran ward, was the center of activities, in addition to the notorious Ngruki *Pesantren*, founded and led by the late Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

I came into the network of (post) jihadists in Solo through three main channels: Ali Usman, the Chairman of *Ikatan Keluarga Besar Alumni Pondok Pesantren Ngruki* (IKAPIM, the Ngruki Alumni Association) in the period of 2003-2007; Heri Varia, a former journalist turned businessman; and Ghozali, a local Muslim activist who works as a freelance researcher. Ali and Heri were UGM alumni and former HMI activists, while Gozali was a local associate of the Research Institute for Democracy and Peace (RIDEP), a Jakarta-based NGO. I got to know Ali and Heri when I was a UGM student and later went to work as a journalist at the *DeTIK* news weekly together with Heri. I met Ghozali when I was invited to talk at a RIDEP workshop in Puncak where Ghozali was one of the participants. Ghozali helped me by playing the role of a casual research assistant in Solo.

Through Heri I was introduced to Awod Umar, the leader of the Brigade Hizbullah, a paramilitary group affiliated to Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), who had participated in *jihad* in Ambon. Awod and other Hizbullah fellows had occasionally assisted Heri running a middle-level business supplying fuel to local manufacturers and industry. Besides being an activist of the PBB and Brigade Hizbullah, Awod also joined a local NGO called *Supremasi*, providing legal aid for the unprivileged and took the role as coordinator of volunteers. Interestingly, *Supremasi* was led by Bares Lamhot, a Christian lawyer. The NGO shared a rental house with Awod's family in Nusukan, a slum area of Solo which was quite prominent as the *preman* area; the front part was used by *Supremasi* while Awod's family lived out the back. Over many visits to the place I met people from various backgrounds: PBB functionaries, Brigade Hizbullah activists, *Supremasi* volunteers, as well as (post) jihadists. I also met some other Ambon 'alumni' there, including Udin and Muslih, who were also Brigade Hizbullah activists. With a strong personal guarantee given by Heri as well as my own track record as a (former) Muslim activ-

ist, I quickly gained the confidence of Awod and his friends. I made a series of interviews with Awod in Nusukan before later moving to another rental house in Baluwarti, next to the Surakarta Palace. Other meetings and interviews took place in the headquarters of the PBB and Hizbullah, in Kartopuran, Solo.

- ***Penetrating the core of the 'Ngruki Network'***

Through the help of Ali Usman I tried to penetrate the core of the notorious Ngruki network. Besides a former chairman of IKAPIM, Usman had been a "special assistant" of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the founder of Ngruki *pesantren* and the Chairman of the MMI Advisory Board. Ali had a unique prominent profile but had fallen on bad times. After graduating from the Ngruki *pesantren,* Ali continued his study to the Department of Sociology at UGM and then to the MBA program at the University of Santo Thomas, Quezon City, and the Philippines. On his return from the Philippines, he successfully ran several businesses which eventually led him to be elected Chairman of the HIPMI (*Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia*, The Young Businessmen Association) in the city of Solo in 1997-2000. Following a family dispute, his business collapsed, and he went bankrupt and fell ill. But he survived and gradually revived his business, successfully repaying his debt to the bank by, among others, utilizing his expertise in currency trading. Reflecting back on his bankruptcy, he joked: "If I had not fallen bankrupt, I could have been trapped into *jama'ah kafiriyah.* My bankruptcy has brought me closer to the *ustadz* and even led to me taking part in *jama'ah Islamiyah.…"*

From Usman, I learned the bigger picture of the Islamist movements in Solo, and was given a sort of endorsement, as well as some personnel contacts. Unfortunately Ali had just lost his mobile phone so that he could not help me with many contact numbers. With the help of Gozali, I tried to enter the core of the Ngruki network, and have a meeting with Zainuddin, a teacher of the Pesantren Abidin who was known to have joined jihad in Ambon. Luckily, Ghozali himself was a graduate of Pesantren Abidin, a few years senior to Zainuddin.

We met in the mosque inside the *pesantren* complex, on Friday morning, 30 November 2007. After briefly telling him about my research project, including my initial contact with Ali Usman, he replied that although he had joined the jihad he had failed to reach Ambon due to the security situation. But he said that he knew other friends who had. However, he suggested I first get permission from the *Amir,* Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. "We were just foot soldiers who knew very little about the big story, but if *amir* gives his approval we could tell a few things we had experienced in the field," he said.

Ghozali then tried to contact Abdul Rahim, Ba'asyir's son and 'special assistant' in order to make an appointment. Rahim asked Ghozali and me to go to Ngruki after *ashar* to meet him first. We went to Ngruki earlier to meet Afriadi, another friend of Gozali who works as a computer teacher at Ngruki. Afriadi promised to arrange a meeting with Windar, another teacher at Ngruki, who was known to have joined jihad in Ambon. Later, Windar told me that he failed to reach Ambon since the police had conducted an operation in Ujung Pandang to prevent *mujahidin* from entering Ambon.

When the Ashar prayer call was heard, we went to the mosque to join the collective prayer. I reached the mosque a bit late, separate from Ghozali, when the prayer had begun, and took my place in the rear line to the right side of the mosque. When I was in the middle of the prayer someone else entered and stood right next to me: an old man with a sarong, *gamis (long Muslim robe)*, cap and *sajadah* (prayer mat) all in white. The pleasant scent of non-alcoholic Arabic perfume floated from his body and dress. At the end of the prayer I recognized who he was: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir! I was soon struck by bewilderment: should I greet him and introduce myself, asking for an interview with him? Or should I just follow the approach already taken by Ghozali through his son, Abdul Rahim?

I then quickly decided I would try my own way! Soon after he finished the prayers, as he headed out the side door, I followed his steps. As he picked up his sandals, I greeted him: *assalamualikum*, Ustaz Abu! He replied *wa 'alaikum salam* giving a little smile. I began to launch a series of mild 'attacks': introducing myself as

a UGM lecturer doing research on *harakah Islamiyah* as well as a researcher of CSPS UGM who had previously invited him to talk on campus through a friend, Ali Usman: "Do you still remember the occasion, Ustaz Abu?" Though his eyes reflected bafflement, he replied still smiling: *I am sorry I can't.* But I felt that he had a good feeling about me. Perhaps, he vaguely remembered his talk on campus, attended by a crowd of journalists just few days before he was forcefully arrested by the police in hospital. Perhaps he felt good about me because I had mentioned a former trusted and devoted pupil of his: Ali Usman. I did not know what his true feelings were, but he responded nicely to my request for an interview. "Please come home, but make it quick, because I must give a sermon after four o'clock," he said calmly.

Of course, I was very glad and grateful and moved quickly to a house a mere 100 meters from the mosque. The house had been quite recently re-built—with some parts, including the wall, not completely finished off. Ba'asyir welcomed me into the guest room: a space of about 6 x 4 meters with no chairs but a wide green carpet, a low-level table, and several cushions scattered around. A cup of hot tea, salted peanuts and some sweets from Kudus accompanied our talk some minutes later. I thus grabbed the precious opportunity to introduce my self and my research topic by mentioning the core issue: this is research about jihad and the jihad activists who had participated in jihad mobilization in Ambon and/or Poso. I also attempted to persuade him that it was an important topic for study by a Muslim, because many studies and discourses on jihad and jihad activists were carried out by non-Muslims which quite often had resulted in unfair and biased judgments. In addition to the research leading to a doctorate degree, I told him it was also part of my job as a lecturer in the Sociology of Religion at UGM. After my rather long briefing he replied: "For the sake of science, it would be okay to do research on the topic…"

Following a conversation and interview which eventually took forty minutes more than previously planned, Ba'asyir recommended I contact two people: Abu Tholut, a JI leader just released from

prison, and Afif Abdul Majid, his former special aide who had accompanied him to Malaysia. After the meeting, Ghozali and I quickly moved to Majid's house which was located close to the Ngruki *pesantren.* He welcomed us kindly especially after being informed that *Ustad* Abu had suggested we meet him on the subject. Instead of Abu Tholut, he suggested I meet Ali Imron, Nasir Abbas or Aris Munandar to talk about the subject. Majid suggested that Imron knew much more on Ambon than Tholut. Ghozali asked if Munandar was no longer a fugitive. Majid replied he had been cleared by the police, especially after Ustaz Abu had been cleared—previously Munandar had been a police fugitive when they tried to link him to Ustaz Abu. Strangely, Majid claimed to have no number of Munandar, instead he suggested us to contact him through his wife.

In short: my attempts to penetrate the core of the Ngruki network eventually failed. Although I finally succeeded in getting Munandar's mobile number, I failed to meet him even after several appointments. He canceled some appointments at the last minute due to some sudden, urgent activities outside the city of Solo. My endeavors to meet some informants through Zainuddin also ended up the same way. In the meeting after I got the endorsement from Ustaz Abu, he explained to me that some of his fellow Ambon veterans had moved out from Solo and he had failed to get hold of their current contact numbers.

- ***Hanging out in the Jakarta 'terrorist complex'***

From a journalist friend in Jakarta, I got some contact numbers, including for Mahendradatta, a member of Tim Pembela Muslim (TPM – Muslim Lawyer Team), and Nasir Abbas, a former JI leader who now worked with the police. With the help of a researcher friend, I was introduced to Fauzan, a JI activist who had completed a jail sentence for his role in the violent Poso conflict. After meeting and having an interview with Mahendradatta, a Muslim lawyer and activist who had graduated from UCLA, I was given some contact numbers, including that of Brigadier General Suryadarma, the com-

mander of the notorious special counter-terrorist police unit, Densus 88. Yet, Mahendra warned me: "Don't mention you got his number from me, because our relationship has been tense recently."

A few days later, I decided to risk sending a message to Suryadarma's mobile. Introducing myself as a UGM lecturer doing research on *harakah Islamiyah* (Islamist movement) by focusing on "jihad transformation", I asked for permission and help to interview Ali Imron and Abu Dujana.[10] Totally beyond my expectations he called me on Monday morning 28 January 2008: "*Assalamualaikum*! Good morning *Pak Dosen…"* With a peasant, friendly voice he expressed his willingness to help me meet Ali Imron. He even promised to send his staff to pick me up from my boarding house to take me to the jail where Imron was imprisoned. But due to his staff's busy schedule, nobody was available to pick me up. "Just come to the special detention center for drugs of the Jakarta Police Headquarters and tell the guards that you have been approved by Pak Surya," he said in his second call several minutes after the first one.

In addition to Suryadarma, I was also helped by Nasir Abbas. After having a meeting and interview with him in a pizza restaurant in Warung Buncit, South Jakarta, on 30 January 2008, I asked his help in arranging an interview with Ali Imron. He responded kindly by contacting Pepen, his fellow 'Afghanistan alumnus', to take me to see Ali Imron. The next morning I met Pepen at the canteen food stall of the Jakarta Police Headquarters and then went together to see Ali Imron in his cell in the 'terrorist complex' of the detention center. At least two things surprised me greatly that day. First, Pepen's appearance was nothing like an Afghanistan alumnus: he was dressed in a black shirt and trousers like an official of the U.S. *Jeep* team, with

10) Here is the message I sent to Brig. General Suryadarma, originally in capital letters. *Ass. Wr. Wb. Perkenalkan saya Najib Azca, dosen sosiologi UGM yang sedang riset tentang harakah islamiyah dengan focus transformasi jihad. Bolehkah saya menemui Ali Imron dan Abu Dujana sebagai narasumber? Atas bantuan dari Pak Suryadarma dihaturkan terima kasih. Wass, Najib Azca.* (Muslim greetings. Let me introduce myself Najib Arca, a UGM sociology lecturer doing research on harakah Islamiyah with a focus on jihad transformation. May I meet Ali Imron and Abu Dujana as sources? I extend my appreciation of your help Mr Suryadarma. Muslim farewell, Najib Azca.

its brand embroidered in several parts of his shirt. He had a muscular body and neat, short hair with trim moustache and short beard made me completely fail to recognize him as an 'Afghan alumni'. The next surprise was that Pepen and I went into the maximum security jail as if we were entering our very own house: without any strict scrutiny, presentation of personal identity documents or writing any personal details in the visitor's book. Only on the second floor, before the steel gate of the 'terrorist complex', which was locked by a huge padlock, was I asked to hand in our personal identity to the prison guard. That was all. So I could bring in everything in my backpack, including my digital camera and digital recorder.

It seemed likely that Pepen was quite well known and recognized by the guards and his presence was enough to entitle me to enter a place where the most dangerous terrorists in Southeast Asia were detained. On my next four visits, it was enough for me to say: "I am the visitor of Pak Ali Imron" to be granted entry to the complex, Then, after submitting my identity card to the guards, I would be allowed to enter the complex without any strict scrutiny nor any extra money to be which was commonly demanded of visitors to other prisoners.

During my interview with Ali Imron I was informed that Hendro, a prisoner sentenced for terrorism in Poso, was jailed in a different place due to misbehavior. I was curious to discover his details. I had the feeling I could uncover a very different case by interviewing him. So soon after finishing my interview with Imron, I sent another message to General Suryadarma expressing my gratitude while asking for more help and permission, if possible to interview Hendro. The General, again surprisingly, said yes and asked me to contact his adjutant to arrange the visit with him. As I will explain in Chapter Five, my instincts were true: the life story and life trajectory of Hendro was quite in contrast to Ali Imron, both in terms of his ideological views and his relationship with the police.

In the meantime, I also met Abu Dujana, the alleged military JI commander, during the break of his trial in the South Jakarta Court on 28 January 2008. After having a brief opportunity to talk

with him, having mentioned that Pak Surya had given his approval, he told me that he had had no critical involvement either in Ambon or in Poso. So I then stopped my efforts to interview him.

In addition to the two contrasting life stories of (ex) JI activists in jail, I met Fauzan, a JI activist who had been released from jail. I was introduced to Fauzan by Badrus Sholeh, a lecturer of the State Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta who was a fellow student with me at ANU, Canberra. I had actually heard his name from a journalist friend, Darlis Muhammad, when I was in Palu before starting my doctoral program. But Fauzan was not around in Palu at the time. My relationship with Fauzan quickly became closer and friendlier after he mentioned that he had been living in Menteng Raya 58, Central Jakarta, the PII and GPI headquarters, which I had visited several times as a PII activist and later. I had a series of interviews with him in Menteng Raya 58 as well as in Palu when we met there. It was with his help that I met with some of 'the Afghan alumni' who run herbal clinic in Cililitan, Jakarta. I was even given a *nabawi* herbal treatment by Chaidir, an Afghan veteran, in the clinic. It was also through his channels that I met with some militia leaders in Poso, including Pian Jempai.

Fauzan had been jailed for a shorter sentence than either Imron or Hendro and for cases not directly linked to terrorist actions. He had been jailed twice; firstly, for his role in leading an attack to Christian villages in Poso in September 2000, and secondly, for his role in smuggling weapons and bullets to Poso in September 2002. Compared to the two other JI activists, his historical root to *jihadi* activism ran deeper: his father and uncle were the diehard DI activists. The *jihadi* tradition was continued by the children: he and two other younger brothers were jailed for activities related to terrorism. However, in the post-prison period, his affiliation with JI was seriously damaged after he was accused by other JI fellows of disclosing the *jihadi* network to the police. Although he himself felt he remained affiliated with JI, his relationship with police was also quite close which caused him trouble among JI activists.

- ***Poso stories: from 'Islamic shop' to fire brigade office***

Before making the trip to Poso, I stayed for two nights in Palu, the capital of Central Sulawesi, to meeting local resource persons and to discuss with local journalists and activists of AJI (*Aliansi Jurnalis Independen*, Alliance of Independent Journalists). I went to Poso accompanied by two journalists from Palu, namely Darlis Muhammad, the local correspondent of the *Tempo* news weekly, and Iwan Lapasere, a freelance TV journalist. During my stay in Poso, there were two important places to spend time and collect information: a local NGO, *Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Sipil* (LPMS, Institute for Civil Society Empowerment), and a youth radio station named 'Matahari'. While my relationship with LPMS had developed several years before my fieldwork, my link to the Radio Matahari began after my fieldwork commenced when I was introduced by Muhammad and Lapasere to its young and energetic manager, Rafik. With his vast networks in Poso, Rafik kindly helped me to develop contacts with various Islamist groups in Poso, including ex Laskar Jihad activists as well as the JI-related group Tanah Runtuh.

Yet, my approach to the Tanah Runtuh group had begun in Jakarta through Hendro, the son-in-law of a leading figure in the Tanah Runtuh, Haji Abdullah (a pseudonym). Bearing Hendro's greetings, I was able to meet and interview Haji Abdullah in his house, also the site of a *pesantren* in the Tanah Runtuh ward, Poso. During the interview he rejected any association with JI and claimed to know nothing about Hendro's link to JI until the case was recently exposed by the media. One of my JI informants, however, suggested the opposite, claiming Haji Abdullah had been committed to JI. Through the full endorsement of Haji Abdullah, I met two *ustaz* who had come to Poso during the conflict, namely Arman and Imran (both pseudonyms). Arman, of Javanese descent, born and raised in Aceh, was also the secretary of the *pesantren* and ran an Islamic shop in Poso, selling various goods from clothing to food, from books to perfumes. A series of interviews took place in his shop, accompanied by some glasses of mineral water. Imran was from Yogyakarta and had graduated from Ngruki *pesantren* before later studying at the State Uni-

versity of Yogyakarta. Imran went with his wife to Poso, where they both worked as teachers, specializing in childhood education, in the *pesantren* under the auspice of Haji Abdullah.

By the second visit in 2009, Arman had moved out from the *pesantren* after receiving pressure from other *ustaz* following some internal dispute. Arman told me there had been a difference of opinion between Haji Abdullah and other 'migrant' *ustaz* over some issues, including relations with the government. Haji Abdullah is a retired civil servant and had only became radicalized during the conflict, but his ideological views are basically moderate and include maintaining good relations with the government. He also had also taken part in the post-conflict 'reconstruction project' and recovery programs implemented by the national government. On the other hand, some of the migrant *ustaz* were associated with more radical Islamic schools of thought and the *Salafi Jihadism* of JI. According to Arman, due to the worsening relationship between Haji Abdullah and other migrant *ustaz*, the former was spending more time in Palu than Poso recently. When I asked Arman if Hendro was the intellectual patron of the migrant *ustaz* he declined to answer.

With the help of Rafik, I was able to meet the ex Laskar Jihad activists in Poso through Pak Jufri, a local Salafi activist. Pak Jufri helped me to meet some Salafi activists who lived in Sayo, including Abim, the leader of the Poso Salafis, and Adang, one of its young leaders. Initially I planned to interview Abim and he had agreed to be interviewed. However, after the first interview, I failed to gain a further interview with him due to his packed schedule as the husband of four wives as well as the leader of the Poso Salafis. After a series of last minute cancelation of interviews by him, I asked Adang to be my life history informant. Perhaps feeling pity toward me, he agreed. Since he worked as a part-time staff of the Poso city fire brigade unit, I conducted two interviews in the office (to be exact: in the mosque of the office) while he was on duty.

Instead of only spending time in the town of Poso, I also went to the Pandajaya village, located in the sub-district of South Pamona in the Poso District. Pandajaya is a Muslim village, with many

migrant inhabitants, surrounded by a number of Christian villages, situated close to Tentena, the center of the Christian community in the Poso District. It took almost four hours by car to reach Pandajaya. Nothing ran smoothly during my trip to Pandajaya. It began with the help of Chalis, an LPMS (Lembaga Penguatan Masyarakat Sipil, Civil Society Empowering Institute) activist, who was about to run for local parliament during the upcoming 2009 election. He helped me to meet a young leader of Pandajaya, Salim (pseudonym) who was organizing a soccer tournament in South Pamona. Salim had gone to Poso, among other reasons, for a fund rising mission. We met where I was staying in Poso. After introducing myself as a UGM lecturer, doing research on Islamist movements in the post-conflict setting of Poso, we talked a little about Sulaiman, a jihadist from Java who had been in Pandajaya and was jailed for his role in a failed bombing attempt in Yogyakarta. Salim said that Sulaiman was a good friend of him and the two of them had almost been arrested together at the time. Salim did not happen to be arrested because he refused to leave before he conducted the *dhurur* (midday) prayer. Sulaiman had never returned since.

In the middle of the talk, I asked him if there were any non-local activists still staying in his area. He told me they had all left. He also said that he was often asked such a question, especially by intelligence operatives. It seemed he lacked trust in me, and was even suspicious, so that he refused to tell me the real situation. Close to the end of the meeting, Chalish asked me about my plan to visit Pandajaya. With nobody available to be interviewed I had no reason to go there, I said. But Salim did not change his mind. I took my leave from him to prepare to leave for an interview. Before leaving I decided to donate some money for the tournament, followed by Chalish. At that very moment, Salim changed his tune by saying there was a non-local *mujahidin* who had just returned from Java, named Harun (a pseudonym) from the *Darus Syahadah* pesantren of Boyolali. I responded telling him I had felt he had lacked trust in me but was happy he had changed his mind. He admitted he had suspected I was an intelligence officer. So we agreed to make an appointment

to meet in Pandajaya the following Sunday, 23 March 2008, on the day of the tournament. I then interviewed Harun in Salim's house but he did not seem relaxed and open during the interview. It was understandable. It is very difficult to build trust in such a short period of time.

During my visit to Poso I also interviewed the Poso District Chief of Police, Daeng Adeni Muhan, and some local militia leaders including Sofian Jempay from the KOMPAK (Komite Penanggulangan Krisis - Committee for Overcoming Crises)Kayamanya, Abah Mohan and Abang Tokorondo (who was taking care of the new building of the Pesantren Gontor project).

- ***Ambon stories: from a wedding to preaching in jail***

It was my bad luck that I had lost the contact numbers of some Ambon-based Salafi activists which I had collected during the *Daurah Nasional* in Yogyakarta several weeks before I left for Ambon. Luckily, Djuanda Umasugi, a lecturer at Pattimura University, Ambon who had helped me during fieldwork had a good friend among them. So it was through Umasugi that I was able to meet Pak Erwin, a leading Salafi activist in Ambon who works as a local building developer. Erwin is a Buginese, about 45 years old, who migrated to Ambon and married a daughter of a senior lecturer of Pattimura University, a colleague of Umasugi's. Although working as a mid-level building developer, Erwin was dressed like a typical Salafi in a long gown and above ankle trousers with a long beard. Initially our encounter at his office-cum-house at the Kebun Cengkih housing complex was a bit stiff since he was suspicious of my research focus on non-local ex LJ activists: "What's wrong with ex *Laskar* staying on here?"

Of course I replied that nothing was wrong with them and I explained that I did not view them negatively at all. The mood became more relaxed when I said that I had met with *ustaz* Wahab Lumaela in Yogyakarta several months before. Lumaela was a senior and highly respected Salafi activist with a noble Ambonese

background. Erwin then called Lumaela, who lived nearby, informing him of my presence at his house. The mood shifted drastically in a few minutes when Lumaela came to Erwin's place and greeted me warmly, hugging me and kissing my cheek as close friends or fellow Salafi commonly do. He still remembered my name and had been reminded, he said, a month ago of my plan to visit Ambon. Lumaela was a sort of gatekeeper for the Salafis in Ambon. With such a pleasant welcome, fieldwork related to the Salafis in Ambon ran very well after that. I was even invited out twice for a restaurant meal by Pak Erwin and the Salafi group.

We then made agreed to meet the next day in the Kisar ward, which was renamed Nurlette ward and eventually *Kampung Muhajirin*. This was the site of the new housing compound being built by Salafis in Ambon on land previously under dispute.[11] They planned to carry out collective labor *(kerja bakti*) to build a new mosque in the complex, named Abu Bakar Ash-Shidiq—a similar name to the foundation that had been founded by the Salafis in Ambon in 2003. Things became even smoother when I was introduced to the Chairman of the foundation *Yayasan Abu Bakar Ash-Shidiq* the next day. Taufan (pseudonym) a young man born in Blora, Central Java, in 1976, who graduated from the UGM Faculty of Social and Political Sciences in 1999. Thus he was my junior, from the same faculty although from a different department. We soon became friendly and he helped me a lot in my fieldwork, including by allowing me to attend an internal Salafi meeting on the transmigration program and by introducing me to Salafi activists to be my informants, as well as becoming one of my core-informants himself.

11) The land had been occupied by Christians from Kisar, a village in Southeast Maluku, before the conflict. When the conflict occured, they left the area, mostly returning to their original homeland. The land ownership was then disputed before the court, with the case eventually ending up at the Supreme Court with the land rights being granted to the Nurlette Family, a local noble family in Ambon. Following due process of law, Haji Nurdin, a strong local businessman and a Salafi activist, had given significant financial support to the Nurlette Family. At the end of the case, he asked for a portion of land for himself as well as for the Salafi housing complex (conversation with Haji Nurdin, Ambon, 23/4/2008).

There was another series of interviews with Anshor (pseudonym), a Salafi who worked as a street vendor in Ambon. He had returned to his hometown, Kendal, Central Java, after the disbanding of the LJ but later decided to return to Ambon for 'romantic' reasons: he wanted to marry a girl he had met a few days before leaving Ambon in 2002…

One of my most memorable experiences in conducting fieldwork among the Salafis in Ambon was my attendance at the wedding of a Salafi *ustaz* in Gemba, a place where many Javanese transmigrants lived in the West Ceram District. Lumaela invited me to attend the wedding. Although he and Taufan were unable to attend, Lumaela helped to arrange a Salafi activist to take me there by motorcycle. The trip took about three hours, including crossing by ferry from Liang Port in Ambon to Waitatiri Port in Ceram Island. My attendance at the wedding proved things to me: first, marriage is a crucial way for Salafis to expand and to develop their network organically in the area; second, it reflected their strong self-confidence and friendly attitude toward outsiders like me.

While my efforts to enter the network of former LJ activists went well, I almost became stuck in my efforts to gain access to those linked with the Laskar Mujahidin. Friends of mine in Ambon, academics or journalists or NGO activists, had lost their contact to them, especially in the aftermath of the Loki incident in May 2004. The Loki incident occurred when a group of jihadi activists attacked a police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) post located in Loki village, Ceram Island, resulting in six people being killed, mainly police personnel. The police launched an intensive security operation to pursue the attackers which led to the arrest of several people associated with the incident while others remained at large (ICG 2005c). In this difficult situation, I sent a message to Syuhaib, a JI activist who had been in Ambon and was in custody at the Jakarta Police Headquarters, asking for advice. Strangely, I had never talked with Syuhaib before, I had just got his mobile number from Idris, a prisoner from the Bali bombing case in the same jail. So I introduced myself first, and then explained my position in Ambon and my problems in try-

ing to meet and interview non-local jihadists in the area. This was just simply an attempt for a sort of snowballing with very little hope.

Amazingly, Syuhaib replied to my message with a very kind offer of help. He suggested I met with Azzam, a KOMPAK activist, the alleged mastermind of the Loki attack and other terror actions, who was imprisoned in Ambon. He promised he would contact Azzam on my behalf, and then, after receiving his approval, sent me the contact number of a local activist who would help take me to see Azzam in custody. What perfect help from a maximum-security detention center in the capital of Jakarta for a researcher located in the tiny Island of Ambon!

Through the help of Ode (pseudonym), a local Muslim activist, I was able to meet Azzam in the Waiheru detention center and conduct two interviews, the first took about two hours while the second one took only about one hour. We made an appointment for a third interview but he eventually canceled it due to family matters. As the material from my interviews with him was insufficient, his life story has not been included. Yet it was a fascinating opportunity to observe a segment of life in custody, include participating in a preaching session given by Azzam in the prison mosque.

My last informant in Ambon was Surahman, a PKS activist, I had discovered as part of snowballing in the fieldwork. It began with a coincidental encounter with Muzakkir Assegaf, the Chairman of PKS Maluku, in front of the PKS office, near my place of stay in Ambon. I was walking around with my local partner, Umasugi, who knew him well. After a short greeting and introduction, I asked for a meeting and interview some time in the next few days which he responded to with a kind willingness. Umasugi and I continued on to another appointment after obtaining his mobile number. Later I contacted Assegaf for an appointment. He agreed to meet at the house of Azis Arbi, a member of national parliament who also the former chairman of the *Dewan Syura* (Advisory Board) of PKS Maluku. During the interview, Assegaf told me about a *da'i* (preacher) from Jakarta who came to Ambon during the conflict and stayed on: it was Surahman.

After finishing the interview I contacted Surahman who soon came to see me at Arbi's house. Surahman quickly agreed to become my core-informant. We made an interview then, followed by two other interviews during my second trip to Ambon in 2009. It seemed that being in the house of a senior and respected member of PKS granted me a privilege. In the middle of the interview with Surahman, the head of the Central Maluku District, Abdullah Tuasikal, came by. It was the run-up period before the Maluku Governor Election in which Tuasikal was going to run as a candidate with PKS political endorsement. He came to see Arbi who, unfortunately, had left to give a sermon nearby. So, the interview was interrupted for twenty or thirty minutes for a chat on recent local political developments with the number one person in the district of Central Maluku!

Having related the long narratives of "following the flow of actors" I now return to discussion of some methodological issues concerning oral history, interpretive biography, and the link between life history method and sociology of social movements.

Oral history: events, meanings, subjectivity

An oral history interview is basically a collaborative project between the narrator and researcher, between interviewee and interviewer. Shopes (2004: 2) defines oral history as "a self-conscious, disciplined conversation between two people about some aspect of the past considered by them to be of historical significance and intentionally recorded for the record." At the heart of conversation is a dialogue, a process of interplay between the narrator and the interviewer each influencing the other in the interview process. Shopes (2004: 3) refers to Portelli (1997) in the quote: "Oral history . . . refers [to] what the source [i.e., the narrator] and the historian [i.e. the interviewer] do together at the moment of their encounter in the interview."

While the term 'oral history' is a new one, Paul Thompson (1978: 19) argues in *The Voice of the Past: Oral History,* that oral history is, in fact, as old as history itself: "It was the *first* kind of his-

tory." But the main question commonly faced by oral history is: how reliable is the evidence of oral history? How does it compare with other types of historical source? After deeply discussing the matter comparing it with other kinds of sources, Thompson (1978: 134) concludes that "there are no absolute rules to indicate the reliability of oral evidence, any more than that of other historical sources." He argues that the standard checks of reliability of oral history are just the same as for other sources, namely, "searching for internal consistency, cross-checking details from other sources, weighing evidence against a wider context."

Another approach to the reliability of oral history is presented by Allesandro Portelli, an Italian historian. According to Portelli (1991: 51; emphasis in original), "Oral sources are credible but with *different* credibility. The importance of oral testimony may lie not in its adherence to fact, but rather in its departure from it, as imagination, symbolism, and desire emerge." Portelli underscores the importance of meaning and subjectivity in oral history and, thus, indicating there are no 'false' oral sources.

For him, the uniqueness of oral history is that "it tells us less about *events* than about their *meaning*... the unique and precious element which oral sources force upon the historian and which no other sources possess in equal measure is the speaker's subjectivity... Subjectivity is as much the business of history as are the more visible "facts". What informants believe is indeed a historical *fact* (that is, the fact that they believe it), as much as what really happened." (1991: 50; emphasis in original)

I attempted to use two different approaches to oral history in my research. While trying to apply triangulation to test the reliability of oral evidence, as suggested by Thompson, it was also important to go beyond events and 'facts' in order to grasp the meanings and subjectivity of the narrators. By taking into account that all the informants who were interviewed in this research were activists, it is useful to apply Della Porta's (1992: 182) warning on typical distortions of activist's narrative. Based on her extensive research on social movements in Italy, she found a particular tendency among

activists who become life history informants, such as the usage of unusual oratorical skills, a strong bias towards justifying their behavior based on political and ideological beliefs, and to connect their own personal choices to a historical, generational or class fate. Thus, instead of describing their private lives, activists as informants tend to steer their story towards general features of the environment and on their 'political' biography. Thus, Della Porta (1992: 182) suggests that "life histories are better suited for recounting an activist's perception [than] that the 'reality' itself."

It is also important to notice another difficulty in dealing with life history. As argued by Waterson (2007: 4) the very particularity of an individual live seems to resist generalizations because of "a (simultaneous) feeling of incompleteness, and of excess." By a feeling of incompleteness, she means, the incapability of a person to tell everything about the self and also due to the fact that life itself is "unfinished business". On the other hand, an excess of meaning is the consequence of the question: "how is one to derive conclusions from all of its idiosyncrasies?" In the same vein, Portelli (1991: vii) also recognizes "the sense of fluidity, of unfinishedness, or an inexhaustible work in progress, which is inherent to the fascination and frustration of oral history..." In this work I will try to delicately reconcile between the gap between biographical narratives as "unfinished business" and the well-established sociology of social movements by discussing the narratives of (post-)jihadists in Indonesia.

According to Anthony Giddens (1989: 680), the life history approach has been successfully employed in studies of major importance and is widely used in anthropology as well as sociology. It consists of biographical material assembled about particular individuals, without necessarily covering the whole span of an individual's life, or all of its many aspects. One advantage of this approach, as Giddens argues, is its ability to provide as much detail about the development of people's beliefs and attitudes over time. Furthermore, Della Porta (1999: 169) argues that while the use of biographical studies in sociological research remained noteworthy, by the end of the 1980s it was less significant in the subfield of political sociology,

in particular of social movement studies. Only a few endeavors have been carried out to work with life histories, especially in research focusing on clandestine political movements—in which Della Porta was among the proponents.

The use of life-history or biographical approach in the study of social movement, as Della Porta (1992: 173) suggests, has in fact oriented towards questions concerning several issues as follows: (1) "the influence of primary socialization on political behavior;" (2) "the role of social networks in the process of recruitment to political organizations;" (3) "the structures of incentives which motivate activists in their political involvements;" and, finally, (4) "the successive shifts in the perception of reality which involvement in a movement subculture brings about." Although sharing Della Porta's suggestion to mainly focus on the recruitment process for participation into the movement, I have moved further by examining the biographical impact of activism to the individual activists.

Up to quite recently studies of the biographical impact of activism have received little attention in contrast to the bulk of works on the political institutional impacts of social movement, as McAdam (1999: 117-9) argues. A similar situation is also apparent when comparing the extensive literature on movement recruitment to the small body of follow-up studies of former activists that have attempted to discuss the biographical impact of movement participation (Giugni 2004: 490). Located under the conceptual map of silence and exit in the study of demography, the life course and contentions proposed by Goldstone and McAdam (quoted by Giugni 2004: 491), I will focus on the 'biographical consequences of individual activism' which can be located in the intersection of thematic focus on 'decline/outcomes' rather than 'emergence/development' and on the micro rather than macro level of analytic focus.

How to study the biographical impact of activism? Here I will follow Denzin (1989) to apply what he calls an interpretive biography. Following Sartre, Denzin (1989: 66) assumes, "the existence of a pivotal event in a person's life. It also assumes that this event will constitute a pivotal meaning structure that organizes the other

activities in a person's life." Based on this assumption, he contends that life is shaped by key, turning-point moments, or what he calls *epiphanies.* Denzin (1989: 70) defines *epiphanies* as "interactional moments and experiences which leave marks on people's lives. In them, personal character is manifested. They are often moments of crisis. They alter the fundamental meaning structures in a person's life." By referring to Victor Turner's (1986) notion of the "liminal phase of experience" where the person is in a "no-man land betwixt and between…the past and the…future," Denzin (1989, p. 70-71) argues that epiphanies are existential acts. Some are ritualized, as in the rites of passage, while others become routinized. He also suggests that "The meanings of these experiences are always given retrospectively, as they are relived and re-experienced in the stories persons tell about what has happened to them." (1989: 71)

I have argued in Chapter 1 that jihad participation has been a pivotal event that becomes a pivotal meaning structure which has biographical impacts to jihad actors. To study how jihad as a pivotal event has shaped the life-trajectory of jihad actors, I applied Sartre's (1963) progressive-*regressive method* which, as formulated by Denzin (1989: 67), "begins with a key event in a subject's live and then works forward and backward from that event." In the case of this research, the key event is the process of 'radical reasoning' to participate in jihad movement as a collective action. Starting from that event, I then work forward by observing the life-trajectory of *jihad* actors in the post-jihad period, and then move backward to collect their social background and process of their engagement with the movement. Contending that biographical method "rests on subjective and intersubjectively gained knowledge and understandings of the life experiences of individuals," Denzin (1989: 28) suggests that such understandings "rely on [an] interpretive process [that] leads one to enter into the emotional life of another." He sees the link between the two steps of *interpretation* and *understanding* in biographical method as follows: "*Interpretation*, the act of interpreting and making sense out of something, creates the conditions for *understanding*, which involves being able to grasp the meaning of an

interpreted experience for another individual." Here we come to *the deep* level of life lived by a person, or what Denzin (1989: 29) calls: "a feeling, moral, sacred, inner self."

In oral history, *the deep* is the outcome of what may be called the 'double dialogue' in the process of interview. While the first level of dialogue between narrator and researcher, between interviewee and interviewer, brings to light *facts* of the 'past', the second level of dialogue between narrator and *facts* bring to light *meanings* of the 'past' which are strongly colored by the *subjectivity* of the narrators. Here we come to the next section of how to dig the deep of the life stories of the narrators during fieldwork.

"Digging deep": doing the interviews

In order to get into *deep* of the life story, the inner self of the informants, which Denzin suggests may only rarely be shown to others, the first critical step to be done by the interviewer is to develop a certain level or trust and confidence in the interviewee. I argue this is one of the most important and simultaneously difficult steps to do in carrying the oral history interview, especially in the case of (post-) jihadists. The different character of relationship and the level of trust and confidence between interviewer and interviewee will affect the different type (formal or informal) and quality (personal or less personal) of information produced by the interview. I will examine the many different experiences I had with my informants during the fieldwork.

Life is so rich and complex; so doing life history interview may lead us to almost unlimited possibilities of stories from the life histories of people. Thus, in order to improve the comparability of different life histories Della Porta (1992: 183) suggests the use of an interview outline. Following Della Porta's suggestion, I made an outline of interview (see the appendices) which basically divided the life history of informants into three parts: *pre-jihad* (consists of personal, social and family background, personal development from

childhood to adolescence/adulthood, as well as social, political and religious affiliation); *jihad period* (consists of two main parts: the decision-making process to join jihad and 'jihad experiences'); and finally *post-jihad period* (consisting of two main parts: the decision to return or to stay and the life trajectory in 'post-jihad' period). In addition, I added two additional sections, namely, *major historical events* and *other issues*. In the first section, I listed some issues/questions concerning major historical events, global, national or local, and how the actors linked the events with their own experiences during jihad and the post jihad period. In the second section, I listed some issues/questions concerning some other general issues, such as the conflict, political changes, democratization, and other Islamist movements, and how they linked the issues with their own experiences during jihad and post jihad period.

Before starting the interview, after introducing the focus of the research and asking permission for the interview, I usually handed out the interview outline to the informants. I also asked for permission to record the interviews. If availability of, and access to, the informant was not difficult, I usually did not start the interview at the first meeting, but instead used the opportunity to develop a casual and relaxed relationship while building more trust and confidence in the informants. Where availability or access to an informant was quite difficult, such as those informants who were in the custody, I began the interview after a rather long introduction to develop a certain level of trust and confidence.

In some cases, the beginning of the interview was sometimes quite tough, such as my interview with Azzam in custody in Ambon and Hendro in West Jakarta Police custody. By Azzam, I was firstly confronted with a tough question: "are you working with the police, *thaghut* (evil, un-Islamic forces), in doing this research?" Of course I refuted his accusation by telling him that I worked as a UGM lecturer and researcher while currently undertaking a doctoral project. In the case of Hendro, the interview was also commenced in such an inconvenient way: I went to his 'isolation' cell escorted by a member of Densus 88, the adjutant of its commander. As I described in Chap-

ter 5, I tried to smooth over the awkward situation by asking permission to conduct the *Ashr* prayer in his cell after I had explained my research topic about and handing him my interview outline.

It is obvious that *not* all the interviews done during the fieldwork were successful. Some interviews were simply *unsuccessful* due to the lack of opportunity to conduct the interview, such as the cases of Sulaiman, Harun, Azzam, Abim, Imran, and Amri (all pseudonyms). Except with Azzam and Sulaiman, I was only able to conduct one interview with the informants. However, although I conducted two interviews with Azzam and Sulaiman, the results were far from perfect for other reasons. In the case of Azzam, the first interview (although it lasted quite long, about two hours) was not quite successful due to my failure to guide the interview as well as his lack of trust, especially in the early parts. The second interview, while more fluent, was much shorter (about one hour). My interviews with Sulaiman took place when I had not yet started my doctoral project, so that the focus of the interviews did not really fit the dissertation objectives. The location of the interviews was also not a 'neutral' place, namely the office of a criminal investigator, which, I think, hindered Sulaiman from narrating his stories freely and comfortably.

The interviews with some informants were only classified as *quite successful* due to the limited duration and frequency of the interviews, such as the cases of Surahman, Hendro, Reza, Adang, and Rahman. Notes need to be provided for Reza, an informant who live in Yogyakarta, the same city as the researcher. Although living in the same location, it was not easy to make an appointment with Reza since he seemed to be busy for taking care of a new family with two kids and earning money for them. Although I met him more than three times, it was for only a short time, sometimes for less than an hour. This seemed to be linked with the next factor, namely a 'formal relationship' during the interviews. Although I have known him for years, the difference in religious culture led us to a sort of cultural gap. It was reflected in his reluctance to meet and have the interview at his house or in another place nearby his house, though our houses

were located quite nearby in the northern part of Yogyakarta. Similar kinds of formal relationship also occurred with some other informants, namely Hendro, Ale, Adang, Anshor, and Rahman.

Finally, there were some life history interviews which, I consider, can be viewed as *successful*, namely with six informants as follows: Fauzan, Ayyash, Awod, Jodi, Nizam, Baghdad, and Fauzi. I consider my life history interview with them as *successful* because I could, to a certain extent, *dig the deep of their life stories, their inner self*. Striking evidence of the penetration of the deep of the informant's inner self was articulated by Baghdad, after a series of life history interviews: "I feel as if I had just finished making a confession as a sinner to a priest…" The statement was made in a break after a series of life history interviews with him for more than two days in his house and other surrounding venues in November 2007. During the interviews, he narrated various aspects of his life stories: from childhood to adolescence, from his relationship with his parents to his girl friends, from jihad experience to post-jihad mental disorder, from mystical encounter to sexual desire…

Of course, not all informants in this category were ready and willing to share *the deep* of their life stories at the same level as Baghdad. However, they did share quite profoundly turning point moments in their lives: Fauzan in his period under a DI-affiliated high school in West Java; Ayyash in his early period of migration to Jakarta; Jodi in his turbulent period of study in the Netherlands; Fauzi and Awod in the early period of *reformasi*.

Some of them quite openly allowed me to follow and observe part of their daily lives or some particular events in their lives. With the exception of Jodi, who I interviewed in my parents' house in Pekalongan, I interviewed the informants at their home—or within the same housing complex as in the case of Fauzan who lives in a compound. Thus I was able to meet, or be introduced, or have a little chat, with either their families or relatives or friends, who were around during the interviews. Some of them were willing to introduce me to their fellow activists or their social networks. Fauzan, for example, brought me to meet and hang out with a group of 'Afghan alumni'

who run a herbal clinic in Cililitan, East Jakarta. He was also willing to introduce me to his 'business partner' in Ciledug, West Java, who runs a small plastic recycling business—though this has not yet happened due to my limited time during fieldwork. Ayyash, on the other hand, allowed me to accompany him to visit his former fellow prisoners, as well as his pupils, held in custody in Batang, Central Java. Fauzi let me attend the regular sermons held in his house. Whereas Awod, besides allowing me to befriend his Hizbullah and Supremasi fellows, helped me to get the contact numbers of some Islamist activists in Solo, including Aris Munandar, the former Chairman of KOMPAK Solo, and helped me to make contact with him.

From my fieldwork experience, I argue that personal networks play a very important role in building with the informants' trust. Of the six informants with whom I made *successful* life history interviews, two of them were my old friends: Jodi is a senior high school friend and Nizam is a junior high school friend. Thus, I had long ties with both of them. My relationship with Baghdad was a shorter one as I had met him several years ago during my early period as a junior lecturer at UGM when I became engaged with youth NU activists in Yogyakarta. The personal relationship was also important here since my cousin, Jazir (pseudonym), a leading youth NU activist, is a close friend of Baghdad. I had met and conducted in-depth interviews with Fauzi before starting my doctoral project. My good relationship with one of his trusted political loyalists also seemed helpful in building trust and confidence in him.

The other three, namely Fauzan, Ayyash and Awod, I had just met and began to know them during fieldwork. Yet I had strong, though indirect, links with them through my good friends who had a strong reputation as Muslim activists and were also their close friends. I was introduced and became acquainted with Awod through Heri; with Ayyash through Aris, and with Fauzan through Darlis. With the exception of Nizam and Fauzan, they were political Islamic activists with multiple types of affiliation. For Nizam, it seemed likely that our personal relationship and my personal credentials as a Muslim activist were seen as sufficient factors for him to allow

me to do the interview. For Fauzan, my track record as a (former) PII activist, with its headquarters located in his housing compound and my older brother as its former leader, seemed likely to have influenced him to quickly trust me. The fact that his relationship with some JI fellows had been problematic since his release from prison had, eventually, led him to be relatively 'open' to both 'deradicalzed' JI fellows and the police as well as to journalists and academics.

"Telling the tales": presenting the narratives

Based on fieldwork notes and transcription of the interviews, I present the narratives of life stories of the informants in Chapters 4-6 of the dissertation. Following Thompson (1978), I present "a collection of stories" based on life history interviews with some informants. According to him, "a collection of stories" is a better way of presenting more typical life-history material rather than "the single life-history narrative" or "a cross-analysis" since "it also allows the stories to be used much more easily in constructing a broader historical interpretation, by grouping them—as a whole or fragmented—around common themes." (1978: 204) The common theme for all informants in this research is their process of becoming jihad activists, their jihad participation and their 'after jihad' life.

Having abundant life story narratives from the core informants, I took the steps to determine whose narratives were to be included into the dissertation. The first step was to exclude the *unsuccessful* interviews from the list of core-informants. Through this step, I reduced the list of core-informants from twenty-one to fifteen. The second step was to distinguish between informants based on the different Islamic activism networks with which they have engaged, namely, *pious*, *jihadi*, and *political* activism. As discussed in Chapter 1, the categorization is not meant to be exhaustive, so that there is some overlap between them. Based on this categorization, I present the narratives of *pious* activists, *jihadi* activists, and *political* activists respectively in the next three chapters. The final step was to

select which informants to be included in the dissertation based on a variety of social profiles and backgrounds as well as the variety of life trajectory taken by informants in the post-jihad period. Through this step I came up with ten life story narratives (four *pious* activists; three *jihadi* activists; and three *political* activists) to be presented and discussed further in the following Chapters 4-6.

In some cases, instead of *successful* interviews I chose to include *quite successful* interviews for special considerations. In the case of Jodi, a jihadist who joined in Afghanistan, I do not include him because he did not participate in the religious communal conflict in Indonesia. In the case of Nizam, a Laskar Jihad activist, I did not include him because his 'after jihad' life was atypical so that I chose to present the life story narrative of Fauzi for his post-jihad trajectory of a Salafi activist. In the case of Baghdad, I did not include him due to his very unusual social background (liberal-NU), jihad experience (as a researcher/documenter), and post-jihad trajectory (a leader of Sufi order who occasionally played the role of a spiritual-political advisor). Instead I present the life story narratives of Surahman, a Tarbiyah activist, who stayed on in Ambon and transformed into a politician. Although I did not include all of the life story narratives of Nizam, Baghdad and Jodi, I use parts of their narratives in the discussion, either the *pre* or *during* or *after* jihad period.

Of the *pious* activists, I chose to present four people of different social backgrounds and life trajectory in the post-jihad period: two of them returning home after the jihad period, while another two stayed on in the conflict area: one in Ambon, another one in Poso. Of those who returned home, I present Reza, a UGM student who quit his studies after his jihad period, and Fauzi, a doctor-cum-politician who later resigned from the political party though still playing an indirect role through his personal and social network. Of those who stayed on, I present Taufan, a new UGM graduate who was a member of the LJ special forces during jihad who was later elected chairman of a Salafi foundation in Ambon, and Adang, the graduate of a vocational high school in West Java who works as a part-time staff member of the Poso fire brigade. Adang had returned home to

West Java for some months before deciding to return to Poso after failing to find a proper job, no longer feeling 'at home' in his own hometown. I will use Nizam's narrative to support my argument on 'enclave culture' on this chapter.

Of the *jihadi* activists, I chose to present three JI activists who had different social backgrounds as well as dissimilar life trajectories following a period of imprisonment. The first person is Fauzan, a Jakarta born male who took the path of jihad, by joining the Afghan war, in the footsteps of his father, the DI activist. After being released from a three and a half year prison sentence for his roles in the religious conflict in Poso, he was accused by his *jihadi* fellows of leaking information about the JI network to the police. So his association with JI movement has become ambivalent; while he still identifies himself as a JI activist, he received financial assistance from the police. The second person is Ali Imron, the field coordinator of the first Bali bombing, who joined the jihad in Afghanistan following his older brother Mukhlas. After being arrested by police and jailed, he made a public apology and converted to be a police partner in counter-terrorism programs. The last is Hendro, the son of an *abangan* family in Wonogiri who converted to be a *jihadi* activist and was sent to the *jihadi* academy in Mindanao after being a university dropout in the late 1990s. Although being sentenced to twenty years jail, he seemed likely remains strongly loyal to *jihadism* and refuses to be cooperative with police.

Finally, of the *political* activists, I chose to present three people: two who return home and one who stays on. Of those who returned home, I present Awod Umar, a man of Arabic-Gujarati descent who became a leader of the Brigade Hizbullah paramilitary group in Solo before the jihad and was later elected chairman of the PBB in Solo, and Abu Ayyash, the son of a non-devout Muslim family in Pekalongan who later became an FPI activist and eventually, after his jihad period, was elected chairman of the FPI Pekalongan. Both Umar and Ayyash were sentenced to jail for a short period of time for their involvement in leading 'sweeping operation' against illegal liquor businesses. Unlike Umar and Ayyash, Surahman, a

PKPU *da'wa* activist from Jakarta, decided to stay on in Ambon in the post jihad period. He was recruited as vice chairman of PKS in Maluku and plays an active role in local politics in Maluku, although not running for election to parliament. I will use part of the narratives from Jodi and Baghdad to support my argument on the process of becoming a jihadist in this chapter. Let us move to their life story narratives in the next chapters!***

Part Two:

The Narratives

Photo 2: Salafi annual gathering, reconsolidating solidarity: Bantul, 2007

(Photo: taken by author)

CHAPTER 4

From Jihad to "Holy Kampong": The Laskar Jihad's Narratives

In the evening, we had no more bullets. You know the situation was that the Sirisori Islam [village] is surrounded by 22 [Christian] villages. So we were under siege…. Thus, the bullets which were being shot from here [a Christian village] could reach there [another one]…. A companion then cried: "*Oh Allah* please help us…."

(Taufan, Ambon, 22/4/2008)

The most meaningful [experiences were] when we were gathered together…, learning religion together…, I had the feeling that our *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Islamic solidarity) was very strong…, yes, we felt like we were becoming a single body… when we got sick, others gave us help, gave us food, and so on and so forth…

(Adang, Poso, 25/3/2008)

For those who were used to vice, they would most likely feel okay. But I didn't get used to it. It was true that before joining the *da'wa ahlussunnah* [Salafi] I got used to it, because I did not know the [Salafi] rule. But after my *hijra* [joining the Salafi], [I knew that] it is not allowed, so that I did not feel good at heart.

(Adang, Poso, 25/3/2008)

"I was shocked and trembling [that Laskar Jihad was disbanded]. I also regretted that I had done [wrong] things so far…"

(Reza, Yogyakarta, 4/4/2008)

"I wish my life will end in an undisputed land of jihad, either in the holy land or in the holy war, either in Moro or in Afghanistan…."

(Fauzi, Yogyakarta, 17/2/2008)

Introduction

This chapter will present and discuss the narratives of non-local Muslim fighters (jihadist) who joined the jihad in Maluku and/or Poso through Laskar Jihad (LJ), a paramilitary wing of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah (FKAWJ, Communication Forum of the Followers of the *Sunna* and the Community of the Prophet). As discussed briefly in Chapter 1, Laskar Jihad was part of the Salafi or the Wahabi-Salafi movements which gained considerable prominence during Indonesia's political transition (Hasan 2002; Noorhaidi 2005; van Bruinessen 2002). Laskar Jihad was the largest and the most well-known group and had successfully mobilized more than five thousand non-local jihadists to participate in the religious communal violence that took place in eastern Indonesia, namely in Ambon-Maluku and in Poso-Central Sulawesi, during the early stages of the Post-Soeharto period.

Laskar Jihad is categorized here as an example of *pious* Islamic activism characterized by its main concern, namely to safeguard the Muslim identity, Islamic faith and moral order against the forces of non-Muslims, and by its lack of interest in gaining political power.[1)] Besides having a different worldview, different types of Islamic activism also have different kinds of affiliation pattern to the group, following the distinction proposed by Della Porta and Diani (1999: 119-20), as discussed in Chapter 1. *Pious* Islamic activists, like *jihadi* ones, tend to have *exclusive affiliation*, thus usually affiliating only to their own group. In a few cases, some of their activists had linkages and affiliation with certain particular groups which had either developed prior their affiliation to their key group or were considered to be aligned, or at least not in contradiction, with their movements. They are unlike adherents of *political* activism who commonly have *multiple affiliations*. Different types of affiliation patterns have a significant influence on the actor's life trajectory and role in society in the post-jihad period.

1) I have adapted the categorization into three main types of Islamism or 'Islamic activism' as suggested by ICG (2005b) in a report on Islamism. The reason for the adaptation was discussed in Chapter 1.

The Laskar Jihad, as a Salafi movement, can be seen as a religious sect which is characterized as a "strict religious organization, demanding complete loyalty, unwavering belief, and rigid adherence to the distinctive lifestyle of its members" as suggested by Noorhaidi (2005: 161).[2] While Noorhaidi observed the movement during the jihad mobilization period, I found similar characteristics during my fieldwork in the post-jihad period. As will be presented later, this research found the Salafi post-jihadists tend to live in a 'holy kampong', a sort of 'enclave community' characterized by 'enclave culture' as also observed by Noorhaidi (2005). I will discuss this issue in the last section of this chapter.

In this chapter I will present and discuss the life stories of four post-jihadists who joined jihad through the Laskar Jihad, namely, Taufan, Adang, Reza and Fauzi.[3] They come from different social backgrounds, had different roles and experiences during jihad, and took different life trajectories in the post-jihad period. Taufan (born in 1976) comes from a middle class *abangan* family in the small town of Blora, Central Java, graduating in political science from the prestigious Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) in Yogyakarta. He went to Ambon, was recruited as part of the special paramilitary forces (Paku, *Pasukan Khusus*) of the LJ, but then shifted to lead FKAWJ Maluku after contracting malaria. After living for more than two years in Ambon, he decided to stay on after the disbandment of the LJ. Unlike Taufan, Adang (born in 1982) was just a graduate of a vocational high school in Kuningan, West Java, where lower class peasant family of Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) background, lives in a rural area. Adang went to Poso, spending more than a year mainly in the *da'wa* and public communication section of the LJ, before returning to his hometown following the disbandment of the LJ. Later,

2) Noorhaidi (2005: 161) refers to Lawrence R. Iannaccone's (1994) definition of a sect as 'a religious organization with a high committed, voluntary and converted membership, a separatist orientation, an exclusive social structure, a spirit of orientation, and an attitude of ethical austerity and demanding ascetism'. For an insightful discussion of religious sects, see Wilson (1970).

3) The names are all pseudonyms with the exception of Fauzi, who granted me permission to use his real name during a telephone call with me on 16 July 2010.

Photo 3: Under construction: Abu Bakar Ash-Shidiq Mosque, Ambon
Photo: taken by author

Photo 4: Ad hoc and rough: Baabul Iman Mosque, Poso
Photo: taken by author

after failing to get a proper job and feeling unhappy with his new life in Java, he returned to Poso and married a local girl and now works part time in the Poso city fire brigade.

Reza and Fauzi both come from Yogyakarta and returned home after the jihad, but their social backgrounds and life trajectories are very different. Reza (born in 1981) was a second year student at the UGM Faculty of Engineering when he decided to join jihad through the LJ in 2001. He comes from a middle class Muhammadiyah family from Jepara, Central Java, who moved to Yogyakarta for study in senior high school. After spending more than a year in Ambon, he returned to Yogyakarta, leaving university and choosing to study in a small *pesantren* in the rural area of Muntilan, Central Java. Although from a similar Muhammadiyah middle class family, Fauzi (born in 1956) was more senior than Reza: he was a medical specialist and also Chairman of PPP Islamic party in Yogyakarta when he joined jihad in 2000. Going to Ambon as the member of a medical team, he joined in battle and was sustained minor injuries. After spending only a month in Ambon he returned to Yogyakarta and later, following internal conflict in the party, he 'officially' left the political party. While continue to be involved in Salafi activism, Fauzi later returned to the political party by endorsing his wife as a candidate during the 2009 election.

Through the life story narratives of the four post-jihadists, I will present my arguments to answer the three main questions of this research—as presented in the first chapter, namely, first, "how did they become jihad actors?"; second, "what did the jihad experience mean to the actors?"; and finally, "how did the jihad experience influence the life trajectory of the actors in the post-jihad period?" I will structure my arguments in four sections: first, the brief profiles of the jihadists and my encounter with them; second, the narratives of how they become jihadists; third, the narratives of their jihad experience; and finally, the narratives of "post-jihad".

Before discussing the life story narratives of the four post-Jihadists, I will present a macro narrative of the roles played by the Laskar Jihad in the Ambon and Poso conflict, respectively. The

macro narratives will provide a social context to understand and to analyze the life story narratives of the post-jihadists which will be discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

A tale of jihad in two troubled towns

The LJ troops came into the respective areas at different periods of the conflict: they began to embark in the port of Ambon in April-May 2000 and landed in Poso more than a year later in June 2001. They arrived in huge numbers in Ambon, approximately 3,000 people in some contingents, when Muslims in Ambon were in despair. It was a period when the Ambonese Christians launched massive counter attacks in the aftermath of the attack and burning of the old Silo Church in the city of Ambon on 26 December 1999. The massacre of hundreds of Muslims in Tobelo, North Maluku, a few days after the Silo incident, was part of the series of bloody counter attacks by the Christian militias. Thus, the arrival of the LJ troops in Ambon was welcomed and greeted with enthusiasm by Muslims in Ambon and its surroundings. A contrasting picture unfolded when they arrived in Poso in June 2001.

Here follows the narrative of Abim, the current leader of the Salafi community in Poso, who took part at two different moments of the jihad movements in the two areas (Interview, Poso, 16/3/208):

> The arrivals of the LJ troops were welcomed in very different ways by people in Ambon and Poso. When arriving in Ambon, we were welcomed with high enthusiasm by the people: so many people greeted us along the streets. Thus, we felt proud and touched. A different situation happened in Poso; people just ignored us. Even, before the arrival of the LJ, flyers had been circulated to disgrace us:, saying that the LJ was a tool and the agent of the government; "they are all intelligence agents." The flyers said, "Thousands of LJ members will come to Poso; do not welcome them because they are government agents."[4)]

4) The original quote is: "Kedatangan LJ ke Ambon dan Poso sangat berbeda dari

Rafik, a local youth leader, who was actively engaged in seeking LJ's arrival in Poso to come to Poso,[5] confirmed Abim's story. The night before the mass gathering to be held in the Poso stadium to welcome the arrival of the Laskar Jihad, he and his Islamic local colleagues worked hard to scrub various anti LJ graffiti from the stadium wall (Interview, Poso, 20/3/2008).

The LJ troops arrived in Poso quite late. The peak of the violence in Poso had occurred one year earlier. Over a two week period from late May to early June in 2000 the Christian militia had attacked the Islamic boarding school "Walisongo" and massacred hundreds of Muslims, including women and children, who were hiding in a mosque (McRae 2008: 91-115, see Chapter 1). In order to launch counter attacks and take revenge, local Muslims received support a few weeks later from the outside mujahidin who had begun to enter the area, mostly associated with the Laskar Mujahidin (LM).[6] Though the number of newcomers was not huge—estimated to be only a few hundred in different contingents, far smaller when compared to the approximately three thousand strong group of LJ who

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sisi sambutan dari masyarakat. Pada saat datang ke Ambon, pasukan LJ disambut dengan meriah oleh masyarakat; orang-orang berjejer di pinggir jalan untuk memberi sambutan kepada LJ. Karena ada rasa bangga dan haru disana. Namun di Poso situasinya berbeda, di sini orang cuek-cuek saja. Bahkan sebelum LJ datang sudah ada selebaran yg beredar yg isinya menjelek-jelekkan LJ; bahwa LJ adalah bentukan pemerintah, orang pemerintah, 'intel semua'. Selebaran itu berisi "ribuan LJ akan ke Poso; jangan diterima karena mereka orang pemerintah."" Interview in Poso, 16 March 2008.

5) One of the locals who played a critical role in mediating and persuading the LJ to come to Poso was Luki Lasahido, a local Muslim activist and politician who graduated from the Islamic University of Indonesia (UII), Yogyakarta. Through his network, he made some efforts to ask the LJ to give help to Muslims in Poso. Rafik is a close friend of Luki Lasahido (Interviews with journalist in Palu and Poso, 15 March 2009, also with Rafik in Poso, 20 March 2009).

6) The distinction between the two is just a simple division of the non-local jihadists in the communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso. While *Laskar Jihad* is a single group, the so-called "*Laskar Mujahidin*" consisted of several militia groups which were linked to different movements, such as KOMPAK (*Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis*), DI/NII (*Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia*), JI (*Jamaah Islamiyah*), Hidayatullah, KPPSI (Komite Persiapan Penagakan Syariat Islam), *etc.* Although there were differences between the groups, they shared some commonalities and at times frequently worked together. On the other hand, tensions between the Laskar Jihad and "Laskar Mujahidin" frequently occured on the ground. See Noorhaidi (2005) on the Laskar Jihad, and ICG (2005c) and Fealy and Borgu (2005) on the Laskar Mujahidin.

went to Ambon in April-May 2000—their arrival considerably affected the course of the conflict.

One of the important factors which made their role significant during the conflict was that they arrived at a time of crisis with quite powerful teams. The Poso Muslims by this stage were feeling shame, fear and indignant anger after the massive and deliberate attack by the Christian militias and this had ignited a high passion for revenge. Although the size of the Laskar Mujahidin troops was not huge, they included members with warfare skills and experiences, having either being trained in Afghanistan or in Mindanao, the Southern Philippines. They were also equipped with quite good weapons, including some of the military standard. Hand-in-hand with the local youth militias, they then launched counter-attacks on the Christian villages allegedly responsible for or behind the assault.

The Laskar Mujahidin's involvement at a critical period of the conflict in Poso granted them a special position which allowed them to build bases in some places in Poso. The Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) built their base in the Tanah Runtuh area of the Gebangrejo ward, the home of a leading local Muslim figure Haji Ahmad (a pseudonym). Haji Ahmad is a retired official of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Poso who also held a senior position in the local office of the Indonesian Religious Scholars Council (MUI, *Majelis Ulama Indonesia)* and ran an Islamic boarding school located in the area. Ahmad's profile gained prominence from early on in the conflict, particularly when he decided to remain in the city during the worst of the May-June 2000 violence—when many local leaders fled.[7)]

Another important Laskar Mujahidin group was the Mujahidin KOMPAK, which arrived in Poso in August 2000 and established its base in the Kayamanya ward, nearby to Gebangrejo. The Mujahidin KOMPAK was led by Fauzan, a *jihadi* activist from Jakarta who also a top JI member who had joined the jihad in Afghanistan in 1987-1990 with the fifth cohort along with Nasir Abbas[8)].

7) Interview in Poso, 17 March 2008; McRae 2008: 136-137.

8) Nasir Abas is a former Chief of JI Mantiqi III which covers the area of Sabah,

Fauzan arrived in Poso with four other members of KOMPAK who were veterans of the Maluku violence, their main duties being to deliver KOMPAK'S humanitarian aid and to recruit and train local mujahidin. Fauzan is a life story informant of this research, whose narratives will be discussed in Chapter 5.

In short, the LM's presence was already felt over a wide area, especially in Poso before the LJ arrived. Another important fact: was that the LJ came to Poso with a much smaller number of troops than in Ambon. It was estimated about 3,000 members of Laskar Jihad arrived in Ambon compared to a few hundred in Poso.[9)] Furthermore, their roles in the real battles in Poso were also questioned.[10)]

Thus, the differently timed arrivals of the troops to the respective areas eventually led to their playing different roles during the course of the conflict and, eventually, in its aftermath. The important role played by the LJ in Ambon during the conflict was indicated by its legacy of activities and programs which remain active until today, particularly in the field of education and *da'wa*. When the LJ and the FKAWJ were disbanded in early October 2002, the Salafis in Maluku established a new foundation to manage the programs and facilities formerly run by the FKAWJ. This foundation, established in early 2003, was called the *Yayasan Abubakar Ash-Shiddiq* or the Abubakar Ash-Shiddiq Foundation. Its objective is "to reorganize and to manage *da'wa* activities of the Salafis in Maluku as well as to

East Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Mindanao. After being arrested by the police on 18 April 2003 in Bekasi, West Java, he left the JI and became a police partner working to help the police for counter-terrorism. He published a book entitled *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI* (Disclosing Jamaah Islamiyah: A Testimony of an Ex Member of JI) in 2005. In a sort of autobiography, Abas wrote his trajectory led him to join jihad in Afghanistan and Mindanao and become involved with the NII and JI. The book concludes with his reasons for leaving the JI.

9) There were different estimates f the number of Laskar Jihad deployed to Poso as reviewed by McRae (2008: 160). The ICG (2004a: 14) estimates 100-150 men, Sangadji (2004: 26) estimates 500 and Hasan (2006: 205) approximately 700.

10) McRae (2008: 161-162) discusses the controversy over the LJ's role in violence in Poso. He mentions a local Muslim combatant sympathetic to the LJ who described the group as less militant than the mujahidin who came in Poso in 2000. Noorhaidi (2005: 208) discusses the issue by concluding that "Viewed from this [combat] perspective, Laskar Jihad's achievement in the Moluccas was, in many ways, strikingly limited."

take care of any assets that used to belong to the Salafis." (Interview with Taufan, Ambon, 22 and 25 April 2008; interview with Abdul Wahab Lumaela, Ambon, 26 April 2008; Budiyanto 2006: 64) The *Yayasan* consisted of three divisions, namely, the division of *da'wa* and education, the division of facilities and equipment, and the division of financing.[11] As reflected in its structure, *da'wa* and education are the core business of the foundation.

The somewhat strong profile and vast societal network of the Abubakar Foundation was shown in its core leadership. In addition to Taufan, who is an ex Laskar Jihad activist and a life story informants of this research, there were two local leading figures, namely Abdul Wahab Lumaela[12] and Nasir Kilkoda. Lumaela is a Muhammadiyah activist who was the acting Chairman of the *Badan Koordinasi Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid* (BKPRM, Coordinating Body of Youth Activists of Mosque) and the Secretary of *Forum Silaturahmi Umat Islam* (FSUI, Coordinating Forum of Muslim Society) of Maluku Province. Kilkoda is a senior official of the *Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Daerah* (BKPMD, the Coordinating Body for Local Investment) of the Maluku Province. The wide network of the Abubakar Foundation is also obvious from the involvement of local businessmen, such as Haji Nurdin Fata and Pak Erwin. During my fieldwork under strong leadership which combined the migrants, local leaders and businessmen, the Abubakar Foundation was in the midst of building a big two-storey mosque located in the Salafi housing complex in the formerly known as Kampong Kisar and newly renamed as "Kampong Muhajirin" in Batu Merah Atas, Ambon.

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11) It was a slimmed down version of the old structure of the FKAWJ which had been comprised of five divisions: education, special forces, financing, health, and public relations (Budiyanto 2006: 34)

12) Lumaela is a graduate of the Faculty of Syari'ah of the State Institute of Islamic Studies of Sultan Alauddin Makasar. He is one of the sons of the *Raja*, the traditional local leader, of Keitelu Village, the oldest Muslim village in Maluku. He was elected *Raja* of Keitelu following the death of the last *Raja*, Ir. Abdullah Lumaela, a diplomat in the Foreign Affairs Department, but he refused to take the seat for religious reasons. "Many traditional beliefs and traditions are not compatible with Islam according the Salafist," he argued. Due to his refusal, there is still no *Raja* of Keitelu until the current day (Interview in Ambon, 26 April 2008).

This picture in Ambon contrasted strongly with that of the Salafi living in Poso. They lived temporarily in the Sayo ward, in an area owned by a local businessman and being lent to them during the conflict. This is perhaps why most of the twenty or so houses there were of an ad hoc, temporary construction, with timber rather than steel frames. Similar features were also found in the mosque, located in the same area. Here my are fieldnotes:

> The *Baabul Iman* mosque of the Sayo ward, Poso, is located in approximately 12 x 20 meters square, built completely of rough timber with a roof consisting of a mixture of traditional coconut fiber thatching (*rumbia*) and zinc. All the walls are also built of rough timber. The floor is not polished but of a rough texture, covered by several small pieces of old, tired faded carpets of different hues. A medium-size whiteboard is located to the rear of the mosque, and there is a huge bookshelf containing only a very few old books. There is also a smaller whiteboard hanging on the wall with the title "*Laporan Keuangan Masjid"* (Mosque Financial Report) written on it, which is used to note down the amount of donations to the mosque. But it appears not to have been updated for quite a long time. It is blank.

The condition of the Baabul Iman mosque of Sayo, Poso is in stark contrast with the Abubakar mosque of Kisar, Ambon. The former has aged and is very modest, its functions having diminished along with the decline of the conflict. Perhaps if its founders leave the area it will become empty and deserted. The Ambon Abubakar mosque is a very new one, in fact still under construction. When finished it will be a massive two-storey building, with completely steel framework, approximately 20 x 20 meters square. If the Baabul Iman is a mosque of the past, the Abubakar mosque is a mosque of the future. They reflect the different destinies of the ex LJ Salafi communities in the two areas.

I argue that the contrasting views of the life story narratives of the ex LJ activists and the Salafi community in Ambon and Poso in the post-jihad period are in response to their different arrival times and roles during the conflict which eventually led to different community profiles, societal networks, and public roles. In short, differ-

ent planting times produced different kinds (and different qualities) of crops during the harvest period. Let us move to the life story narratives of the actors.

Brief profiles and the encounters

- ***Reza: the student jihadist***

I will start with Reza,[13] one of the informants in this chapter whom I had known for years before the fieldwork. As I described at some length in Chapter 3, my long acquaintance with him did not guarantee his easy approval for the interview. My relationship with him, as researcher and informant, was significantly influenced by his relationship with Rahmi (a pseudonym) his aunt, my colleague at UGM. It was through her that I had first come to know him some years before my fieldwork began.

Reza was born in December 1981 in Jepara, a middle-sized town in Central Java, famous for its fine wooden furniture. He is the oldest son of two from a middle class *santri*[14] family. When he was a child, his father worked for Medco, a private national oil company, in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, while he lived in Jepara with his mother. Living in Kauman, a *santri* part of town, he was raised under the influence of the Muhammadiyah, a modernist Islamic movement. His grandfather was a local cleric and a leading Muhammadiyah figure in the area. His mother worked as a teacher in a Muhammadiyah kindergarten where he studied. Later he and his mother joined his father in Balikpapan and lived there until he finished primary school. Then he moved to Yogyakarta to study, from

13) I conducted a series of interviews with Reza during my first fieldwork; twice in January 2008 and twice again in April 2008. I met and talked with him casually in December 2009 when I did my second fieldwork.

14) A discussion on the concept of *santri* and *new santri* was done by Yon Machmudi (2008: 69-103) in an article 'The Emergence of the New Santri in Indonesia" published in *Journal of Islam Indonesia* volume 02, number 01.

junior high school to university, staying with his mother's younger sister, Rahmi, who was a UGM student at the time, in the Kauman ward, the home base of Muhammadiyah.

Recalling his early childhood in Jepara, Reza explained he was a naughty boy. Although his mother was a kindergarten teacher, he was well known as "the naughtiest boy in the school." His mother came from a military family with a strict discipline in educating children, including Reza. He recalled that beating was a common practice in his family, especially by his mother. "If I caused any trouble, or came home late, my mother would beat me. She would use a clothes hanger or kitchen utensil, to beat me. So, my legs have got accustomed [to the blows]." (Interview, Yogyakarta, 12/1/2008)

Following family traditions, Reza went to Muhammadiyah schools in Yogyakarta. According to Rahmi, Reza was a good boy as a teenager, spending most of his time either at school or home. As a young man from a Muhammadiyah background, he was a big fan of Amien Rais, the Muhammadiyah leader at the time. Why was that? "Perhaps, it was because of his analysis and courage [in criticizing the government]. Perhaps, it was because of my friends' influence." (Interview, Yogyakarta, 12/1/2008)

After graduating from Muhammadiyah High School I in Yogyakarta, one of the best schools in the town, he was selected as a student at the Faculty of Engineering at UGM, a prestigious university in Indonesia, in 1999. It was later in his third year of study in 2001 that he joined in the jihad movement to Ambon.

I began to know Reza, through Rahmi, a few years before he joined the jihad. Although I had met him, I had never had any deep personal conversation with him. We would just briefly meet when he came to my office to visit Rahmi or when I visited her house where he was staying. So we just know to each other from a distance. I remembered him as a trendy and good-looking young man, usually wearing t-shirt and jeans. It was not a surprising that the girls loved him. Rahmi also told me that he was a big fan of Metallica, an American heavy metal rock band, with a poster of the group on his bedroom wall.

After a long period of time, perhaps eight years, we eventually met again in the morning of 23 December 2007 in the UGM mosque in Bulaksumur, Yogyakarta. As I described in some detail in Chapter 3, it had taken me about six months to finally meet him!

It was a very different Reza I met that morning. He was wearing an above ankle-*sarong* and a white long gown with a large, loose shabby jacket in reddish brown on top. The black skull cap he wore on his head nicely complemented his fresh complexion and long, thick beard. He greeted me with *assalamualikum* and shook my hand warmly. He was still the good-looking guy with the nice smile he used to be. But it was hard to imagine him now as the big fan of Metallica.

After our first meeting, we had a series of four interviews, approximately one hour long each, although one only lasted about thirty minutes. In my second fieldwork in 2009, I had three short meetings with him, including one during a *tabligh akbar* given by Ustadz Luqman Ba'abduh on "Tips on how to educate your children not to become terrorists" in November 2009. Reza and his friends opened a stall selling Salafi books at the event.

Although we had already had several meetings and interviews, and he was generally quite relaxed and open during the interviews, I felt there was still some kind of veil, some kind of cultural barrier between us. It was reflected, for instance, in his choice of meeting or interview venues. Although we lived quite close, about 1 - 2 kilometers away, on the north side of Yogyakarta, he preferred to meet in the UGM mosque— located more than 4 kilometers from his place and even further from mine. I had once suggested we meet at his place, which was much closer, but he did not respond to my suggestion.

I speculate there are two possible reasons for his reluctance to meet and be interviewed at home or nearby: first, personal and family privacy; second, 'communal privacy'. What I mean by 'communal privacy' is a sort of 'cultural border' where outsiders, meaning non-Salafis, are not welcome to intrude. I had never been inside Reza's home since he never invited me, but Rahmi did provide some possible family reasons for his reluctance. She told me that Reza

and his family was staying in a sort of *rumah petak*, a small house the size of a studio apartment, with the one main divided into three: a living room, bedroom, and kitchen/bathroom. It was located in a compound of *rumah petak*, mostly occupied by Salafis. So: it was a kind of Salafi enclave which I will discuss further in this chapter.

- ***Taufan: the 'fresh university graduate' jihadist***

Unlike Reza, Taufan[15] comes from an *abangan* family in Blora, a small town in Central Java, where he was born in 1976. His father was the village head, while his mother was a primary school teacherl. Both were members of Golkar (*Golongan Karya)*, a state-sponsored political party which was founded during the early period of the authoritarian Soeharto regime. Taufan is the third of five children from a middle class family in rural Central Java. Although growing up in an *abangan* Muslim family, he began to invent a new personal and collective *identity* as a *santri* when he was in elementary school by practicing Islamic rituals such as praying five-times a day as a consequence of what he called "environmental factors" (*pengaruh lingkungan)*. He further invented a *movement identity* for himself as a Muslim activist by participating in youth Islamic activism at a local mosque in the town of Blora, and, later, by taking up its leadership position when he was in high school. His leadership career began by his assuming leadership of some local groups, including *Karang Taruna*, a state-sponsored youth organization at the village level, and OSIS (*Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah*, Internal School Student Organization).

15) I conducted life-story interviews with him on three occasions, in different places and times in Ambon, beside some casual conversations, including when I attended an internal meeting of Salafi activists on the transmigration program. The first interview took place in the Abubakar mosque, in Kisar, Kebun Cengkih on 22 April 2008. The second and third interviews both took place on 25 April 2008, but at different times and places; in the afternoon in Al Ma'ruf mosque in Batumerah and in the evening at his home in Kisar, Kebun Cengkih. I had another interview during my second fieldwork in Ambon in November 2009.

He said that both NU and Muhammadiyah influenced his religious traditions as a teenager. He attended regular Islamic sermons given by NU clerics whilst simultaneously participating in religious activities held by the youth wing of Muhammadiyah (IRM, *Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah)* in Blora. Although Taufan shifted from *abangan* to *santri* and even began to engage with Islamic activism while he was in Blora, he was not yet radicalized. This is indicated by his application to study at the *Taman Taruna Nusantara*, a secular, prestigious senior high school, founded by the military to recruit bright students, located in Magelang, Central Java. He, unfortunately, failed the final selection stage.[16] He told how his shift from *abangan* to *santri* was eventually followed by his parents applying Islamic norms and rules, such as conducting regular prayers. After finishing senior high school in Blora, Taufan left town to study at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (Fisipol) of UGM in Yogyakarta in 1995.

Taufan was one of the brighter students among his peers. He finished his study in four year in 1999 with a thesis on the political behavior of the Islamic community with the case study of *Pesantren* Krapyak, the well-known NU boarding school in Yogyakarta. During this period he became involved in some Islamic movements, including the HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, Islamic Student Association), before eventually becoming anchored in Salafi activism. After graduating from UGM, he applied to be a lecturer at the Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (UMY) but did not succeed. He also worked as a sales person in an electronic company in Yogyakarta for a few months before eventually deciding to the join jihad movement in Ambon in early 2000.

Although we went studying in the same faculty of UGM, I began to know Taufan when I was conducting my first fieldwork in Ambon in April 2008. The first time we met by coincidence. It was Sunday morning around 10 a.m., 20 April, when I visited the

16) He told me jokingly that his failure was most likely due to his trouble listening and understanding an English question asked by one of the members of selection committee. Because he failed to understand the question, the interviewer asked him to leave the room, and being nervous he made another mistake by turning to the left instead of the right. He said he had ear problems from childhood (Interview in Ambon, 22/4/2008).

'joint work' program held by the local Salafi community to build a mosque in the Salafi housing compound located in the Kisar ward, later renamed as *Kampong Muhajirin*. On site I was introduced by *Pak* Erwin, a senior local Salafi activist, to Taufan, the Chairman of the Abu Bakar Foundation, who led the program. He was wearing a black skull cap, above-ankle trousers and a light blue Adidas brand t-shirt. When I mentioned my status as an UGM Fisipol lecturer he quickly replied "I am also an alumnus of Fisipol UGM, from Government Science." The conversation quickly became smoother since we knew some people in common, including a female peer who had become a lecturer in my department.

After the meeting I had a series of meetings and interviews with Taufan, and I attended mass prayers and sermons in the Salafi mosques, either in Batumerah or in Kampong Muhajirin. It was also through his kind help and introduction that I could interview Anshor, ex LJ activist from Kendal, Central Java, who married a local girl and works as a street vendor in Ambon. I was frankly quite impressed by Taufan and other Salafi fellows in Ambon for their kindness, openness, and trust in helping me do my research among them. Taufan and other Salafi fellows were very kind and helpful in sharing information and giving me access to some of their activities, including allowing me to participate in an internal Salafi meeting on the 'transmigration program' held in the house of a Salafi activist who works in the transmigration office of the Maluku Province. With their help I was able also to attend the wedding of a Salafi *ustadz* who married a local girl in the Gemba village in Ceram Island.

• *Adang: the high school graduate jihadist*

Adang[17] was born in Kuningan, a medium-sized town in West Java, in 1982. Unlike Reza and Taufan, he comes from a lower class

17) I did a series of two life-history interviews with Adang on 24 and 25 March 2008 in Poso. Another interview was done when I did the second fieldwork in Poso in December 2009.

family in a rural area with a Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)[18] background. He is the fourth of five children born to a peasant father and a mother who worked as a petty trader in the local market. Leading a peasant household of a traditionalist NU Islamic background, his parents maintained some traditional beliefs, popular among farmers, such as *santet* (witchcraft) and the myth of *Dewi Sri*[19]or the goddess of rice and fertility—which later become a source of dispute between him and his parents. Adang went to public schools from primary to senior high school, finally graduating from a vocational high school in electronic communications in his home town, Kuningan. Whilst at high school he began to engage with Salafi activism under the influence of his school peers. Later in 2001 he joined the jihad to Poso.

Adang became my life history informant as the result of some incidents. My prospective informant was initially Abu Abim, the leader of the Salafi community in the Sayo compound in Poso. We had an initial meeting and he basically agreed to be my informant. The meeting took place on the evening of 16 March 2008 in the house of *Pak* Jufri, a senior local Salafi activist who lives in the compound, attended by four Salafi activists including Adang. After briefly explaining my research topic, objective and plan, I asked for Ibrahim's endorsement and willingness to be my informant. He agreed and even, later, introduced me to the Salafi activists who attended his sermons in the mosque. Yet he was a very busy person. Besides being the leader of the Salafi community in Poso, he was also the husband of four wives and the father of several children who all lived in the compound—though in separate houses. Due to

18) Nahdlatul Ulama is Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation, well-known for its traditional character. In the book *Nahdhatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia* published by Monash Asia Institute in 1996, the editors (Greg Fealy and Greg Barton) seek to discuss important aspects of its behaviour, ideology, and its relationship with the state and other internal power structures. Noorhaidi (2005) observed that there were very few members of the Laskar Jihad with an NU background.

19) Sumintarsih describes in *Dewi Sri Dalam Tradisi Jawa* (Dewi Sri in the Javanese Tradition) that the myth and tradition of Dewi Sri has survived in the peasantry, particularly in Java. The symbolism of the tradition is manifested in the rituals of marriage, of agriculture and space-use order. *Jantra* Vol.II, No.3, 2007. For a Sundanese version of Dewi Sri, see http://www.sunda.org/sundanese/myths.htm [accessed on 28 July 2010].

his schedule he canceled several appointments we had made for interviews at the very last moment. I only managed to have one, 40 minute interview with him.

In between the canceled interviews with Abu Abim, I met Adang in the *Baabul Iman* mosque, where I would stay in the compound, which was located just next to his house. I told Adang about the story which is why, perhaps feeling sorry for me, he finally agreed to be my life story informant. My first interview with him took place in the *Baabul Iman* mosque on 24 March 2008 for less than an hour. The second interview, the next day, happened by pure coincidence after Abu Ibrahim suddenly canceled his interview with me. I was waiting for my local contact to pick me up from the Sayo compound that evening when I met Adang who was about to leave for work. After hearing that Abu Ibrahim had just canceled our appointment, he offered me the opportunity to interview him at his workplace, the Poso city fire brigade office. Thank God.

He then drove me on his modest, old motorcycle to the office. We spent about one hour and half for the interview which took place in the *mushalla*, a small mosque, situated at the back of the office. My last interview in December 2009 also took place in the same place.

Adang was a quiet, polite person; he was not an overly expressive extrovert individual. Even his pleasant smile, I felt, was carefully managed. He also kept his distance from me, refusing, for example, to narrate his battle tales for moral reasons ("I worry it would damage my sincere soul by telling the tales to others"). I also only had limited opportunities to meet and interview him. This is why I categorized my interviews with him as *quite successful* (see the category in Chapter 3). It seemed to me that Adang was one of the rising stars among the Salafi activists in Poso. He gave a sermon in Friday prayers in the *Babul Iman* mosque, as well as taking the position as *imam* in one of the *isha'* prayers, while I was there. He also looked to be quite close to Abu Abim, the leader. Besides attending the first meeting in the place of *Pak* Jufri, he was also the partner of Abu Ibrahim when they were played badminton in the compound.

- ***Fauzi: the 'doctor-cum-politician' jihadist***

Fauzi[20] was born in Yogyakarta in 1956 from a hard-core Muhammadiyah activist family. His late father, Abdul Razak Fachruddin, was the National Chairman of Muhammadiyah from 1968 to 1990. He is the sixth of the family's seven children who grew up in the Muslim urban suburb of Kauman, Yogyakarta, the heart of the Muhammadiyah movement. Thus his personal and collective identity as a Muslim was developed from his early childhood. He also went to Muhammadiyah schools from primary to senior high school in Yogyakarta. On his childhood and adolescence, he described himself as a fighter (*tukang kelahi*) with strong deeply anti-Chinese feelings. He also portrayed himself as a rebel by referring to his grandfather, *Kiai* Fachruddin, who stood down from his position as religious patron in the Pakualaman Palace in protest against its collaborative policy with the Dutch Colonialists. Thus when he was a student in the UGM medical faculty, instead of being active in Islamist organizations he preferred to become involved with the nationalist student movement organization of the GMNI (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia*). The reason was that he did not like the 'bossy' attitude of some senior activists of HMI whom he had known. In 1995 he graduated from UGM as a medical specialist and was then elevated as the Chairman of the Islamic political party *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, the Development United Party), in Yogyakarta from 1997 to 2001.

During the late Soeharto period, Fauzi became a loyalist and special aide of Amien Rais, then the Chairman of the Muhammadiyah National Board, when the latter launched his political campaign against the Soeharto regime. But Fauzi eventually became disappointed with Amien Rais following his decision to found a new pluralistic political party *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN, the National Mandate Party) instead of joining or establishing a new Islamic par-

20) I conducted a series of life history interviews with Fauzi in Yogyakarta in February and March 2008. I met him first, however, in Solo, on 15 January 2008, in the house of his second wife. During my second fieldwork I did another interview with him in Yogyakarta in October 2009.

ty. It was the early period after the fall of Soeharto and the beginning of the *reformasi* era. Following his disappointment with Amin Rais, he began a new trajectory of Islamic activism by engaging in a closer relationship with Ja'far Umar Thalib, the leading cleric of the Salafi movement who later became the Commander of Laskar Jihad. Fauzi invited Thalib to give a sermon at the weekly session held at his home in Yogyakarta since 1998.[21)] When the Ambon conflict erupted in January 1999 and the Laskar Jihad was then established in early 2000, he provided a lot of support, both financially and politically, before eventually joining the movement in late 2000.

I had known Fauzi several years before conducting my fieldwork, especially when I had a series of in-depth interviews with him in 1999 for a previous research project on pluralism in Yogyakarta.[22)] He had not yet joined jihad at the time though he already had a typical Salafi appearance: wearing a white skull cap and above-ankle trousers with a long beard. The interviews took place in his small house located in Jetisharjo, near the Code River in the city center of Yogyakarta. I first learnt about his participation in jihad from my good friend Hery Varia, a former journalist and Ali Usman, a Muslim activist and later Chairman of the Ngruki Alumni Association, during my fieldwork in Solo in 2007. Briefly following a series of calls and exchanged SMS, I was able to meet him in a house situated in a middle class compound in Solo in mid January 2008. It was a short but pleasant meeting, accompanied by a cup of hot coffee and snack. He had only a faint memory of our first interview years ago. After listening to my brief introduction of the research project, he expressed his willingness and interest to be interviewed. We agreed

21) Ja'far Umar Thalib gave a regular sermon in Fauzi's house every Friday evening for about two years, until 2000. After becoming busier with many activities related to his position as a Commander-in-Chief of Laskar Jihad, Ja'far delegated the sermon to one of his trusted lieutenants, namely Muhammad Umar al-Sewed. The regular sermon every Friday evening in Fauzi's house continued to happen until 2008 when I did my fieldwork.

22) A paper based on the research co-authored with Mohtar Mas'oed and Rizal Panggabean appeared as an article entitled "Social Resources for Civility and Participation: The Case of Yogyakarta" in *The Politics of Multiculturalism in Southeast Asia*, a book edited by Robert W. Hefner, published by the University of Hawai'i Press, 2003.

to meet again later in Yogyakarta, in the home of his first wife, the Solo house being the home of his second wife.

During my first fieldwork I had a series of three in-depth interviews with him in a house located in an upper-middle class complex in Godean, on the outskirts of Yogyakarta. There was a tennis court in the compound with a security guard at the gate of the complex. Fauzi's house was one of the biggest: a two-storey house built on a two-lot area of land, approximately of 300 meters square. In front of the house, there was a similar-sized plot of land for a large garage able to hold more than four cars and several motorbikes. The interviews were usually accompanied by a cup of hot coffee, snacks, and, even nicer, dinner meals. In between the interview, we prayed together with Fauzi, leading the prayers. There was another permanent menu item at all the sessions: a box of *Ji Sam Soe kretek (*clove-scented*)* cigarettes. Fauzi said he had failed to stop his habit of smoking and drinking coffee. He said that he had once told Ja'far Umar Thalib: "*Ustadz*, please prohibit me from doing many things but not these two things: smoking and drinking coffee".

I also attended the weekly sermons held in his house on 7 March 2008, after the interview. According to Fauzi, this practice was begun by his late father in 1980s. The sermons then moved to his house in Jetisharjo and then to his current house in Godean, in west Yogyakarta. The changing preachers invited to the sermon reflected his shift of religious views. Up to 1998, the preachers varied from liberal Muslim artist and man of culture, Emha Ainun Nadjib to philosopher and scholar of Islamic mysticism, Damardjati Supadjar. From 1998 the preachers were exclusively Salafi. Ja'far Umar Thalib was the first, replaced by Muhammad Umar as-Sewed and then recently Afifi Abdul Wadud.

My relationship with Fauzi became quite close and personal. Besides discussing personal matters like his relationship with his second wife, he also related in some detail his involvement in political affairs from behind the screen. Probably my background as a Muslim activist and my good relationship with some of his close friends led him to trust me. It was a lucky coincidence that I knew

one of his trusted friends in politics from when he was still active in politics. This trust was manifested when Fauzi called his friend and then handed his mobile to me to chat with him. Yet he was a busy person, so it was not easy for him to keep his interview appointments with him. So my biggest challenge in interviewing him was his limited time for interviews.

On becoming a jihadist

As presented in Chapter 2, I suggested that all the informants in this research became jihad actors after experiencing what I call 'radical reasoning'. By 'radical reasoning' I mean a set process involving both cognition and emotion through either 'moral shock' (Jasper 1997, 1998, see also Jasper and Poulsen 1995) or 'cognitive opening' (Wiktorowicz 2005) or both which eventually led to jihad as an act of identity (Marranci 2006, 2009). Radical reasoning often occurs in the context of, and as a response to, identity crisis (Erikson, 1968) experienced by the actor. I suggest that the decision to join jihad involved radical reasoning because it ruptured the 'normal' daily life of the actors: they took part in a deadly violent conflict, putting their own lives at huge risk, leaving families and relatives—sometimes job and occupation—far away, and being prepared to face harsh experiences and even suffering.

I will use the life story narrative of the informants to support and explain the above argument on how they decided to join the jihad movement and become jihad activists. I begin by discussing the identity crises experienced by the informants in different stages of their life. By identity crisis, I refer to Erikson's (1968: 16-7) notion as "a necessary turning point, a crucial moment, when development must move one way or another, marshalling resources of growth, recovery, and further differentiation," which usually applied to adolescence and young adulthood. Erikson has furthermore argued that personal growth and societal change, as well as identity crisis in individual biography and present-day crises in historical transformation cannot be

separated because the two help to delineate each other. Identity crisis, hence, may also happen at different stages of the life cycle.

Following Erikson, I start by arguing that all the informants experienced crisis identity in the period of political crisis in Indonesia from the early 1990s. In what Uhlin (1997: 155) called the 'pre transition period', Soeharto shifted his political strategy by embracing Islamic groups and giving support to the foundation of the *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se Indonesia* (ICMI, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) in 1990 (Hefner 2000: 159). This turning point represented a major blow to the Islamist movements that had begun to rise since the early 1980s. The crisis reached its peak in 1997-1998, referred to by Bertrand (2004) as the 'critical juncture' in modern Indonesian history.

As reflected in the life story narratives of the informants in this chapter, their personal identity crises happened during this political crisis period: in 1996 for Taufan (in his second year at university), in 1998 for Fauzi (following his disappointment at the founding of the new 'pluralistic' political party National Mandate Party or PAN, by his political mentor, Amien Rais), in 1999/2000 for Adang (in his second year of high school) and in 2000 for Reza (in his second year of university). Although the four informants experienced identity crises in different ways for different reasons, they then became involved with Salafi activism and eventually decided to join jihad through Laskar Jihad. Following McGuire (2002: 62-68, see also Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi 1975: 65-68) I argue that their identity crisis happened at two different periods of personal development, namely, in the rites of passage to adulthood (in the cases of Adang, Taufan and Reza), and in middle age (in the case of Fauzi). In all the cases, identity crisis followed by 'cognitive opening' as suggested by Wiktorowicz led them to adopt new perspective of Islamic Salafism. Following their involvement with Salafism they were eventually moved to join jihad by the combination of two main factors: 'moral shock' at the news of Muslims persecution and/or the fatwas issued by Salafi clerics stating the obligation to do jihad.

I will start with Adang's story. His identity crisis began in his second year of high school in Kuningan, West Java, following his exposure to a new version of Islamism, namely Salafism. Born and raised in an NU household with strong traditionalist Islamic traditions in the Windusengkahan ward, Kuningan,[23] Adang was surprised and quite shocked to discover a puritan version of Islam, that was critical of the many syncretic strands of the faith he used to follow and which urged women to wear cover their whole body, including the entire face except for the eyes. His participation in Salafism was influenced by his school friend Hasan who persuaded him to attend a center of Salafi activism, *Darus Sunnah*, located in the city area of Kuningan, less than 10 kilometers from his home ward. The encounter began with his borrowing and reading Islamic books available in the *Darus Sunnah* library, followed by his attending regular Salafi sermons held in the center.

> It began with curiosity. I just followed the activities because Hasan often asked me to join. I was initially curious about who they were they because the females wore the veil. Although it contradicted [my traditional faith], I went on studying while praying to God for guidance. I eventually learnt that they had a valid understanding of Islam based on *sunnah* (Interview, Poso, 24/3/2008).

Such a 'cognitive opening' as suggested by Wiktorowicz (2005: 85) is a critical step taken by activists through which they may join an extremist Islamic group. This usually occurs following a crisis that may have unsettled their certainties, including their identities, making them more receptive to the possibility of new ideas and world views. Yet, while many people experience 'cognitive opening' in different ways and contexts, only a few then join the movement. Wiktorowicz suggests that, "Those who are most likely to be drawn to a movement…. find these interpretations and their representative

23) Brief but useful informantion about Kuningan District and Windusengkahan Ward can be seen in Wikipedia, at http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabupaten_Kuningan and http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windusengkahan,_Kuningan,_Kuningan [accessed on 29 July 2010].

institutions wanting… [thus] religious seekers extend their search for meaning to perspectives outside the mainstreams." (2005: 86)

A quite similar process happened to Taufan and Reza in their early university period. For Taufan, moving from the small town of Blora to Yogyakarta, a center of student activism made a major impact on his life. He said that he had become a sort of 'garbage bin' (*tong sampah)* during his first eight months in Yogyakarta, studying different Islamic schools of thought on campus. He even admitted to being "almost stressed" (*hampir stres)* as a consequence of confronting and studying various, sometimes contradictory, Islamic schools of thought. He claimed he took part in *Tablighi Jama'a* activities as well as those of the HMI and *Jama'ah Shalahuddin*, the Islamic student unit of UGM. Having been involved with the HMI for about two years, he decided to leave for the profound reason: "there was a satanic culture in HMI." What he meant by 'satanic culture' was such habits as late night discussions which led to the *fajr* prayer being skipped later and discussions on religious philosophy leading to radical conclusions such as "carrying out religious rituals with the motive of entering the heaven was a sign of *syirk* (idolatry or polytheism)." (Interview in Ambon, 22/4/2008)

During such a crisis of identity, Taufan actively sought a meaningful and satisfactory belief system which eventually he found in the Salafi teachings. How did he eventually end up with the Salafi movement? He related that the process of becoming a Salafis took place in gradually, by reading some Salafi books, then participating in regular preaching programs by the Salafis near his boarding house, eventually going to the Salafi *pesantren* led by Ja'far Umar Thalib. Yet he related that one of the critical incidents that influenced him to join the Salafis was when he was 'defeated in discussion' on *tawhid* (the Islamic doctrine of monotheism) by one of his boarding house friends. After learning that this friend regularly attended the preaching sessions of Thalib, he also began to attend Thalib's sessions. While he said his involvement in Salafi activism began in his second year in Yogyakarta, it intensified in his last year of study at UGM.

For Reza, though his cognitive opening similarly occurred in his early university study, it was quite a personal and emotional beginning. He related that it was the death of people close to him, especially his aunt and an old teacher, which led him to think about studying religion in preparation for the next life. Thus, he joined a cohort of four university friends who went around seeking "the right Islamic teaching". They were student activists during the period, one of them was even secretary general of the Executive Board of the UGM Student Council. They attended different kinds of Islamic sermons, by preachers such as Hizbut Tahrir, Jama'ah Tabligh, Ikhwanul Muslimin, but eventually anchored himself in the Salafi activism (Interview in Yogyakarta, 20/1/2008). So, although it started with his personal troubles, he shared his 'crisis of identity' with his peers to seek a new and more meaningful belief system. But why did they eventually decide that Salafi teaching was the best?

According to Reza, he became convinced to become a Salafis following his participation in a *daurah* (intensive religious session) given by *ustadz* Abdurrahman Lombok held in Magelang. He was impressed by the teachings given in the *daurah* because "all the arguments had a strong religious basis" (*semua ada dalilnya*). He recalled that Islam was metaphorically depicted as the 'wellspring' which began to flow from the Prophet Muhammad and his early companions (*salafus shalih)* and continuously flowed through the channel up to the present time. He explained that there were many corruptions that had distorted Islam's purity along the way from its original form up to the present. He quoted a *hadith* that says "every hundred years there will be a man born to purify Islam, back to its purity as in the period of the Prophet and his early companions" (Interview in Yogyakarta, 20/1/2008). He said that it is the duty of the Salafi clerics to bring back the purity of Islam

Luckily I met Naufal,[24)] a pseudonym, one of Reza's cohorts in the search for "the right Islamic teaching" at university. He was

24) Naufal was involved in helping the Salafi publication during the conflict period, though he did not join in the conflict. During the period, his appearance was that of a Salafi activist: with above ankle trousers and a long beard. During the conversation he

actually my junior in the sociology department at UGM. He said that for them the most interesting Salafi doctrine was its principle of non-*hizbiyya* or non-partisan politics. Noorhaidi (2005: 143) explains *da'wa hizbiyya* as "Islamic movements that are perceived to prioritize politics over the purification of the individual Muslim's religious beliefs and practices." Naufal explained that the doctrine of non-*hizbiyya* was very relevant to their experience as student activists who had observed bitter contestation and rivalry among Islamic movements in campus. He said that *da'wa hizbiyya* activities were confronted by the Salafi activism (Interview, Jakarta, 16/11/2009).

Fauzi's story is unique because his identity crisis happened in adulthood when he had quite a settled social and professional life: he was simultaneously the Chairman of an Islamic political party in Yogyakarta and a medical specialist in his early 40's. The turning-point in his life occurred when the long-time activist, his political mentor, Amien Rais, decided to resign from his leadership in the Muhammadiyah to found a new 'pluralistic' political party. "I was deeply disappointed by that," Fauzi said. He admitted that he used to be a big fan of Amien Rais when the latter was a committed Muslim activist. So Fauzi's identity crisis arose when he lost the role-model figure of Muslim activist that he had previously personified in Amien Rais. Then he found a strong and flamboyant character in the figure of Ja'far Umar Thalib, a young Salafi preacher.

Fauzi invited Thalib to give the weekly sermon at his house in Jetisharjo, Yogyakarta. Although he had the public image of a fiery speaker, in his sermons Thalib spoke more about the ethical conduct of the Prophet Muhammad based on the book *Adabul Mufrod*. Fauzi was impressed and studied more about Salafi teachings from Thalib for about two years through the weekly sessions which were mainly focused on personal morality and ethical conduct. When Thalib later became busy following the establishment of the Laskar Jihad in early 2000, the sermons were taken over Muhammad Umar as-Sewed,

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told me that it was part of his fieldwork research for his bachelar thesis on the Ambon conflict. After graduating he became a lecturer at the Airlangga University, Surabaya, and is currently doing his doctoral program in Japan (Interview in Jakarta, 16/11/2009.

Thalib's lieutenant. What factors led him to convert from Muhammadiyah to Salafism?

Fauzi claimed he was disappointed at classes held by Muhammadiyah clerics since they did not refer to major original sources and references in Islamic teachings but relied more on modern sources and references. He was attracted and later satisfied by the Salafi clerics because they always referred to the major original sources of Islamic teachings, especially the Qur'an, hadiths and other books. He was also disappointed with Muhammadiyah for abandoning discussion of some core matters such as *takhyul (*superstition*)* and *bid'a* (misguided innovation) which were eventually taken over by the Salafis.

His further and deeper engagement with Salafism, especially through weekly sessions with Ja'far Umar Thalib for two years from 1998 to 2000, eventually led him to join jihad in September 2000. His close relationship with Thalib kept him informed with the establishment of Laskar Jihad from the very beginning. As the leader of a political party he claimed to endorse its establishment through various ways, political and financial. But it was not enough for a highly committed man of action like Fauzi. Especially after he learned from the news that a massacre had taken place in Tobelo, North Maluku, resulting in the murder of up to 3,000 Muslims.[25] Thus, he decided, "I had to retaliate!" (Interview, Yogyakarta, 7/3/2008).

This was a 'moral shock' as suggested by Jasper (1997, see also Jasper and Poulsen, 1995). According to Jasper (1997), 'moral shocks' occur when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that s/he becomes inclined toward political action, whether or not s/he has acquaintances in the movement. "Whether the underlying image is a state of shock or an electrical shock, it implies a visceral, bodily feeling, on a par with vertigo or nausea. Strong emotions should flow from this," Jasper contends (1998: 409).

25) The real number of Muslim casualties was actually much lower than he mentioned, but at least 500 people were killed. A more detailed description of the violent incidents, including the dispute regarding the number of casualties is presented in Chapter 1.

His reply "I had to retaliate!" in response to the news of the Muslim massacre in Tobelo reflects his identity crisis which eventually led him to do jihad as an *act of identity*. I follow Marranci's (2009b: 20) notion of an act of identity being a "self-correcting mechanism in a response to drastic changes in environment, producing a deep crisis between the autobiographical self and identity." *Jihad as act of identity* is also reflected in Fauzi's explanation of his decision to join jihad, by making a distinction between the politician and man of religion (*agamawan)*: "a politician talks a lot about jihad but never takes any action; man of religion talks about jihad and simultaneously takes action" (Interview, Yogyakarta, 7/3/2008). By doing jihad, Fauzi implemented a self-correction of the crisis between his autobiographical self and identity: moving from being a 'politician' to becoming a 'man of religion'.

In different ways and forms, such 'moral shocks' were also narrated by Reza and Adang, but not by Taufan. After being involved with the Salafi activism for several months, Reza was moved to join jihad following his participation in a *daurah* held in the Gedung Amal Insani, Yogyakarta. He related that the event was held to campaign for jihad in Poso, in the aftermath of the recent violence that had taken place in that area. As explained in Chapter 1, it seems probable that the massive violence which took place in May-June 2000 resulted in more than two hundred people being murdered, mostly Muslims, mainly in the area of the Walisongo Islamic boarding school, located in a suburb of the Poso district.[26)] During the *daurah* the tragic situation in Poso was exposed through an investigative report produced by a team sent to the area, complete with pictures shown of badly suffering Muslims persecuted by Christians. Reza recalled that he was moved join jihad after attending the session which had the effect of a 'moral shock' on him.

Like Reza, Adang also related that he was moved to join jihad after hearing the stories of Muslim persecution by the Christians.

26) For a detailed description and discussion of this episode, see McRae (2008), Chapter 3 in particular.

Alongside news from the media, Adang also heard the first-hand story of locals who had fled from Ambon and testified before Laskar Jihad activists in Kuningan. The news and stories of Muslims persecution brought about 'moral shocks' that fed feelings of solidarity toward fellow Muslims in agony in the area. Such feelings were furthermore amplified by the *fatwas* made by Salafi clerics from the Middle East who declared a status of jihad to help fellow Muslims in Maluku as the individual duty for Indonesian Muslims.

Both Reza and Adang mentioned and highlighted the *fatwas*[27] in their decision to join jihad—something almost absent from Fauzi's interview. Both also were insisted on joining jihad although their parents did not give them permission. Arguing his decision to join jihad without his parents' approval, Adang compared the religious status of jihad with the five daily prayers: both are the individual duty of every Muslim. "If it's *fardhu kifaya* (collective duty), we need approval [from the parent]. If it's *fardhu 'ain* like the five daily prayers, but then the parents do not give their approval, how could we judge the parents then? I don't mean to say that they were unbelievers…" (Interview, Poso, 24/03/2008). For Adang, his attachment to the Salafi community, for him an expression of his very strong commitment to Islam, was much more important and powerful than his attachment to family. Thus, it was an act of identity, a statement of his ultimate commitment to Islam, through Salafism. The falling tears and cries of his parents failed to prevent him from participating in jihad. It was a similar scenario for Reza: the arrival of his mother from Sulawesi also did nothing to stop his journey for jihad.

Taufan's path of 'radical reasoning' was somewhat different to the others. In his narratives, he did not mention a process of 'moral shocks' in his decision to join jihad. For him, the main factor that influenced him to join jihad was the *fatwas* for jihad issued by some leading Salafi clerics from the Middle East. During the interviews, he claimed that he had not heard many stories of the conflict itself.

27) Noorhaidi (2005) discusses the issue of the jihad *fatwas* in his dissertation, especially on pages 117-123.

What really mattered for him was his loyalty and commitment to Salafi activism and, eventually, obeying the *fatwas*. So, it was a 'cognitive opening' which really mattered to him. His attachment and submission to Salafism, produced in him a Salafi identity, and it was his *shared* and *reciprocal emotions* with the Salafi community that guided him to his next actions, including his participation in the jihad movement. Thus for him, participation in jihad was an act of identity: a statement of loyalty and commitment to Islamic identity, through Salafism.

The Narratives of jihad experiences

What did the jihad experience mean to the actors? For the actors, the jihad experience was— to use Sartre's term—'a pivotal event'. A 'pivotal event' is an episode in one's life that brings about "a pivotal meaning structure that organizes the other activities in a person's life" (Denzin 1989: 64-7).

I argue that jihad participation was a 'pivotal event' for the actors because of two key elements: *first*, the nature of 'high-risk' activism, which involves a high level of 'costs' and 'risks', thus producing powerful meanings to the actors through the high level of emotions invested it; and *second*, the use of religious symbols and meanings during the events, as reflected in the use of the term *jihad*, producing powerful symbolic effects which become embodied in the actors. The combination of the two elements lead to the production of "a pivotal meaning structure" as reflected in the use of the marker or a signifier referring to the movement participant as a *jihadist* or a *jihad* actor/activist or *mujahid* (Arabic: plural, *mujahidin)*. Furthermore, *jihad* participation also marks the life phase of the *jihad* actor/activist by symbolically making the distinction between *before* and *after* the *jihad* as will be discussed in the next section.

Before presenting the life story narratives of the four jihadists, I will briefly summarize their participation in the jihad movement (see Table II in the Appendices). Three of them went to Ambon-

Maluku, namely Taufan, Reza, and Fauzi, only one went to Poso: Adang. Three of them spent more than one year in the conflict area, namely Reza, Adang and Taufan—the last even spending more than two years during jihad. Fauzi only spent one month. Three of them fought in battle during the conflict, namely Taufan, Fauzi and Adang—although the last person refused to relate any details. Reza's role was mainly to educate children. Taufan and Fauzi went to jihad in 2000 while Reza and Adang arrived in 2001.

Although the informants had a variety of roles and experiences as well as arrival times and duration of jihad, they all had 'radical experiences' which informed their later lives. The 'radical experiences' were the consequence of their involvement in a violent conflict situation as well as jihad activism. I will show briefly through the life story narratives below, how their different kinds of jihad experiences became 'a pivotal event' in their lives by creating for them a new *movement identity* as a jihad activist and marking their lives with a 'signpost': "after jihad"—through enhancing their attachment and identification as a Salafi activist.

- ***Taufan: the 'fighter-cum-manager' jihadist***

Of the four jihadists, Taufan spent the longest period in jihad: he arrived in Ambon with the first cohort of the Laskar Jihad troops in May 2000 and then decided to stay on following the disbandment of the Laskar Jihad in October 2002. As a consequence of his long period of jihad participation, he was present and even took part in some critical events in the period, such as the massive attack on the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) Police Headquarters in Tantui in June 2000, the burning of the Pattimura University in July 2000, and many other smaller incidents either in Ambon or in Saparua Island. During his term Taufan took different roles and jobs, from *da'wa* to education to combat. He was also selected as a member of the special Laskar Jihad paramilitary forces, called *Pasukan Khusus* or

Paku for short.[28] So, his special status as a Paku member was a sort of *tactical identity*—to use Jasper's (1997) term.

During the interview, he even proudly claimed that some members of the Paku were very disciplined and capable of fighting even better than the regular military. Yet Taufan admitted that during most of the battles the leading roles were played by members of the security forces who took partisan roles by siding with the Muslim militia. The task of the Laskar Jihad troops, even Paku members like him, was to merely bring fuels to set alight when the attack had already begun. They also helped to bring weapons to the battle which were then used by the security forces personnel when the fighting began. His narratives confirm the contention that the Laskar Jihad only played a minor role during battle as argued by McRae (2008: 161-162) and Noorhaidi (2005: 208).[29]

Taufan, however, was one of the very few Laskar Jihad activists who were involved in real battles during his jihad period. As observed by Noorhaidi (2005: 205) in his extensive fieldwork research and interviews conducted with more than a hundred Laskar Jihad members, only two informants claimed to have engaged in real battles.

Here is Taufan's account of his participation in a real battle in Sirisori Islam Village,[30] Saparua Island (Interview, Ambon, 22/4/2008):

> The attack on Sirisory [Islam] began at 3pm… [and lasted] until night. Maybe as it was the end of the month, that was God's will, it was completely dark because there was no moonlight at all. Oddly *Obet* [Christians] would sometimes yell *Allahu Akbar* while launching attacks, though their voices sounded odd…. The Laskar [Jihad] was about 55 people while KOMPAK was

28) *Pasukan Khusus* was a special Laskar Jihad paramilitary force designated for combat tasks. It consisted of less than a hundred members. See Noorhaidi (2005: 205).

29) From the interviews with more than a hundred members of Laskar Jihad, Noorhaidi (2005: 205) found only two informants who claimed to have engaged in real battles.

30) The Sirisori Village in Saparua Island which was located close to Ambon Island was divided into two parts based on the religion of its inhabitants: the Sirisori Islam and the Sirisori Kristen.

> about twenty, but the KOMPAK guys had more weapons…. One of the KOMPAK guys was shot dead when launching a counter attack…. By evening, we had no more bullets. You know the situation was that the Sirisori Islam [village] is surrounded by 22 [Christian] villages. So we were under siege…. Thus, the bullets shot from here [a Christian village] could reach there [another one]…. A fellow then cried: "*Oh Allah* please help us…." Through the handy-talkie, the *Obet* [Christians] launched a psywar: "We are inviting [new forces]… we are launching a long term attack." … Thank God, at about midnight they eventually withdrew their forces. When things turned calm, we prayed: "Oh *Allah*, please send your help before dawn." We were so exhausted. Thank God, they did not return until dawn…

It is very interesting to notice how he narrated his experience of taking part in battle in such a way which reflected closeness with the 'divine', even explaining how the 'divine' was invited to become involved, and then participate, in different dramatic stages of the violent conflict. Taufan's tale of his experience in the conflict engages William James' (1982: 42) notion of religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider divine." Thus, participation in violent conflict could be seen as an instance of religious experience from the point of view of the actor: violence as a means to reach what they perceive and feel as 'divine.' It was also fascinating to pay attention to how he constructed a narrative identity as a "soldier of God" during the battle. By constructing such an identity, Taufan transformed his collective identity as a Muslim or a Salafi activist to a transcendental level of 'divine'.

After he caught malaria in March 2001, which drastically weakened his physical stamina and endurance, Taufan withdrew from being a member of Paku. From then on he was assigned to deal with the managerial affairs of the Maluku FKAWJ office in Ambon, and was eventually elected chair. Among the main FKAWJ programs during his leadership were news publications and organizing fund raising programs. Such jobs gave him ample opportunity to develop his social networks, through his engagement with various

kinds of people, including the elites, both inside and outside Salafi groups. It marked the shift in his narrative identity from 'soldier' to 'manager' during the jihad. He had kept his managerial and leadership job until the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad were eventually closed down in early October 2002.

Jihad participation as 'a pivotal event' which shaped his life trajectory was then reflected in his decision to stay on in Ambon post-jihad: a shift from 'God's warrior' to 'Godly manager' who was taking care of *da'wa,* education and other programs of the Salafis in Maluku.

- ***Reza: the 'teacher' jihadist***

Reza arrived in Ambon in late 2001 in a cohort of about 80 people and then left the area following the disbandment of the Laskar Jihad in October 2002. He initially joined the mobilization for jihad in Poso but the destination then shifted to Ambon. The narratives of Reza were representative of many, if not most, of the Laskar Jihad activists, namely little or no battle experience during jihad. During the jihad, his main task was educating local youth and children, especially in the natural sciences and mathematics. Yet he had some experience of being involved in tense and fearful situations as a consequence of his presence during the violent conflict in Ambon. He also developed an intense *reciprocal emotional* relationship with both the Salafi fellows who joined jihad as well as local youths and children who participated in his education programs.

In the first month he was deployed at the campus of the state-owned Islamic Academy of Ambon in the Air Kuning ward, situated on the hill-side of Ambon Island. The location functioned as the training and education camp for Laskar Jihad members in Ambon, especially those who had just arrived. As described in his narratives, some of the Laskar Jihad activists did not have a long and intensive engagement with Salafism, so that they need further education in Salafi teachings. After spending about a month in Air Kuning, he was deployed to Ahuru, at the frontline facing the strong Christian militia base of Karang Panjang.

During his term in Ambon, the conflict was de-escalated so that direct clashes with Christian militias were actually quite rare. A state of civil emergency had been declared in June 2000 following the collapse of the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) Police Headquarters in Tantui, Ambon. In response to the increasing partisanship of security apparatus members, the national government had sent its special military troops the *Battalion Gabungan* or the Yon Gab[31] to deal with the conflict in Ambon from August 2000 (ICG 2002d; Azca 2003). It was why during his jihad period in Ambon, Reza observed some tensions and clashes between the Laskar Jihad and the security forces, especially the Yon Gab, that included a clash between the Laskar Jihad and the security apparatus in Ahuru where the mosque dome was shot at sporadically by the security forces. Here he recalled the mood of those very moments (Interview, Yogyakarta, 4/4/2010):

> …the most fearful time was after *isha'*…the bullets being shot by the snipers were passing through the window of the kitchen, bang! It was very loud and made us all afraid and nervous. It was followed by a series of shots, bang-bang-bang, with the bullets fired and their sounds passing through the trees and leaves…

At another time, Reza recalled that the situation in Ambon was increasingly tense prior to, and in the aftermath of, the *tabligh akbar* given by the Commander-in-Chief of the Laskar Jihad, Ja'far Umar Thalib, in the Al Fatah mosque of Ambon in April 2002. The event was deliberately held to coincide with the anniversary of the RMS (*Republik Maluku Selatan*, the Republic of South Maluku), the Maluku separatist movement. During the *tabligh akbar*, Thalib delivered a fiery speech with a strong condemnation and ultimatum to the

31) The Joint Battalion (Yon Gab from *Batalion Gabungan*) consisted of 450 personnel recruited from the special forces of all three services, namely the army Kopassus, the navy Marines, and the airforce Paskhas. The first Yon Gab troops arrived in Ambon on 9 August 2000 (ICG 2002d: 11). Unlike the other troops who had been deployed in small groups in many areas and, in many cases, sided with the local people, the Yon Gab was concentrated and 'isolated' in order to reduce or even eliminate the possibility of 'contamination'. Its function, as told by Mada Yasa was: "as a tactical command unit and was only to be used in certain emergency situations" (The Jakarta Post, 14 August 2000).

government to resolve the conflict and to arrest the Christian leaders they claimed responsible. Otherwise, Thalib daringly threatened to mobilize and command the Muslim militia to launch massive attacks on the Christians (Eriyanto 2002; Azca 2003).

Reza recalled the mood and the situation at that time (Interview, Yogyakarta, 4/4/2008):

> In the aftermath of the *tabligh akbar* the mood was tense, especially in the city and around the Al Fatah mosque. Many *acang* [Muslim militias] came in, carried out bombings, and then there were many shootings. At that time we considered the security apparatus as our enemy so that we hated them. It was, perhaps, the outcome of either a particular doctrine, or mood, or opinion, that we saw the forces as our enemy rather than the Christians. *Naúdhubillah.*[32)]

He was also posted to Talake, situated in downtown Ambon City. It was quite a safe area, next to the Perigilima ward, where the Ambon City Police Headquarters was located. His main job was in education, providing lessons to local youths and children who had no normal education since many local schools had collapsed over the conflict. As a university student in the UGM Faculty of Engineering, Reza was good at teaching and providing tutorial sessions to children in the natural sciences, such as physics and chemistry, and mathematics. His pupils were mostly from junior and senior high schools. Although he did not take part in battle during the jihad, Reza had a strong feeling of pride and self-esteem for his role. This was apparent in his claim that even though the number of students

32) *Naúdlubillah* means asking for God's protection from doing such things. It reflected his post-jihad views, after learning the self-reflections and self-criticisms from some Salafi clerics regarding the mistakes that had occurred during jihad, including disobedience and hatred of the state apparatus. One of the systematic reflections and self-criticisms was articulated by Muhammad Umar as-Sewwed in his foreword '*Rujuk kepada Kebenaran adalah Ciri Ahlus-Sunnah*' (Back to the Truth is a Character of Ahlus Sunnah) for a translated book entitled *Meredam Amarah terhadap Pemerintah, Menyikapi Kejahatan Penguasa menurut Al-Qur'an dan As-Sunnah* (Overcoming Anger against the Government, How to Deal with Atrocity by the Ruler According to Qur'an and As-Sunnah) by Syaikh Abu 'Abdirrahman Fauzi Al-Atsari published by Pustaka Sumayyah in 2006.

who joined his special tutorial lessons was very small (less than ten), yet most of them were among the best students in school. It was meaningful for Reza, a young Salafi activist.

His last post was in the *Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu* (SDIT, the Integrated Islamic Primary School) in Air Kuning, Ambon. Reza was assigned to be a teacher in the school until he returned to Yogyakarta following the disbandment of the Laskar Jihad in October 2002. He recalled some important steps he took before leaving Ambon during the interview. He explained that all the Laskar Jihad activists were called to gather in Kebun Cengkih, the headquarters, include those who had been posted in far and remote locations. Then *ustadz* Yasiruddin, one of the leading Salafi figures in Ambon, read the policy issued by the supreme religious board of FKAWJ, namely the Advisory Board, to disband the FKAWJ and its paramilitary wing Laskar Jihad from then on. Many of those present wept in response to the dramatic disclosure to disband the Laskar Jihad, including Reza himself: "I was shocked and trembling. I also regretted that I had done [wrongdoing] things up to this far…" (Interview, Yogyakarta, 4/4/2008)

The next memorable moments were the 'farewell ceremony' held in the Slamet Riyadi Port of Ambon. As a result of the strong *affective bounds* which were developed during the jihad period, a big crowd of local Muslims gathered in the port of Ambon to farewell the hundreds of Laskar Jihad activists who were about to leave and return home. Reza recalled that many people were weeping, especially the pupils, who had joined the Salafi schools and tutorials, and their parents. Some of them even handed in souvenirs, or gifts, or money to the returning jihadists. Reza recalled that he was given two pearl wall decorations by parents of his former pupils, while another parent gave him some amount of money. One of the parents even asked him to stay on in Ambon. These were memorable moments and meaningful experiences for the young Salafi activist which lasted the rest of his life. It was the combination of the 'pivotal event' of his jihad experience and the social network of the Salafis which shaped his life trajectory in the post-jihad period, including his 'radi-

cal decision' to quit university and choose to study Islamic teaching in a small *pesantren* in Muntilan, Central Java.

- ***Adang: the 'public relation' jihadist***

Adang initially intended to join the jihad movement in Ambon but he was eventually sent to Poso. He spent more than a year in Poso, from August 2001 until the closing moments of the Laskar Jihad in October 2002. He was mainly posted in the Bonesompe ward, the center of Laskar Jihad activities in Poso, which coordinated the other posts including the wards of Sayo, Tolana, and Tokorondo. His mainly worked in the public relations section, mostly delivering and distributing the *Bela*[33] daily news and *Bulletin Al Jihad* weekly news which was published every Friday. He was then assigned to work with the *Suara Perjuangan Muslim Poso* (SPMP, the Voice for Struggle of the Poso Muslims), the ad hoc radio station managed by the Laskar Jihad. The most frequent radio programs were broadcasting the recitation of Al-Qurán, he said. As one of the announcers, he said he occasionally played the role of news reader or host of the dialogue program.

In addition he claimed he took part in the combat ("*terjun di lapangan"*). However, he refused to tell the story of his battle experiences. "I can't tell the stories to protect my own soul… [because of] my worry for losing my sincerity [for doing the jihad]…,"[34] he explained the reason (Interview, Poso, 25/3/2008). He also claimed that it was actually his favorite activity during jihad "for the sake of God" ("karena Allah").

Here we come to the issue of violent experience, the sacred, and silence. Silence is one of the critical issues in the study of vio-

33) *Bela* was an abbreviation of *Berita Laskar*, or the Holy Forces News, but the word itself means defense. According to Adang, both *Bela* and *Bulletin Al-Jihad* were published as one-page bulletins. I have no information of how regularly they were published, especially the daily one.

34) The original statement is: "Saya tidak bisa menjelaskan karena menjaga hati..... khawatir tidak ikhlas.....saya pikir cukup tahu begini pengalaman saya…" (Interview, Poso, 25/3/2008).

lence (Hastrup 2003) and of oral history (Leydesdorf 1992). Interestingly the silence that occurs here is not mainly linked to the issue of suffering or trauma of the victims, as commonly observed in existing studies, but rather the issue of *sincerity,* the moral purity of motives and actions and their relation to the sacred or the divine, from the point of view of the perpetrators. Yet, we should be careful in drawing a distinction between victims and perpetrators in the violent conflict situation since, as suggested by Nordstorm and Robben (1995: 8), particularly in the front lines of violent conflict, the distinction between the two are "much more volatile and inchoate, with violence being constructed, negotiated, reshaped, and resolved as perpetrators and victims try to define and control the world they find themselves in."

When I asked Adang about what were his most sacred experiences during jihad, he mentioned two things: the combat (he uses words "the unexplained battle experience"[35]) and the *ribat* (guarding the security post located in the border with Christian area). His reason was: "there was only a thin line between life and death if we were attacked… Because death was felt close, so we were suggested to pray frequently to God." (Interview, Poso, 25/3/2008). Here we can bring the issue to the discussion on the link between violence and religious experience as discussed previously.

During the interview Adang said that one of his most frightening moments during his jihad was taking part in *ribat. Ribat* is basically the security job of being posted in or around a security post which was commonly located on the borderline with the Christian areas. During *ribat,* Adang said, those who were working were divided into two groups on duty alternatively: if one was on duty, another could take a rest or sleep. One time when he was off he fell asleep. But he was suddenly woken up by a series of very loud shots which spontaneously led him to run away and hide in a water channel. It later turned out to be a funny story when he and other jihadist

35) The original quote: "yang tidak bisa saya sebutkan tadi." (Interview, Poso, 25/3/2008).

fellows eventually learnt that the shootings were targeted far from the security post. Although it sounds odd, fear and fun sometimes come close to each other interweaving during such violent conflict situations.

Interestingly Adang narrated a different story when I asked him about his most meaningful experiences during the jihad.

> The most meaningful [experiences were] when we were gathered together…, learning religion together…, I had the feeling that our *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Islamic solidarity) was very strong…, yes, we felt like becoming a single body… when we got sick, others helped us, fed us, and so on and so forth… During the learning session (*ta'lim),* the most meaningful moment was when I was memorizing *hadits* and Qur'an verses…, during the *ta'lim,* I was able to acquire much new knowledge and eliminate my ignorance…, I miss such moments; it was very meaningful to me…

Adang's narratives reveal that his participation in jihad could develop strong *affective reciprocal bounds* among those involved. Such emotional experiences of collectivity and togetherness of the community of Salafis in Poso remained strong and long-lasting in his life. It was one of the main reasons he eventually decided to return to Poso after he went home and spent a few months with his family and relatives in West Java.

- ***Fauzi: the 'doctor-cum-fighter' jihadist***

Like Taufan, Fauzi was among the very few of the Laskar Jihad activists who had taken part in real battles. Yet Fauzi originally joined jihad as a member of the FKAWJ medical team (from September to October 2000). His special position was reflected in mode of travel to Ambon: he went to Ambon by plane on the same flight as Ja'far Umar Thalib, the Commander of the Laskar Jihad. However, his elite status did not hinder him from taking part in a real battle and becoming a foot soldier. His involvement in the battle was driven by the news of an attack by Christians on two Islamic villages in

Saparua Island, the Iha Village and the Sirisori Islam Village, which resulted in four Muslims being killed. As a member of the medical team and as a fighter Fauzi decided to come to the battle area. Here is part of his narrative (Interview, Yogyakarta, 7/3/2008):

> I [we] were in seven, including two other medical doctors and two medical staff…. I brought several Molotov bombs…. At about 4 p.m., the fighting spirit of the Muslims drastically declined, especially after four Muslims were killed. Thank God, I spontaneously went to a mosque and made a sort of sermon through the loudspeakers: calling for all Muslims to revive the spirit for jihad! ...I just behaved like a crazy man… I acted as if I were Umar Ibn al-Khattab when he had done the thing during a Friday prayer sermon[36]…
>
> *What did you speak about?*
> [I talked] about the primacy of jihad, about jihad as the ultimate worship to God… Fortunately, Muslims eventually stood up [for the battle] again.

During the battle, Fauzi was suffered a minor shot to his buttocks. His wallet was damaged but he was fortunately safe—though with a small injury.

> *How could you explain that?*
> *Wallahu a'lam*[37]… I witnessed myself someone who was safeguarding *ustadz* Ja'far being shot in his chest; his jacket was damaged, but he was okay. *Subhanallah,* a lot of miracles happened there. Perhaps, it was because we were *ikhlas* (sincere)… It was also because of faith. As Allah says in a verse: *in tanshurullah yanshurukum (*if you help Allah's religion, Allah will definitely help you).[38] If we make a sacrifice to Allah, Allah will repay with the things beyond our rational calculation…

36) There is a famous story in the history of Islam about the role played by Umar Ibn Khattab, the second khalifa, who commanded the Islamic troops who were on a mission far away in Persia when he was giving the Friday sermon in Medina. Umar, the story goes, suddenly had the vision that the troops were about to be attacked by the enemy, so he commanded the troops to go to the hill. Thus, in the middle of the sermon, Umar suddenly started shouting: "To the hill!" Such a story can be found in http://www.sahaba.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=85 [31 July 2010].

37) An Arabic term, meaning: Only God knows the truth.

38) Al-Qur'an surah Muhammad: 7.

During the battle, amidst the shootings and the bombings, the narratives of sacred or seemingly miraculous incidents are quite common. It reminds me of the notion of 'religious sensation' described by Birgit Meyer as the feeling and inducement of a particular kind of excitement, in which "the inducement is produced by *sensational forms* that make the transcendental *sense-able*" (2006: 8; emphasis in original). Meyer furthermore suggests religious sensations are "about human encounters with phenomena of events that appear as beyond comprehension, in a word: a sublime, that induces… a simultaneous sense of *beauty* and *terror*." While it should be admitted that it is beyond the objective of this dissertation, it would be interesting to elaborate further on narratives such as Fauzi's as examples of religious sensation from taking part in jihad movements.

Fauzi, furthermore, narrated that during the battle the sacred and the profane were sometimes fascinatingly blurred and blended. Claiming himself to be a rational man who trained as a medical doctor but simultaneously a man of religion committed to jihad, Fauzi narrated his experiment to test a 'religious myth/belief' in practice during his jihad participation in Ambon. There was a kind of 'mythical belief' widely held among the jihadists that a Muslim who was killed during jihad smells like an Arabic perfume. Fauzi wanted to test if such a belief was true. So, when he was carrying out an examination of the bodies of four Muslims killed in battle, with a crack in one of their heads, Fauzi put his finger into the brain, the centre of the nerve system of human being, and then sniffed it. "It did not smell like perfume, but it did not stink as normal; it was just plain," he said (Interview, Yogyakarta, 7/3/2008).

It is, of course, the deep personal bodily experience of the jihadist Fauzi which is not verifiable. And verifiability is not the case here. Anyhow, the case shows convincingly how highly passionate his jihad experiences were and their deep impact on his life. When I asked him to reflect on the meanings of his jihad experiences, he replied: "Doing jihad in Ambon was the greatest pleasure I have ever had in worship in my life compared to anything, either *shalat* or *hajj* or *umrah* or anything else" (conversation, Solo, 15/1/2008).

The narratives of after jihad

In this section I will present and discuss the after jihad narratives of the four jihadists who had joined the Laskar Jihad. As indicated in the previous section, they took different pathways in the post-jihad period. Taufan decided to stay on in Ambon and became a leader of the *Yayasan* Abubakar Ash-Shiddiq, a Salafi foundation in Ambon. Adang had returned to his family in Kuningan, West Java, but following some troubles he decided to return to Poso, staying there up to my fieldwork: marrying a local girl and working as a part-time member of the fire brigade. Reza returned to Yogyakarta, but instead of completing his university degree he chose to study in a Salafi *pesantren* in Muntilan, Central Java, and now works as a Salafi publisher in Yogyakarta. Fauzi also returned to Yogyakarta, but he took the maverick trajectory of a Salafi activist. After having left his political party in 2001, he recently began to re-engage with politics. He also refused to blame Ja'far Umar Thalib and, furthermore, developed closer links with the At-Turats, a Salafi network that had previously opposed the mobilization for jihad.

I argue that the jihad experience influenced the life trajectory of the actors in combination with two other main factors, namely, their biographical traits, and their engagement with different social networks prior to, during and after their jihad participation. In my analytical framework, I distinguished three different kinds of social networks associated with the post-jihadists, namely: *core-network*, a network through which they join jihad; *tactical-network*, a network of jihadist networks which occur temporarily during the jihad period; and *extended-network*, an extension of networks which developed in the aftermath of jihad. I use the concept of social network in two meanings: first, social network as the link between concrete actors through specific ties as articulated by 'realist' view; and second, social networks as "phenomenological realities" and "networks of meaning" as suggested by phenomenologist, such as White (Diani 2003: 6; Passy 2003: 27).

I argue that the *core-network*, the network through which jihadists join the jihad, is the most important network which acts as

the 'ideological network' for the jihadists. In the case of the four post-jihadists their *core-network* was similar, namely the Salafi movement, as manifested through the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad. In a sect-like group of the Salafi, their membership affiliation type is *exclusive affiliation*, meaning those who joined the group usually only belong to their own group. It is in contrast to *multiple affiliations* which is common to *political* Islamists. I follow the distinction between *exclusive affiliation* and *multiple affiliation* proposed by Della Porta and Diani (1999: 119-20). Of the four post-jihadists, Dr. Fauzi, was an exceptional case- a Salafi jihadist with the social background of a *political* Islamist who had developed a wide social network before his involvement with the Salafis. Thus, his attachment with the *core-network* of Salafism was quite loose compared to the others activists and this was in fact reflected in his life trajectory in the post-jihad period.

Of the four post-jihadists, Taufan developed the strongest *affective bounds* with the *core-network* as indicated by his long term jihad participation in Ambon for more than two years as well as his leadership position. His strong link with the *core-network* influenced him to stay on in Ambon following the disbanding of the Laskar Jihad in October 2002. His long period of jihad participation and leadership position during jihad, especially as the chairman of the FKAWJ Maluku before its disbandment, had granted him the opportunity to develop *tactical-networks* during the jihad and later *extended-networks* in the post-jihad period. His *tactical-networks* were mainly local leaders, some of whom eventually, engaged with the Salafism and became his *extended-networks*, especially following the establishment of the Abubakar Foundation in Ambon in the post-jihad period. It was a combination of both his leadership capacity and his engagement with a variety of social networks which eventually led Taufan to be elected as the chairman of the Abubakar foundation.

Adang and Reza, on the other hand, developed comparable relationships with the *core-network* in terms of their duration of jihad participation and their roles during the jihad. They both joined the jihad for more than a year and their main roles were non-combat;

education for Reza and public relations for Adang—perhaps, including some involvement in battle for Adang. They both also returned to their hometowns following the break-up of the Laskar Jihad and from then on, their life trajectory began to deviate. Adang eventually decided to go back to Poso following his turbulent period, firstly in his hometown Kuningan and then in other cities where he moved on searching for work. His decision to return to Poso can be seen as an indication of his strong link to the *core-network* of Salafism, which was relatively less visible in his home area of West Java, so that he decided to return to Poso, where both the *core-network* and his memorable passionate experiences of jihad were alive. On the other side, Reza remained in Yogyakarta and developed a stronger link with the *core-network* of the Salafis which was strong in his surrounding. His decision to go to the Salafi *pesantren* instead of continuing his study at the university also reflected the primacy of the Salafi network over his family network.

Finally, Fauzi has not yet developed a strong link to the *core-network* of Salafism. In addition to his short period of jihad participation, his social background as a political activist and wide social networks contributed to his weak relationship with the *core-network.* The fragmentation of the Salafi network in the post-jihad period has also weakened his links with the *core-network* since he had a strong personal relationship with Ja'far Umar Thalib, the abandoned Salafi leader. His short period of jihad participation also limited his *tactical-network.* On the other hand, he has developed very wide *extended-networks* which he had begun to build long before his engagement with Salafism. The combination of all these factors with his strong personality eventually led him to be a 'maverick' Salafi post-jihadist.

- ***Taufan: the 'manager' post-jihadist***

There was no dramatic shift from the jihad period to 'after jihad' for Taufan; he continued to stay on in the same place, Ambon. Although the area remained the same, there was a big difference: the huge number of Salafis had left the area after the Laskar Jihad was

disbanded in October 2002. Several hundred, several thousand, of the ex Laskar Jihad activists have left Ambon and returned to their hometowns, mostly to Java. Only a very few of them decided to stay: "less than ten people," Taufan recalled by counting his fingers. And he was one of the rare birds.

Why did he decide to remain in Ambon in the post-jihad period? He explained that one of the main reasons was that some leading local Salafi figures asked him to remain in Ambon to take care of social and *da'wa* programs previously managed by the Maluku FKAWJ. In March 2001, Taufan was elected Chairman of the Maluku FKAWJ after he left the Paku due to malaria. Under his leadership, he claimed he focused on education and *da'wa* programs for the local Salafis and wider community. So he felt responsible to take care of the programs when he was asked to do so by some leading local Salafi figures. It was a critical turning point, an epiphany to use Denzin's (1989: 70) term, in his life: the beginning of a new passage in his life influencing his decision to remain in Ambon.

Unlike Reza and Adang who were surprised and shocked by the decision to demobilize the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad, Taufan was not. As the leader of the Maluku FKAWJ he had a wide network among the *core-network* of the Salafis and had previously been exposed to some critical issues, including criticism of the flaws of the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad under the leadership of Ja'far Umar Thalib. Even more, only a few weeks before the decision to disband the Advisory Board of the FKAWJ in Yogyakarta on 5 October, he attended a Salafi leadership meeting in Jakarta and made a trip to other cities in Java. Yet he admitted to still being a little bit surprised to know that the decision was eventually made to close down both the FKAWJ and the Laskar Jihad. "When the decision to disband [was informed] many *ikhwan* shed tears, I was… just relaxed. If that was the fatwa made by *ulama*, let's just follow it," he said (Interview, Ambon, 22/4/2008).

Taufan is quite a calm person. During my series of interviews, he also remained calm and quite carefully managed his emotions. So he explained that he did not express passionate emotions in response

to the dramatic changes occurring to the Laskar Jihad. For him, loyalty and commitment toward the fatwa made by *ulama* is one of the ultimate values of a Salafi—an attitude which was also reflected in his decision to join jihad. However, in the aftermath of the demobilization of the FKAWJ and the Laskar Jihad the situation in Ambon was quite complicated and the problems were not small. Here is his narrative:

> When [almost] everyone went away, all the remaining issues were delegated to me as Chairman of the Maluku FKAWJ …. including all the assets. [But] The Laskar had hundred of millions of debts, so all the assets were sold to pay the debt.… [M]ost [of the assets] were logistics stuff… like the damaged cars, also *ghanimah*[39] stuff, like the kerosene tank car…

In the post-jihad period, in early 2003, the Salafi community in Maluku founded the Abubakar ash-Shiddiq Foundation to manage their activities and programs—as mentioned in an earlier section. Taufan was eventually elected as its chairman. It seemed to be a continuation of his role as Chairman of the Maluku FKAWJ from early 2001. It could also be seen as recognition by the local Salafi activists of his leadership among them and his strong position in the *core-network* of the Salafis.

Although experiencing a drastic decline of its human resources, the Abubakar Foundation attempted to continue the programs and activities inherited from the Maluku FKAWJ especially in education, *da'wa* and health services. As described by Budiyanto (2006: 43-54), the *Taman Pendidikan al-Qur'an* (TPQ, Qur'an Learning School) which spread throughout the Ambon Island during the conflict dramatically declined in numbers to a few, including the TPQ Al-Manshurah in Batu Tagepe, Ambon. Besides the TPQ, the Abubakar foundation also managed to run the kindergarten *Tarbiyatul Awlad Al-Manshurah* (formerly named the TKIT Al-Manshurah) and the primary school *Madrasah at-Thaifa Al-Manshurah* (formerly named the SDIT Al-Manshurah). It also transformed the *Radio*

39) An Arabic term meaning, in classical Islam, wealth taken by force from an enemy in times of war. See http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e709 [accessed at 31 July 2010].

Suara Perjuangan Muslim Maluku (SPMM, the Voice for Struggle of Maluku Muslims) 105.5 FM which was well-known during the conflict into the *Radio Suara Tauhid* (the Voice of Tawhid) 106.5 FM. It also changed the name of the Ahmed Clinic Medical Team into the Poliklinik Ahlussunnah. In addition to education and *da'wa* programs, Taufan also manages a small shop, located in the Ambon city market, belonging to the Abubakar Foundation which sold various goods, from herbal medicine to Arabic clothing and perfumes.

In the course of the time Taufan married a local girl and had two little children when I was doing my fieldwork. He already had his own house in the Salafi compound of the newly renamed "Kampong Muhajirin" in Kebun Cengkih, Ambon. It was quite a compact house about 5.5 x 11 meters situated on a 12 x 15 meter plot of land. When I came by his place one evening in late April 2008 for an interview, the house was not yet completely finished. The living room wall was not yet painted. I could not see the exterior properly because it was dark; there was no adequate lighting in the surrounding area. The road along the complex was also not properly surfaced so it was bleak after rain.

Although he led a modest life, Taufan played an important role in post-jihad Maluku, at least among the Salafis. It was under his leadership that the Salafis in Maluku were planning to expand their *da'wa* by engaging with the transmigration program run by the local government. The issue was being discussed by the Salafis in Ambon during my fieldwork. I had the rare opportunity to take part in an internal meeting of the Salafis discussing the program. The meeting was interestingly held in the house of an official of the Department of Transmigration of the Maluku Province who was also a Salafi, in Kebun Cengkih, Ambon.[40] Although the Salafi joint-transmigration program was eventually not successful, as Taufan related during my second fieldwork in Ambon in late November 2009,

40) In casual talk after the meeting, it was reported that the idea to organize and mobilize Salafi activists to take part in the transmigration program was initially raised in April 2008, when *ustadz* Ayip Syafruddin and Abu Ghifari (the boss of the Ghuraba honey brand) made a visit to Ambon and the surrounding area.

it was fascinating to observe how the local Salafis attempted to develop an *extended-network* in the post-jihad period, including with the local government.

Another interesting feature of the *extended-network* of the Salafis in Ambon was their good relationship with the local security forces. In contrast to the tense relationship with the security forces during the late period of the Laskar Jihad (as reflected in Reza's narratives), they rebuilt a new relationship with a new spirit of co-operation, especially in the war against 'terrorism'. As described by Budiyanto (2006) they held a collaborative session with the local government and the security forces to discuss a book written by the former vice-commander of the Laskar Jihad, *ustadz* Luqman bin Muhammad Ba'abduh on blaming terrorism. *Ustadz* Wahab Lumaela also told me that when a group of Salafi activists went to Yogyakarta to attend the *Daurah Nasional* in 2009, the local police helped by providing them with a letter of notification—because the event was held not long after the bombing of the J.W. Marriot Hotel in Jakarta and strict scrutiny was applied during the period especially for those of an Islamic Salafi background.

The development of the Salafi movement in Maluku in the post-jihad period was also noticeable. According to Taufan, the current number of Salafi families in Ambon was estimated to be about 600 while the number in Maluku was approximately 1,000. This made Ambon the city with the biggest Salafi community in Eastern Indonesia as claimed by Taufan. The magnitude and dynamics of the Salafis in Maluku was reflected in their participation in the *Daurah Nasional* held in Yogyakarta in 2009 which was attended by more than 100 Salafi activists and they travelled by plane—in contrast only five people came from Poso.

- ***Adang: The 'casual fire brigade' post-jihadist***

Unlike Taufan, Adang had left the land of jihad (Poso) following the demobilization of Laskar Jihad in October 2002. He said he left Poso feeling a blend of sad and happy emotions. He felt happy

because the security situation of Poso had been quite safe during the period. It made some Laskar Jihad activists begin to get bored and wish to return home—and some had even left without permission. On the other hand, he said he felt sad because he would be separated from his Salafi friends after having lived together for more than a year. There was no dramatic farewell ceremony from Poso as related below by Reza leaving Ambon.

Away from his home for more than a year, Adang began to miss his parents and family. The son and his parents agreed to meet him when he disembarked from Poso at the Tanjung Priok Port, Jakarta. Unfortunately, due to a sudden change, he and the group were disembarked in Surabaya, and they went home to Kuningan by train and bus. So when he got home, his parents had not yet returned. After being worried by the lack of news from Adang, they were finally reunited: the return home of the rebellious jihadist! Adang described how they wept as they hugged him tightly. He said his journey home from jihad indicated a change of him, a change in him (Interview, Poso, 25/4/2008):

> When I first arrived back in Windusengkahan, people did not recognize me because of my long hair and bigger body. My female cousin then hugged me weeping—although she was not my *mahram.*[41)]

Not only his body and hair but his interior life had been transformed by his jihad experience: a self transformation from a simple village boy to a more committed Salafi activist with stronger passion for pristine Islam. His identification and attachment to Salafism as the *core-network* was significantly enhanced during the jihad. Thus, the 'honeymoon' period with his family and environment did not last long. He began to feel alienated living in a rural area with strong syncretic Islamic traditions, in sharp contrast to the purity of Salafism. Adang recalled that his happiness at the family reunion did not

41) Mahram is a legal Islamic term that basically refers to a close relative. For strict Muslims physical contact is not encouraged between non-mahram. For simple explanation of the concept, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahram [2 August 2010].

last longer than a month. He also began to get bored with his daily job helping his parents with household as well as farming tasks. Unlike Reza who returned to Yogyakarta, a stronghold of the Salafi movement, Adang lived in a rural area of Kuningan, where Salafism was alien. He also missed his religious mentor, *ustadz* Abim, who was staying on in Poso—even bringing two of his wives to the area.

After staying at home for weeks, Adang went to the capital city of Jakarta and neighboring Bekasi to look for work. Although having applied for many jobs and having several jobs' interviews over about six months, he was unsuccessful. Under such pressure he decided to take up work as a construction laborer in Jakarta. After learning about his job his parents ordered his brother to ask him to go home. His parents were sad and shed tears: "Why did you leave home just for such a low class job?" (Interview, Poso, 25/4/2008)

Work was, actually, only one of his problems. The more profound problem was his troubled feeling of living in a "polluted, contagious, dangerous" environment—to borrow the terms of Almond, Appleby and Sivan (2003: 36) to describe how the 'enclave culture' views cultures outside its own arena. Jihad's experience implanted a sort of puritan Salafi ideology in his own mind, feelings and body. Living in a place surrounded by 'vices' made him unhappy and troubled not only his feelings but also his body. As he said in an interview (Ambon, 25/4/2008): "I got tired of seeing so many *ma'siah* (vices) there [in Java]. My eyes got sick of seeing the vices."

What kinds of vices did he refer to? Here is his narrative (Interview, Poso, 25/4/2008).

> There were many kinds of vices, like dating women; because there is no such thing as dating according to Islam. Then, many women wore sexy and skin-tight dresses. They seemed to reflect what the Prophet says: "they get dressed but they are basically naked." If we look at their *awrah*[42] deliberately, it will become our vice, our sin.

42) An Arabic term used within Islam which means "the intimate parts of the body, for both men and women, which must be covered with clothing." Exposing the *awrah* is unlawful in Islam and is regarded as a sin. The exact definition of *awrah* varies between

> *What kinds of feelings did you have?*
> Yes, I didn't feel good…. If your heart felt calm, it meant you had done something good; but if you felt worried about being found out by others, it meant you had done something bad … For those who became accustomed to vice, they would probably feel okay. But I didn't get used to it. It was true that before joining the *da'wa ahlussunnah* [Salafi] I was used to it, because I did not know the rules. But after I did *hijra* [by joining the Salafi], [I knew that] it is not allowed, so that I did not feel good at heart.

Not feeling happy or at home either in his hometown or in the big city of Jakarta, his imagination and memory brought him back to Poso, a small town on the seashore of Central Sulawesi, where he had stayed for more than a year in a modest and pious Salafi community. He began to think of returning to Poso. It was a turning point, an epiphany, in Adang's life. According to Denzin (1989: 70) *epiphanies* are "interactional moments and experiences which leave marks on people's lives… [they] are often moments of crisis [which]… alter fundamental meaning structures in a person's life." He claimed to have had a happier life in Poso, living in a sort of 'holy kampong' of the Salafi community in the area. His wonderful memories of jihad called him back. His parents initially rejected his plan to go back to Poso. Besides feeling afraid and worried about possible conflicts occurring in the future, like many parents, they did not want their son to live far away from them. After a series of long and tough discussions lasting about two months, his parents eventually gave him approval to return to Poso.

After living for about six months in Java, mostly in the west, Adang went back to Poso in April 2003, beginning a new chapter in his life. Before leaving for Poso, he had contacted *ustadz* Abim, his religious mentor, who was the leader of the Salafis in Poso. So it was a journey back to his *core-network* of the Salafi community, the 'holy kampong' where he has developed strong *affective bounds*

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different schools of Islamic thought. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Awrah [2 August 2010].

with his Salafi fellows, both locals and migrants who had stayed on in the area, such as his Salafi mentor: *ustadz* Abim.

Back in Poso, Adang initially retuned to his previous duty as a teacher in the Islamic kindergarten and an announcer for the Islamic local radio station which had belonged to the Laskar Jihad during the conflict. He then married a local girl from a Salafi family, a pupil of one of *ustadz* Abim's wives. His father-in-law is a Salafi of Buginese, South Sulawesi background, who works in the local Poso city fire brigade. Through the help of his father in-law, Adang was recruited to work part-time in the Poso fire brigade. He works three 24 hour days a week. He claimed to refuse an offer to be recruited as a public servant at his work because he was unwilling to be part of a government not based on Islamic law. "Please do not dispose of *syariah* only because you want to get what you want to," he suggested in an interview (Poso, 25/4/2008).

When I met Adang in Poso in 2008 he had moved into the Salafi compound of the Sayo ward, living in a modest house with his wife and a three-year old daughter. His father-in-law and his mentor, *ustadz* Abim, also lived in the same compound. Besides working in the fire brigade, Adang also taught in the TPA (Qur'anic Learning School) in the Sayo ward. Giving the weekly Friday sermon in Salafi mosques in Poso moving from one mosque to another was another job for him. He had formerly run his own small business selling clothes but stopped in 2007 without any clear explanation. Taking part in a *syirkah*, a sort of joint-venture business with other Salafis, selling various items like non-alcohol perfumes, *siwak* (traditional Arabic wood for tooth brushing), sandals, et cetera was another side-job.

Although living modestly on the outskirts of a small town of Poso, Adang had high ambitions for his future: studying Islamic teachings overseas, particularly in Yemen. In order to achieve his dreams, he prepared himself through self-study programs at home, such as learning Arabic, reading classical Salafi textbooks, and memorizing Qur'anic verses.

Like other Salafi in the compound, Adang and his family lived modestly in puritan fashion, not watching television or listening to radio, etc. He also admitted he had no particular social engagement with any surrounding communities, unless the local authority called for collective activities such as cleaning up the roads and the environment. As common among the Salafis, Adang rejected to participate in any political elections. When I asked him for his opinion on the concept of implementing *syariah* bylaw as happened in some areas, he admitted he had not studied the issue. But he raised doubts that such a policy would benefit the Muslim community.

When I asked him about the modest life and conditions of the Salafi community in Poso, he referred to the life histories of the companions of the Prophet who lived more than one thousand years ago (Interview, Poso, 25/4/2008). He said that their lives were:

> …like the companions of the Prophet, who mostly lived modest and underprivileged lives. There was importance [to be modest people], as the Prophet says "modest people would be more likely to enter the heaven rather than the wealthy people, because the wealthy will be asked how did they get their possessions and what their possessions had been used for. If their possessions had been used for nothing, they will be barriers rather than assets for them in the after life…

In other words, for Adang, modesty is a sign of piety, even perhaps a sort of *collective identity* of the Salafis who live in an 'enclave community' in Poso. This picture is very different from that of the Salafis in Ambon as presented earlier.

- ***Reza: the 'dropped out' post-jihadist***

Like Adang, Reza was among the hundreds, even thousands, of ex Laskar Jihad activists who returned home in October 2002. Yet unlike Poso, large crowds of locals held a sort of farewell ceremony in the Port of Ambon before their departure. So, Reza went back to Yogyakarta with a nice memory of his meaningful participation of jihad in Ambon. Reza was also lucky because Yogyakarta was a

strong Salafi base, so that he was supported by a robust Salafi network in the post-jihad period. Thus, even though the FKAWJ and the Laskar Jihad had been disbanded, he remained associated with the Salafi *core-network* in Yogyakarta.

Soon after returning to Yogyakarta, Reza was confronted with an important question: would he continue his studies at the Faculty of Engineering of UGM? Although he had been on 'study leave' for more than a year without official permission, it seemed likely that he could have retained his status as a university student and still be entitled to continue the study. His aunt, Rahmi, had also contacted a senior lecture at his faculty to help him continue his studies. But the key question was did Reza want to continue his studies? Did he still have the passion to continue? Or had he changed his mind and passion from studying technology to Islamic teachings? It was a critical moment, a time of *epiphany*, "interactional moments and experiences which leave marks on people's lives…are often moments of crisis [which]… alter fundamental meaning structures in a person's life" as Denzin (1989: 70) defined, which eventually shapes the rest of his life.

During the interview, Reza seemed quite ambiguous regarding this issue. In reply to a question on the matter, he said he did not want to continue his study in the post-jihad period. But in another answer, he said that he took about three months before making the decision to leave university. Anyhow, his decision to leave university was a critical moment which shaped the next episode of his life story.

From his narratives, I identified two factors which influenced him to make the decision: the family and the Salafi community. The family network pushed him firmly back to the university, because he was half-way towards finishing his study. After completing university he could study another subject following his own interests. But the Salafi network drove him into another direction. However, he said that among his fellow Salafis there were various opinions regarding this issue, some in favor of continuing study while some others not. Following a series of discussion and consultation for about three months with his parents and family, he finally decided to leave the university.

Why did he finally decide to leave university and go to a *pesantren?* "I was worried I would get [bad] influences from my old cohort of friends on campus…," Reza said in an interview (Yogyakarta, 4/4/2008). For me, his answer reflected the construction of an imaginary boundary of his life story: *before* and *after* the jihad. By expressing his concerns over the potentially (bad) influence of his *old cohort of friends* on campus, Reza considered his *pre-jihad* network of peers to be less *pious,* or possibly even dangerously contagious, for his new life *after-jihad.*

I also argue that his decision to prefer studying at a *pesantren* rather than university can be seen as an indication of two things: first, the primary role of the Salafi community as the *core-network* in his post-jihad period; and second, his consolidation of identity as a Salafi as the consequence of his jihad participation. Reza's decision to quit from university was a reflection of the primacy of the Salafi network over his family network in shaping his life trajectory in the post-jihad period. It was not the first time this happened since it had also occurred prior to his participation to Ambon. However the superiority of Salafi community as the *core-network* was not the single factor which lead to his decision but it was in tandem with the consolidation of his collective identity as a Salafi as the consequence of his jihad participation. When I asked him what the most important influence from his participation in jihad on his life in the aftermath, he replied in somewhat uncertainly: "Perhaps, courage." (Interview, Yogyakarta, 4/4/2008) Interestingly, what he meant by courage was that after his jihad period in Ambon he had more courage and was more confident to wear the Salafi dress, including the robe and *sarong.* So, what he meant basically was the increasing courage and confidence to express his identity as a Salafi.

Reza initially planned to join the Salafi pesantren in Depok, West Java, near the University of Indonesia campus. Since that pesantren program was not ready yet to commence, he moved to join a pesantren in the rural area of Muntilan, Central Java, led by ustadz Abdurrahman Lombok. He joined the pesantren for almost two years from early 2003 to late 2004. Although located in rural area, the

pesantren was quite well-known among the Salafis, as indicated by its students originating from all over Indonesia, including Aceh, Maluku, and Kalimantan. The pesantren was basically free so that the facilities in the pesantren were quite modest. He described his modest life at the pesantren as follows: the daily food menu was steamed rice with vegetables without any other side dishes; the quality of drinking water was pretty bad, a bit muddy and smelly. As a person from a middle class family background, it was quite hard to live this modest life in the pesantren. He claimed he spent most of his time in the pesantren learning Arabic and reading the basic Salafi teaching texts. As a consequence of his deteriorating relationship with his family, he admitted he rarely left the pesantren for a family visit.

After completing his studies at the Muntilan pesantren, Reza worked as a casual teacher in the TPQ (Al-Qur'an Learning School for children) of the Al Anshor pesantren in Watussalam, Sleman, the center of Salafi activism in Yogyakarta. Rahmi told me that at one particular period after jihad, Reza worked as a casual street vendor in the mosque after the Friday prayer session. During a series of conversations with me Rahmi expressed her concern over her nephew: a young man who used to have bright life prospects but chose to live modestly as a Salafi activist.

In 2006 Reza married a girl he met through the Salafi network and had two kids when I met him in 2009. During our last conversation in late 2009 he said that he had just got a new job in the *Pustaka Salafiyah*, a new Salafi publishing house owned by *Pak* Hendrata, a businessman and Salafi activist and located near the Al-Anshor pesantren. He also has a casual job selling various Islamic herbal medicines and food supplements, including honey and *habatus sauda* (black cumin or nigella sativa). Although he worked hard to earn money, his financial situation was still at a subsistence level. Rahmi told me that when his youngest fell ill and had to be treated in hospital, he still needed financial assistance from the family.

During our series of meetings and interviews Reza looked happy and healthy, and always had a nice smile on his face. In our last conversation after Friday prayers in the Al Anshor mosque in

late December 2009, I told him I thought he was beginning to look stocky. He confirmed my observation. He said he was more than 20 kilograms heavier than he was at university ten years earlier. I hope this is a good sign for his life.

- ***Fauzi: the 'maverick' post-jihadist***

After joining the jihad for one month in Maluku from September to October 2000, Fauzi returned to his 'normal life' in Yogyakarta, working as a medical specialist and returning to his role as the PPP Chairman of PPP for the province of Yogyakarta. Although spending only a month in the Maluku jihad, Fauzi had the dramatic experience of taking part in the real battle in Saparua Island, and even being shot and slightly injured on his buttocks. It was a rare experience among those who joined the jihad through Laskar Jihad as also observed by Noorhaidi (2005, also Hasan 2006). Furthermore, he had also the unique experience of having the 'ecstatic experience' of spontaneously giving a sermon in the middle of the battle when the fighting spirit of the Muslims had drastically declined.

Both his involvement in the battle and his 'ecstatic sermon' were exceptional like his unique social profile as a Salafi politician. All these factors eventually led to his peculiar life trajectory in his post-jihad period. I call him a 'maverick' post-jihadist. Why maverick?

Fauzi status as a 'maverick' post-jihadist is reflected in his life trajectories and life story narratives as a Salafi activist in the post-jihad period. It began from his background as a political activist, and even chairman of a political party, during his jihad participation. It was odd from a Salafi perspective, because participation in partisan politics (*hizbiyya*) is considered unlawful. Noorhaidi (2005: 143) explained *da'wa hizbiyya* as "Islamic movements that are perceived to prioritize politics over the purification of the individual Muslim's religious beliefs and practices." After his involvement in the Ambon jihad, Fauzi remained active in politics until August 2003 when he

was fired from leadership due to internal conflict. Following that he made steps to leave from the political party.[43)]

After his jihad participation, Fauzi's continued involvement with Salafi activism including holding a weekly Salafi sermon at his house—a practice which began in 1998. However, Fauzi also maintains an uncommon personal habit for Salafis, namely smoking! Our series of meetings and interviews from early 2008 to late 2009 were always accompanied by both one (or two) packets of cigarettes, especially the *Ji Sam Soe kretek (*clove-scented cigarette*)*, and a cup or more of hot black coffee. While there is no firm legal ruling on drinking coffee among Salafi clerics, smoking is clearly forbidden by a fatwa made by leading Salafi clerics.[44)] Yet Fauzi, despite his alleged commitment to Salafism, admitted he could not yet stop smoking. As a heavy smoker, he consumes more than one (sometimes two) packets of cigarettes in a day. He claimed nobody could force him to stop smoking, including Ja'far Umar Thalib when he was the Commander of Laskar Jihad.

The next indication of his maverick nature was his response to fragmentation among the Salafis following the disbanding of the FKAWJ-Laskar Jihad. While most of the Salafi activists and *ustadzs* left and dismissed Ja'far Umar Thalib from their network, Fauzi maintained a good relationship with him. He even moved further by inviting an *ustadz* from the Al-Turats Salafi network, who opposed the mobilization and the establishment of Laskar Jihad, to preach regularly at his home. When I asked him how he responded to internal friction among the Salafis, he replied jokingly saying that it was part of the rivalry among the Arabic descent people. So he claimed

43) Fauzi was fired from his leadership in August 2003 following internal conflict in his party, the PPP, especially as the result of his rejection of the new leadership elected at the National Congress (*muktamar)* held a few months before. He accused the leadership of being corrupt and brought the corruption cases to the police. Fauzi accepted his dismissal and was cited by the press saying "I will quit from any political party, including PPP. I will then focus on studying religion." *Suara Merdeka*, 2 September 2003, 'Ketua PPP DIY Diberhentikan'.

44) Smoking is forbidden because it may cause physical damage and bad smells. The fatwa is available in the 'official' Indonesian Salafi website at: http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=427 [accessed on 2 August 2010] .

that he did not let himself get involved further in the conflict. Yet he was implicitly sympathetic to Ja'far Umar Thalib as reflected in his comment about Thalib's engagement in the *Dhikr Akbar* as a sign of his maturity in religious thinking.[45)]

His loose relationship with the Salafi *core-network* was reflected in his attitude and relationship with *jihadi* activism. While the majority of Salafis tend to view and respond to *jihadi* activists with hostility, Fauzi does not. Although he did not accept their doctrine on *jihadism*, he expressed his appreciation toward the '*spirit'* behind their actions. It was reflected in his view on Imam Samudra during my conversation with him in Solo (15/1/2008): "I admire Imam Samudra for his ability not to fall in love with the 'worldly life'. While most of people run to grab the 'world', he had the courage to take a different direction." He also told me that he twice visited the late Imam Samudra and other *jihadi* fellows when they were in the maximum security prison in Nusakambangan. On his second visit he brought his wife with him to teach her to be ready if someday he made the decision to 'abandon the worldly life'.

Another part of his maverick nature was also reflected in his continuous involvement in political issues, although through 'unofficial' and 'indirect' ways. During the interview, and particularly in casual conversation, he narrated some of his involvements in political affairs from 'behind the screen'. An example of his 'unofficial' involvement in political affairs was his recommendation that some former PPP activists be recruited as the functionaries of some new political parties prior to the 2009 political election. He told me that some leading national politicians contacted him to join the leadership of some new political parties, including the Hanura (*Hati Nurani Rakyat*, People's Conscience) and the Gerindra (*Gerakan Indonesia*

45*) Dhikr Akbar* is the Sufi-like activity of chanting 'the names of Allah' held in a mass gathering led by the renowned public preacher, Muhammad Arifin Ilham. Thalib's participation in the program was criticized by many Salafi *ustazs* as a deviation from the Salafi *manhaj*. See Noorhaidi (2005: 227).

Raya, Great Indonesia Movement).[46] Fauzi refused to join but recommended some of his PPP loyalists to be recruited by the parties.

He even took the step of endorsing his (first) wife, Uun Ilmiyatin, as a candidate for parliament in the 2009 elections through the secular party, Gerindra, a newly founded political party, led by retired army general Prabowo Subianto. Ilmiyatin was listed on the Gerindra list of candidates for the province of Yogyakarta. Fauzi supported the candidacy of his wife by carrying out informal campaigns and mobilizing his social networks, especially former supporters of the PPP. Unfortunately, his wife was not elected. However, such practices were extremely uncommon among the Salafis, for two main reasons: first, his direct involvement in political election; and, second, Fauzi's endorsement of a female figure, namely his wife, as a political candidate for parliament.

How could such maverick actions and maneuvers be conducted by Fauzi, a Salafi post-jihadist?

Back to my argument on the important role of social networks, I argue that Fauzi was able to lead such unconventional way of life as a Salafi post-jihadist because of the interlinkage of two main factors: his extensive networks before jihad and his maintenance of Salafi networks in the post-jihad period. As described previously, Fauzi was a strong public figure and political leader with vast social networks before his engagement with Salafism and his participation in jihad movement in Ambon. So rather than submitting himself to the Salafi *core-network*, he took the Salafi network as one of his *extended-networks* in the post-jihad period. On the other hand, while continuing his social and political roles, Fauzi maintained his engagement with the Salafi network and continued identifying himself as a Salafi. This was manifested in his personal behavior and appearance such as growing his beard long and wearing a long, white

46) Both parties were led by retired military generals during the Soeharto period. Hanura was led by retired General Wiranto, former Chief-in-command of the Armed Forces, while Gerindra was led by retired Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, the former commander of the Special Army Forces (KOPASSUS) and the Reserved-Army Forces (KOSTRAD).

gown in his daily life. He also continued to hold weekly sermons in his house by inviting a Salafi cleric as the sole preacher. Due to his self identification with Salafism, even though it was peculiar, he was seen by some of the Salafi groups, including the At-Turats Salafi network, as part of the Salafis. In addition, he also had plenty of social and economic resources that helped him carry out his peculiar choices and ideas as a maverick Salafi post-jihadist.

Finally, how meaningful was the influence of his jihad participation on the rest of his life? He said that he had no doubt that "jihad is the ultimate worship to God." He told me that he had a personal wish to end his life in jihad: "I have a wish to end my life in an undisputed land of jihad, either in the holy land or in the holy war, either in Moro or in Afghan…." (Interview, Yogyakarta, 17/2/2008)

Conclusion

I have presented in this chapter the life story narratives of four post-jihadists who joined jihad movements through Laskar Jihad in three different stages: *before, during,* and *after* the jihad period. Through their narratives, I have presented my arguments on three main questions of this research as introduced in the first chapter. I conclude this chapter by highlighting some research findings and making a reflection on 'holy kampong' of the Salafi community in the post-jihad period.

How did they become jihadists? Through the life story narratives of the four informants, I argue that they became jihadists after experiencing a process of 'radical reasoning'. I have demonstrated, through a micro-sociological approach, that it began with a period of identity crisis which happened in different ways for the different actors at two different life stages: early adulthood (for Taufan, Reza and Adang) and middle age (for Fauzi). Following a period of crisis identity, they experienced 'cognitive opening' where they began to embrace Salafi teachings and furthermore to take part in Salafi activism.

The next critical step was the presence of 'moral shocks' induced by the news of persecution of hundreds of Muslims in religious violence incidents, either in Maluku or in Poso, which eventually moved them to join the jihad movement. Yet not all of them experienced such 'moral shocks', as narrated by Taufan, a Salafi activist from Yogyakarta. For him, it seemed probable that a sort of 'short-circuit' linked his attachment to Salafism with jihad participation, facilitated by the jihad *fatwas* made by Salafi clerics. Essentially the cognitive process was more crucial for him than affective one.

I also argue that their jihad participation can be seen as act of identity, or a "self-correcting mechanism in a response to drastic changes in environment, which produced a deep crisis between the autobiographical self and identity" as argued by Marranci (2009: 20). For Fauzi, *jihad as act of identity* was reflected in his narrative of making a distinction between the politician and man of religion (*agamawan)* before joining jihad. As a politician during that time, as a result of profound self-reflection he stated that a politician is a 'man of talk' while an *agamawan* is a 'man of action'. By joining jihad, Fauzi made a self-correction in the crisis between his autobiographical self and identity: shifting from 'politician' to 'man of religion'. In the cases of Reza and Adang, jihad as an *act of identity* were reflected in their decision to submit to religion, through Salafism, as superior over their attachment to their family. Thus, in spite of their family's disapproval and rejection of their joining jihad, they continued to do so. In a different case, jihad can also be seen as act of identity for Taufan. For him, participation in jihad was the moral consequence of his attachment to Salafism, by following the fatwas made by leading Salafi clerics. So, for Taufan, jihad is also *act of identity*, as a statement of loyalty and commitment to Islamic identity, through Salafism.

What did the jihad experiences mean to the actors? I argue that the jihad experience is interpreted as a 'radical experience' that brings about 'a pivotal meaning structure' to the actors that organizes the other activities in that person's life. As shown through the life story narratives of the actors, the jihad experience as a pivotal event

is reflected in different ways: in the "from the battle front" narratives of Fauzi and Taufan; in the "teacher of children in the conflict" narrative of Reza; in the " security personnel on the border" narrative of Adang. Although the informants had a variety of roles and experiences, as well as period of stay and duration of jihad involvement, I argue that they shared a 'radical experience' which shaped their later lives. The 'radical experience' was the outcome of their involvement in a violent conflict situation and simultaneously of jihad activism. The 'radical experience' enhanced their attachment and identification to *collective identity* as Muslims and to *movement identity* as Salafi activists.

How did the jihad experience influence their life? I argue that the jihad experience influenced the life trajectories of the jihad actors in combination with two main factors, namely their biographical traits and their social networks. Through an analytical framework of three different kinds of social networks, namely, *core-network*, *tactical-network* and *extended-network*, I have shown that the dynamic engagement of informants with different social networks influenced their choice of life-trajectory in the post-jihad period. In the case of the informants in this chapter, their *core-network* was similar, namely the Salafi movement, while their *tactical-network* and *extended-network* were variable, depending on their social background, profile and personality.

In the case of Taufan, his intensive and extensive engagement with the *core-network* of the Salafi movement in Ambon led him to remain in Ambon. After spending more than two years in Ambon, both as a member of the 'elite forces' of Laskar Jihad and as the Chairman of the Maluku FKAWJ, Taufan developed both his *tactical* and *extended-networks* which eventually led him to be elected as a leader of the Salafi foundation in the post-jihadi period.

In the case of Adang, his decision to return to Poso after spending more than six months in West Java reflected the crucial role of jihad experience as 'a pivotal event' in shaping his life trajectory. It could also be seen as an indicative of his strong link with the Salafi *core-network*, as both the network of actors and 'network of mean-

ings', which did not seem to be available to him in his own environment in West Java.

In the case of Reza, his post-jihad choice to study at a Salafi *pesantren* rather than continue his university study reflected his jihad experience as 'a pivotal event' in affecting his life trajectory. It was also a sign of the supremacy of the Salafi network as his *core-network* over his family network. In the case of Dr. Fauzi, his 'maverick' trajectory in the post-jihad period was a consequence of his loose links to the Salafi *core-network* and the important role of his vast *extended-networks* developed long before his engagement with Salafism. Yet, he maintained his engagement with the Salafi network and continued to identify himself as a Salafi, thus seeing himself still part of the Salafi network.

On 'holy kampong'. I argue that engagement in an 'enclave community' or 'holy kampong' is one of the most interesting features of the 'after jihad' life style of the Salafis presented in this chapter—with the exception of Fauzi. Although living in different areas, either remaining in the (post) conflict area or returning to their hometown, they eventually chose to live in a so-called 'enclave community' or a 'holy kampong', a sort of exclusive community with a distinct pattern of behavior, dress, and social relationships—a phenomenon also observed by Noorhaidi (2005, also Hasan 2006). Such a life style was strikingly reflected in the narratives of Taufan and Adang who live in Salafi compounds in Ambon and Poso respectively. Reza, although taking a different trajectory by returning home to Yogyakarta, also lives in a similar small Salafi complex in the north of Yogyakarta. As an additional case, I also mention below the narrative of Nizam, a Laskar Jihad activist from Pekalongan who returned home after his jihad participation in Ambon.

The term 'enclave community' here is inspired by Almond, Appleby and Sivan (2003) who use the term 'enclave culture' to describe the call to return to a primary identity proposed by contemporary religious fundamentalist movements. Almond and collaborators (2003: 33-37) argue that in the so-called 'enclave culture' the funda-

mentalists usually build a 'wall of virtue' based on moral values.[47] This imaginary wall works to separate the saved, free and morally superior enclave from the morally corrupted outside society. In a stark contrast to the community of virtuous insiders, the social life beyond the enclave is perceived as a "polluted, contagious and dangerous" area. As suggested by Noorhaidi (2005: 184) in his analysis of ex Laskar Jihad activists in Indonesia, the notion of enclave is linked to the issue of space in its symbolic and social meanings.

The 'Kampong Muhajirin' by the Salafi community in Maluku and a similar Salafi compound in Poso are striking examples of such enclave communities. As described briefly in previous section, the Salafi communities in Ambon and Poso have built a housing compound for those affiliated with the Salafis. In Ambon, it is located in what was formerly known as the Kisar ward but was then newly renamed 'Kampong Muhajirin', situated in Batumerah Atas, near the city area of Ambon. When I made a last visit in November 2009 the compound of 140 houses was inhabited by about 100 families, including two senior local Salafi figures, *Pak* Erwin and *Ustadz* Wahab. In addition to clean water, electricity and telephone installation, a new asphalt road had also been built by the local government passing through part of the compound.[48] Because there were many more people who wished to stay in the area but no more space available, they had plans for another Salafi housing complex to be built in Kampong Jawa, Wayame, Ambon.[49]

In Poso, besides the old compound located in the Sayo ward, the Salafi community in Poso has begun to build a new compound

47) Almond, Appleby and Sivan (2003: 30) make use of the term 'enclave' as an apt metaphor for the call and emphasize it as "the primary impulse (at least at the leadership level) that lies behind the rise of the tradition to forestall the danger of being sucked into the vortex of modernity".

48) The building of the new road is probably due to the member of provincial parliament, Lutfi Sanaki, having built his house near the compund. Some Salafi activists living in the area suggested it was the result of his successful political lobbying that the new road was built..

49) According to Taufan, there was already 50 people listed as future occupants for the land in Wayame, including an Ambonese Salafi activist who lived in the Netherlands and wished to return home (Interview, Ambon, 20/11/2009).

located in the Tolana ward, on the outskirts of Poso, situated in the middle of farming land quite far from the center of population. When I visited the site in December 2009, there were less than five people settled in the compound, including *Ustadz* Abim with his families. Proper facilities like surfaced roads, electricity, clean water and telephone connections had not yet been installed. In the near future, some Salafis living in the Sayo ward will probably move in to the area, including Adang, as he told me during the interview.

Although there is a sharp contrast in terms of strategic location and proper facilities between the Salafi compounds which have been built in Ambon and Poso, the two shared the feature of Salafi 'holy kampong' or 'enclave community'. The remarkable feature of both compounds was the dress-code applied to all the dwellers, namely for men the *jalabiyya* or long Arabic style white robe with a skullcap and women the *niqab* or Arabic style black robe with a veil to cover their face.. During my fieldwork I observed some young girls wearing the black *niqab*, complete with veil, both in the compound of 'the Kampong Muhajirin' and the Sayo ward. It was the narratives of some former Laskar Jihad activists in the post-jihad period: shifting from their participation in 'holy war' to starting a new life in a 'holy kampong'….

Nizam's narrative also revealed an interesting feature. Living with his wife and two children in an ordinary kampong located in the Kandang Panjang ward, of Pekalongan, on the north coast of Central java, near to his parent-in-law's house, Nizam's house manifested almost physically a 'wall of virtue'. The house looked odd: from the front all that could be seen was just a white painted wall about 7 meters long and 3 meters high with two doors, a big and small one in bright green. There were no windows at all. There were only two small ventilation holes next to the big door but covered by a zinc plate so that no-one could see inside. There was a small button to ring the bell. It seemed likely that the house was formerly the garage of the house. Entering inside I could see some rooms along the left side of the house, which measured about 20 meters from the front to

the back. There was also an empty space of about 3 meters wide on the left hand side.

The erection of such a 'wall of virtue' based on Salafi moral values was also reflected in Nizam's decision to 'home school' his two children. In 2005 he decided to withdraw his children from the *Ma'had Islam* primary school which they used to attend. His father works as a teacher in the same school. So why did he decide to withdraw his children from the school? "Because the school prioritizes general subjects over religious ones," Nizam argued. As a consequence, he said, the children had little time to learn religious teachings at home, especially prior and during the exams. As he planned to send his children to Salafi boarding school at high school level, he decided to teach them himself with programs and subjects he considered more important and more useful to them as prospective pupils of a Salafi boarding school. Thus, Nizam began to build a sort of 'wall of virtue' for his children from their early childhood so that they have begun to live in such a Salafi 'enclave culture'.

Interestingly, I found a contrasting tendency in choice of residence among the post-jihadists who were *political* Islamic activists. As I will present and discuss later in Chapter 6, two of them even live in a slum area well-known for crimes and being a criminal haunt. I cannot make meaningful comparisons regarding the post-jihad choice of residence between the Salafi jihadists and the Jama'ah Islamiyah jihadists discussed in the next chapter—who share a preference for *exclusive affiliation*—because two of the three informants are still serving time in prison. ***

CHAPTER 5

From Jihad to Prison: The Narratives of Jama'ah Islamiyah

"The most wonderful experience during the battle was when shooting the enemy"

(Fauzan, interview, Jakarta, 30/1/2008)

"Conducting jihad like the Bali bombing must be stopped and must be prevented from happening again."

(Ali Imron, 2007: 177)

"We considered it [schoolgirl beheading] legitimate in so far as it did not surpass what they had done [to us]. So, based on the principle of retaliation, it was justifiable as long as it was equivalent to their past actions. Next, we aimed to stop them from repeating their massacre of children as had happened in the Walisongo *pesantren* …"

(Hendro, interview, Jakarta, 2/2/2008)

"[Prison] is a humiliating place for a man of faith (*mu'min*). It is very hard for a man of faith to be jailed by unbelievers (*kafr*). We felt so stupid because we were under their control. We hated them but we were so powerless."

(Fauzan, interview, Jakarta, 15/2/2008)

"This is not a prison; this is a sort of apartment with meals, even better than home…"

(Hendro, interview, Jakarta, 18/12/09)

Introduction

This chapter will present and discuss the narratives of *jihadi* activists who joined jihad through the jihadi group Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI). While JI is only one of the *jihadi* groups in Indonesia, it became the most notorious group in the aftermath of its action, the first Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 that resulted in the death of 202 people, mostly foreigners, and several hundred injured. The horror was followed by a sequence of terrorist actions including the first Hotel Marriot bombing (2003), the Australian Embassy bombing (2004), and the second Bali bombing (2005). Soon after the Bali bombing, on 25 October 2002, JI was added to the United Nations 1267 Committee's list of terrorist organizations linked to al-Qaeda/ the Taliban under UN Security Council Resolution 1267.[1)]

In this chapter I will present and discuss the life story narratives of *jihadi* activists. One characteristic feature of *jihadi* activism, according to ICG (2005b: i), is its focus on armed struggle (*al-jihad*) and the fighter (*al-mujahid)* as its characteristic actor. It follows a particular jihad or *jihadi* ideology (*jihadism*) with the following basic views: (1) perception of non-Muslim hostility toward Islam; (2) perception of a perpetual war between Muslims and unbelievers; (3) justification of the use of violence to achieve the political goal, of (4) the establishment of an Islamic state (Hassan 2009). Although like the *pious* activists they rejected democratic principles and political engagement, (unlike the general stance of the *political* activists) the *jihadi* engaged in bitter debate with the *pious* activists over religious justification of the use of violence and terrorism in their actions.[2)]

1) http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7548.doc.htm

2) The ICG (2005b) outlines interesting features of debates and rivalries between the three variants of Islamism, namely *jihadi*, *missionary*, and *political*, mainly in the case of Middle East countries. A bitter debate between the *jihadi* and *salafi* movements in Indonesia took place following the publishing of the book Imam Samudra, the leader of the first Bali Bombing, entitled *Aku Melawan Teroris* (I Fight against Terrorists) in 2004. In his semi-autobiographical book, Samudra reveals his personal story of joining the jihadi movement and provides several reasons why terrorist actions, such as the Bali Bombing, are justifiable in the fight against the global hegemony of Christians and Jews. In a reply to Samudra's book, Luqman bin Muhammad Ba'abduh published a book entitled *Mereka Adalah Teroris: Sebuah Tinjuan Syariat* (They Are Terrorists: An Islamic Law Perspec-

Another characteristic of *jihadi* activism is its type of group affiliation. Following Della Porta and Diani (1999: 119-20) I have distinguished membership affiliation in social movements between *multiple affiliation* and *exclusive affiliation.* Unlike *political* activists who commonly have multiple affiliations, *jihadi* (and *pious*) activists usually affiliate only to their own group or some other exclusive affiliation.[3)] In a few cases, some of their activists have links and affiliation with a particular group which had developed before their affiliation to the *jihadi* group. Though sharing a pattern of *exclusive affiliation* membership, *jihadi* activists apply a different form of attachment to the group through the rite of passage of taking a *bai'ah* or spiritual oath.

In *Understanding Islamism* ICG (2005b: 13) separates *jihadi Islamism* into three main variants, namely, *internal*, those who combat against nominally Muslim regimes considered impious and thus lawful targets for subversion; *irredentist*, those who fight to redeem land considered to be part of the Dar al-Islam from non-Muslim rule or occupation, such as the case of Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Mindanao and Palestine; and *global*, those who combat against the West, or more specifically against the United States and its allies.[4)] Such a distinction, however, I would argue, does not mean necessarily imply a different category of actors, but rather a different focus of actions at different periods of time by similar actors.

As I will show and discuss later in this chapter, many JI activists began their jihadi activism by taking part in the 'military acad-

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tive) by Pustaka Qaulan Sadida in 2005. In this 748 page book Ba'abduh identifies the fallacies of thinking by Imam Samudra and jihadi fellows who conduct bombing in the name of Islam and why such actions are unjustifiable from the point of view of Islamic Law. Ba'abduh used to be a vice-commander of Laskar Jihad in Ambon. Ba'abduh's book was then countered by a book entitled *Siapa Teroris? Siapa Khawarij?* (Who is a Terrorist? Who is Khawarij?) by Abduh Zulfidar Akaha published by Pustaka Al Kautsar in 2006. Ba'abduh responded with another book entitled *Menebar Dusta, Membela Kaum Khawarij* (Spreading Lies, Protecting Khawarij) published in 2007.

3) This distinction between the two type of group affiliation was suggested by Della Porta and Diani (1999: 119-20)

4) A similar framework was also used by Gergez (2005: 2) in his book *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* published by Cambridge University Press.

emy' of overseas mujahidin, either in Afghanistan or in Mindanao of the Southern Philippines. By doing so they also engaged in fighting to redeem Muslim lands from non-Muslims forces or becoming *irredentist jihadists.* Following their participation in *irredentist jihadi* activism, either in Afghanistan or in Mindanao, they returned to their home country and engaged in *internal jihadi* activism, either in Maluku or in Poso, and some eventually took part in *global jihadi* activism by carrying out terrorism actions targeting venues symbolic of the West, such as bars/restaurants frequented by foreigners in Bali, a foreign embassy, international hotels and churches. Thus, based on my research findings, I have modified the definition of *internal jihadism* to extend beyond "combating nominally Muslim regimes considered impious," to include "combating non-Muslims living in a Muslim country particularly, but not necessarily, in the conflict situation." Fighting against non-Muslims in a conflict situation occurred in the religious conflict that took place in Maluku and Poso, whereas one example of the second case of fighting against non-Muslims in a non-conflict setting was the series of Christmas bombings of churches in 2000.[5)]

This chapter will present the narratives of the trio of JI jihadists: Ali Imron, Fauzan, and Hendro.[6)] These three JI jihadists first joined jihad abroad (Ali and Fauzan in Afghanistan and Hendro in Mindanao, the Southern Philippines), then took part in the communal conflict in Maluku and/or in Poso, and eventually received prison sentences in Indonesia. However, their journey to prison, their terms and experiences as prisoners, and their interpretation of their time in prison as well as their recent life trajectories are dissimilar.

Ali Imron was arrested for his involvement in the first Bali bombing of 2002, three years after his short period of jihad participation in Maluku in 1999. After his arrest, Imron publically apologized for his role in the bombing and became 'cooperative' with

5) This was part of a JI's operation led by Hambali to respond to religious communal conflict in Ambon by carrying out bombing in several cities and towns in Indonesia. For a further discussion, see ICG (2002) and Imron (2007).

6) Ali Imron is a real name while the other two are pseudonyms.

the police which resulted in him receiving the 'lenient' sentence of life imprisonment—while the other perpetrators received the death penalty.[7] In jail, Ali cooperates with the police in implementing 'deradicalization' programs. Fauzan was jailed for his role in communal conflict in Poso. Fauzan was arrested and jailed twice for two conflict-related cases in Poso and later, after spending three and a half years in prison over two different periods, was released in late 2004. He claimed to be still associated with the JI, though he has a complicated relationship with other JI activists and has expressed his confusion and ambiguity toward the JI leadership. The third jihadi activist Hendro was captured and sentenced to twenty years for his role in 'terrorist' actions, including bombings and killings, in the post-conflict situation in Poso in 2006,. Although he has sought forgiveness from the victims and their families, he seems to remain ideologically 'radical' and refuses to 'cooperate' with police.

Through the life story narratives of the three post-jihadists, I present my arguments to answer the three main questions of this research—expressed in Chapter 1, namely, first, "how did they become jihad actors?"; second, "what did jihad experience mean to the actors?"; and finally, "how did jihad experience influence the life trajectory of the actors in the post-jihad period?" I will structure the discussion in four sections as I did in the previous chapter: first, the brief profiles of the jihadists and my encounter with them; second, the narratives of how they become jihadists; third, the narratives of their jihad experience; and finally, the narratives of the "post jihad" experience of the three (ex) prisoners. I use term "post jihad" in quotation marks because there is no clear fixed border to the *post* jihad period for those committed to *jihadism*. I will discuss the three jihadi narratives as cases of demobilization and disengagement from a social movement theory perspective. Before commencing I present a brief introduction of the JI as an organization with an emphasis on its transnational and underground movement features.

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7) The other perpetrators of the first Bali Bombing who were sentenced to death and executed were Imam Saudra and Imron's two brothers, namely, Mukhlas alias Ali Ghufron and Amrozi.

Photo 5: Live from custody: Ali Imron on TV, 2011
Photo: taken by author

Photo 6: "Casual businessman" jihadist: Fauzan
Photo: taken by author



Photo 7: Under isolation: Hendro in cell, Jakarta 2008
Photo: taken by author

As described briefly in Chapter 1, the Jama'ah Islamiyah is historically rooted in the *Darul Islam* (DI) movement, a radical Islamist movement which aimed from 1949 to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. JI's transnational character was influenced by the exile of two (ex) DI activists who co-founded the JI, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, in Malaysia from 1985 to 1999. Building a new base for the Islamist movement in Malaysia, they began to recruit local people to join the movement, including Nasir Abbas who later become one of JI's leading figures. They also began to engage with transnational Islamist activists, particularly in Afghanistan through the participation of several groups of DI activists in the military academy of Afghanistan Mujahidin. Those factors critically shifted their view of the territorial boundary of Islamic struggle: from Indonesia (national-oriented) to Southeast Asia (transnational-oriented). This paradigm shift of the Islamic struggle was then reflected in the general organizational guidelines of the JI, the *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah* (PUPJI, the General Guidelines for the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah) (ICG 2002c, 2005a, 2007a, Ridwan 2007, Abuza 2003, 2007, Gunaratna 2002).

The transnational nature of JI is reflected in its leadership structure which is divided into three geographical areas: Mantiqi I which covers the western part of Malaysia and Singapore; Mantiqi II which covers the western and central part of Indonesia, including Sumatra, Java, Bali, west and east of Nusa Tenggara; and Mantiqi III which covers Sabah-Malaysia, eastern Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi and Mindanao, Southern Philippines, including the Hudaibiya military camp (Abbas 2005: 120). It aims to establish the Islamic caliphate (*khilafah)* on earth (the 4th principle), through *iman* (faith), *hijrah* (migration), and *jihad* (the 5th principle), by gradually implementing the system of the *jama'ah* (community) followed by the *daulah* (nation-state) and then the *khilafah* (transnational-state, the 10th principle) (Abbas 2005: 104-5, Abuza 2007: see Chapter 3, footnote 23, 43). It also applies the strategic principle of *tandzim sirri* (literally meaning secret movement), an underground movement characterized by secrecy and covertness (Abbas 2005: 107). The secretive *tandzim*

sirri nature of the JI is reflected in the narratives of those who remain committed to the JI movement. I discuss this issue in the next section.

Brief profiles and encounters

- ***Ali Imron: the youngest son jihadist***

Ali Imron[8)] was born on 2 January 1970 in Tenggulung village, Solokuro sub-district, Lamongan district, East Java.[9)] His parents come from a middle class *santri* family in the rural area of Lamongan where his father occupied the respected position of village secretary for 22 years (Noor Milla 2009: 129). The family's *santri* background was reflected in his education trajectory: he went to Islamic schools from primary to senior high school. The small village of Tenggulung then gained prominence throughout the globe for the three Bali bomber brothers: Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, Amrozi, dan Ali Imron, who all came from that same family in Lamongan.[10)]

As the youngest son of eight, Ale—his nickname—was attracted to follow the religious trajectory of his older brothers, especially Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, who studied at the well-known

8) I conducted a series of interviews with Ali Imron in the police detention room, both in my first fieldwork in 2008 and in the second one in December 2009.

9) The description of the profile of Ali Imron in this chapter is based primarily on his autobiographical book entitled *Ali Imron, Sang Pengebom* (Ali Imron, the Bomber) published by Pustaka Republika in 2007, especially Chapter One "*Riwayatku dari Anak Desa Menjadi Militan*" (My life story from a village boy to becoming a militant) pp.1-40.

10) Mukhlas was the fifth, Amrozi the sixth, and Ali Imron the youngest of eight children. Each of the three published his own book. Mukhlas' book was entitled *Mimpi "Suci" Dari Balik Jeruji Besi ; Hikmah Mimpi yang Baik dan Benar* (The 'sacred' dream from behind the bars: Learning from good and right dream) and Amrozi's book was entitled *Senyum Terakhir Sang Mujahid ; Catatan Kehidupan Seorang Amrozi* (The last smile of the *mujaheed:* The life notes of Amrozi) both published by Arrahmah Media in 2009. The two books were published in tandem with another book by Imam Samudra entitled *Sekuntum Rosella Pelipur Lara ; Catatan & Renungan Dari Penjara* (A hibiscus flower to sooth the hurt : Notes and reflections from the prison) by the same publisher. The three books were published after their execution in November 2008. Ali Imron's book was published earlier in 2007.

Pondok Ngruki pesantren in Solo,[11] and, later, joined jihad in Afghanistan. Unlike his older brother, Ale, however, only spent one month in Ngruki in 1988 before returning to his village. He confessed he did not feel at home there (Imron 2007: 3). He then continued his study at the Muhammadiyah high school located in Pondok Karang Asem Paciran and graduated in 1991. Yet, Ale did not board in Pondok as did many other students but instead made the daily trip from home to school. He narrated that made his education process less intensive as he wrote in his book: "I spent more time having fun than studying…" (2007: 4)

After completing studies at the Islamic high school in Lamongan in 1991, Ale went to Malaysia joining a group of migrant workers. Through his older brother Mukhlas, Ale then joined jihad in Afghanistan later that year. Before departing to Afghanistan in September 1991, Ale swore a *bai'ah* (religious oath) to Abdullah Sungkar, which he discovered later in Afghanistan, was a sign of his commitment to join the *Darul Islam* (DI) movement (2004: 6). Ale returned to Indonesia in 1996 and then worked as a teacher in the Al Islam *pesantren* founded by his older brother M. Chozin and friends in Tenggulung. After marrying in 1998, Ale was sent by the JI to Ambon in 1999 for a few weeks.

On 12 October 2002, he played a key role in the first Bali bombing which resulted in him receiving a life prison sentence. Prior to this he had participated in the bombing of the Philippines Ambassador Jakarta residence in August 2000 and the Christmas church bombings of 2000. After being arrested for the Bali bombing, Ale had a change of heart and made a public apology for his role in the bombing. Ale was sentenced to life in jail, and was spared the death penalty given to the other bombers, namely Imam Samudra, Mukhlas and Amrozi, who were executed on 9 November 2008 (*Jawapos*, 9/11/2008).

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11) The Ngruki *pesantren* is well-known for its role as the hub of Islamist jihadi in Indonesia. See the ICG report entitled *Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki" Network in Indonesia* published in August 2002. Another older brother of Ale, Amin Jabir, also went to study in Ngruki but he passed away in an incident in the Lawu mountain expedition in 1987 (Imron 2007: 3).

I met Ale in jail for a series of interviews from 2008 to 2009.[12] I was able to meet him and conduct the interviews with the help of Brigadier Suryadarma, Commander of the anti-terrorist police squad Densus 88, and Nasir Abbas, ex JI leader who had become an ally of the police, as described in Chapter 3. He was held in a maximum security detention center for drugs and narcotics offenders at the Jakarta Police headquarters. One part of the building was the 'terrorists block', occupied by prisoners who had been classified as agents in 'terrorist actions' in the archipelago.[13]

When I first met him on the morning of 31 January 2008 in his cell he was wearing a white T-shirt and *sarong* and was smiling. After we shook hands and I had introduced myself as a lecturer doing doctoral research, we sat on the vinyl carpet of his cell floor and began to talk. The room measured about 4 x 5 meters and was divided into three: a 2 x 3 meter bedroom partitioned by a small curtain; a small bathroom/toilet and a living space. His room held had a number of items that included books, a fan, a Fujitsu laptop and printer, and a boxed Nokia E90, the latest model mobile phone. His appearance, with a thin moustache and pretty trim beard, was quite different to the beardedless terrorist on the cover of his recently published book *Ali Imron, Sang Pengebom* (Ali Imron, The Bomber, November 2007). His complexion also looked brighter and his body a little stockier.

Ale is a special prisoner in that special cell block. He is one of the most senior JI members and is serving the longest sentence, life-time imprisonment, in tandem with Mubarok alias Utomo Pamungkas,[14] another Bali bomber. His cooperative attitude and assistance to the police on counter-terrorism issues allows him to re-

12) The interviews took place on 31 January 2008, 15 June 2008 and 29 December 2009.

13) When I visited there were about twenty prisoners jailed in the block, who had been involved in various terrorist actions, such as Bali bombing I and II, the Marriot hotel bombing, the hiding of Noordin M. Top, as well as the conflict related terrorism in Maluku and Poso.

14) Like Imron, Mubarok also confessed his role in the bombing and became 'cooperative' with the police. Noor Huda Ismail, a Ngruki graduate who works as a freelance journalist and researcher, has written the book, *Temanku Teroris?* (My Friend a Terrorist?), Hikmah publisher (PT Mizan Publika) 2010 which relates the story of his friendship with Mubarok in the Pondok Ngruki in Solo.

ceive certain privileges. A report entitled "*Deradicalization" and Indonesian Prisons*, ICG (2007d: 12-3) mentions Ali Imron and Nasir Abbas as the 'two stars' of the deradicalization program run by the police endeavoring to change the ideological attitudes of jihadi activists, especially those affiliated with the JI. ICG (2007d) praises the success of this program in convincing about two dozen members of the JI and a few members of other jihadi groups (perhaps, including Fauzan) to collaborate with the police. One of the program's most important strategies is to employ a personal and humanistic approach to the prisoners, often linked to the economic needs of their families.

The above average facilities provided in the 'terrorists block' compared to ordinary cellblocks is perhaps part of the program's approach. Here follows a brief description of the common room, situated in the corner of the block, where many prisoners spent their time together, either eating or watching TV. The common room was basically a large cell that had been equipped with electric stoves, eating utensils, and a 29 inch flat screen TV. In addition a treadmill machine was located outside the common room. Prisoners were also allowed to play table tennis in the afternoon around 4-6 pm in a facility located in front of the block's entrance gate.

Although the block was located in a maximum security detention building, encircled by three meter high steel fences, I was easily able to enter the block for my fieldwork using the simple password—supplied to me by Imron on my first visit: "I am a visitor of Ali Imron." With this password I never had a security check before entering the block so that I could bring in all my equipment in my backpack, including digital recorder and camera. All I had to do was surrender my identity card to security at the reception desk.

• *Fauzan: the oldest son jihadist*

Fauzan,[15] the first of five male children, was born in Jakarta in 1966 to an Islamist activist family. His father came from West

15) I did a series of interviews with Farihin during my first and second fieldwork, in 2008 and 2009 respectively, mostly in Jakarta but also in Palu in March 2008.

Nusa Tenggara, while his mother was from West Java. Like Ale, Fauzan was raised in a *santri* family. Furthermore, his father was a hard-core activist of the DI movement whose involvement in the rebellion movement in West Java led to his arrest by the military in August 1957.

His family roots in *jihadi* activism were planted even deeper; his uncle, who was also a DI activist, took part in an assassination attempt on President Soekarno on 10 November 1957 in Jakarta. Born in a *jihadi* family, Fauzan grew up in the very heart of Islamist movements at 58 Menteng Raya Street, Central Jakarta, where his parents lived. Since 1960 the place had been the headquarters of two radical Islamist youth organizations associated with Masyumi, namely, *Gerakan Pemuda Islam* (GPI, Youth Islamic Movement) and *Pelajar Islam Indonesia* (PII, Indonesian Muslim Student Association).

Fauzan and his brothers were engaged in Islamic activism from the very beginning and, later, following the life trajectory of his father becoming a jihadi activist. Fauzan and three of his three brothers, joined jihadi movements and served time in jail for their involvement.[16)] Fauzan spent his early childhood in Tasikmalaya, West Java, his mother's town, before moving to Jakarta in 1979 where he finished his primary school. He continued junior high school in Jakarta before moving back to Tasikmalaya for senior high school. This was because in 1982 he had become involved in political riots during the election campaign ran by Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, Functional Group), a state-backed political party. His parents sent him to an Islamic high school managed by a network of DI activists in Tasikmalaya (Interview, Jakarta, 21/1/08).

After finishing high school, Fauzan joined jihad in Afghanistan in late 1987 through the DI network. Returning to Indonesia in

16) One of them participated in several bombing attacks in 2000-2001 and was sentenced to 20 years; the third became involved in jihad in Poso in Central Sulawesi and was sentenced to several months; while the fourth brother who took part in the bombing of the Atrium shopping mall, Jakarta, in August 2001 and later became involved in Noordin M. Top's network was sentenced to seven years (Interview, Jakarta, 21/1/08; Ismail 2007: 4; ICG 2007: 19).

1992, he married a girl from a DI activist family in Cirebon, West Java. Following an internal conflict within the DI, he joined the JI. He also became involved with the GPI and was elected commander of its paramilitary group in Jakarta in 1999. He later joined jihad in Ambon in late 1999 and continued the jihad in Poso from 2000 to 2002 through KOMPAK. His roles in the Poso conflict resulted in two separate jail sentences for him. He was arrested following his leading role in an attack on the Christian area of Sepe-Silanca in December 2000 and was sentenced to one year imprisonment. In September 2002 he was arrested in Palu for his role in smuggling weapons and bullets and was sentenced to two and a half years jail. He was released from prison in 2004.

When I met him first in January 2008 in a meeting arranged by a researcher colleague in Jakarta, I was impressed by his appearance: a rather big and tall man with a thick but short beard. His graying hair was cut short. His trousers were a bit above the ankle, in the typical Salafi fashion. Though he appeared friendly, he seemed somewhat reserved. But our conversation quickly turned smooth after he mentioned that he lived at 58 Menteng Raya Street, Central Jakarta. I had frequently visited the PII headquarters there. We also knew some people in common, including my older brother, a former leading PII activist who had spent some time in the compound in the mid-1990s. We soon became friends. After the meeting, we went to the 58 Menteng Raya compound, where he had spent most of his life. Coincidently as we entered some former PII activists in the compound recognized me as a former PII activist, which also confirmed my identity.

Thus, the following meetings and interviews ran smoothly there, mostly inside the complex mosque, and occasionally interspersed with a drink or meals in a modest café next to the mosque. I also met him once in Solo, Central Java, and another time in Palu, Central Sulawesi.[17)]

17) The interviews with Fauzan took place on 29 January 2008, 15 February 2008, 15 June 2008, 30 October 2008 and 17 November 2009 in Jakarta. A meeting followed by a conversation took place in Palu, Central Sulawesi on 30 March 2008.

The 58 Menteng Raya compound is a fascinating place with a unique history. It is situated in the heart of Jakarta with the United of States Embassy about five hundred meters away and the National Monument Square, situated in front of the Presidential Palace, located less than a kilometer away. Although it is a strategic location, the compound is somewhat of a slum area—in contrast to the surrounding buildings. The compound historically belonged to Masyumi but it was granted to the GPI following the disbandment of Masyumi by President Soekarno in 1960.[18)] The compound is about 5,000 meters square, with an old building at the front currently used as the National Headquarters of the GPI. When I visited there in June 2008, there was a big GPI banner out front with three calls for action: cancel the fuel price hike; disband Ahmadiyah; GPI affirms its undying defense of the FPI.[19)]

Entering further into the compound through a small gate behind the old building, we could see quite a big modern mosque of about 30 x 50 meters positioned to the back. On the two sides of the compound there were many modest, small houses side by side right to the rear. Some looked quite strong and well-built; some were even two storey, while others were only constructed of simple, aged timber. Fauzan told me there were about forty houses in the area, many of them inhabited for decades, like the one occupied by Fauzan and his family, most of the occupants former GPI or PII activists. During my fieldwork, the place where Fauzan's parents used to live was shared by Fauzan's younger brothers and their families. Fauzan himself usually slept inside the mosque on the thin portable bed I frequently saw him use during my interviews.

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18) According to P. Adiyes Putra (2008), the place originally belonged to the Masyumi Islamic party. Following the disbandment of Masyumi by Soekarno in 1960, the place was granted to the GPI. The GPI used the place as its headquarters. Later the PII also jointly occupied the place until recently. The issue was discussed further in Putra's pers onal blog at: http://adiyes.blogspot.com/2008/04/menteng-raya-58.html (6 August 2010).

19) The banner was made in response to the violent incident in the National Square Jakarta when FPI members attacked a mass demonstration promoting pluralism and defending the rights of Ahmadiyah on 1 June 2008, the anniversary of Pancasila, the state ideology. Following the incident many pluralist groups pressured the government to disband the FPI, a paramilitary group prominent for its roles in carrying out 'sweeping operations' against places of vice.

It was a place of great significance because so many important activists had been there. Fauzan told me that some prominent global jihadi activists had visited the compound, including Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron, and Hambali, and they had even—with his help—obtained resident identity cards there,. Fauzan also claimed that Syeikh Khalid Muhammad, the alleged mastermind of the September 11 bombing, had once been a visitor. He also said that some terrorist actions, such as the bombing of the BCA bank branches in Jakarta in the mid 1980s, were also discussed, planned, and prepared in the complex. However, on the other hand, many liberal and pluralist Islamic figures had also visited. For example, the kindergarten and the children's Qu'ranic recitation school located in the compound were managed by an Islamic foundation YAKPI (*Yayasan Kesejahteraan Pemuda Islam*, Youth Muslims Welfare Foundation) led by Sofyan Djalil, an ex PII activist, the then Minister of State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN). Utomo Danandjaya, the former Chairman of the Executive Board of the Paramadina Foundation, a leading institute and university promoting Islamic liberalism and pluralism, was also a former Chairman of the National Board of the PII in 1960s.

- ***Hendro: the ex abangan jihadist***

Hendro[20] was born in Wonogiri in December 1976 into a rural peasant family. Unlike Ale and Fauzan, he came from a lower class *abangan* (non-devout Muslim) family. As the second of four children from a poor family, even as a child he worked, cleaning cars and selling books. Fortunately, due to his excellent academic results, he received a scholarship from primary school to senior high school. While the primary school scholarship was provided by the *Super Semar* Foundation, a quasi-state education foundation under the Soeharto regime, his scholarship for junior and senior high school

20) I conducted a series of interviews with Hendro in two different places: they took place in the West Jakarta Police detention room during my first fieldwork in February 2008 and in Jakarta Police Headquarters in October 2009 during my second fieldwork.

was provided by a local Islamic charity foundation, Al Barokah, led by a local community leader, *Mbah* Samsu (pseudonym).

After finishing primary school, Hendro was raised as a foster child by *Mbah* Samsu and sent to study in Islamic schools under his charity foundation. This was the first critical episode in his personal history— Hendro, the son of an *abangan* family, fostered by a leading *santri* figure in town and sent to Islamic school. So influenced by his new milieu, Hendro began to change his personal and collective identity from *abangan* (non-devout) Muslim to *santri* (devout) Muslim. This appeared to be a profound shift, for later, after graduating from junior high school as the second best ranked student in his town, the teenager Hendro aspired to continue study at the radical Islamist pesantren Pondok Ngruki in Solo. However, *Mbah* Samsu rejected his idea and insisted that he continue studying in a high school under his charity foundation (Interview, Jakarta, 1/2/08).

Being refused permission to study in Pondok Ngruki did not weaken his desire to become a militant Muslim activist. After he graduated from high school in 1994, still amongst the top of the class, Hendro entered study at the State College for Islamic Studies in Salatiga, a middle-sized town in Central Java. Again, due to his excellent academic achievements, *Mbah* Samsu and the head of the local subdistrict provided him financial support to pursue his studies. They entertained great hopes that the bright young man Hendro would return as a college graduate to make a great contribution to the area.

Unfortunately, Hendro never finished his studies. As I will describe in the next section, he became involved in a radical Islamist movement and eventually left college. Leaving Salatiga in 1995 he went to Solo, the heart of Islamist activism. His former wish to study in Solo was eventually realized, although not in Pondok Ngruki. In Solo he ran a small business selling books and Islamic clothing. Through his involvement with the JI network, he joined jihad in Mindanao, the Southern Philippines, in 1998. After spending years in the Mujahidin military academy in Mindanao, he was assigned to Poso, Central Sulawesi, to lead a local JI group. In Poso, Hendro became involved in terrorist actions, including killings and bomb-

ings, which eventually brought him to jail in 2006 with a twenty year sentence.

It was during his period in jail in police custody in Jakarta I met him for a series of interviews in 2008-2009. During my early interviews with him in 2008, he was 'under isolation' for 'misbehavior'. I will discuss this issue later in his 'after jihad' narratives. What I want to describe here is how I tried to gain his trust and confidence during the interviews.

As briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, I was able to meet Hendro through the kind help of Brigadier General Suryadarma, the Commander of Densus 88. Furthermore, Brig. Gen. Suryadarma even assigned his aide, Sergeant Tatang, a younger man of about 30 years old dressed casually in blue jeans, to escort me to meet Hendro in his 'isolation' cell in the West Jakarta district police headquarters. It was Friday at about 4 pm when Sergeant Tatang and I entered Hendro's cell, number 25, located next to the security gate. "Assalamualikum, *ustadz*!" Sergeant Tatang greeted Hendro and we each shook hands. The sergeant then briefly introduced me to Hendro, briefly informing him that I had permission to interview him and that General Suryadarma himself had ordered him to escort me there. After forwarding greetings from "*Pak Haji*"[21] to Hendro and giving permission for further interviews the next day, if needed, he left me alone in the cell with Hendro. So, it was quite clear that it was through General Suryadarma's influence and authority that I was in Hendro's cell!

Hendro himself was reserved. Wearing a cheap blue T-shirt and *sarong*, he looked a little overweight for his rather short body. Dark marks on his forehead, signaled many hours spent prostrate in prayer. I introduced myself as a UGM lecturer and explained my fieldwork research, including my interviews with Islamist leader Abu

21) Later, following my conversation, I learnt from Hendro that "*Pak Haji*" was the pseudonym of a *santri* officer of Densus 88 with whom he had a good relationship. He claimed to have been given a mobile phone number by him although it was 'officially' forbidden to use mobile phones inside the jail. The fact was, however, that most of the detainees used mobile phone inside the jail. He told me he thought there was a kind of rivalry between Muslims and non-Muslims officers in Densus 88.

Bakar Ba'asyir and the leading Muslim lawyer Mahenderadatta, but he kept silent, his eyes lowered, only occasionally giving short answers to my questions. I thought there was a thick wall between us. I could understand his reserve by putting myself in his shoes. At the moment he had a 'troubled' relationship with Suryadarma following his 'misbehavior'. Yet I had been escorted to his 'isolated' cell by Suryadarma's aide at his special wish, which placed him in an awkward situation. So I could imagine that he was trying to scan and assess me: "Who in the hell is this man and how far can I trust him?"

Fortunately, I was gradually able to develop his trust and confidence in me, by amongst others, asking his permission to perform the *ashr* prayer in his room after I had handed him a three-page interview guidelines to read. By the end of the interview after we had performed the *maghrib* prayer together with him as the *imam* he embraced me, kissing my cheek to wish me farewell. This was a sign of closeness and friendship familiar to Islamist activists. His suggestion that I should meet and conduct interviews with Imam Samudra and other *jihadi* fellows who were jailed in the special prison of Nusakambangan was another sign of his trust. He even joined in talking to Achmad Michdan, the leader of Muslim Lawyer Team, on my mobile phone, asking him to give me the opportunity to visit Imam Samudra and fellows. Unfortunately the visit failed to eventuate as there was insufficient time to meet all the conditions required to permit such a visit.

Later, when I met him again during my second fieldwork in October and December 2009, he had been transferred back to the 'terrorist block' of the Jakarta Police headquarters after his stay of about a year in West Jakarta police detention. Comparing the two places, he said each had 'plusses' and 'minuses'. On the 'plus' side of staying in the 'terrorist block', he claimed, there were many good inmates who would remind him if he were careless or less disciplined in conducting *ibada* and other religious teachings. He claimed that he felt it was like being in a *pesantren* due to the intensive Islamic study programs in prison. During my fieldwork there, I had the opportunity to take part in an Islamic study program held after *isya*

prayer given respectively by Zarkasi and Abu Dujana, two senior JI leaders who had recently been arrested and detained in the block. However, he said that there were also drawbacks to being there: the good service and comfortable facilities provided by the police. For Hendro, the good services and comfortable facilities from police were a threat to purity of faith and *jihad* conviction. He argued that the more comfortable life they had [in prison], the more likely their spiritual life would deteriorate. He commented of the 'terrorists block': "this is not a prison; this is a sort of apartment with meals even better than at home…" (Conversation, Jakarta, 18/12/09).

On becoming a jihadist

As I have elaborated in Chapter 4, I will concentrate on 'radical reasoning' in explaining how the informants in this chapter became jihadists. I begin by discussing the identity crisis experienced by the informants in different stages of their life by referring to Erikson's (1968: 16-7) notion of identity crisis as "a necessary turning point, a crucial moment, when development must move one way or another, marshaling resources of growth, recovery, and further differentiation," which usually apply to the age of adolescence and young adulthood. Erikson has argued that personal growth and societal change, as well as the identity crisis in individual biography and present-day crises in historical transformation cannot be separated because the two help to delineate each other and may happen at different stages of the life cycle.

Unlike the life story narratives of the Salafi jihadists in Chapter 4 who shared an experience of identity crisis in the period of political crisis in the early 1990s, the stories varied in this chapter. While Hendro had such an identity crisis in 1994 and Ale in 1990, it happened earlier in mid 1984 for Fauzan, following his move from Jakarta to Tasikmalaya. Interestingly, although it happened in the period before the so-called 'political crisis' from the early 1990s, for Fauzan it was still triggered by his intensive involvement with the

dynamics of political affairs in the mid-1980's. In his case it seemed that 'place' was really important as he lived in the center of radical Islamic movement in Jakarta during this time.

Yet I would start by arguing that all the informants in this chapter had experienced crisis identity in their adolescence, the transition from childhood to adulthood, the "passage to a new identity involving responsibility, knowledge, ritual and symbolic roles, and acceptance to adult culture" (McGuire 2002: 62). It occurred during high school for Fauzan and Imron but in early university for Hendro. While personal identity crisis was clearly narrated by Hendro and Ale, it was however less prominent for Fauzan. In Fauzan's narratives, political crises were more dominant in shaping his life during adolescence.

A striking case of personal identity crisis was narrated by Hendro from his early university days in the State College for Islamic Studies in Salatiga after leaving his hometown Wonogiri. He began a new phase as a university student by passionately joining the Islamic Student Association (HMI), especially active in its special unit of *da'wa,* LDMI (*Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam*, the Da'wa Institute of Islamic Student). He had big dreams of becoming both an Islamic scholar and Islamic activist following his earlier shift from *abangan* to *santri*. But his expectations and idealistic imaginations of an Islamic campus and Islamic activism seemed too high—or too puritan. He became quickly disappointed with the religious atmosphere of both the campus and the HMI which he said was, "Full of Islamic symbols but empty of meaning." He became concerned with simple issues, such as, the way many female students were dressing and having a date with male students in public, and also the common habit of HMI activists of postponing one of the five daily prayers by prioritizing their meetings or discussion sessions. These were not trivial, but major, issues for him: "How could the so-called Islamic intellectuals behave in a way incompatible with Islamic teachings? They claim to struggle for Islam but are actually damaging it" (Interview, Jakarta, 1/2/08).

It seemed likely that during this period he had experienced 'cognitive opening' through an encounter with the radical Islamist movement before he turned twenty. He told me that he had a group of four friends who shared similar concerns and dissatisfaction at un-Islamic atmosphere both on campus and in HMI. Unfortunately, I did not succeed in tapping a detailed story of this period. In short, after being a university student for only one year, he decided to leave. This was a critical decision since it severed his relationship with *Mbah* Samsu, his foster father who had funded his studies and held high ambitions for him. By leaving university Hendro opened a new chapter in his life: the new step of becoming a jihadi activist.

In 1995 he left Salatiga and moved to Solo, the heart of Islamist activism in Central Java. He managed a small business selling books and Islamic clothing in Solo while making trips back and forth to Wonogiri. During the period he continued to study Islamic teachings more intensively which eventually led him to meet a person named Abdullah, a petty book trader like him. They quickly developed a close friendship for both shared similar views on Islamic teachings. Hendro told me during the interview that it was Abdullah who gave him information and an offer to study Islamic teachings overseas—although he was aware that the destination was the Southern Philippines. He said that he took up the offer because he wanted to study Islamic teachings overseas for free (Interview, Jakarta, 1/2/08).

However, Hendro was silent on the matter of Abdullah's identity and the movement network, claiming to have no information on the issue. It is also surprising that he had never asked questions before taking the important decision to go overseas. He also said that Abdullah asked him to be ready to face any possible risks that might happen during the period of study. He told me that he had replied, "I am ready for what-so-ever risk happens, including death. The main thing for me is that I am able to go and study without cost, *bismillah.*"

His police dossier testimony reveals another version of the story:

> I was assigned by *wakalah* Solo under Ihsan to go to Philippines in 1998 in a group with Abdurrahman, Zaid, Usman, Ibn Sirrin, to study Islamic tenets in Moro… In September 2002, I returned to Indonesia and stayed temporarily in BTN Palupi (the *wakalah* Palu office). In October 2002 Nasir Abbas escorted me to Poso to Alfi from Java who lived in Tanah Runtuh, Gebang Rejo village, and after that he assigned me as leader of *wakalah* Poso. (2006: 8.b5)

Although it is not easy to trust the police record of interview because of the common use of torture and violence during interrogation, I argue that the second version is in fact closer to the facts. I base my argument on the supposition that Hendro's refusal to reveal his true story is due to his sustained commitment to JI as an underground movement. As I will show later in this chapter, Hendro's denial of the existence of JI as an organization is part of his ongoing commitment to JI, although some other ex-JI activists, such as Nasir Abbas, Ali Imron, and Fauzan, have disclosed information on the role of JI,.

Following Hendro's narrative, I argue that his 'radical reasoning' began in 1994 in response to his identity crisis in his early period of study at university. During the crisis, he experienced 'cognitive opening' through involvement with the radical Islamist movement, which eventually led him to leave his studies and move to Solo. It is not clear if he became involved with JI from Salatiga or later in Solo. Although if one considers Solo's position as the 'capital' of the radical Islamist movement in Indonesia, it seems likely he became engaged with JI in his period of activism in Solo. What is obvious from his narrative of becoming a jihadist is that he experienced a sort of *conversion*, namely "a *radical transformation of self* and meaning system" (McGuire 2002: 74) from being the son of an *abangan* family to becoming a *jihadi* activist. His decision to join the jihad movement in Mindanao can be seen as *act of identity*, a way of resolving the deep crisis between his autobiographical self and identity by undergoing a radical transformation of his meaning system by joining the *jihad* and embracing *jihadism*.

Hendro's narrative of becoming a jihadist differs from Ali Imron and Fauzan who come from jihadi families. Thus, for Imron and Fauzan their decision to join the jihad movement and become a jihadi activist might be called "a *reaffirmation* of elements of previous identity," a less extreme type of conversion as argued by McGuire (2002: 74). This type of conversion, McGuire suggests, often does not involve change in one's religious affiliation but produces real changes in the individual's personal religious behavior and sense of identity.

In the case of Ali Imron, his 'radical reasoning' to join jihad began with an identity crisis following his failure to study in Pondok Ngruki in 1988. Unlike his older brother, Mukhlas, who graduated and eventually became a teacher in Ngruki, Ale spent only one month there before returning home. Continuing his study in a high school and Pondok Pesantren affiliated with Muhammadiyah in Karang Asem, Lamongan, he also admitted to not having a strong commitment to study. "I spent more time having fun than studying," as he narrated in his book (2007: 4).

Following this identity crisis, Imron then took part in an Islamic study circle held by his fellows in the Pondok Karang Asem in 1990. During the study circle sessions some teachers taught jihad lessons , describing the misery of fellow Muslims persecuted by non-Muslims in other corners of the globe, such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to Islamic teachings on jihad which resulted in 'cognitive opening' for Ale, there was also a video screening of the jihad struggle carried out by Muslim movements, in places such as Palestine and Afghanistan. For Ale these sessions ignited 'moral shocks', "when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action," as argued by Jasper. "Since then I was moved to change my old bad habits… I also wished to take part in a struggle to defend my religion and my fellow Muslims from the atrocities done by their enemies as happened in Palestine and Afghanistan," as he narrated in his book (2007: 4).

His next step was to contact his older brother Mukhlas who had joined jihadi activism and lived in Malaysia during the period.

After coming to Malaysia, Ale became involved with DI and eventually joined the jihad movement in Afghanistan. Ale's step in following the life trajectory of his older brother to join jihad can be seen as an *act of identity*, namely resolving a deep crisis between his autobiographical self and identity by making a *reaffirmation* of his previous identity as a part of a jihadi network and family.

Unlike Hendro and Ale, for Fauzan political crisis has a more critical influence than the narrative of personal identity crisis. Raised in the heart of the radical Islamist movement at 58 Menteng Raya, Fauzan was involved in the movement from his adolescence. In 1982, as a 16 year old junior high school student, he said he took part in a riot during a political campaign in Jakarta. He also claimed to have distributed newsletters published by Islamist radical groups such as *al-Ikhwan* and *ar-Risalah.* These were published by a group of young activists in Yogyakarta affiliated with Abdullah Sungkar (see Chapter 1). He also recalled he had participated in circulating a fatwa made by the *Dewan Imamah* signed by Mursalin Dahlan and Ahsanuddin Hayat supporting the murder of President Soeharto, upholding *syari'a* and establishing the presidium [of national leadership]. Due to political tensions during the period, including Muslim resentment over the unpopular "Asas Tunggal" issue, the 58 Menteng Raya compound was temporary closed down by the military.

Fauzan recalled just before he took part in the Tanjung Priok incident in September 1984, he moved to Tasikmalaya to attend a Muhammadiyah high school while joining a *pesantren* managed by a network of DI activists. He said it was his own maternal grandfather who arranged for him to join the *pesantren.* His deeper involvement with the radical movement took place in this period, including his participation in the "*Pesantren Kilat*", an intensive Islamic study program run by the *Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Pesantren Kilat* (LP3K, Institute for the Study and Development of *Pesantren Kilat*) led by Mursalin Dahlan.[22)] He recalled one of Dah-

22) When I was a high school student in Pekalongan, I took part in the *pesantren kilat* held by LP3K. So I had the experience of taking part in a training program held by a *jihadi* group and encountered some people mentioned by Fauzan.

lan's statements: "the Soeharto regime is *thaghut*, anti-Islamic, so it must be overthrown!" (Interview, Jakarta, 21/1/08). According to Fauzan, the LP3K was a group founded by a DI faction under Aceng Kurnia.[23] He claimed he had followed the training course named *Fi'ah Qalilah* (FQ) held by LP3K up to level two. As also happened to Ali Imron, a series of intensive sessions were organized to persuade the pupils to join in the jihadi movement by inducing both 'cognitive opening' and 'moral shocks' in a single training package. As the son of a DI family, it seemed to Fauzan like a sort of rite of passage for becoming a jihadi group member.

After finishing senior high school, Fauzan was already prepared for the further challenge of joining jihad in Afghanistan. He told me he had been recruited to join jihad by Broto, a DI faction under Ajengan Masduki, with whom he took the *bai'ah*. Why did he join the jihad in Afghanistan? "I was moved by the news that Muslims in Afghanistan had been attacked and invaded by [communist] Russia. The Indonesian media had also given great exposure to the cases. That's why we wanted to help them with our blood," said Fauzan. His father, the (ex) hard core DI member, endorsed the decision made by his oldest son to join jihad as *act of identity*: reaffirmation of his jihadi family background and *movement identity.*

The narratives of jihad experiences

The jihad narratives of the jihadi trio in this chapter took place in two rounds: first, their participation in jihad overseas in the form of *irredentist jihad,* and second, their participation in jihad in their own country in the form of either *national* or *global jihad.* The

23) A comprehensive overview of the various factions of the DI movement from its birth in 1948 until its recent development was discussed in the ICG report *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing,* Asia Report No. 92, 22 February 2005. A man named Aceng Kurnia was recently shot dead by police in Aceh following a military training session held by a group named *Tandzim Al Qaeda Indonesia of Aceh* (Vivanews, *Menguak Jaringan Teror di Aceh*, 13 March 2010, 18: 35).

first jihad participation overseas could also be considered as *i'dad* or preparation for jihad, since they spent most of their time during that period as cadets of the Mujahidin military academy, either in Afghanistan or in Mindanao. However, the distinction between the cadets and the mujahidin was blurred since the two shared life in the war zones and some cadets occasionally took part in battle.

The first round of jihad for Ale and Fauzan took place in Afghanistan: from late 1987 to 1992 for Fauzan and from late 1991 to 1996 for Ale; while the first round of jihad for Hendro took place in Mindanao of the Southern Philippines from 1998 to 2002. The second round of jihad for Ale came about in different periods with different forms: firstly, he took part in *internal jihad* in Maluku twice for a short term at different periods in 1999; secondly, he took part in *internal jihad* by carrying out the Christmas bombing in December 2000; thirdly, he took part in *global jihad* by carrying out the bombing of the Philippines Embassy residence in August 2000 and later the first Bali bombing in October 2002. The second round of jihad for Fauzan also came about at different periods with different forms: firstly, he took part in *internal jihad* in Maluku in 1999 for a short period of time; secondly, he took part in *global jihad* by participating in the Philippines Embassy bombing in 2000; thirdly, he took part in *internal jihad* in Poso from December 2000 to 2002 which resulted in two prison sentences for him until his release in 2005. The second jihad round for Hendro lasted from 2002 to 2006 when he was assigned to lead a local JI structure in Poso and took part in *internal jihad* which resulted in his imprisonment until recently.

What did the jihad experience mean to the actors? I argue that their first jihad participation, which took place overseas over quite a long period in a local violent conflict situation, was perceived as a 'pivotal event' by the actors producing "a pivotal meaning structure that organizes the other activities in a person's life" (Denzin 1989: 64-7). I also argue that jihad participation was a 'pivotal event' for the actors because of two key elements: *first*, the nature of 'high-risk' activism, involving high levels of 'costs' and 'risks', produces powerful meanings in the actors through the investment of a high

level of emotions; and *second*, the use of religious symbols and meanings during the events, as reflected in the use of term *jihad*, produces powerful effects which impact on the actors. The combination of the two elements lead to the production of "a pivotal meaning structure" as reflected in the use of marker or a signifier referring to the participant of the movement: as a *jihadist* or a *jihad* actor/activist or *mujahid* (Arabic: plural, *mujahidin).* It also increased the commitment of the actors to the movement, in this case to the DI/JI. It is through commitment to the movement that the activist "increasingly identifies with the group, its meaning system, and its goal" (McGuire 2002: 84). As a consequence of their identification and commitment to JI as their social and ideological network, the informants continued to take part in their second round of jihad.

In the next section I will present the narratives of jihad experience of the jihadi trio and how they interpret their jihad experience as reflected in the way they narrated their life stories.

- ***Fauzan: the 'smuggler' jihadist***

Fauzan joined jihad in Afghanistan from late 1987 to 1992 as the fifth DI contingent in a 25 member cohort along with Nasir Abbas (Abbas 2005: 56-7). Before leaving for Afghanistan, he and other jihadi fellows spent about two months in Malaysia occupied with various preparations including applying for a Pakistani visa and studying religious teachings. For Fauzan alone, it was also a case of family reunion because his uncle, Nasir "kecil" or little Nasir, who had been involved in the "Tanjung Priok case" had migrated to Malaysia and joined Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in exile.

Before going to jihad in Afghanistan the young Fauzan had imagined taking part on the frontier of real battles against the communist Soviet Union troops—perhaps, like the Hollywood and jihadi movies he had previously watched. However, he and other fellows were sent to the Afghanistan Mujahidin military academy located in the Kheldan Sadaa valley, Pakistan, on the Afghanistan

border, namely the Northern Khowst (Abbas 2005: 49). Although he admitted he was not initially prepared for study, he claimed that he eventually learnt various aspects of jihad, including the need to be prepared, in terms of knowledge and skills, both mentally and physically.[24)]

When I asked Fauzan about his most meaningful experience during jihad, he replied: "I sensed the beauty of Islam by living together with the mujahidin. There was also a strong bond of fellowship among the mujahidin cadets in the academy" (Interview, Jakarta, 30/1/08). So, there were reciprocal emotions shared by the mujahidin cadets. He then also mentioned the very meaningful experiences of joining in the battle. As cadets, as also explained by Abbas (2005: 58), they had the opportunity to take part in battle as an exercise for one month each year during vacation.[25)] For Fauzan, the special experience of taking part in battle at the frontline with the Afghanistan Mujahidin infantry happened during the vacation of his second year at the academy. There were about eight mujahidin fellows from DI who got this rare opportunity to take part in battle for about a month with their instructors, Syawal and Muhammad Qital, in Samarrkhil Jallalabad in the province of Nangrahar (Interview in Jakarta, 30/1/2008, Abbas 2005). Their involvement at the front line was, uniquely, without approval from the Commander Rasul Sayyaf. Fauzan said of his experience taking part in battle: "The most meaningful experience during the battle was when shooting the enemy."

> *What did you feel at that time?*
> It was such a satisfaction inside my soul. Because what we had [in the academy] was just theory, so when I was shooting it was such a relief, because the theory had been put into practice.

24) Nasir Abbas (2005: 109) explains that there were three steps of jihad as a holy war, namely, *i'dad* or preparation, *ribath* or standby securing the border zones, and *qital* or joining in the battle.

25) The Commander of Tandzim Ittihad Islamy Rassul Sayyaf said Indonesian mujahidin could only take supporting roles in the rear position with the artillery division, not at the front with the infantry. Sayyaf said that Indonesian mujahidin should join the struggle in their country. However, an exception sometimes happened—as claimed by Fauzan and confirmed by Abbas (2005).

> *Did you successfully shoot the enemy?*
> *Wallahu a'lam*, because it was at night, [when the enemy was] close by. During the day, it's quite far [the distance from the enemy]. The commander sometimes asked us not to shoot during the day. Sometimes, having witnessed other mujahidin shoot the enemy and reach their target, though, I felt such satisfaction…
>
> *Did you have any fear of death?*
> Of course, it's human. Especially at the time of departure [to the battle].
>
> *Which battle?*
> All [battles]. We usually had such strong fears at the time of departure, but the Al Qurán says that if we pray when we are in fear then Allah will fulfill our prayers. But when the shooting began, the fear had gone.
>
> (Interview, Jakarta, 30/1/08)

Fauzan claimed he had taken part in real battles in Afghanistan about six times. With such experience and expertise, Fauzan had been trained as one of the key DI members on his return to Indonesia in 1992. Furthermore, during his time in Afghanistan he also claimed to have had the opportunity to meet one of the legendary Afghanistan mujahidin, Abdullah Azzam, beside the commander of the Tandzim Ittihad Islami, Abdul Robbi Rassul Sayyaf.

After returning to Indonesia in 1992, Fauzan was among the elite DI activists with a special credential: an "Afghan alumnus" jihadist. He maintained and consolidated his DI network by holding weekly meetings to share information, listen to sermons, as well as do physical exercises. The exercises, he explained, were part of efforts to "maintain our military performance, both our expertise as well as our physical condition, while waiting for the next duty to be carried out" (Interview, Jakarta, 30/1/08). When JI was founded in 1993 following internal DI friction, Fauzan joined JI under the leadership of Abdullah Sungkar. His next duty as a jihadi activist came when the religious communal violence erupted in Ambon in 1999. As a consequence of the slow JI response to the conflict in Ambon, Fauzan decided to join jihad through KOMPAK "because it was ready to facilitate the jihad" (Interview Jakarta, 30/10/2008).

He spent three month in Maluku from December 1999 to March 2000. His main role during the period was delivering logistics, such as food and medicine, and joining local militias in safeguarding the border area in security posts. He also took part in conducting field observation for opening a paramilitary ground in Ceram Island. So, his role in Ambon was not significant. Returning to Jakarta in March 2000, he became involved in the preparation for the Philippines Ambassador residence bombing which was carried out later in August 2002. He did not play a key role in the action, merely helping to bring the explosive materials from Lamongan to Jakarta. The bombing was not a response to the conflict in Maluku, but rather a retaliation for the bombardment of the JI camp in Mindanao done by the Philippines and the U.S. troops (Interview, Jakarta, 30/10/08).

He played a more critical role later that year in Poso, Central Sulawesi. He went there in September 2000 and remained under the banner and network of KOMPAK. Soon after his arrival, he opened a paramilitary training ground in Sausu, a village in the coastal area of Donggala district on the way to Poso. But his more prominent role was later on 27 December 2000 when he led a group of mixed local militias to attack the villages of Sepe and Silanca, a Christian area about 10 miles from the city of Poso. They killed two Christians and burnt some houses but two of the militia were arrested, including Fauzan, its commander. He was sentenced to one year in prison.

After being released from prison in December 2001, he returned to his family who had moved to live in Solo, nearby the Pondok Ngruki. After that he made several trips back and forth to Poso smuggling weapons and ammunition. He claimed to have smuggled more than 10,000 bullets and 10 military standard weapons to Poso, beside hundreds of detonators for making bomb during the period. But in September 2002 bad luck caught up with him. He claimed that he had been entrapped by the intelligence in efforts to link him with global jihad network of Al Qaeda. How did he come to such a conclusion?

Here follows his brief story from the interview in Jakarta (30/10/2008). After being asked by Poso local jihadists to buy am-

munition, he contacted some of his contacts to search for supplies. Unlike previous 'search operations' which were usually long and complicated, he felt that this one ran very smoothly with no fuss. Furthermore, his ship ticket to forward the goods to Palu was also paid by a fellow Muslim activist. Everything seemed to run well until the ship docked in the port of Palu in the evening of 27 September. To his dismay a police squad was waiting for him at the docks, with a group of snipers. Unbeknownst to him three intelligence officers from Jakarta had followed him and even stayed in the same Class I-B cabin as him. He was soon arrested, handcuffed and brought to the Palu police headquarters. This was revealed to him later when he was brought to the National Police Headquarters in Jakarta and spoke with a police officer, who asked him: "Did you realize that you had been followed from Jakarta?" Fauzan replied no. "Didn't you realize they were your cabin mates?"

His arrest took place in the aftermath of the 11th September terrorist attack in New York which probably explains the severe treatment he received during interrogation by the security apparatus. Fauzan was sentenced to a two and a half year jail sentence by the court. Compared to his previous sentence, this later period in prison involved torture. About one year after his arrest, the first Bali bombing occurred in October 2002 (having in fact initially been planned for execution on the first anniversary of September 11).

I will narrate next the story of Ali Imron, the Bali bomber.

- ***Ali Imron: the 'follower' jihadist***

Following the trajectory of his older brother Mukhlas, Imron joined jihad in Afghanistan from late 1991 to 1996. Ale—his nickname—was sent to study at the Afghanistan Mujahidin Military Academy in the ninth contingent consisting of 33 people from Southeast Asia, 18 of them from Indonesia including Qudamah alias Imam Samudra dan Abu Syaikh alias Umar Patek, another two per-

petrators from the first Bali bombing.[26] Ale was also given the new alias, Zaid by his senior DI member, Dzulqarnain (Imron 2007: 8). I present his narratives of jihad in Afghanistan and in Maluku as well as his role in the first Bali bombing in 2002 next.

After having transited in Malaysia for a month to apply for a Pakistani visa and other physical and mental preparations, he left for Karachi, the capital of Pakistan in September 1991. After staying overnight at a mosque of Karachi he and a group of 18 jihadis from Indonesia made the two-day journey to Peshawar and then continued to Pabbi and on to Sadda Parachinar, to the Afghanistan Mujahidin military academy on the border with Afghanistan. The academy was under the leadership of *Tandzim Ittihad Islami* Afghanistan led by Syaikh Abdur Robbi Rasul Sayyaf. The academy had a special class for mujahidin cadets from Southeast Asia with mostly Indonesian instructors, except for the Malaysian Nasir Abbas (Imron 2007: 5-9, interview, Jakarta/31/1/2008).

There were two main subjects taught at the academy, namely, religion and military studies. Interestingly, most of the description of his academy schooling in his book was about the military. While his religious studies are described in one short list of subjects "*Aqidah, Fiqh Jihad, et cetera"*, his military studies were described in detail over four pages under the five subjects of (1) "physical exercise and discipline", (2) "[military] tactics"; (3) "map reading"; (4) "weapon training"; and (5) "field engineering" (Imron 2007: 12-5). Such an imbalance seems to reflect his interest in military matters rather than religious issues. However, I contend that the most profound effect of joining such a military education program led by mujahidin is not mainly increased military expertise and techniques but rather increased involvement in 'high-risk' jihad activism with a high level of emotions and strong religious symbolism.

The way Ale narrated his daily life in the military academy reflected his hard experiences during the jihad. Here is an excerpt from

26) The list of those who travelled to Afghanistan in the same group with Ale based on different paramilitary division was provided on pages 9-12 in his book. The description of the details of subjects learnt in Afghanistan was presented on page 12-15.

his book: "I followed all the programs of the academy day by day as far as I could. I always had such feelings of tiredness, exhaustion, fatigue, being upset and irritated but I kept trying to be tough and forbearing." (2007: 15) Ale attempted to cope with all of his troubles and difficult days by taking a religious approach, to make sense of his trajectory as a *jihadist*: "On the other hand, I felt really grateful for being able to be in such a [troubled] place to fulfill my religious duty for *i'dad* (preparation for holy war). Thus [by thinking that way] my participation in the academy gave me such a unique feeling of joy and happiness." (2007: 15-6)

Unlike Fauzan and Hendro, Ale did not take part in real battles in Afghanistan. He spoke of his unfulfilled wish to take part in a battle. Ale said that it was a sort of tradition for the cadets to be sent to battle during the long vacation. Thus, during the December 1991 vacation, he and other mujahidin cadets were ready to be selected to for battle. Some fellows had even left the academy in preparation for battle. But good news came from the battle front—'bad' news for Ale and his fellows: the communist regime under Najibullah had been defeated—meaning the opponent was not longer available. "We were all feeling regret and sorrow because there would be no more opportunity to take part in real battle," he described the collective emotions at the time (2007: 16).

Jihad participation in Afghanistan was an opportunity to build a broader network of jihadists. Ale also met with Abdul Matin alias Dul Matin,[27] who was later involved in the first Bali bombing and other series of bombing, when he took part in a military short course in Afghanistan (2007: 17). Of course, jihad participation in Afghanistan had also expanded the global network of jihadi groups as for example in the link between Hambali and Al Qaeda. Ale himself had the personal opportunity to meet the leader of Tandzim Ittihad Islami Afghanistan Syaikh Abdur Robbi Rasul Sayyaf in the headquarters in Towrkham when he escorted Abu Dujana to clarify the rumor that the Taliban were going to attack the Tandzim headquarters (2007: 23).

27) Dul Matin was just shot dead in Pamulang, Jakarta, on 9 March 2010 (*Kompas*, 10/3/2010).

After returning from Afghanistan in 1996 with the strong credentials of an "Afghan alumni" jihadist, Ale was selected to be part of the special team (*khos)* of JI under Ustadz Zulkarnain in 1998. One of his jobs was to source weapons and other combat equipment (2007: 32). In 1999 he was sent to Ambon to "help Muslims who were fighting against Christians" (2007: 32) as ordered by Zulkarnain, the JI military commander. His roles during the Maluku conflict were relatively minor, namely taking part in preparations to open a military training ground on Buru Island and forwarding logistics into the area in close relation with KOMPAK (*Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Crisis*, Action Committee for Crisis Response), a humanitarian group founded by the DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, Indonesian Council for Islam Propagation*)*. Ale also claimed he had persuaded the chairman of the KOMPAK Solo branch, Shobih alias Aris Munandar, from his contingent in Afghanistan, to build the paramilitary group later known as the Mujahidin KOMPAK. Although his role in Ambon was less significant, it is important to notice the way he viewed the conflict. While admitting that the outbreak of the conflict had nothing to do with the JI, he argued that the conflict "promised a new hope for JI" by "giving a way to find the field of jihad and spark the spirit of jihad" (2007: 56).

Ale took a more critical role later in the first Bali bombing in October 2002. As a field commander he commanded the bombing operations on the D-day while Imam Samudra was the project leader. In Chapter 3 of his book Ale describes in detail every single step of the plan and preparation up to the execution of the bombing which was initially planned to be held on the anniversary of the September 11 attack (Imron 2007: 75-103). Yet Ale actually only half-heartedly took part in the bombing. He had raised doubts and questions regarding the previous terrorist actions, such as the Christmas bombing in 2000, which was carried out by him and other JI activists, but questioned by other JI members. He had also queried whether the bombing projects were 'officially' JI programs because they had not been led by Dzulkarnain, the JI special troops commander. Dissent among JI members had begun in the aftermath of the foundation of

the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly) to which Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was elected as leader (*amr).* Ale claimed most of JI members refused to join the MMI while only a few approved. Such friction inside JI confused him and made him pessimistic about the organization's development (2007: 33-4).

Thus, his participation in the Bali bombing 2002 was mostly due to his trust in some JI seniors, especially his older brother Mukhlas. As an ordinary member, although part of the special troops, he admitted that he had never learned about the structure, the guidelines, and the membership of JI until being later informed by the police when he was in prison (2007: 35). Ale's narrative sounds different to that of Hendro, the leader of JI in Poso. I turn now to his narrative.

- ***Hendro: the 'leader' jihadist***

Hendro went to Mindanao in the Southern Philippines by ship from the Tanjung Perak port of Surabaya in 1998. He told me that he had visited his parents in Wonogiri seeking their permission and blessings for his overseas trip without mentioning his destination. According to the police file, he went to Mindanao in a group of four, namely with Abdurahman, Zaid, Usman and Ibnu Sirin, while during my interview he mentioned only one fellow named Said (Interview Jakarta, 1/2/2008, 2006: 8.b5). He spent four years in Mindanao from 1998 to 2002. In the first two years he studied at the military academy and then joined the battle frontline for another two years. During the interview Hendro mentioned that the military academy was located in the Hudaybiya Camp, which was initially co-founded by Nasir Abbas with Qotadah on behalf of JI in 1994-5.[28)] According to Abbas (2005: 156), at the gate of the Hudaybiya Camp there was a banner "the Military Academy of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah"

28) In Chapter 5 of his book Abbas (2005: 139-68) describes how he and Qotadah alias Baasyir began to open the military academy in late 1994 which was firstly used to train the 'elite forces' of the Moro Liberation Front. He claimed that it was him and Qotadah who named the place The Hudaybiya Camp, which was later used to train the JI members.

including its Arabic translation *Kuliyah Harbiyah Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah*.[29)]

What was the most meaningful experience for him in Mindanao? "I had discovered all new things there; from the discipline of life, profound religious studies as well as military training," Hendro said (Interview, Jakarta, 1/2/2008). Another impressive aspect of his life in the academy was that the military training applied Islamic ethics and codes of conduct, such as the absence of harassment, dirty words and flag raising. "We just held the flag parallel to the chest both in training and the battle." His taking part in the frontline of the battle was, of course, another meaningful experience. During the interviews, he narrated many stories of *karamah* (miracles). Here is one of his narratives in the battle fronts in Mindanao:

> It was clear that the weapons of the enemy in the frontline were far more complete [than us], including the heavy weapons. But, *subhanallah*, many of their mortars did not exploded when they fell down around the mujahidin. The mortars just went deep into the ground…. Later, I took part in a group to intercept the enemy patrol group. Some of the mujahidin put a bomb on the road that the ten member patrol group would pass. And then *bang*, the bomb exploded so that the heads and the legs of the troops flew high in the sky. *Subhanallah*, it was really beyond the calculations of demolition science… The next lesson was that to be a martyr means to be one of Allah's chosen ones; it's not random. Here is the evidence: hundreds of bullets were shot in the frontline ruining the corn plants around the mujahidin. But why were none of the mujahidin shot although many of them wished to become martyrs? Rationally thinking, at least one among a hundred bullets would reach the target. But, even when the bullets were very close by they did not reach us. That means that to be a martyr is to be the chosen one….
>
> (Interview, Jakarta, 1/2/08).

The narratives have interestingly shown how his experiences of taking part in violent situation were interpreted as 'religious expe-

29) Abbas' (2005:156-7) book list of participants of the JI military academy in 1998 consists of 17 persons. Interestingly there is no Hendro listed nor his alias. Perhaps, he used another pesudonym.

riences' with profound religious meanings. Such 'radical' experiences became 'pivotal events' which produced a new pivotal meaning structure in his life and formed his *movement identity* as a *jihadist.* As to be a martyr is to be the chosen one, it seemed likely that he also thought that a life trajectory as a *jihadist* is also to be the chosen one.

During his term in Mindanao Hendro met Nasir Abbas, well-known as Sir Sulaiman in the area, who he sincerely describes as one the most respected and impressive instructors in the academy. Abbas was one of the founders and the first leader of the Camp Hudaybiya who established and trained the elite troops of the Moro military forces since 1995, which is probably why he was highly respected in Mindanao. It was also Nasir Abbas, as the chairman of Mantiqi III, the regional division of JI leadership which covers the Southern Philippines, Sabah and Sulawesi, who assigned Hendro to move to Central Sulawesi to lead a local JI structure in Poso, known as W*akalah Khaibar,* in September 2002.[30] In order to support his job, JI even arranged his marriage with the daughter of a local leading Muslim figure, Haji Ahmad (pseudonym) (ICG 2007c: 5).

Under his leadership JI quite successfully consolidated the local militia forces and expanded its role in Poso and the surroundings. Several terrorist actions took place in Poso, Palu and the surroundings, include the bombing of Poso's central market, killing six, in November 2004; the Poso armed robbery of some $50,000 in local government salaries in April 2005; the bombing of the Tentena central market, killing 22, in May 2005; the killing of Budianto and Sugito, two alleged informers, in August 2005; the killing of policeman Agus Sulaeman in October 2005; the beheadings of three Christian schoolgirls in October 2005 and the bombing of a pork market in Palu killing seven, in December 2005 (ICG 2007c: 2).

30) ICG (2007a: 5) suggests that a week after the Bali bombings in October 2002, a JI executive meeting decided to establish a new wakalah in Poso. The reason for the establishment of the new JI structure in Poso was because JI had many members there but there was no strong leadership. JI leaders also considered Poso had good economic potential to become a major source of income through its agricultural wealth and the cacao boom, replacing Singapore and Malaysia.

Following the second Bali bombing on 1 October 2005 and the schoolgirl beheading in Poso a few weeks later the police intensified investigations and conducted a series of arrests. The police finally arrested Hendro on 9 May 2006 (ICG 2007c: 10). For his role in terrorist actions in Poso and surroundings he received a twenty year sentence. During the interviews he admitted his role in several terrorist actions, including the controversial action of beheading schoolgirls in Poso, and confidently presented some arguments and justification for the actions. As the leader of jihadi group at the local level he tried to take the responsibility for the actions conducted by some members of his group. I will discuss this issue in the next section.

The 'after jihad' narratives: the tale of three (ex) prisoners

In this section I will present and discuss the "after jihad" narratives of the JI jihadist trio by focusing on their experience in and after their imprisonment. While Fauzan was released from prison in 2004, Ali and Hendro are serving their term in jail: a life sentence for Ali and a twenty year sentence for Hendro. Through their narratives I will show how 'prison experience' has been crucial in shaping the life trajectory of the jihadist trio. I argue, however, that the meanings and consequences of their experiences in prison varied depending on two factors, namely, their roles, experiences and leadership position during the 'second jihad' and their relationship with their social networks.

As described in Chapter 2, I distinguish three different kinds of jihadi social networks, namely: *core-networks*, networks through which the jihadists join the jihad; *tactical-networks*, jihadist and other networks which occurred temporarily during their jihad period, either in Afghanistan/Mindanao or in Maluku/Poso; *extended-networks*, extended networks which developed in the aftermath of jihad, both among jihadists and beyond. Beside the three social net-

works, in the case of informants in this chapter, family also plays an important role as a *supporting network* in the post-jihad period. I use two interpretations of the concept of social network: first, social network as the link between concrete actors through specific ties as articulated by a 'realist' view; and second, social networks as "phenomenological realities" and "networks of meaning" as suggested by White (Diani 2003: 6; Passy 2003: 27).

I argue that the different roles, experiences, and leadership position during the 'second jihad', namely jihad participation in Indonesia, produced a different 'ideological attitude' and 'moral choice' in the 'after jihad' period, either in prison or afterwards. In the case of Ali Imron, I contend that his 'operational role' (rather than his 'ideological' one), his position as follower, and his experiences of doubt and uncertainty in the process prior to the first Bali bombing led him to shift his 'ideological attitude' and 'moral choice' after his arrest. In the case of Fauzan, I contend that his 'operational role' (rather than the 'ideological' one), his follower position, and his experience of being tortured by the security apparatus and accused by his *jihadi* fellows while he was in prison, led him to behave in a complex ambivalent manner after his prison period. While in the case of Hendro, I contend that his leadership position and 'ideological role' eventually led him to retain his 'ideological attitude' and 'moral choice' intact.

I also argue that the relationships between informants with different social networks significantly affect the construction of meaning of the prison experiences as well as its consequences. I suggest that the *core-network*, the network through which jihadist join jihad, is the most important 'ideological network' of all the networks. This is because of the fact that the *Islamist jihadi* is a type of group with *exclusive affiliation*, meaning that those who joined the group usually only belong to their own group. It contrasts with the *multiple affiliations* which commonly apply to *political Islamist.* I follow the distinction between *exclusive affiliation* and *multiple affiliation* proposed by Della Porta and Diani (1999: 119-20).

The *core-network* of the jihadi trio was similar, namely the DI-JI movements. When Fauzan and Ale joined jihad in late 1980s and early 1990s, the JI was not yet founded so they became involved with the DI. Later when Hendro joined the jihad in 1998, JI had been established in 1993 so that he became involved with the JI. As discussed in the previous section, the JI was a splinter group of the DI following internal leadership friction. For Fauzan and Ale the circle of Afghan alumni was part of the *core-network* and for Hendro it was the circle of Mindanao alumni. Another part of the *core-network* was the cohort of alumni, meaning those who had joined jihad at the same time. For example, Nasir Abbas was an Afghan alumni cohort of Fauzan.

With regard to the *tactical network*, they had different stories. Fauzan joined jihad through KOMPAK. Some JI activists also joined jihad through KOMPAK, including Ali Imron in his second trip to Maluku forwarding humanitarian goods belonging to KOMPAK. Aris Munandar alias Syabih, an Afghan alumnus in the same cohort as Ali, was the chairman of KOMPAK in the Solo branch. [31] Hendro's story was very different since he was assigned directly by the leadership of JI Mantiqi III under Nasir Abas. His *tactical network* was the many local jihadi groups in Poso, such as Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Wahdah Islamiyah, Laskar Jihad and Mujahidin KOMPAK Kayamanya. As his marriage was arranged for the purpose of jihadi activism, so it was also part of both the *tactical* and *extended-network*. It is interesting, however, to note that the JI structure, which was based in the Ulil Albab *pesantren* in Tanahruntuh, sometimes competed with the Mujahidin KOMPAK some of whose leaders were JI activists, including Fauzan.

A more interesting picture was the *extended-network* which developed in the aftermath of jihad. During the trial process, Hendro

31) The establishment of the Solo branch of KOMPAK led by Aris Munandar was a reaction toward the slow response of Mantiqi II, which covered Maluku area, toward the communal violence in Ambon. KOMPAK was established by the DDII to to assist Muslims affected by natural disasters, conflict, and poverty. JI relations with DDII were due to the involvement of Abdullah Sungkar, JI's founder, in DDII in late 1970s and early 1980s. For further discussion of the relationship between JI, KOMPAK and DII see ICG (2004b).

was defended by the *Tim Pembela Muslim* (TPM, Muslim Defense Team), an independent lawyer team, while Ali was represented by a lawyer team provided by the police headquarters. Thus, during his period in prison, the police constituted an important *extended-network* for Ali Imron. They provided him with not just a lawyer team but also good facilities in jail as well as access to media. Unlike other prisoners, Ali was quite often quoted in media. Ali has also been appointed as the 'unofficial' chaplain for drugs prisoners by regularly giving Islamic sermons for them in prison (Interview, Jakarta, December 2009). Fauzan's *extended-network* has become much broader since he his release from prison. I distinguish at least four kinds of *extended networks* for Fauzan, namely, first, security apparatus; second, Muslim activists; third, business sector; and finally academic-journalist groups. The security apparatus has been an important extended network for him since many police and intelligence officers have been in touch with him and got to know him. His *extended network* among Muslim activists, especially in Poso and the surrounding area, developed further as the repercussion of his jihad participation. His jihad activism in Poso also developed his economic network through selling food, clothes, and timber. Finally, Fauzan also has an extended-network of academics-researchers and journalists, including foreigners, since they have quite often interviewed him. The four kinds of *extended-network* are actually not exclusive to each other, but instead often overlap.

As mentioned above, in the case of the JI informants in this chapter, family and family relationships play an important role as a *supporting network* especially in the post-jihad period. For Ale, for example, family support is very important in taking care of his wife and children as well as giving moral support to his decision to make a public apology for his role in the bombing, in contrast with his two other brothers, Mukhlas and Amrozi. While for Fauzan and Hendro, family support comes from their parents in-law who helped them by taking care of their wives and children when they were in jail or after.

- ***Ali Imron: the 'Starbucks' (post-) jihadist***

Prison time was a key turning point in the life of Ali Imron. It began after his arrest on 13 January 2003, when he was in hiding in a very remote village of East Kalimantan with Mubarok and Imam Susanto. His capture was part of a series of successful operations conducted by the police in hunting the Bali bombers. It began with the arrest of Amrozi on 5 November 2002, followed by Imam Samudra, the leader of the bombing, on 21 November 2002, and then Mukhlas on 4 December 2002 (Imron 2007: 124-56).

His arrest and the following events, including a series of police interrogations and a court trial, eventually led to a major turning point in his life: Ale made a public apology and confession expressing his regret for his role in the bombing! He also asked for pardon from the victims, the families of the victims, and any people caught up in the bombing. His dramatic shift of ideological thinking and 'moral choice' toward his jihad action was extremely interesting especially for its contrast with his two older brother, namely Amrozi and Muchlas, also the Bali bombers. Their ideological convictions on jihad remained intact and they refused to make an apology. Together with Imam Samudra, the Bali bomber leader, they received a death penalty and were eventually executed on 8 November 2008.

How did such major shift of ideological thinking and 'moral choice' on jihad action happen to Ale? When he was in police custody, Ale began to write his testimony on his involvement in the bombing, his reflections in jail, until he made the major decision to express his apology. The book was then published in November 2007 entitled *Ali Imron, Sang Pengebom* (Ali Imron, The Bomber) by Pustaka Republika. It is a kind of autobiography that begins with his personal stories as a local village boy who became a transnational *jihadi* activist by participating in the jihad movement and military training in Afghanistan (Chapter 1). In addition to quite a detailed story of his role during the Bali bombing 2002 and his hiding as a fugitive in various areas until his arrest (Chapter 3), he wrote a special chapter explaining how he changed his attitude to become coopera-

tive with the police (Chapter 4). He also wrote a section describing his involvement in jihad actions before the Bali bombing of 2002 (Chapter 2) and a final section on his reflections regarding "Jihad versus Terrorism" (Chapter 5).

Based on the book and my series of interviews with him, I will describe his reasons and a series of processes that preceded his decision to change his relations with the dynamics of JI as his *core-network*. I will also discuss his relationship with the police as an *extended-network* as the consequence of his shift to becoming 'co-operative' and its repercussions on his term in jail.

In his book, Ale discusses his major shift in Chapter 4 entitled "*Mengapa Saya Kooperatif*" (Why did I become cooperative) with two sub-topics, namely "*Sikap Setelah Ditangkap"* (My Attitude After Being Arrested) and "*Perasaan Setelah Ditangkap"* (My Feelings After Being Arrested) (Imron 2007: 171-8). It is interesting to note that he makes a distinction between 'attitude' and 'feeling' in the process of his ideological shift. Although not neatly and clearly displayed in the book, he emphasizes cognitive and intellectual processes in the first section and affective and emotional processes in the latter.

In the first part, Ale describes how the testimonies given by his JI fellow perpetrators who were arrested before him had influenced him to choose to tell the truth of the whole story of the Bali bombing. Ale admitted being somewhat surprised to know that Imam Samudra and Ali Ghufron then followed Amrozi's testimony admitting their role as perpetrators of the bombing. He said that he thought they testified to tell the world about the paths of struggle for the sake of Islam, including the Bali bombing. It was the reason he decided to endorse and confirm their testimony that the first Bali bombing was "part of jihad in the path of Allah to revenge and to fight against the despotic power of the U.S. and its allies." (2007: 172) Yet later, after reflecting deeply over the bombing, he concluded that he had made a mistake and asked forgiveness for his involvement. How did he come to such a conclusion? Here is his reasoning (Imron 2007: 174):

> Conducting jihad by a bombing as in Bali is disputable among Muslims. Some say it is correct while some say it is wrong. Whereas I previously had followed the opinions of those who justified the bombing, I then changed my mind to follow those who refuted the justification of the bombing. This is justifiable; there is nothing to forbid it.[32)]

In the second part, Ale describes his heavy emotional burden (*beban berat)* following the capture of his brothers and especially some innocent fellows who were allegedly involved with the bombing. Unfortunately the description of his emotional tensions was thin. The strongest illustration was, peculiarly, his anguish in looking at his two older brothers, Amrozi and Mukhlas, in police custody in Bali. He describes his feelings of humiliation when looking at his two brothers being handcuffed and escorted by two police every time they left their cells. He narrated that it was so unbearable a feeling that he was forced not to look at them if he encountered them because "I could not help and could not bear my feeling seeing them under such conditions." (2007: 176) It seemed likely that such anguish was caused, or at least heightened, by his moral choice to confess and apologize for his involvement in the Bali bombing—in contrast to the moral choice of his two brothers. As a consequence they were treated quite differently: the police treated Ali kindly in a relaxed fashion while his brothers were subject to a high level of security measures. He continued to express his disagreement with them regarding the moral wrong of terrorist actions and says: "conducting jihad like the Bali bombing must be stopped and prevented from happening again." (2007: 177)

His ideological shift and 'moral choice' brought him closer to the police, who asked him to help them carry out the so-called 'deradicalization' programs mentioned previously. Unlike other

32) The original quote is: "jihad dengan cara melakukan pemboman seperti di Bali masih diperdebatkan oleh kaum Muslimin. Artinya bahwa dari kalangan kaum Muslimin ada yang membolehkan dan ada yang tidak membolehkan. Maka jika saya sebelum kejadian Bom Bali saya mengikuti pendapat yang membolehkan, kemudian setelahnya saya berubah mengikuti pendapat yang tidak membolehkan, hal itu sah-sah saja dan tidak ada larangan."

prisoners, Ali is quite often quoted in the media. He has also been appointed as the 'unofficial' chaplain for drugs prisoners, preaching regularly to them in prison (Interview, Jakarta, 28/12/2009). Ale's special relationship with the police attracted world-wide attention in September 2004 when the press discovered him having coffee in the Starbucks café, Plaza X, Jakarta with Brig. Gen. Gories Mere, the National Police Headquarters' Director of Drugs, Investigation and Crimes. (Tempointeraktif, 3 September 2004; BBC News 24, 2 September 2004).

Although Ale explained his reasons and, a few of the emotional processes which led to his dramatic shift in ideological conviction and moral choice, there were still some questions such as: how did he make such a 'radical decision' to blame his *core-network* of JI in the bombing? How did he make a 'moral choice' different from, even in contrast to, his older brother Mukhlas who had been his 'role model' to join jihad?

I argue that there are some crucial factors that influenced Ale to make such a 'radical decision'. First, Ale had actually been uncertain with and somewhat confused by the internal fragmentation of his JI *core-network* prior to the bombing. It was reflected in his response to at least two issues: first, the internal dispute regarding the establishment of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Mujahidin Council) led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in August 2000, and second, the internal dispute regarding the series of bombings, including the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings. On the first issue, Ale suggests that most of the JI members disagreed with any JI member joining MMI while only a few agreed. On the second more crucial problem, he was confused by the fact that if the bombings were JI programs "why did many of our colleagues, supposedly JI members, disagree, unhappy with the actions?" (Imron 2007: 33).

Second, Ale was not the decision maker of the first Bali bombing project; his role was minor from the outset. At the first meeting to prepare for the bombing, held in mid August 2002 in Solo, Ale was merely a follower who was picked up by Amrozi (*ibid*, 75-8). I share Milla's (2009: 20) argument that Ale was merely a 'com-

plementary follower'; his involvement in the bombing was to carry out particular jobs in the field.[33] Thus, as a 'complementary follower' Ale did not need a rationale for the action. Third, Ale had been uncertain regarding the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the bombing. Milla (2009: 224) explains how Ale had refused the idea of carrying out a bombing in Bali presented to him one year earlier. Instead of bombing a public area, likely to cause many innocent civilian casualties, Ale suggested launching a terrorist action against a U.S. ship which was anchored in an Indonesian port (Interview Jakarta, 15/6/2008, Milla 2009: 224). Finally, his participation in the bombing was merely an expression of loyalty to his JI *core-network* as well as respect towards the senior members of JI, especially his older brother, Mukhlas. Although admitting knowing only a little about the organizational side of JI, Ale (2007: 34) claims that as a member of JI he must follow its approved program.

In such a confusing situation and his fragile association with both the *core-network* and the plan of action, Ale was in a weak position to respond to the two wave of effects: first, the dramatic and difficult consequences of the actions toward victims, his brothers and fellows, especially allegedly innocent suspects, and, of course, himself; and second, strong pressure from outside against the JI as the *core-network* and himself, both from the general public and, particularly, from the security apparatus.

The bomb explosion in Bali created devastation in the beach suburb of Kuta, Bali. Milla (2009) describes how Ale felt deeply saddened hearing the sound of ambulances crowding the streets of Kuta. In his book, Ale made a long list of innocent people who had become involved in the event and were arrested by the police. He also described how sad and humiliated he felt following the arrest of his two brothers, Amrozi and Mukhlas. He was also terrified by his arrest and detention. Furthermore, there was also very strong pressure from the public and the state toward JI as the *core-network* for its jihadi activism and his involvement in it. On the other hand, the

33) Milla (2009) uses the pseudonym Zado to refer to Ali Imron.

police also applied a 'humane approach' to JI prisoners in order to 'deradicalize' them and, furthermore, to weaken the network of JI activists.

I contend that his 'radical shift' was a consequence of several factors, including his troubled relationship with the weak JI leadership as the *core-network*, the massive unexpected 'collateral damage' caused by the bombing, and the incentive of the 'humane approach' applied by the police as the *extended-network.*

During my interview in June 2008, several months before the execution of Ali's brothers, I asked him a question about his moral feelings over his ideological shift and its consequences: "What do you think and feel about your shift and different attitude regarding jihad and the Bali bombing compared to your two other brothers, Amrozi and Muchlas? Do you feel guilty towards them?"

> Of course it is difficult to have such different opinion about this issue, but I believe that I have done the right things. I think this is the true meaning of jihad according to the al-Qur'an and al-hadith… not their interpretation on jihad… although we never know which is the right according to Allah until He Himself tells us…
>
> *How has your family, especially your mother, responded to this issue?*
> Hmm, it is a very difficult situation… I know my mother sometimes feels sad about this issue… that her children quarrel with each other, but I am confident that people will finally know that what I have done basically is for the sake of religion and for the sake of the family as well…
>
> (Interview, Jakarta, 15/6/2008)

It was interesting to me that Ale confronted the issue of 'guilty feelings' by using religious justification and simultaneously 'family considerations' for his moral choice. On the one hand, he claimed his moral choice was based on his convictions and his interpretation of the concept of jihad according to its major sources like Al Qur'an and Al Hadith, and on the other hand, he claimed his choice was based on family interests. As he said: "I believe people will finally

know that what I have done is basically for the sake of religion as well as for the sake of the family…"

While Ale made a major shift by offering a public apology and becoming cooperative with the police, Hendro's narrative in his prison period is quite a contrast. I move to his narrative in the next section.

- ***Hendro: the 'isolated' (post-) jihadist***

Hendro's story began with his absence. When I visited the 'terrorists block' of the Jakarta police detention center I did not find Hendro, the leader of the Poso JI *wakalah* amongst the Poso perpetrators detained there. Where was he? Why was he not jailed there? During my interview with Ali Imron I asked him. He replied that Hendro's behavior had upset other Poso men, so he had been transferred to prevent undesired consequences. Sergeant Tatang, Brigadier General Suryadarma's aide, who drove and escorted me to meet Hendro in West Jakarta police custody, confirmed this story. Maybe it was true—maybe it was not, I did not know for sure what had actually happened. What I observed during my fieldwork was that indeed the cell where Hendro was held was in contrast to the 'terrorists block' cells where the other jihadi were detained.

Here follows a description of the contrast between Ale's and Hendro's cells based on my field notes on 1 February 2008.

> Ale stays in a block of about 15 cells where people freely move from one to another, Hendro stays in his own cell which is locked the whole day. Though both cells are a comparable size (Ale's room was perhaps slightly bigger), Hendro's room is just a square, about 3 x 6 meters with a toilet partitioned only by a low wall about one meter or less to the rear. There is a dirty dark greenish carpet with a thin portable bed plus a rice cooker, an electric water heater, some books, instant noodles, a bottle of honey, and a largish cardboard box with probably clothing and food inside. There were some *gamis*, Arabic style long male robes, on hangers next to a big poster with the text: *Ten Tips to Memorize Qur'an; Those who memorize Qur'an are Islamic Banner Bear-*

> *ers*. Unlike Ale's cell there is no Fujitsu laptop or newest E90 Nokia mobile phone, nor a treadmill exercise machine located in the corner outside nor a widescreen TV next door.

Why had Hendro been 'isolated' that way? What was his misbehavior? In the interview, he told me that General Suryadarma was upset by his attempt to defend himself against the charge of "schoolgirl beheading" in Poso. Hendro had made some phone calls to people outside the jail, and even successfully arranged for a signed letter testifying that Hendro had not initiate the action. He said he merely gave his permission. Perhaps this is true, but it is also possible that he was trying to avoid his responsibility as the leader of the Poso militia at the time.

Assigned by Nasir Abbas, then the leader of Mantiqi III, Hendro came to Poso in September 2002 appointed as leader of the Poso JI structure. Hendro succeeded in consolidating the local militia forces and expanded its role in Poso and the surroundings. It was during his leadership that several 'terrorist' actions were carried out in Poso, Palu and the surroundings.[34] Unlike Ale who changed his ideological conviction toward jihad and become 'friendly' to the police, Hendro's jihadi ideology remained intact, as did his loyalty to his JI *core-network*. His sustained commitment to JI was reflected in his denial of the existence of JI as an organization and his involvement within it. During interviews, he consistently refused to admit his involvement with JI and claimed that he only heard about the JI in the aftermath of the first Bali bombing from the police.

His refusal to acknowledge the existence of the JI was in contrast to the public testimony of some of (ex) JI members who had openly exposed their experiences with the JI, such as Nasir Abas, Ali Imron, and (though less publicly) Fauzan. Hendro behaved ambiguously regarding his connection with the JI. On the one hand, he admitted being the leader of the Poso *Wakalah* but, on the other

34) The list of terrorist actions which took place in Poso during his leadership is presented in ICG (2005c). For further discussion on this issue see ICG (2007a) Report *Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge*. Asia Report No. 127.

hand, he denied that the *wakalah* was part of the JI structure. I suggest that this attitude was in response to two striking developments resulting from his ambiguity: first, the forceful pressure applied by external forces, especially the security apparatus, toward the JI, and second, the confused leadership of the JI after the exposure of terrorist actions by the JI activists and JI associated activists. In such a stressful situation he returned to the basic principle of JI as a secret organization (*tandzim sirri).* This was not unusual. Other JI activists and leaders had followed JI's alleged spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in denying any links with the JI (*Koran Tempo,* 1 December 2004). Similarly Imam Samudra refused to testify as a witness in any JI- related cases. (Milla 2009: 231).

How to explain Hendro's decision? I will discuss his decision compared to those of Fauzan and Ali Imron in the next section. Before moving to that section I will explain his rationale for some of the Poso terrorist actions. One of the major terrorist actions conducted by his followers was the 28 May 2005 bombing of Tentena market, the center of the Christian community, that resulted in 22 dead and 53 injured. What was the idea behind the action?

> It had been part of the simulated demolition training, one which targeted many casualties. First, by causing many civilian casualties it would be a shock therapy to those who used to massacre Muslims. It was a shock therapy…. The main point was that we were persecuted (*dizalimi)* and the victims (*terzalimi)* so that we were allowed to defend ourselves by giving shock therapy to stop them from repeating such actions. Here is the logic *Pak:* If we were slapped on the right cheek and silent, they would slap us again later. *Dienul Islam* does not teach us to be a coward. Do not go looking for the enemy, but do not retreat if you face them…
>
> (Interview, Jakarta, 2/2/2008)

Another awful event was the 'schoolgirl beheading' in which three Christian female high school students were murdered on 29 October 2005. How could such a horrible action against innocent female civilians be justified?

> We considered it was legitimate in so far as it did not surpass (*melampui)* what they had done [to us]. So, based on the principle of retaliation, it was justifiable as long as it was equivalent to their past actions. Next, we aimed to stop them from repeating their massacre of children as happened in the Walisongo *pesantren* …
> (Interview, Jakarta, 2/2/2008)

After having conducted two days of in-depth interviews from afternoon to dusk in February 2008, interrupted by the Ashar and Maghrib prayers, I could grasp the shadowy answer: Hendro might be seen as a 'dangerous virus' by the police since he still remained convinced of the jihadi need for such violence. Though he had apologized and asked forgiveness from the families of the 'schoolgirl beheading' victims, he nevertheless still partially endorsed the Bali bombing of Imam Samudra and his group. He had suggested I visit and interview the Bali bomber trio, Imam Samudra, Mukhlas and Amrozi, in the Nusa Kambangan maximum security prison. "Because they remain consistent with jihad," he argued.

About one year later, after some Poso local recruits were returned to local custody in Sulawesi, Hendro was returned to the 'terrorist block' in the Jakarta Police headquarters. His wish to be transferred to local custody in Palu, where his wife and children were living with his father in-law, still had not been approved by police at my last meeting in December 2009. Although his father in-law had attempted to conduct 'high level' lobbying in Jakarta—as Hendro told me during my first interview in 2008—it had not yet succeeded. When I met his father in-law in Palu he said that the police, especially Densus 88, are still concerned over the likelihood of the unfolding of new turbulence should Hendro be sent back to Palu (Interview, Palu, December 2009).

Thus: in contrast to Ali Imron who was seen by police as a partner in 'deradicalization' programs, Hendro was seen as the source of a possible new security threat in Poso if he were transferred there—at least at the time of my fieldwork. The following narrative of Fauzan lies between of the two: he was neither seen as a source of danger nor as a friend of the police like Ale. His narratives

were also more complicated because he was released from prison in 2004 so that he was able to develop his *extended-networks* quite extensively as reflected in his narratives in the next section.

- ***Fauzan: the 'casual businessman' (post-) jihadist***

Fauzan joined jihad in the two areas of conflict: Ambon and Poso. While his jihad trip to Ambon in December 1999 was only for three months, his involvement in Poso from September 2000 had a long impact on his life. He was arrested and jailed twice in Poso/Palu: first in December 2000 for his role in leading attacks on Christian villages when he was imprisoned for one year, and second in September 2002 for his role in smuggling ammunition to Poso when he was imprisoned for two and half years. While his *core-network* was JI, Fauzan joined jihad through KOMPAK, a humanitarian group founded by the DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*) as its *tactical-network*. Fauzan claimed about ten JI activists joined jihad through KOMPAK (Interview, Jakarta, 29/1/08). What was interesting in the case of Poso was that: when the 'official' JI began to become involved more intensively in Poso, the KOMPAK Mujahidin had already been a quite important player with strong roots at the local level. As a result: the two forces, JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK, sometimes competed with each other and created tension between them.

As a consequence of his important role in providing paramilitary training to local militia in late 2000, Fauzan had quickly developed quite a wide *tactical-network* in Palu, Poso and the surrounding area. When I conducted fieldwork in Poso in March 2008, some former local militia leaders still remembered him with great respect. His remarkable role in Poso and Palu during the conflict period was also reflected in his marriage with a local girl when he was jailed for the second term. A local girl expressed her pride and admiration for his impressively bold roles during the conflict and was willing to be his second wife while he was in prison (Interview, Jakarta, 29/1/08). His period of imprisonment in Palu had also brought about two unintended consequences: first, his relationship with the *core-network*

of JI was damaged because of accusations that he had betrayed the movement by leaking information about the JI network and its activists; second, as a repercussion of a long tough process of interrogation, some police and intelligence officers became close to him and, now, stay closely in touch him, monitoring during the post-prison period. So, to a certain extent, he has become part of security service network and they have become his *extended-network*.

In one of my series of interviews with him, Fauzan told me that his term in prison was one of the hardest parts of his trajectory of experience during jihad. Following his second term in prison, some of his JI *core-network* began to distrust and suspect him as being no longer a 'clean' person.[35] Thus, in the aftermath of his release from prison in late 2004, Fauzan does not feel the same Fauzan as before. While his participation in the jihad movement in Afghanistan granted him the credential of *jihadist*, his period in prison in Palu has badged him with a new status: a traitor of *jihadi* activism!

What had actually happened when he was in jail? What kinds of experience did he have when he was a prisoner? Here follow his narrative of the troubled part of his experience in jail:

> [Prison] is a humiliating place for a man of faith (*mu'min*). It was very hard for a man of faith to be jailed by unbelievers (*kafr*). We felt so stupid because we were under their control. We hate them but we were so powerless.
>
> (Interview, Jakarta, 15/2/2008)

Intimidation, torture, and terror were also part of his life in custody, especially during police interrogation. "Repressive measures by the officials were common, particularly in the beginning, both in the police office and in the prison," Fauzan recalled his early period in prison.

> *Just in the beginning?*
> It was during the time of interrogation. .

35) Such suspicion of JI members who have been arrested and spent of time in jail is common amongst the JI. See ICG Report (2004b).

How harsh?
It was harsh, actually, but it was common. But it got worse in the second term when I was tortured by electric shock. There were some marathon interrogations that used electric shocks. As for the beatings, from the head to toe, it was just like a regular menu.

Did you feel it hard?
I felt it was hard when I felt down. [But] then I realized that it was the consequence [of jihad] I had to face.

Did the effects last long?
I was not affected the first term [in prison] because my spirit remained high. But in the second term, it was rather... the shock therapy made me a bit down, it was so fearful to face...

(Interview, Jakarta, 15/2/2008)

It is interesting to note that his second term in jail had more devastating effects on him. His more severe treatment seemed likely because his second arrest in September 2002 was a year after the horrific September 11 Al Qaeda terrorist attack in New York, when a terrorist act had initially been scheduled to take place by some JI members led by Imam Samudra. The Bali bombing eventually took place few weeks later on 12 October 2002. It was during such an atmosphere of insecurity that the security apparatus carried out harsh actions in order to extort important information regarding JI personnel and its network from Fauzan. He did not tell me what he told the police, but it was in the aftermath of his second term of being a prisoner that he felt he had been stigmatized by accusations of treachery. [36)]

What had happened to him and his life after the prison?

36) Among the rumors was that Fauzan had leaked information about Muslim forces to Reverend Rinaldy Damanik, the ex Chairman of the Crisis Center of the Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah (GKST- Central Sulawesi Protestant Churches) who was jailed for allegedly possessing illegal weapons. During the peak of the conflict, Damanik was at the top of the wanted list for Muslim militias, including Fauzan's. Fauzan met Damanik when Fauzan was in detention at the National Police headquarters in Jakarta. Damanik published a book on the Poso conflict in 2003, in which he told of his encounter with Fauzan in prison, with a photograph of the two standing in front of the gate hugging each other. Damanik (2003: 73-6) also mentioned some information from Fauzan regarding some conflict incidents and the role played by some local leaders.

> … you would never be able to feel what I had. It was normal actually if people worried a lot that I had disclosed something [during the interrogation]. Although, according to Islamic law, it [the disclosure] was forgivable [in such hard situation]. One factor which let me down further was the lack of trust from my [jihadi] fellows…
>
> *So what's been happening?*
> [Some] avoided talking to me, shutting down contact and communication (*silaturahim*). When I asked what's up? They have no ideas, are confused, or act as if they were sick.

Thus, for Fauzan, his second term in prison has damaged his credibility and his *movement identity* as a jihadi activist and furthermore has broken down his relationship with the JI *core-network*.

Luckily Fauzan was not alone; there were other JI activists who had similar experiences of their relationship with the JI *core-network* breaking down following their period of incarceration, including Nasir Abas and Ali Imron. Abas, the former Chairman of Mantiqi III, one of the top positions of JI, moved even further; he officially declared his resignation from the JI (Abas 2005: 303-17). Furthermore, he even became closely involved with the police in assisting 'counter-terrorist' operations. Ale, though not officially declaring his resignation from the JI, moved in the same direction as Abas by being 'cooperative' with the police. The two have become the main 'counterparts' of the police in conducting 'deradicalization' and 'counter-terrorism' operations (ICG 2007d). Thus, Fauzan joined the *extended-network* of those who were alienated or even resigned from the JI.

Being released from custody was, of course, a blessing. But life did not instantly become convenient in the post-prison period: he had to face the challenges of daily life in taking care of his two wives and two families while he did not have a fixed job. His first wife lives in Solo with three children who were studying in the *pesantren* Ngruki. His father in-law, who was also a JI activist, sent them to Solo, following his second term in prison. His second wife lives in Gorontalo, with her parents, taking care of a small child who

was born not long after his release from prison. In order to meet the needs of his two separated families, he had to work hard by working various casual jobs. Sometimes, he worked in a logging business (sometimes perhaps illegal felling of timber) in Central Sulawesi, sending the timber to Java. From Java, he bought foods, clothes, and other goods and forwarded them to Sulawesi. During my last visit to Jakarta in December 2009 he told me that took part in a small business recycling plastics with a group of jihadi in Ciledug, on the outskirts of Jakarta. But he claimed to only have a small share and was attempting to increase his share by accumulating capital.

Another interesting *extended-network* was his relationship with the security apparatus after his period in prison. In some ways, his credential as a member of the jihadi group, alumnus of Afghan jihadi, and a former leader of militia in Poso, became his 'cultural capital' which was sometimes convertible to money. He told me the story of how a few weeks after his release from prison in Palu, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was bombed in September 2004. He had just returned to Jakarta and had begun to start a normal life. His mobile phone rang and a middle-rank police officer asked where he was, requesting him to visit the Densus 88 headquarters soon. Later he was ordered to attend a police briefing for high level business community in a five star hotel in Jakarta. During the meeting he was introduced to the audience as one of the leading jihadi figures just released from the prison in Palu and a friend of the police. At the end of the meeting, some wealthy businessmen put thick envelopes (with millions of rupiah) in his small pocket!

Another interesting part of his *extended-network* was his close relationship with Noor Huda Ismail,[37] a graduate of the notorious *pesantren* Ngruki who used to work as a journalist for the Wash-

37) Noor Huda Ismail is the Vice President of Sekurindo Global Consulting, a security consulting division of PT Sekurindo Gada Patria, based in Jakarta, Indonesia. Previously he worked as a special correspondent for the Washington Post's Jakarta bureau from 2003-2004. He was also a research analyst at the Institute of Defense and Security Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, in 2005. He recently founded *Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian* to work on deradicalization programs. Further information on him is available at his blog: http://noorhudaismail.blogspot.com.

ington Post. Ismail wrote an interesting article entitled *Schooled for Jihad* published in the Washington Post on 26 June 2005, describing his own life story of being schooled in the notorious Ngruki School but not caught up in a radical pathway—unlike some of his school mates. As a consequence of his place of work and the nature of his journalistic work in exposing the network of jihadi activists, some jihadi activists viewed him as an agent of the U.S. infidels. Recently, Ismail and his friends set up a risk consulting company named *Sekurindo Global Consulting* with Ismail as Vice President.

When I was in Poso in March 2008, Ismail called me telling that he and his Christian colleagues were conducting a risk assessment in West Sulawesi for a prospective foreign investor, assisted by Fauzan. I met Fauzan some days later in Palu. He confirmed that he was working on the risk assessment project assisting Ismail and his friends. It sounds rather a peculiar collaboration: a graduate of Ngruki working with an Afghan alumnus conducting a risk assessment for a prospective foreign investor! Huda told me that it was part of his efforts to 'deradicalize' some former jihadi activists, including Fauzan. He claimed that one of the success stories was Fauzan greeting his Christian fellows at Christmas! (Interview, Yogyakarta, 26/9/2009).

In one of my interviews, amidst such complicated and confusing social networks, I asked Fauzan if he still saw himself as part of the JI movement. Interestingly, he replied, "yes" in a somewhat less confident tone. "I think I still feel I belong to JI. I think its ideological framework is still compatible with me, although there have been acute crises and a lot confusing matters regarding its leadership…" he said while looking into space inside the mosque of 58 Menteng Raya Jakarta, the compound where he was raised by his hardcore DI activist parents. It seemed to me that his identity crisis as a consequence of his breakdown with his JI *core-network* began to happen since his second term of imprisonment in Palu, has not yet been resolved—and has perhaps, even got worse.

In sum, Fauzan's attitude toward *jihadi* activism, from the perspective of social movement theory can be seen as *neglect*, whereas

Ale did *exit* and Hendro *sustained* his commitment to *jihadi* activism. I will discuss further different attitudes toward *jihadi* activism by the jihadi trio from a social movement theory perspective in the last section.

After jihad: identity pressure and disengagement

As shown in previous section, the JI jihadi trio took different pathways during their imprisonment or its aftermath. During their imprisonment, each lost their basic human freedom of physical mobility under the exercise of power and authority by the state. Being imprisoned for their involvement in *jihadi* activism, the trio of JI activists was confronted by the use of forces and pressure, at different levels, by the state apparatus. I argue that during their imprisonment the *jihadi* trio experienced 'identity and ideological pressure', a situation where their attachment and commitment to *jihadi ideology and identity* was under pressure. Identity pressure brings about three possible effects to *jihadi* actors: first, identity enhancement, meaning attachment and commitment of actors to *jihadi* ideology become increased; second, identity shift, meaning attachment and commitment of actors to *jihadi* ideology become altered; and third, identity confusion, meaning attachment and commitment of actors to *jihadi* ideology become confused. I suggest that their three variant outcomes of identity pressure ran parallel to the three variants of post-movement trajectory in social movement theory, namely, *exit* (parallel to *identity shift)*; *neglect* (parallel to *identity confusion);* and *sustain (*parallel to *identity enhancement).*

Following a period in prison, and as a consequence of experiencing identity pressure, Ale altered his ideological conviction by conducting a public confession, correcting his jihad ideology, and eventually helping police in 'deradicalization' programs. It is a sort of *identity shift.* In contrast, Hendro remained committed to *jihadism* and the principle of JI as a *tandzim sirri* (underground movement) as reflected in his denial to admit the existence of JI as an organization.

Hendro also refused to become 'cooperative' with the police. It is a sort of *identity enhancement.* On the other hand, Fauzan has become deeply ambivalent over his attachment to JI and his relationship with the police during and after imprisonment. Although some JI activists and its network have accused him of becoming a 'traitor', Fauzan remained associated with the JI while simultaneously maintaining a casual relationship with the police. It is sort of *identity confusion.*

From a social network viewpoint, Ale and Fauzan, for different reasons, had a breakdown in their relationship with JI as the *core-network* of *jihadi* activism following their period in prison. They then joined a group of (ex) JI activists who had similar troubles in their relationship with JI, who shifted to become 'less radical' jihadists, and simultaneously began to develop a new kind of relationship with the police as part of their *extended network.* However, the process and the level of breakdown of relationship between the two activists and the JI *core-network* was not identical. Fauzan had a low level of breakdown which occurred tacitly following the accusation of some JI activists of his betrayal while Ale had a higher level of breakdown which occurred overtly following his public confession and his 'cooperation' with the police in the aftermath of the Bali bombing of 2002.

On the other hand, Hendro maintained his relationship with the *core-network* as reflected in his denial of the existence of the JI movement. While the structural leadership of JI has been significantly weakened in the recent period, Hendro sustained his commitment to the JI more as an 'ideological network' rather than as a network of particular social actors. His sustaining commitment to the JI as the 'network of meaning and ideology' was manifested in his commitment and loyalty to the principle of JI as *tandzim sirri* (underground movement). He also limited his relationship with the police to formal procedural functionality between detainee/prisoner and the holder of authority and refused to build a 'cooperative' relationship with the police, unlike the stance taken by Fauzan and, especially, by Ale.

How then to discuss the different life trajectories taken by the jihadi activist trio? I will start by quoting Poletta and Jasper's (2001) remark: "If identities play a critical role in mobilizing and sustaining participation, they also help explain people's exodus from a movement." By approaching the issue from a social movement theory perspective, I refer to the distinction between the two kinds of disengagement from activism as suggested by Klandermans (1997), namely, passive defection or *neglect*, and active defection or *exit*. Following Klanderman's framework, I argue that Ale did *exit*, Fauzan did *neglect*, while Hendro did indeed *sustain* his commitment to JI and/or *jihadi* activism. As I have suggested, *exit* is a consequence of *identity shift*; *neglect* is a consequence of *identity confusion;* and *sustain* is a consequence of *identity enhancement.*

Ale *exited* from the JI for two kinds of reasons: cognitive-rational and affective-emotional. He *exited* because he altered his interpretation of the doctrine of jihad and was critical of terrorist and bombing actions he perceived as wrong committed by his JI colleagues.[38)] In addition to his intellectual shift and reconstruction of his jihadi views, Ale also claimed to have the strong emotional experience of *guilty feelings* especially following the arrest of some innocent people accused of being associated with terrorist actions. In his book, Ale described his strong feelings of *humiliation* seeing his two older brothers, Amrozi and Muchlas, in jail under tight surveillance and being handcuffed when leaving their cells. Because of these feelings of *shame* and *humiliation,* Ale said that he always looked down avoiding their gaze when he encountered his two brothers (2007: 175-6). Intriguingly, he wrote nothing about feelings of *guilt* toward the victims of the bombing and their families. In another section of the book entitled *Akibat Perbuatan Saya* (the Effects of my Actions) he asks for forgiveness and lists 24 people who

38) Imron formulated ten points of criticism in his book as follows: (1) the absence of Islamic leadership/state as the condition for jihad; (2) erroneous motives and objectives; (3) violation of the ethics of jihad; (4) misplaced retaliation; (5) creating enemies and causing troubles for the self; (6) violating justice and truth; (7) simplifying the use of suicide terrorism; (8) lack of carefulness in choosing targets of action (9) self-imposed jihad; (10) lack of support from the Muslim community (Ali Imron 2007: 212-32).

were arrested by the police, directly or indirectly due to their role in helping him flee from the police.

Following Klandermans' (1997: 102-3) categorization of active defection, I contend that Ale's choice could be seen as *resigning one's union membership* instead of *resigning as a union activist* meaning that although he did *exit* from the JI and criticized its views and strategies on jihad, he remained committed as a *jihadi Islamist*. Or, following Jasper (1997), Ale has shifted his *movement identity* from *organizational identity* as a JI activist to *activist identity* as a jihadi activist.

Fauzan, on the other hand, did *neglect* the movement for various reasons. Following Klandermans, *neglect* means a kind of erosion of support, in which "the non-participant individuals who, though once prepared to participate, have changed their minds and lost their readiness to take action" (Oegema and Klandermans 1994 as quoted by Klandermans 1997: 100). He furthermore explains erosion of support as happening due to two sorts of causes and contexts: micro-individual and macro-social. I borrow Klandermans's framework to explain Fauzan's *neglect* by making some adjustment of his rational choice logic to a 'cultural approach'. I argue that Fauzan's disengagement was a consequence of a set of micro-individual causes, namely, the increasing distrust of JI fellows towards him had produced a crisis of self-identification with the JI which eventually led to a decline of sympathy for the movement. At the same time the acute JI leadership crisis eventually brought about disorientation and confusion. The macro-social contexts were also favorable to his *neglect*, namely the decline of the *jihadi* movement and generally negative public opinion of JI.

On the other hand, Hendro had a different story and trajectory. While serving his sentence in custody, Hendro continued his sustained commitment to the JI as the 'network of meaning and ideology'. Unlike Fauzan and Ale, senior JI members who did either *exit* or *neglect*, Hendro *sustained* his commitment as an obligation to remain in his organization, maintaining what Klandermans (1997:

30) calls *normative commitment.* Klandermans suggests the critical role of ideology in maintaining *normative commitment*.

It is a big puzzle why Hendro maintained his normative commitment to the movement, while Fauzan and Ale did not. It is also intriguing to examine what factors led him to have such an unbreakable commitment to the movement and ideology, despite being sentenced to twenty years in jail. I suggest that the discussion of three issues may help explain the different pathway taken by each, namely, first, different generations and cohorts of jihadi activist; second, different positions in the jihadi movements, and finally, family support and power relations.

The jihadi trio come from different generations and cohorts of *jihadi* activists: Fauzan is the most senior who joined jihad in Afghanistan from 1988 to 1992; Ale is the second senior who spent time in Afghanistan from 1991 to 1996; and Hendro is the youngest who joined jihad in Mindanao from 1998 to 2002. Their different generations and cohorts affected their 'waiting period' for participation in the next jihad actions. Fauzan waited about seven years before taking part in the 'second jihad' in Ambon in 1999 while Ale spent three years before joining jihad in Ambon in the same period. Unlike his two seniors, Hendro did not have a 'waiting period' before he took part in his 'second jihad' in Poso in 2002. Hendro was a 'fresh graduate' from the Moro mujahidin academy when he was assigned to Poso to become the leader of JI Wakalah Poso. I suggest that the 'freshness' of his jihad spirit was a crucial factor influencing his later life trajectory. By being overseas in the crucial period of leadership crisis of JI in 1999 following the death of Abdullah Sungkar, Hendro was also relatively free of a troubled relationship with the JI as his *core-network.*

The jihadi trio each had different positions in the JI movement: Fauzan was an ordinary JI member; Ale was a member of the JI 'special forces' under Zulkarnain; Hendro was the leader of the JI Wakalah Poso. Their different positions in the JI movement eventually led them to different positions in action which then brought them to jail: Fauzan led a group of militia to attack a Christian village

(the first case) and took a personal role in smuggling weapons and ammunition to Poso (the second case); Ale played the role of field-coordinator in the Bali Bombing 2002; Hendro played his role as the leader of a series of terrorism actions in Poso. Different positions and responsibilities in the movement and actions, which involved different processes of reasoning, commonly led to different levels of endurance under difficult situations. I share Milla's (2009: 297) contention in making a distinction between the mode of reasoning between leader and follower. While a leader usually applies comprehensive and adequate reasoning process, followers usually apply heuristic reasoning which mainly relies upon judgment made by the leader. Thus the follower's stance is commonly more vulnerable to change under strong pressure compared to the leader. Thus, I argue that Hendro's strong commitment to his ideological conviction was due to his leadership position in movement and action. He, therefore, had followed a certain process of reasoning before committing the actions and had been relatively ready with a set of reasons and explanations. The same processes seemed likely not to have happened in the cases of Fauzan and Ale.

The next crucial factors are family support and power relationships. I argue that family support plays a crucial role in endorsing decisions made by individual jihadists in the post-jihad period. Take for example Ale's decision to shift his ideological conviction and later work closely with police on 'deradicalization'. It was such a difficult and radical decision to make, because he had to take a contrasting position compared to his two older brothers, Mukhlas and Amrozi. But family endorsement helped him to feel relief. On the other hand his shift put him closer to power, particularly the police, which during the global war on terrorism has become a very resourceful agency. Thus, while serving his sentence in jail, Ale was able to marshaling the supports of his family *pesantren* through his *extended-network* with the state, especially the police.

Hendro also enjoyed strong family support from his family, especially his father in-law, Haji Ahmad. Ahmad was a prominent local figure who led Muslim groups both during the conflict and in

the peace process, and he had strong and wide networks both at local and national level. In an interview with me at his home, Ahmad Poso rejected any accusations of being the source of protection of his son-in-law as the leader of the local militia in carrying out terrorism actions (Interview, Poso, 17/3/2008). However, Hendro is the husband of his daughter and the father of two of his grandchildren. It was for the sake of his daughter and his grandchildren that he conducted many efforts and high-level lobbying in an attempt to have Hendro transferred from Jakarta to a local jail in Palu. During my last conversation, Hendro claimed that his father in-law had never blamed him for his actions—which did not necessarily mean he supported him. He also claimed that his father in-law had assured him he would take care of his children. I suggest it was such family support and endorsement which made him more confident to choose the difficult pathway of jihad, even in prison.

For Fauzan, family relationships have been both facilitating and hindering factors in his making big decisions in the aftermath of his imprisonment. Although being accused of being a traitor by some of his jihadi colleagues, it was difficult for Fauzan to *exit* because of the strong family bonds and network of jihadi activism around him. He is the oldest son of a jihadi family who is expected to be an exemplary figure for his younger brothers. His two father-in-laws were militant Islamist activists, one of them also being a *jihadi* activist, who most likely supported his sustained commitment to *jihadi* activism. Both parents-in-law also provided support for his two wives and their children living in two different areas, namely in Solo, Central Java, and in Gorontalo, South Sulawesi. Without receiving support from his fathers-in-law, it would be very difficult for him to support his two families. Being in such difficult situation, being absent as a strong power holder in his family network, Fauzan had to develop a soft approach to maintaining his *extended-network* with a cohort of 'deradicalized' jihadists, including the police.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented the life story narratives of the JI jihadi trio in three different stages: *before*, *during*, and *after* the jihad period. Through their narratives, I have expressed my arguments on the three main research questions as introduced in Chapter 1. I end this chapter by highlighting some important findings from these research questions as reflected in the life story narratives of the JI jihadi trio.

How did they become jihadists? Through the life story narratives of the JI jihadi trio, I have argued that they became jihadists after experiencing a process of 'radical reasoning'. The radical reasoning took place in different ways for the different actors but at the same life stage: a period of transition toward adulthood, namely in the late high school period for Fauzan and Ali Imron, and in the early university period for Hendro. It happened in the context of, or in response to, *identity crisis* as particularly narrated by Ali and Hendro. For Hendro, it occurred following his deep disappointment at what he called the 'un-Islamic atmosphere' both in HMI and his Islamic campus. For Ali, it was rooted in his failure to undertake high school study at the notorious Pondok Ngruki, Solo. For Fauzan, rather than personal identity crisis, his narratives were colored by political crisis and his engagement with it since his early youth.

The route towards becoming a jihadist for the JI jihadi trio was also varied: it was a sort of *reaffirmation* of family history and identity by following the life trajectory taken by the father (for Fauzan) and an older brother (for Ali Imron). For Hendro, who comes from an *abangan* family, his radical reasoning for becoming a jihadist can be seen as *conversion*, meaning "a radical transformation of self and meaning system" from being the son of an *abangan* family to converting as a *jihadi activist!* So jihad as *act of identity* holds different meanings for them: for Hendro it was a way of resolving identity crisis by making radical transformation and meaning system through joining *jihad* whereas for Fauzan and Ale it was a way of reaffirming family history and identity.

The process of radical reasoning, which involves 'cognitive opening' and 'moral shocks', took place in a 'single package' for Fauzan and Ale, when they took part in a sort of 'recruitment training' held by a radical Islamist network in their schools, respectively the DI network for Fauzan and the network of Ikhwanul Muslimin for Ale. There was no clear, detailed story from Hendro on how he experienced 'radical reasoning' that led him to become a jihadist. The closed nature of his narration of the process of his engagement with *jihadi* activism is probably linked to his ongoing commitment to the JI as *tandzim sirri*, an underground movement.

What did the jihad experience mean to the actors? I argue that jihad experience means a 'radical experience' that brings about 'a pivotal meaning structure' to the actors that organizes the other activities in a person's life. As shown through their life story narratives, a new pivotal meaning structure was constructed following their participation in the 'first' jihad overseas: in Afghanistan for Fauzan and Ali Imron, and in Mindanao for Hendro. I argued that the 'radical experience' of being involved in a transnational *jihadi* movement in the context of a 'holy war' in a foreign country brings about 'identity consolidation' to the actors which takes place in two ways: first, through the enhancement of *collective identity* as *Islamist activists*; and second, through the construction of a new *movement identity* as *jihadi activists*. Their participation in jihadi activities abroad also become the rites of passage of their involvement with a jihadi movement, namely Darul Islam (DI) which later transformed into Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI).

How did jihad experience influence their lives? I argued that jihad participation as 'radical experience' informed the later life trajectory of the actors in a combination of two main factors, namely their biographical traits and their social networks. Through an analytical framework of three different kinds of social networks, namely, *core-network*, *tactical-network* and *extended-network*, I have shown that the dynamic engagement of informants with their different social networks has influenced their choice of life-trajectory in the post-jihad period. In the case of the three informants in this

chapter, their *core-network* was similar, namely the DI/JI movement. I also argued that jihad participation informed the life trajectory of the actors in two different steps, namely, first, through the *experiences*, and, second, through the *consequences* of jihad participation. As shown in the narratives of the JI jihadi trio, their involvement in *jihadi* activism eventually brought them to prison for their participation in different *jihadi* actions and for different lengths of imprisonment. Fauzan was sentenced twice (2000-1 and 2002-4) for his roles in conflict related cases in Poso; Ale was sentenced to life-time imprisonment for his role in the first Bali bombing in 2002; Hendro was sentenced to twenty years for his role in a series of terrorist actions in Poso from 2003 to 2006.

The life trajectory of spending a period in prison for involvement in terrorism or terrorist related-actions is a particular feature of the *jihadi* activists involved with the JI. It differs from the life trajectory of the *pious* jihadists who lived in 'holy kampong' in the post-jihad period as explained in the previous chapter. It also diverges from the life trajectory of the *political Islamist* activists who are actively involved in the dynamics of local politics in the post-jihad period as discussed in the next chapter.***

CHAPTER 6

From Jihad to Local Politics: The Narratives of Political Jihadists

"[Jihad] was a period of life which was very nice, meaningful, and precious. It was short but rich with meaningful experiences: fighting, hunting animals, travelling…"

(Awod, interview, Solo, 6/12/2007)

"As I walked to the forest the kids escorted me, one of them was hanging on my shoulder, others were in the front of or behind me holding my shirt. When I began to enter the forest, some of the kids released me with tears. I could not bear my own feelings of sadness. They were still standing there watching my every step as I entered the forest…"

(Ayyash, interview, Pekalongan, 18/12/2007)

"When I was in Jakarta I got some decent money every time I preached… you can't get such *angpao* [money in envelope] here [in Ambon]. Yet even though the place [for *da'wa*] is far, my soul feels so satisfied, so calm. It means I have done a lot for many people. When I was in Jakarta, it was money-oriented *da'wa*."

(Surahman, interview, Ambon, 4/5/2008)

Introduction

This chapter will present the life story narratives of the post-jihadists who come from an Islamic *political* activism background. Adapting the categorization of different types of Islamism proposed by ICG (2005b), I define Islamic *political* activism as Islamist movements with some of the following characteristics: involvement in political process, either directly or indirectly, and generally accepting the nation-state and working within its constitutional framework; articulating a reformist rather revolutionary vision and referring to democratic norms; its characteristic actors being paramilitary and political party activists. There is a degree of variation among them in the use of violence, some basically avoiding its use while others occasionally using it for vigilante action against what they perceive as 'moral vices'.

Different to the *pious* and the *jihadi* Islamic activists who reject democratic principles and political engagement, the *political* Islamic activists basically accept democratic principles and are actively involved in the political process, either through political parties or other socio-political associations. The *political* Islamic activists also differ from the two others in their type of group affiliation, as discussed in Chapter 1 While *pious* and *jihadi* activism usually applies *exclusive affiliation*, meaning its members have *only* a single affiliation to their own group, *political* activism usually applies *multiple affiliations*, meaning its members have multiple affiliations to different groups.

Unlike the two previous chapters which present the narratives of (ex) jihad activists who come from a single Islamist network, namely Laskar Jihad (Chapter 4) and Jama'ah Islamiyah (Chapter 5), this chapter will present three post-jihadists who come from different Islamic movement networks, namely, Awod Umar, an activist from the Islamic political party PBB and the leader of its paramilitary group Brigade Hizbullah in Solo, Central Java; Abu Ayyash, an activist from the paramilitary group the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) in Pekalongan, Central Java, and Surahman, an activist from the tar-

biyah movement affiliated with the Khairu Ummah foundation in Jakarta. Although coming from different movement networks, having quite different experiences and jobs during the jihad, they eventually had a somewhat similar trajectory in the post-jihad period: involved in the (new) dynamic of local politics. The way they engage in the dynamics of local politics were, however, not similar. Awod became involved in local politics though a paramilitary group affiliated with the Islamic political party before his participation in jihad; Surahman began to get involved in local politics through a political party in the aftermath of his participation in jihad; while Ayyash became involved in local politics through an Islamic paramilitary group with which he was involved before and continued to be after his participation in jihad.

Through the life story narratives of the post-jihadists trio, I will present my arguments to answer the three main research questions as also conducted in the two previous chapters (Chapter 4 and 5). Furthermore I will use part of the narratives of Jodi and Baghdad, two other life history informants with *political* activist background, to support and substantiate my arguments in this chapter, particularly on the first stage in the process of becoming a jihadist.

Brief profiles and the encounters

- ***Awod Umar: the ex bad boy jihadist***

Awod is a young man of mixed Gujarati and Arabic descent born in Solo in 1980.[1)] His father is of Gujarati descent while his mother was of Arabic descent, but both were born in Solo, Central Java. He is the second of five boys, one of whom died, from a lower-middle class background. During his childhood, his father spent several years working outside Solo, mostly in West Java, even in

1) I did a series of interviews with Awod Umar in Solo during both of my fieldwork periods. The first one took place in November 2007 and the last one occurred in December 2009.

Photo 8: A preacher post-jihadist: Surahman, Ambon 2008
Photo: taken by author

Photo 9: A political leader post-jihadist: Awod, Solo 2009
Photo: taken by author

Photo 10: Militia leader, in court: Abu Ayyash, Pekalongan 2009
Photo: courtesy of Radar Pekalongan

Photo 11: A father, at home: Abu Ayyash, Pekalongan 2008
Photo: taken by author

Malaysia. Although having strong foreign ingredients in his blood, Awod has quite successfully adapted to Javanese culture as reflected in his considerable fluency in using high (*kromo)* Javanese language—as mentioned briefly in Chapter 2 as an illustration of the concept of identity.

Raised in a *santri* family, Awod went to Islamic schools from kindergarten to high school. But he was a bad boy during his teenage years so that he dropped out of senior high school in his first year. Although admitting to be somewhat delinquent and often involved in youth brawls, he claimed he never been studied martial arts but was rather a natural born fighter who fights from his own instincts and courage. He related one of his stories of reckless (*nekat)* bravery of when he fought five other youths with his arm in a cast. Naturally he lost and was severely injured. He also claimed he had never been a member of any teenage gang but just joined in fights mainly on his own, either for the sake of his school or *kampong.*

As a street delinquent he admitted he had committed various kinds of bad behavior or the so-called five prohibitions or *ma-lima* in Javanese namely, *maling* (stealing), *minum* (drinking alcohol), *main* (gambling), *madat* (using drugs), and *madon* (womanizing, visiting prostitutes). But with one exception he said: "I have committed *malimo* with the exception of *madon."* Why did he not visit prostitutes*?* He replied in a normative way: "Because my parents' teachings, especially my mother, on respect for women." Awod claimed he had a very close relationship with his mother. The fact that his mother had played the role of a single parent during his early childhood, when his father was working outside Solo, might be one explanation for his close relationship with his mother.

A few months before the fall of Soeharto's New Order government in 1998 Awod suddenly began to change his behavior, he stopped drinking alcohol. I will discuss the process of his identity crisis in the next section. He shifted his identity gradually and later joined the Brigade Hizbullah, a paramilitary group affiliated with the Islamic party PBB in the *reformasi* era. He had joined paramilitary training held in an army compound in Jakarta during the tense politi-

cal situation under the Presidency of B.J. Habibie.[2)] In 1999, following an internal conflict in the Brigade Hizbullah, he was elected as its chairman—when he was just 19 years old. He went to Ambon in 2000 to join the jihad movement following the religious communal conflict that unfolded in the area. His political career developed quickly, he was elected as chairman of the PBB Solo in 2009—when he was just 29 years old.

I met and began to know Awod in November 2007 when I did my fieldwork in Solo. I was introduced to him by my old university friend, Heri Varia, a former journalist who had become a businessman in Solo—as described briefly in Chapter 3. In that period Awod had joined a local NGO providing legal aid for the poor and becoming the coordinator of paralegal volunteers. The NGO, named *Supremasi*, was led by a Christian lawyer named Bares Lamhot. The office of the *Supremasi* occupied the front half of Awod's rental house in Nayu, a slum area of Nusukan, Solo. I did a series of interviews with him there, sometimes with some *Supremasi* volunteers, who were also Brigade Hizbullah activists, around, the interviews sometimes ending after midnight.

Awod is a calm and helpful person. His looked quite fit in keeping with his role as the leader of paramilitary groups and a paramilitary trainer, being a relatively tall person of about 175 cm with a muscular body. During the interviews he usually replied to my questions with quite plain and well-considered answers, straight to the point, without a lot of metaphors or abstract-symbolic language. In his stories he never described himself as crying or shedding tears, even when he was injured or wounded during fights or other terrible situations. During the interviews, he helped me by showing his per-

2) It was part of the political turmoil in the early days after Soeharto's resignation between those political groups, many of them Islamic groups, who supported President Habibie versus those who wanted him to step down and transfer power to a political presidium led by leading opposition figures, including Megawati Soekarnoputri, Abdurahman Wahid, Amien Rais and Hamengku Buwono X, backed by many student movements and the nationalist and leftist groups. For further discussion see O'Rourke (2002) and Hefner (2000).

sonal documentation, including some completed application forms for participating in the jihad movement and some media clippings.

Another important place of meeting was the *Gedung Umat Islam* (the House of the Muslim Community) situated in Kartopuran, in the heart of the Solo City, also the location of the PBB Solo office. It was a historic place which used to belong to the Islamic party Masyumi. When I met him there after Friday prayers, a group of young Muslim activists were hanging out there chatting, most of them smoking. Awod was a smoker too. He was always smoking when I interviewed him and usually drinking a cup of black coffee. My last interview with him in December 2009 also took place in that place when he had just been elected chairman of the PBB in Solo. The interview started just about midnight and ended about two hours. Such a practice of meeting in or after midnight is quite common among *political* Islamist activists—and it also occurred during my interviews with Abu Ayyash, the chairman of the FPI Pekalongan, as I will describe in the next section.

- ***Abu Ayyash: the ex abangan jihadist***

Unlike Awod, Abu Ayyash was born in an *abangan* family in Pekalongan in 1973, with the Javanese name, Slamet Budiono.[3] More than twenty five years later, after getting married, starting a family and engaging in Islamic activism, he began to use the alias: Abu Ayyash.[4] He is the eleventh of twelve children from a lower class family; his late father was only a primary school graduate who worked as a laborer in a local factory. Some of his brothers and sisters passed away when they were young; he was one the five remaining at the time of my interview with him in 2007-2009. His father

3) My series of interviews with Abu Ayyash took place in different periods of time during both of my fieldwork periods: the interviews began in December 2007 and the last one was in early January 2010.

4) The alias comes from the name of his second child, Cheric Ayyash Ghanusi. The name was inspired by the Islamic leader from Bosnia, Mustapha Cheric, who visited Indonesia in the mid 1990s. Ghanusi is a Turkish variation of the Indonesian name Sanusi. I have no information for the origin or inspiration of the second name Ayyash.

had moved to Jakarta and Belitung to start a small business but the business failed and he returned unsuccessful, bringing nothing to the family but misery. His father had been an activist of the PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*, The Indonesian National Party), a secular nationalist party, that was involved in conflict with the communist party (PKI) in Pekalongan in the 1960s. His father passed away in the late 1990s while his mother was still alive, living in the same place as Ayyash and his family in Boyongsari, a slum area in Pekalongan where a prostitution complex used to be located.

The young Slamet Budiono attended public school from primary to high school. Yet he transferred to an Islamic school in early high school. This was probably for practical rather than ideological reasons; unlike the public high school, the Islamic school was located in town, thus saving transport costs. His new school was a private vocational high school managed by an Islamic foundation; it was a second-class school that ran in the afternoon after the morning classes of the regular school had finished. Although his family background was *abangan*, his social environment was colored by strong *santri* traditions, especially NU. He said that he began to learn Islamic teachings, such as reading the *Qur'an* and simple Arabic, from his childhood, and then became a *santri* as a teenager by carrying out Islamic practices, such as regular prayers and fasting.

Coming from a poor family, the young Ayyash had little privileges; he began his first job as a young teenager. He worked as a parking attendant when he was in first grade junior high school and then became a *becak (pedicab)* rider when he was in senior high school for about ten years. Yet his poor family background did not prevent him from having big dreams; the young Ayyash wanted become a prominent poet (his two favorites being prominent Indonesian poets Rendra and Taufik Ismail) or a journalist. Big dreams need big actions. So he decided to migrate to Jakarta in the early 1990s after completing his high school. It was during this period that he had an identity crisis which I will discuss later in his process of become a *jihadist*.

In Jakarta he joined in a *pesantren* and became involved with Islamic activism. During this period he met a girl from Purwokerto who eventually become his wife and mother of his children. After marrying in Purwokerto and living there for a while without a fixed job, he returned to Pekalongan and his old job as a *becak* driver. Following the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, he became involved further in Islamic activism in Pekalongan, organizing collective action to close down the prostitution complex of Boyongsari, located just a few hundreds meters from his home. The successful collective action became the embryo of the establishment of the FPI in Pekalongan in 1999 where he became one of its leading activists.

He joined the jihad movement in Ambon in 2000/2001 through KOMPAK and spent four months in a remote village of Ceram Island, Maluku. His career as an Islamist activist grew after that: he was elected as acting chairman of the FPI Pekalongan in 2003, and was elected chairman for the period 2005-2010 and reelected for 2010-2015. Although his career as an activist was quite bright, his economic life deteriorated. The local government following the implementation of a city order bylaw in 2007 closed down his small street stall selling fried snacks or getuk goreng. Ironically this policy was an initiative of the new Major of Pekalongan, Dr. Basyir Ahmad, whose election campaign he had supported in 2005. He took part in a series of social protests against the policy by joining the *Forum Komunikasi Pedagang Kakilima se-Pekalongan* (FKPK, the Communication Forum of Street Vendors in Pekalongan).

I first met him in a discussion held by an Islamic Study Group in Pekalongan in December 2007, followed by a series of interviews at different periods of time—the last taking place in early January 2010. Different from the public image of the FPI as a vigilante group, Ayyash's appearance was less imposing: he had a small, skinny body with a thin, scarce, beard. His manner of speech was not aggressive or offensive, quite the opposite: he spoke well in a sophisticated manner, sometimes coloring his language with striking metaphorical symbols. He was also a heavy smoker. During the interviews, he smoked a lot, usually accompanied by a cup of coffee. He writes

poetry some of which have been included in an anthology published by a local group while others have been published in local media, as I will show in the 'after jihad' section. He also has a Facebook account and occasionally publishes his poems there.

During the period of my meetings with him, he had no fixed job and continued to struggle to earn money for the family. When I asked him about his job and money to live on, he calmly replied that God sends His blessings in many different ways.[5] He and his wife and their five children live in a very modest house belonging to his mother located in the former slum of Boyongsari, Pekalongan. My interviews took place in three different places which reflecting his various activities: his house, the office of a local NGO named PAS (Public Area Service) working on public issues, and the shared center of Islamic organizations in Pekalongan. Two of the interviews began about midnight and ended around *fajr (*dawn*).*

- ***Surahman: the sentimental jihadist***

Surahman was born to Betawi (indigenous Jakartan) parents in Medan in 1967.[6] His father went to Medan for oil-related business as a sub-contractor of the state-oil business company, Pertamina (*Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Negara)*. Surahman said that his father used to be a *preman (*petty criminal*)* associated with the Pemuda Pancasila (PP) who had participated in the communal riots in Medan during the 1965-66 chaos, such as anti-Chinese operations led by the army. His father had been assigned to Medan by his boss and had then married the boss' daughter, Surahman's mother. Working as a Pertamina contractor, his father became involved in the massive Pertamina corruption practices that occurred under the management

5) I had at least two insights on this issue. When a friend of mine was looking for a house to rent there in 2008, he tried, unsuccessfully, to help her by brokering. On another occasion, I saw him buy bunches of durians for his mother to sell in the small shop at the front of his house. So he attempts to earn money in many ways. Other income came from some local donors sympathetic to his way of life.

6) I conducted a series of interviews with Surahman in two different periods of fieldwork in Ambon: the first in May 2008 and the next in November 2009.

of Lieutenant General Ibnu Sutowo.[7] In 1981, his parents moved to Jakarta, running a new timber business in partnership with a Madurese businessman. Surahman told me his mother had said his father did not want to continue with the Pertamina 'dirty business' so he decided to resign and return to Jakarta. Later in his life, his father dedicated his life more to religious activities and *da'wa*.

Surahman is the second of twelve children, six male and six female. Raised in a *santri* family, he attended Islamic primary school, continuing to a public junior high school and then vocational high school, all in Jakarta. Coming from a middle class family enabled him to continue on to study accounting at a private accounting academy in Jakarta where he got a diploma. He also studied Arabic at an academy for Islamic *da'wa* in Bekasi, though he failed to complete the course. He claimed that he learnt Islamic teachings mostly at home, from his father. Although his father had never formally studied in a *pesantren,* he had learnt from many *kyai* and eventually become a local preacher, giving regular sermons for women at home. Surahman described his father as a moderate person who could be accepted both by the NU and Muhammadiyah community.

When he was a teenager, Surahman began to learn martial art of the *Pencak Silat Sanggar Buana* school. Due to his mastery in martial arts, he was selected to compete in the National Sport Festival (PON, *Pekan Olahraga Nasional)*, a national multi-sport event held every four years. In that same period, he also became involved with Islamic activism through the PII (*Pelajar Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Muslim Student Association) from his years at junior high school. He said it was a turning point in his life; due to his participation in PII training and activities he shifted to become what he termed a "Muslim militant activist". So, instead of studying for exams, he preferred to read Islamic books by writers such as Imam Ghozali. He also refused to participate in the flag raising ceremony at school because, he said, "it was *thaghut* (anti-Islamic)." He was then elected PII Chairman in the Pondok Pinang ward in 1984-1985.

7) On corruption in Pertamina during the period, see Maks Kobonbaev (2006).

At the same time he was also elected as chairman of the Islamic section of the religious unit (*Rokhis, Kerohanian Islam)* of his school's student organization.

Firstly radicalized by the PII, Surahman eventually found the PII 'too liberal' in its application of Islamic teachings. Surahman left the PII and became involved with BKPMI (*Badan Koordinasi Pemuda Masjid se-Indonesia)*[8] which was led by a rather prominent young preacher named Toto Tasmara. He also then actively participated in *da'wa* activities through the Institute of *Da'wa Khairu Ummah* led by Ustad Ahmad Yani, his own uncle. It was during this period that he went to Maluku to participate in jihad mobilization through PKPU *da'wa* program in 2001. He continued to stay in Ambon, extending his contract with the PKPU and was eventually recruited by the PKS as one of its leaders in the Maluku province. I first met him in April-May 2008 when I did my first fieldwork in Maluku. I got his name and contact details from Muzakir Assagaf, the Chairman of the PKS Maluku, after having interviewed him. I had two interviews with Surahman in 2008 and another in November 2009 during my second fieldwork

Surahman is a friendly and energetic person who easily befriends new people. He looks like someone who enjoys meeting people and talking with them. During the interviews, he replied my questions frankly and talked in a fast but relaxed manner. His job as a preacher has perhaps given him the skill to easily talk and express his ideas and emotions. His leading position in PKS Maluku was reflected during my second interview, when he made calls to some PKS activists who had become members of parliament just to seek some information or confirm data. He also did not hold back any personal information, such as how he had two wives and how he

8) The BKPMI was founded in 199? in Bandung as a unit of activities under the West Java MUI under the leadership of KH. E.Z. Muttaqien. In 1993 BKPMI transformed into the BKPRMI (*Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Remaja Masjid Indonesia)* in the Sixth National Meeting of the BKPMI held in the Asrama Haji Pondok Gede, Jakarta. During the Meeting, a consensus was achieved to place the BKPMI as an autonomous unit of the *Dewan Masjid Indonesia* (DMI, the Council of Indonesian Mosque). See more at http://bkprmi-tng.890m.com/print.php?type=N&item_id=1.

managed them, as I will present later in this chapter. My relationship with him quickly grew closer because our shared PII network. He also invited me to join him attend the PII anniversary held in Maluku on 4 May 2008, which he attended with Sudarmo, the former chairman of PKS Maluku. Surahman's role at the end of the event was to lead the closing praying session. His personal character as a sentimental person was reflected in the way he delivered his task, moving the audience by building a mood of melancholy through his trembling voice, almost shedding tears, during the prayers.

On becoming a jihadist

As I have explained previously in Chapters 4 and 5, I will concentrate on 'radical reasoning' in explaining how informants in this chapter became jihadists. I start by discussing the identity crisis experienced by informants at different stage of their life by referring to Erikson's notion on identity crisis which usually applies to the age of adolescence and young adulthood. Suggesting that personal growth and societal change, as well as the identity crisis in individual biography and present-day crises in historical transformation cannot be separated because the two help to explain to each other, Erikson argues that identity crisis may happen in different stages of the life cycle.

Following Erikson, as with the life story narratives of the Salafi jihadists in Chapter 4, I begin by arguing that all the *political* jihadists in this chapter experienced crisis identity in the period of political crisis in Indonesia from the early 1990s. During the period Uhlin (1997: 155) calls the 'pre transition period', Soeharto shifted his political strategy by embracing Islamic groups as reflected in his support for the establishment of the *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se Indonesia* (ICMI, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) in 1990 (Hefner 2000: 159, see also Liddle 1996). This was a turning point that provided a major impetus to the rise of Islamist movements which had began to happen from the early 1980s. The

crisis reached its peak in 1997-1998 at what Bertrand (2004) called a 'critical juncture' in Indonesian modern history.

As reflected in the life story narratives of the informants in this chapter, their personal identity crisis happened during a period of political crisis: in the early 1990s for both Ayyash (in his early phase of migration to Jakarta) and Surahman (when he became more radicalized and eventually found the PII to be 'too liberal') and in 1998 for Awod (when he suddenly wanted to abandon his 'bad boy' culture). Although the three informants experienced an identity crisis in different ways for different reasons at different periods of time, by following McGuire (2002: 62-68, see also Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi 1975: 65-68) I argue that it happened in the same period of personal development, namely in the rites of passage to adulthood: in late adolescence for Awod (b. 1980) and Ayyash (b. 1973), and in the early twenties for Surahman (b. 1967). In the three cases, identity crisis was followed by 'cognitive opening' as suggested by Wiktorowicz which led them to adopt a new perspective of more radical Islamic activism: joining a paramilitary group Brigade Hizbullah in the case of Awod, engaging with the BKPMI in the case of Surahman, and becoming involved with Islamist movements concerned with transnational Islamic issues in the case of Ayyash.

I will begin with Awod's story. In an interview, he narrated his personal identity crisis which became the turning point of his identity shift as follows: "A few months before the fall of Soeharto, I *suddenly* made a promise to stop drinking alcohol. I don't know why. But it was clearly neither due to somebody's advice or because I had got in trouble or some other action. Perhaps, it was just because I wanted *to be different* (*tampil beda*)." Although his friends complained and confronted him and accused of him of not being loyal to them, Awod stayed true to his word: "I have never taken back my own words; it is my character. I have never drunk alcohol again after that…" (Interview, Solo, 6/12/2007).

It maybe that the teenager Awod was unaware and did not understand the major social and political changes that were taking place in his environment during the period. In the late Soeharto period, the

social and political atmosphere had escalated and uncertainties were rife, including tension between the so-called Islamic groups *versus* the secular nationalist groups (see Hefner 2000, O'Rourke 2002, and Sulistyo 2002). Just a few months after Awod's promise to change his behavior a gigantic historical change happened in Indonesia: the resignation of President Soeharto after 32 years in power.

Awod was then exposed to the new wave of *reformasi* bringing freedom of political parties and freedom of political expression. More than 200 new political parties emerged during the post 1998 period, although eventually only 48 were allowed to participate in the 1999 political election, the first democratic election since 1955. It was also an era of the emergence of the repressed: "*politik aliran"*[9] as reflected in the (re)emergence of several Islamic political parties who used Islamic symbols as political tools in contest with many others who badged different kinds of symbols and attributes, ranging from religious to socialism and nationalism. Amidst such heavy traffic of religious and political symbols and attributes, Awod was thrown into uncertainty and forced confront his own self and identity, and answer the questions "who are you?" and "who do you associate with?"

Awod became fascinated by a symbol with which he felt quite familiar, the crescent and the star. He had seen it placed in the small *sate* restaurant belonging to his father where other parties also put their posters and stickers in different designs, sizes and colors. But his imagination and attention was mesmerized by the symbol in green and yellow of the *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB - Crescent and Star Party), the new face of the party *Masyumi* (*Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia*, the Democratic Assembly of Indonesian Muslims). Masyumi won the second biggest share of votes in the 1955 election only slightly behind the PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia)* although both had the same number of parliamentary seats, namely

9) The concept was originally developed by Geertz (1960) in his seminal work *The Religion of Java.* He basically argues that political parties are divided based on certain mass bases, embedded in the social milleu. For a discussion on recent developments of *politik aliran* in Indonesian politics see Ufen (2006).

57 (Feith 1962; Ufen 2006). In Solo, however, the picture had been very different: the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) had won the most (57.33%) votes, followed by PNI with 30% and Masyumi with 11.10% (Feith 1999; Sulistyo 2003).

That same year in 1998 Awod asked his surprised father if he could accompany him to attend a PBB event held in Kartopuran, the previous headquarters of Masyumi. Awod said that he did not feel confident to attend by himself: he still felt that he was viewed as a delinquent and therefore someone strange to attend an Islamic political party event. What had happened to Awod?

It probably stemmed from a mixture of his rising sense of uncertain identity in the hectic political days and his heightened sensitivity to former political and religious symbols. It was a time of *schismogenesis;* drastic changes in environment, producing a deep crisis between the autobiographical self and identity. Schismogenesis processes are often the result of a 'circle of panic', which Bhaba (1994 as quoted by Marranci 2009: 20) explains as 'the indeterminate circulation of meaning as rumor and conspiracy, with its perverse, physical effects of panic.' It was such a mood colored by *politik aliran* that Awod labeled a 'red threat': a revival of the conspiracy of Nationalism-Secularism-Communism against Islamic forces during the Habibie period. What happened to Awod could be seen as a process of 'cognitive opening' as suggested by Wiktorowicz (2005: 85) which usually occurs following a identity crisis, thus leading to increased receptiveness to the possibility of new ideas and world views.

Awod eventually joined the Brigade Hizbullah, a paramilitary group affiliated with the PBB. While his first step was a sort of reinvention of his *personal identity* as a Muslim, by abandoning his habit of drinking alcohol, he moved further by inventing a new *collective identity* as a Muslim activist and eventually a *movement identity* as an activist of the Brigade Hizbullah, an Islamic paramilitary group associated with a group with a long history back to the nationalist struggle: the Laskar Hizbullah.[10] His involvement with

10) In his keynote speech entitled *Confronting Secularism and Communism (Meng-*

the Brigade Hizbullah, for Awod was a further sign that he had left the bad old days of the *ma-lima.*

Unlike Awod, Ayyash had a sort of identity crisis when he migrated to Jakarta in the early 1990s after completing high school and seeking work. Living in a metropolitan city, far from his family and hometown, he began to miss his old life in the cozy, religious atmosphere of Pekalongan. Here follows his narrative:

> When I started to live in Jakarta, I had the feeling of losing something…a feeling of loss because it was not easy for me to do *ibadah* (observe religious worship), because I did not hear the *adzan* (call to prayer) for there was no *musholla* (prayer houses) around my place of stay… I [sometimes] began to weep… some days later, when I was on the way back [home], I found a nice mosque where I then joined, staying and learning [Islamic teachings] there…. (Interview, Pekalongan, 17/12/2007)

After having had on-and-off of job for several weeks, moving from one place to another, from one friend to another, Ayyash eventually ended up staying in the Islamic Boarding School complex of *Al Mukhlisin*, located in Penjaringan, North Jakarta. It was a boarding school especially for migrants; most of its pupils were non-locals looking for jobs in Jakarta. It was the branch of a *pesantren* belonging to Nur Muhammad Iskandar SQ, a well-known Islamic cleric affiliated with the NU who managed a big *pesantren As-Shidiqqiyah* in Kedoya, West Jakarta. It was an interesting place because it teaches not merely religious studies but also business practices to its pupils. In addition to his learning process in the *pesantren*, he also began to engage with broader Islamist movements concerned with transnational Islamic issues. He related that he took part in some events held

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hadapi Sekularisme dan Komunisme), Yusril Ihza Mahendra, the then PBB Chairman, explained the birth of the Laskar Hizbullah was initiated by the Japanese in 1943 as part of the preparations for national independence as well to provide assistance to the Japanesse in combatting the Allied forces. Following the declaration of national independence, the *Laskar Hizbullah* was reorganized under Masyumi, the first and only Islamic political party in the period established on 8 October 1945. Source: The Guide Book of Brigade Hizbullah, no date, published by Komando Pusat Brigade Hizbullah.

in the Al-Azhar mosque in Kebayoran Baru and the DDII headquarters in the Kramat Raya Street concerning the war in Bosnia.

A period of identity crisis which took place in his early period as a migrant worker in Jakarta in his late adolescence was probably a critical turning point in his life. While his collective identity as a Muslim had developed in his childhood, it was consolidated when he was far from the *santri* town of Pekalongan. His involvement in events held by radical Islamic movements in Jakarta on transnational Islamic issues, like the Bosnian war, led to 'cognitive opening' as suggested by Wiktorowicz (2005). Although it was unclear whether he had joined any particular Islamic movement in Jakarta, he began to become a freelance Muslim activist who was actively involved in events concerning Islamic transnational issues. The significance of this phase was reflected in the use of Bosnian and Chechen war heroes as the names of his children[11] as well as in his later life trajectory of joining jihad.

While his critical turning point of becoming a Muslim activist happened when he was a migrant worker in Jakarta, another big step in his career as an activist took place later in Pekalongan in the wake of *reformasi.* As a major political change, *reformasi* brought about dramatic shifts which caused a deep crisis and simultaneously political opportunity for many individuals. Following the collapse of the Soeharto regime, voices for local reform were also echoed in Pekalongan, in the call for closure of the prostitute complex in Boyongsari—just a few hundred meters from Ayyash's house. The popular image of Pekalongan as a *santri*[12] town was utilized as a

11) The Bosnian war has a special place in his imagination. His respect and admiration for the Bosnian Islamic leader, Mustapha Cheric, inspired him to name his second child: Cheric Ayyash Ghanusi. All his children were named after prominent Muslim figures from different parts of the world. The third son, Tufail Lamlam Tambusai, was named after Sultan Tambusai, a Western Sumatran Minangkabau Islamic hero. The fourth daughter, Syamila Dina Ayu Kristina, was named after Syamil Basayaf, a Chechen Muslim hero, and Kristina was is the Chechen capital. The fifth daughter, Hansa Khalida Ziya, was named after Khalida Zia, a woman leader from Bangladesh, and Hansa - a poet and a mother of many jihadists.

12) Two most important features of Pekalongan are *batik* (traditional textile product) and *santri* (strong Islamic tradition). The names of these features have also been

symbolic weapon to remove the long-standing prostitute complex in Pekalongan. Ayyash played an active and vital role in mobilizing support for the campaign by joining an anti-prostitution alliance involving local elite figures from various religious, social and political groups. As the result of wide support and constant efforts by various Islamic movements, the complex was finally closed down in 1999. The successful role played by Ayyash in the "Boyongsari project" placed him in a special position, both among local inhabitants and the general population of Pekalongan, particularly among Muslim activists. For the local inhabitants, he was seen as a local Muslim leader with courage, leadership, and networks; for outside Muslim activists, he was seen as a strong local resource and contact person for further *da'wa* and Islamic activism.

Following the successful networking and actions of the 'Boyongsari project', Ayyash took part in establishing the *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, the Islamic Defender Front) in Pekalongan.[13)] Like the Boyongsari project participated in by several Islamic groups, the same broad alliance joined in establishing the FPI in Pekalongan. By taking part in the FPI, his *movement identity* was transformed from

turned into acronym slogans – the city of Pekalongan with the slogan *BATIK* town and the district of Pekalongan as *SANTRI* town. *BATIK* is an acronym of *Bersih* (clean), *Aman* (safe), *Tertib* (well-ordered), *Indah* (beautiful) and *Komunikatif* (communicative). While *SANTRI* is an abbreviation of *Sehat* (healthy), *Aman* (safe), *Nyaman (*comfortable), *Tertib* (well-ordered), *Rapi* (neat) and *Indah* (beautiful).

13) Among FPI Pekalongan initiators were Ahmat Lutfi, an HMI activist who was a *Radar Pekalongan* journalist, *U*stad Mustaqim, Ustad Ibnu Soleh, Ustad Nugroho, and Ustad Tahirun. During the initial stages, they conducted extensive consultations with Pekalongan social and religious leaders, both those linked with civil society groups such as the traditionalist Nahdhatul Ulama and the modernist groups of Muhammadiyah and Al-Irsyad but also those who linked with Islamic political parties such as the PPP, PAN, PBB, and PK. The local FPI was founded and declared public at the end of 1999 in the Al Irsyad Meeting Hall in Pekalongan. In its first four years the FPI centered its activities at number 60 Bandung Street, the house of the late *ustadz* Gaffar Ismail, a well-known preacher and religious figure. The place functioned as the center of Islamic activities by different groups and organizations, including *Keluarga Besar PII* (Association of Alumni of PII). From information based on interviews with Abu Ayyash and other Muslim activists in Pekalongan, in December 2007.

a 'freelance' Muslim activist to an activist of the FPI, the notorious vigilante paramilitary group.[14)]

Compared to Awod and Ayyash, identity crisis was less significant in the narratives of Surahman. While his involvement with the PII in junior high school period seemed to happen relatively smoothly, some turbulence occurred later following internal tension within the PII that led him to conclude that PII was 'too liberal' in applying Islamic teachings. Although not clearly narrated, it seemed likely that he began to embrace a new perspective of Islamic teachings more radical than before; a sort of identity crisis followed by cognitive opening happened to him. Moving out from 'the young radical' PII he joined 'the more committed to true Islam' BKPMI.[15)] Surahman's trajectory resembles like that of Taufan who left the HMI and joined the Salafi (Chapter 4) and of Hendro who left HMI and eventually engaged with the JI (Chapter 5).

Unlike Awod and Ayyash, who had a special engagement with the dynamics of Islamic movements during the political transition, there was no such story in Surahman's narratives. Older than the two others (in 1998 he was 31 year-old, while Awod was 18 and Ayyash was 25), Surahman it appears became a somewhat established young preacher activist among the Islamic circles of Jakarta. He claimed to endorse the *reformasi* movements although he was not involved in any particular actions and movements. His critical turning point happened later in 2000, following a series of reports regarding the violent conflict in Maluku, which eventually led him to make the decision to join jihad in Maluku. Yet this took several steps.

When the religious conflict broke out in Maluku and the news of Muslim persecution was widely circulated in the media and other

14) For further readings on the FPI, see van Bruinessen (2002), Yunanto (2003), Jamhari and Jahroni (2004), Fealy (2004), and Jahroni (2008).

15) H. Abdullah Suad Lubis in a series of article 'Jalan Menuju Konflik Horisontal 6' alleged that the BKPMI had been accused of involvement in Imran's Komando Jihad group that hijacked a Garuda flight in 1981. The accusation was not substantiated. But he describes the increase of Islamic militant movements during the period, as reflected in the *Usroh's* movement. See http://wongpamulang.multiply.com/journal/item/169 (12 August 2010).

sources, Surahman became overwhelmed with feelings of solidarity with the *umma* (Muslim community). As a preacher, he expressed *moral emotions of solidarity* by choosing the conflict as one of the topics in his preachings and sermons. He even sometimes made the call for *jihad* to his audience. He recalled that when he gave a sermon during the *Idul Adha* prayer he talked about the misery of fellow Muslims in the Maluku conflict. While preaching and discussing the tragic violent incidents affecting Muslims in Maluku he admitted he often shed tears. Eventually his preachings and his calls for *jihad* echoed in his mind and led to a series of questions interrogating his own commitment for real actions such as: *What have you been doing to help your desperate fellow Muslims in Maluku? Why did you make the call for jihad for others but not for your self?*

Following a period of personal reflection, Surahman made the decision to join jihad. What happened to him and how to explain his decision to join jihad?

I argue that his decision to join jihad was an *act of identity*, a sort of response to *schismogenesis*, drastic changes in environment, which took place during the Indonesian transitional period, producing a deep crisis between the autobiographical self and identity. One of the most dramatic events during the period was the eruption of the 'religious war' in Ambon and Poso, Eastern Indonesia that led to 'moral shocks' producing *moral emotions of solidarity* and eventually leading to him to join jihad. By joining jihad he left behind a comfortable life as a preacher in the capital city of Jakarta to start a new life in the tiny remote town of Tual, Southeast Maluku. He was married with one small child at the time. His wife initially refused to join him there, but eventually followed him to Maluku. After staying about a month in Tual, she returned alone to Jakarta.

Surahman's story of becoming a jihadist sounds similar to the narrative of Dr. Fauzi who joined jihad through Laskar Jihad (Chapter 4). In his considered decision to join jihad Fauzi, a politician, distinguished between politicians (who talk a lot about jihad but never take action) and *agamawan* (who talk about jihad and simultaneously take action). While Fauzi's decision to join jihad was an *act*

of identity to resolve his crisis identity by transforming himself from 'politician' to *agamawan*, 'man of religion', in the case of Surahman we could say he transformed himself from 'jihad preacher' to 'jihad actor'. Yet the difference between the two was: Fauzi took part in the real combat during *jihad* while Surahman played his role exclusively in *da'wa* in Tual, Southeast Maluku, which was quite calm in the period. On the other hand, Fauzi spent only one month in the field while Surahman spent more than two years in the area before eventually deciding to stay on until the present.

A stronger case of 'moral shocks' was narrated by Awod after reading the news and watching the video of the massacre of hundreds of Muslims in Tobelo, North Maluku. He recalled that the news portrayed "how Muslims were severely attacked, murdered and tortured... thus they need our [help]." He also referred to the metaphor of the unity of Muslims as a single body, as the Prophet says, "If one part of the body hurts, the rest of the body will also suffer." So the moral shocks produced strong *moral emotions of solidarity* inducing Awod to take action: *jihad.* He was, furthermore, motivated to join jihad in Maluku after hearing that Muslims in Maluku were seriously in need and desperate since the Christian militias had almost reached and taken possession of the Al-Fatah mosque, the Muslim headquarters in Ambon—news that, was actually somewhat exaggerated. The way Awod responded to the news also reflected his status as a leader of an Islamic paramilitary group trained to fight and, therefore, with greater responsibility to take action to help fellow Muslims in desperate need. He, however, related a humble account of what he did in the *jihad*: "At least I was in Ambon and gave a hand, although just as one of the number [of people who were in fighting]…"

Awod's jihad can be seen as part of a series of *acts of identity* during the political transitional period as *schismogenesis*, a period of deep societal crisis. His first *act of identity* happened before the *reformasi* era, by shifting from a bad street boy to be a (better) Muslim starting with stopping drinking alcohol. He continued by abandoning all the *ma-lima*, the five kinds of moral misconduct, after joining the Brigade Hizbullah, an Islamic paramilitary group. His next *act*

of identity was his decision to join jihad, to participate in the Maluku religious conflict which he perceived as a holy religious war. Thus, his jihad participation can be seen as part of a series of efforts to resolve his identity crisis by establishing a new *movement identity* as a Muslim activist.

Yet, his journey to jihad in Ambon did not run smoothly. His mother, the main figure in his life, initially did not support his participation. Fortunately his father took a 'neutral' position, neither endorsing nor rejecting his decision. His Islamic activist fellows were also divided between pro and contra. He recalled some rhetorical questions from some of them: "Do you want to die? Do you want to surrender your only life?" Yet, although his mother disapproved and his friends discouraged him, Awod decided to follow the call of his conviction: "Every bullet bears the name of the person it will kill. We don't need to be afraid of death: our destiny has been written by God!" Awod portrayed himself as a passionate person: "I would get sick if I failed to do my will…" His mother eventually gave her permission after observing his determination. He was also still bachelor at that time which gave him more independence to make such a decision.

Other examples of 'moral shocks' were stunningly narrated by Jodi and Baghdad, two other jihadists of different social backgrounds: Jodi was a dropout scholarship student in the Netherlands while Baghdad was newly graduated from an Islamic college in Yogyakarta. Joining jihad in different areas in different periods (Jodi went to Afghanistan in 1991 while Baghdad went to Ambon in 1999-2000), the two experienced strong moral shocks which eventually led them to join jihad although they did not have any personal contacts in the area of jihad. In the case of Jodi, an ex PII activist in high school, the story began when he read a newsletter entitled *Afghan* shown him by his friend, an Indonesian who was studying in the Netherlands. He was shocked after reading the news and looking at the picture portraying how the Soviet Union troops had bombed a market in Afghanistan causing the death of many Muslims, including the elderly, women and children. Suddenly he thought, "it was intolerable ruthlessness!" while he felt a sort of guilt: "I had a nice

life in the Netherlands whereas many fellow Muslims in Afghanistan were living in misery." So, he thought that he had to take action, eventually deciding to join jihad in Afghanistan, even without knowing any people in the ground! There was, of course, a very long story behind his decision to join jihad, but in short: it happened against a background of 'identity crisis' after his failure to complete his bachelor degree in aeronautics in the Netherlands with a scholarship from Indonesian government.

A very different story was narrated by Baghdad, a young NU activist and graduate of the state Islamic college in Yogyakarta who was also a leader of Syadziliyah Qadiriyah Naqshabandiyah Sufism in Jagat Mulya (pseudonym) in East Java. Following news reports of the Ambon conflict, Baghdad experienced moral shocks: the conflict was very serious, many people had been killed, but there had been no adequate response. In addition to the news, he also claimed to receive mystical whispers and calls to go to Ambon to help solve the conflict. Baghdad said he had been told by his deceased grandfather and some *wali* (the saints) to make the trip to Ambon to take the name of Allah (he recalled reciting the name of God three times: "Allah, Allah, Allah"). He also formulated a rational reason for his jihad participation: to help resolve the conflict by giving feedback from the field to President Abdurrahman Wahid, the Indonesian President at the time who also an NU leader. With financial assistance from a circle of young NU activists in Yogyakarta he eventually went to Ambon. He met and joined with a young Ambonese, his brother's friend who had been studying in Surabaya and returned to help his family, in the port of Surabaya before the ship left for Ambon. Unlike Jodi, I failed to detect any sign of 'identity crisis' from Baghdad's narratives. The strongest driving force behind his decision to go to Ambon seemed to be the 'mystical call' and his passion for intelligence matters: to discover 'the real players' behind the conflict which he saw as being orchestrated by the pro-Soeharto forces.

Different from Awod, Jodi and Baghdad who were single, Ayyash was married with two children when the conflict erupted in Maluku. Yet a headline of the Islamic newspaper *Republika* on

the tragedy of Tobelo, North Maluku, passionately ignited 'moral shocks' in him. He even still roughly remembered the headline title, "Eight hundred Muslims massacred in one night". The news had, to quote Jasper (1998), "implie[d] a visceral, bodily feeling" which raised a strong sense of *moral emotions of solidarity* to take action: *jihad*. Portraying himself as a sentimental person who had no experience of using weapons in battle, Ayyash narrated that the news led him to profound reflect on moral responsibility: "what could we do for our fellow Muslims who were in such a tragic situation?" He thought that such a moral duty and responsibility would haunt him until his death if he did not take concrete action to help his fellow Muslims. He imagined that God would question him in his after life: "what were you doing when your Muslim fellows were in such a tragic situation?"

Yet, Ayyash was a husband and father of two small children at the time. In short, he did not have the "biographical availability" to join in 'high-risk' activism—to quote McAdam (1988). As a high-risk activist, joining the jihad movement to Ambon was, perhaps, a trip of no return. Most difficult of all was that his second son, Cheric Ayyash Ghanusi, was just a tiny baby, only months old. His wife, although wishing him to stay and take care of his family with two little children, let him make his own decision as head of the family—a reflection of the patriarchy tradition. After being troubled for several days over making such decision, at the last minute he eventually decided to join the jihad. It could be seen as *act of identity*, in the context of *schismogenesis* and identity crisis that had happened to him during the period, so that the action was made to resolve the deep crisis between his autobiographical self and identity as a Muslim—by referring to Marranci (2006, 2009). It could also be seen as one of the *epiphanies*, the turning point moments in life, "which leave marks on people's lives. In them, personal character is manifested. They are often moments of crisis. They alter the fundamental meaning structures in a person's life," as Denzin (1989: 70) argues. It can be seen as both: an *act of identity* through which he altered his life meaning structure: becoming a *jihadist* was seen as more

important than his duty and responsibility as a husband and a father of two little kids.

He related the touching story of his departure for jihad: it was about midnight when he began left his home, leaving behind his lovely wife and two beloved kids. His heart was trembling as tears fell heavily from his eyes. Yet he had confidence in his decision: to journey towards jihad in the path of Islam! Thus, it was a midnight journey for jihad!

The narratives of jihad experiences

Before presenting the life story narratives of the *political* jihadi trio, I will give a brief summary of their participation in the jihad movement (see Table II in the appendices). All of them went to Ambon-Maluku; two of them returning home, namely Awod Umar and Abu Ayyash, while Surahman stayed on in Ambon until the present. Both Awod and Ayyash spent less than one year in Maluku: six months for Awod and four months for Ayyash. During the jihad period Awod was based in Ambon, although he made some trips to some other places including Saparua Island. On the other hand, Ayyash was posted to Ceram Island whereas Surahman was assigned to stay in Tual, Southeast Maluku. Awod mainly had a combat role: staying and safeguarding the border between Muslim and Christian areas, taking part in battles, and providing training to local militia. Ayyash' duty was mainly to provide education programs for children while Surahman's job was *da'wa* activities. Although the informants had a variety of roles and experiences as well as period and duration of jihad, they shared 'radical experiences' which informed their later lives. The 'radical experiences' were the consequence of their involvement in a violent conflict situation as well as in jihad activism.

I will show briefly through the life story narratives below, how their different kinds of jihad experiences have become 'a pivotal event' in their lives by creating a new *movement identity* as a jihad

activist and marking their lives with the 'signpost' - "after jihad"—which becomes their credential for their later life trajectories as political activists.

- ***Awod: the fighter jihadist***

Awod said that he went to Maluku alone, financing himself, after feeling disappointed with the complicated bureaucracy of mobilization for the jihad. He joined KOMPAK later after arriving in Ambon. He also said that he arrived in Ambon not long after the attack and burning of the Pattimura University in July 2000. So it was a period of high tension in the conflict when a state of civil emergency had been declared on 22 June 2000 following the destruction and Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) headquarters and armory storage in Tantui. It was also a period with plenty of clashes and attacks by Muslim militia on Christians following the arrival of thousands of Laskar Jihad troops in Ambon since May-June (Azca 2003).

From his early days in Ambon Awod was posted in the Air Kuning ward, the frontier of the Christian area, where many local Muslims had chosen to leave the area. He said that in the beginning only a few people dared to stay on but later many more people joined them. During the interview he expressed his feelings of relief and happiness at the warm welcome shown him in Ambon by local Muslims. "I felt I had a very nice life when I was there because my presence was useful to many people. For instance, I contributed to the revitalization of the Air Kuning ward by staying there [when many people had left]."[16] His narrative was colored by a sense of pride and significance for his bravery to stay living on the border, revitalizing the abandoned area of Air Kuning.

Awod also told of his meaningful experience of helping a child who had been shot in battle in Ambon. Because the boy was severely

16) It was not clear if the place was the JI House as mentioned by ICG (2005c). The KOMPAK's office was located in Waihong, and Awod narrated that he had been there before coming to Air Kuning.

bleeding and needed emergency medical treatment, he carried him from the location to a village about 4-5 hours away. "It was one of my most meaningful experiences in Ambon," he said. Although being based in Ambon, Awod took part in some battles outside the Island, including Saparua Island, a predominantly Christian location where Muslims were badly attacked. He said that he spent about two months in Saparua. He also said that he took part in some battles together with Umar Al-Faruk, the notorious alleged Al Qaeda member, and his father-in-law, Haris Fadillah alias Abu Dzar, the commander of *Laskar Mujahidin*. He also claimed to take part in the battle when Abu Dzar was killed in the Siri-sori village of Saparua in 2000.[17] As the consequence of his bravery and his participation in several battles, many local people, including women, praised him and even served his daily needs such as cooking his meals and washing his clothes.

Another meaningful experience was his story of inability to provide help in battle. Awod explained that he had joined a militia group who had come from Ambon to provide support to Muslims in the Ihamahu village in Saparua. There was a rumor that Muslims in the village would be massacred on 25 December 2000, a repeat in memory of the massively violent incident in Tobelo, North Maluku, which had taken place one year earlier. On their way to Ihamahu they had to pass through Christian villages. However, they failed to get through when the local Christian militia blocked them so they then retreated. Awod narrated that one member of the group had brought a walkie-talkie handheld transceiver so that they could communicate with the Ihamahu Muslims who were sheltering in a local mosque. The news from Ihamahu was frightening: "Please help us, or else we'll be killed like in Tobelo…" Awod said that he and the other Muslims were very sad because they could not do anything.

Besides taking part in battle, he also played the role of trainer on paramilitary training for local militia. As the leader of the Brigade Hizbullah Solo who had been trained in paramilitary training, his

17) According to ICG (2002: 19, footnote 85) the death of Abu Dzar was recorded and produced in a VCD made by the Solo branch of KOMPAK under Aris Munandar. The battle took place on 26 October 2000.

presence in Maluku was useful and helpful for the local militia. Yet, in between combat and training, Awod also spent time enjoying the natural beauty of Maluku by travelling, swimming and hunting in remote areas. When I asked him to reflect on his jihad period in Maluku, he said "it was a period of life which was very nice, meaningful, and precious. It was short but rich with meaningful experiences: combat, hunting, travelling…" (Awod, interview, Solo, 6/12/2007) He also said that as a heavy smoker he continued to smoke even in battle. He told that there was a break in the midst of battle when some smokers were hanging out, including the son of Abu Dzar, the brother-in-law of Umar Al-Faruk.

In his stories, Awod narrated the 'radical experience' of his jihad participation in some violent conflict situations: staying on the frontier of conflict and taking part in battle. Yet, besides the narratives filled with terror, horror, and fear during jihad, he also spoke of his feelings of pride, honor, satisfaction and usefulness during his jihad participation. Interestingly, he also said that jihad participation included fun and joy, such as when travelling, swimming, and hunting in the forest. The way he told his stories seemed to me to reflect his memories of jihad participation as moments of joy and pride rather than episodes of fear and terror. For me, it reflects both his previous trajectory as a bad street boy and his later trajectory as the leader of an Islamic paramilitary group with the reputation of bravery.

- ***Ayyash: the teacher jihadist***

Ayyash joined jihad in Maluku in 2001 with a group of six FPI activists from Pekalongan through KOMPAK. During the interviews, he said that they did not use particular symbols and banners for jihad mobilization. Yet it was certain that Said Sungkar, a senior FPI Pekalongan member, played an important role in helping them to go to Maluku to join the jihad. He also said that Sungkar went back and forth to Maluku several times to send logistics and accompany the jihadists. Spending four months in Maluku, Ayyash was

posted in quite a remote area of the western part of Ceram Island given the main responsibility of education, especially for children.

So his jihad narrative was quite in contrast to Awod. Instead of taking part in clashes or other paramilitary training activities, most of his narratives were about religious activities, *da'wa*, and particularly children's education programs. Of course, during his stay in Ceram Island, the atmosphere of violent conflict was still high and tense. He stayed in a Muslim village named Tanah Koyang, which was on the border with the Christian village Aryati but separated by two villages which had been damaged due to conflict and abandoned by their inhabitants. One of his narratives of conflict was the Christians' attack on his village. It was during the fasting month of Ramadhan, so that the Muslims were resting after *fajr* when some Christian militia entered the village. After reports were received from some farmers that the 'enemy' had penetrated into the area people were mobilized and a clash followed.

Yet most of Ayyash's stories were about religious activities such as *tadarrus* (Al Qur'an recitation), *tausiyah* (religious preaching), and collective prayer. When I asked him about his most meaningful experience during his jihad period, he told stories of holding education programs for local children. The fact that Ayyash had left his two infant children far away in Pekalongan seemed likely to have colored his feelings and emotions during his jihad period. One of his most interesting stories was close and intimate relationship with local children. It was also a meaningful period which left its mark in his life by his taking on the alias: Abu Ayyash, meaning the father of Ayyash, his second child.

Interestingly, his first impression after arrival was of strong mystical traditions in the area. He gave the example, that during Ramadhan when the fast is broken when it turns dark, the locals instead just come inside, close the door and windows and then start breaking the fasting. He also identified some local customs 'contaminated' by Christian culture such as, having dancing parties at night and liquor parties after *takbiran* (celebrating *Idul Fitri*). His observations led

him to jump to the conclusion that "perhaps, the eruption of conflict is a warning from God to them."

After finding such strong evidence of syncretism among the local people, he focused his activities on trying to make the local kids feel closer to the mosque through story telling. For example, he held frequent story telling sessions on the history of the prophets, their close companions, and their struggle to establish Islamic society. He also spoke to them about how wonderful heaven was and how frightening was hell. His warm enjoyable approach seemed to be successful in winning the hearts and minds of the children. Feeling attracted by his stories and story-telling sessions, some children even joined him sleeping in the local mosque. He told them many stories before bedtime. An extract follows from his narrative (Ayyash, interview, Pekalongan, 18/12/2007):

> We tried to bring Islamic values close to the language and symbolic world of children. At dawn, after the *fajr* prayer, we trained them to march while singing *nasyid* to keep their Islamic spirit burning. *I felt being really part of them.* Then, in the middle of the day, after returning from school, even before removing their school uniform, some already came to us, asking for play and fun. Sometimes we made a trip to the forest, searching for birds or just playing with them.

How close and intimate his relationship with the local kids was reflected in their response when Ayyash was ordered to move to another place. They got upset and protested to his *mas'ul* (leader) asking Ayyash to be returned to them. "I was so surprised when I learned that the kids had held a *demo* asking me to be sent back to them," he recalled the event trembling. Unfortunately, the order remained unchanged so Ayyash had to go to his new assignment up in the hills one late afternoon. Here is an excerpt from the narrative (Ayyash, interview, Pekalongan, 18/12/2007):

> As I walked to the forest the kids were escorting me, one of them was hanging on my shoulder, others were in the front of or behind me holding my shirt. When I began to enter the forest, some of the kids released me with tears. I could not bear my own

> feelings of sadness. They were still standing there watching my steps as I entered the forest…

After spending four months[18] in Maluku, mostly in the West Ceram area, he went back to Pekalongan. Before leaving the area, he met the kids for a farewell occasion. He claimed that by that time the kids were already tougher and more ready to say goodbye. He said that he had tried to convince them that it was not their last meeting. "We will meet again, *insya Allah*. If not here, we will meet again in heaven if you are all good and practice *ibadah* regularly…" The kids replied humorously: "Hurrah, we going to heaven!"

Although quite contrast to Awod's narrative, Ayyash also had 'radical experiences' from being in the land of jihad, experiencing a deep and profound relationship with the children from the conflict area. It became a 'pivotal event' which shaped his life in the post-jihad period, as I will discuss in the next section.

- ***Surahman: the preacher jihadist***

Surahman joined jihad through PKPU (*Posko Keadilan Peduli Umat*, the Justice Command Post for Caring for the *Umma)*, a humanitarian unit of the Tarbiyah movement, linked to the Partai Keadilan (PK, the Justice Party) which later became the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, the Prosperous Justice Party). His reason for joining jihad through the PKPU was because it was a group with programs of sending *da'wa* activists to the land of jihad. Another of his reasons was that the PKPU had developed a network with the Institute *Khairu Ummah*[19] where he had been previously affiliated.

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18) He said that he had a sort of 'contract' to join jihad for four months. It was the standard period for married persons in the network he joined. Other networks may have applied different periods.

19) Kotarumalos (2007: 90) suggests that *Khairu Ummah* was a proxy of PK which was founded in 1989 by several *tarbiyah* activists such as Yusuf Supendi, Muklis Abdi, Abdul Muadz, Rosihan Anwar dan Rahmat Santoso. They were preachers who frequently gave sermons on campus. Some of them were Middle East alumni, while others were IAIN and LIPIA graduates. Their preaching activities spread as far as Jakarta, East Kalimatan, Riau, NTT and Papua.

Unlike Awod and Ayyash, his jihad trip to Maluku was relatively well managed and well prepared. He had a three-month contract as a *da'i* with the PKPU and received a monthly salary. He went to Maluku in September 2000 in a group of seven persons who were later distributed to different areas. He was assigned by the PKPU to a post in Tual, a small town far from the capital city of Southeast Maluku, together with another jihad fellow. Tual was in a remote area part of the Kei Islands, located far from Ambon and closer to Papua. The conflict that occurred in Tual in March 1999 resulted in about 200 being killed and tens of thousands fleeing. It stopped after three months. ICG (2007b: 1-2) suggest that the conflict resolved quickly because "the area was relatively homogeneous ethnically and strong customary (*adat*) mechanisms bridged the religious divide." So when Surahman went to the area in late 2000 the situation had returned to normal: it was no longer a story of conflict and violence.

Coming to the land of conflict with his wife was not a simple matter for Surahman. When they had just arrived in Ambon in September 2000, the atmosphere of conflict was quite high and his wife began to worry and frequently broke into tears. When they then moved to Tual, a remote and quiet place, another problem emerged: his wife felt lonely especially when Surahman went out preaching or giving sermons. One of the major difficulties of working as a preacher in an area like Tual was the distances between the various places of *da'wa.* Surahman gave an example. If he went from Tual to Banda Eli, a place located in *Kei Besar,* he had to wait five days before the next boat could bring him back. After trying to live for a month of loneliness in Tual, his wife decided to return alone to Jakarta, prompted also by news that their only child was sick in Jakarta.

As a man who liked travelling, Surahman enjoyed his time in Tual. He had some challenging experiences, include the 'little' accident of falling from a boat during a storm in the middle of the sea. Luckily, he was okay and did not think much of this. His major concern was when he had to miss a prayer when he was traveling to a remote area. He gave the example of a mosque in Aru Island, which was only used once a week for Friday prayers.

When I asked him about his most meaningful experience while doing jihad in Maluku, he answered "I felt my soul was satisfied" (*kepuasan hati)*. Here follows an extract from his narrative (Surahman, interview, Ambon, 4/5/2008):

> When I was in Jakarta I got some decent money every time I preached, but I didn't feel the same. You can't get such *angpao* [money in envelope] here. Yet even though the place [for *da'wa*] is far, my sould feels so satisfied, so calm. It means that I have done a lot for many people. When I was in Jakarta, it was money-oriented *da'wa.* It was not right, it affected our sincerity

Although his jihad narrative seemed 'less radical' compared to Awod and Ayyash, his life trajectory in the post-jihad period suggests the opposite: he decided to go back to Maluku only few months after completing his duty in the area and then stayed on. So his jihad experience has become a 'pivotal event' shaping his life trajectory in meaningful ways: from metropolitan preacher to local preacher, eventually, becoming a local politician, as I will discuss in the next section.

The 'after jihad' narratives

In this section I will present and discuss the after jihad narratives of the *political jihadist* trio. As mentioned earlier, in different ways all of them were involved in the (new) dynamic of local politics in the post-jihad period. In the case of Awod Umar, he continued to engage in politics through the Brigade Hizbullah, the paramilitary group affiliated with the PBB Islamic party. However, he also played a critical role in local politics through his *extended-networks*, such as an alliance of Islamist movements in Solo as well as a local NGO working on legal issues. In the case of Abu Ayyash, he became engaged in local politics through his FPI leadership by giving political endorsement during the election for mayor in Pekalongan in 2005. Later he joined in a mass protest against local government policy on street vendors through a Pekalongan association of street vendors. In

the case of Surahman, he became involved in local politics in Maluku following his appointment as one of the leaders of PKS Maluku in 2004. He also successfully arranged a political coalition in Tual which led to the election of the PKS candidate as vice district head during the local elections.

I argue that jihad experience influences the life trajectory of the actors in combination with two other main factors, namely, their personal background and profile, and their engagement with different social networks prior, during and after their jihad participation. As discussed previously in Chapter 2, I distinguish three different kinds of social networks associated with the post-jihadists, namely: the *core-network*, a network through which they join jihad; the *tactical-network*, a network of jihadist networks which occurs temporarily during the jihad period; and the *extended-network*, an extension of networks which develop in the aftermath of jihad. I use the concept of social network with two meanings: first, the social network as the link between concrete actors through specific ties as articulated by a 'realist' view; and second, social networks as "phenomenological realities" and "networks of meaning" as suggested by phenomenologist, such as White (Diani 2003: 6; Passy 2003: 27).

I furthermore argue that the *core-network*, the network through which jihadists join the jihad, is the key network which acts as the 'ideological network' for the jihadists. In the case of the *political* post-jihadists trio they each had different *core-networks*, namely the Brigade Hizbullah for Awod, the FPI for Ayyash and the Tarbiyah movement for Surahman. However, as a consequence of their *multiple affiliations* patterns of membership, their relationship with the *core-network* was relatively less strong than the *pious* and the *jihadi* activists who had *exclusive affiliation.* This distinction between *exclusive affiliation* and *multiple affiliations* follows the framework argued by Della Porta and Diani (1999: 119-20). In the cases of the *political* post-jihadists, I contend that the dynamics of *extended-networks* played an important role in shaping their life trajectory in the post-jihad period.

I also argue that jihad experience brought the *political*-jihadists meaningful credentials in the post-jihad period. Participation in 'high-risk' jihad activism has enhanced the credibility of their *movement identity* as Muslim activists both within the *core-network* and their *extended-networks*. As I will show in the next section, the *political* jihadist trio each climbed their activism career ladder in the post-jihad period: Surahman was appointed as vice chairman of PKS Maluku from 2004, Abu Ayyash was elected chairman of the FPI Pekalongan for two consecutive periods (2005-2010 and 2010-2015), and Awod Umar was recently elected as the chairman of the PBB Solo in 2009.

- ***Awod: the paramilitary leader and the paralegal***

The main thread of Awod's narratives in the post-jihad period is the combination between his political party activism, particularly as the leader of the Brigade Hizbullah, and his involvement at the KBH (*Kantor Bantuan Hukum,* Legal Aid Office) *Supremasi*, a local NGO working on legal issues. As I have argued, his participation in 'high-risk' activism of jihad has brought him meaningful credentials as a political activist and leader of a paramilitary group, both within and outside his own party. In short, in the post-jihad period his *movement identity* and social reputation as a Muslim activist has developed beyond his *core-network*, the Brigade Hizbullah and PBB, and gained prominence among Muslim activists in Solo. Interestingly, however, his image and reputation as a Muslim activist has not hindered him from crossing the boundary of his religious identity as indicated by his involvement in a local legal aid NGO led by a Christian lawyer. For Awod, cooperation with non-Muslims is acceptable as long as it can help to achieve common goal: social justice! On the other hand, he still believes that *syari'a* also leads in the same direction as reflected in his sustained commitment as a PBB activist.

I will present my argument on the link between jihad experience, social background, social networks and life trajectory by discussing Awod's life story narrative in the post-jihad period in four

episodes. *First*, he consolidated his *movement identity* and leadership within his *core-network* of Brigade Hizbullah by mobilizing and facilitating his fellow Muslims to join jihad. *Second*, he extended his social network by taking a leading role in 'sweeping operations' conducted by an alliance of Muslim militia in Solo under the banner of *Koalisi Umat Islam Surakarta* (KUIS, Coalition of Muslim Communities in Surakarta[20]). *Third*, he extended his social network by taking part in anti-corruption movements in Sukoharjo, which eventually led to his involvement in the KBH *Supremasi*. *Fourth*, he extended his social network by giving political endorsement toward the 'secular candidate' during the mayor election in Solo in 2005.

Episode One: Mobilizing Fellows to join Jihad

After spending six months in jihad in Maluku in 2000, Awod returned to Solo, sharing his narratives of meaningful experiences in jihad to his fellow Brigade Hizbullah members and persuading them to follow his trajectory. As the Brigade Hizbullah leader he successfully persuaded some of them and facilitated nine members to join jihad in Maluku. Most of them joined the jihad through KOMPAK, except one who joined through Laskar Jihad, due to a lack of resources. "What was most important was being able to join jihad; it was not a big issue through which network they joined," he explained. His reason for mobilizing his fellows, interestingly, sounded personal rather than heroic. "I had meaningful experiences there because I had been very useful to many people; it was such a pleasant feeling. When I came back to Solo, I persuaded my fellows to join jihad because I didn't want them to miss such a wonderful opportunity…"

Awod's narrative of jihad was confirmed by Udin and Muslih, two Brigade Hizbullah activists who joined jihad in Maluku following Awod. I met them in Awod's rental house which was also the office of KBH Supremasi during my fieldwork. Udin was Awod's close

20) Surakarta is more familiarly known as Solo, the name Surakarta however is often used in formal and official documents to refer to this same city in Central Java.

friend who also joined in *Supremasi*. Although Awod and his fellows did not join jihad in the same period, they shared the same meaningful experience of jihad which eventually tied them in a strong bond of Islamic activism. Awod's tie to the *core-network* became stronger following his marriage with a female PBB in 2001/2002. I contend it was a critical period of his consolidation with his *core-network*, especially within the Brigade Hizbullah.

Episode Two: Commanding a 'Sweeping operation' and Being a Prisoner

Besides his position as leader of the Brigade Hizbullah, Awod's status as 'an Ambon alumnus' raised his reputation as a Muslim activist in Solo. He also became involved in the DDII as a functionary in the department of youth and in the MMI as a functionary in the training department of the paramilitary division of the Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia.

He also frequently participated in collective actions held by the alliance of Islamic movements in Solo. In the fasting month of Ramadhan in 2005 he was appointed to lead a sweeping operation conducted by KUIS, an alliance of Islamic militias in Solo. The target of the operation was the Warudoyong café located in Solo Baru, Sukoharjo. He explained it had been identified as a target for selling liquor during Ramadhan despite a major public call (*himbauan)* from Islamic leaders not to sell liquor during Ramadhan as the gesture of respect toward Muslims in Solo. Unfortunately, the action led to a riot where a man wearing a PDI-P T-shirt was badly attacked by some of the over 400 strong mob. The incident was shot and broadcast on the national TV station *Metro* and the incident soon became politicized.

Awod, as the leader of the action, and two other coordinators were arrested by the police and the case was brought to court. During the approximately one month-long trial Awod was held in police custody. The judge found him guilty but gave him a light sentence: six months probation (*hukuman percobaan)*. Instead of discouraging him, the case encouraged him to become further involved in Is-

lamic movements. He explained that during the trial process he felt that God had helped him by reducing his sentence. He mentioned that two of the five prosecution witnesses were not able to appear in court; one fell sick and had to go to Jakarta for treatment, another died in a traffic incident on the way to court. For him it was a sign that he was on the right side and God was on his side. "I was treated unjustly [by the police] and God's power helped me: making the impossible become possible…"

He also said that he had a good time in custody: "it was just like a vacation," he said smiling recalling the incident in the interview. Here is an extract from his narrative on his term in jail (Interview, Solo, 15/11/2007):

> There were many stressed people in custody; some of them felt sad and regretful over their own wrongdoings, some of them felt victimized and treated unjustly. In such situation, I usually attempted to help them by chatting with them to prevent them having negative thoughts, or, even worse, actions. It was my duty as a Muslim to conduct *da'wa* there. So, I persuaded those who were not praying to start praying; I taught those who were not able to read the Al-Qur'an …And I am still in touch with some of them until now.

So, instead of a cell in hell, it sounded that Awod's time in custody was another form of Islamic activism. Even more so, during his term in custody a new idea of social activism blossomed. Following a series of discussions with other detainees, including a university professor who had been jailed for corruption, the new idea developed to establish a social foundation protecting the rights of prisoners. Although the foundation had not yet been established at the time of the interviews, it was agreed it would be named: *Yayasan Pijar Anak Bangsa* (The Citizen's Flame Foundation).

Thus, I contend that Awod's short period in custody was a meaningful period for two reasons: on the one hand, it has enhanced his credibility as a Muslim activist among Islamist movements, and on the other hand, it was a fruitful opportunity to develop his *extended-network*.

Episode Three: Taking Part in the Anti-Corruption Movement

In addition to his growing reputation as a Muslim activist, Awod has not limited his social network to merely Islamist groups. This was evident in his involvement in the anti-corruption movement in Sukoharjo. He became involved on hearing of the threat made towards the leader of the movement, Bares Lamhot, a lawyer and local NGO leader. Lamhot is a Christian lawyer who has long been engaged with community advocacy issues, previously with the well-known progressive NGO named PADMA (*Pusat Advokasi Masyarakat*, Center of Community Advocacy). Lamhot was threatened by a group of local *preman*, allegedly linked with the subdistrict head for his role in the anti-corruption movement and was coerced to end the movement. Lamhot did not give up but looked instead for wider moral support and 'protection'.

One of Lamhot's friends contacted Awod as the leader of the Brigade Hizbullah, told him the story and asked for help (Interview Heri Varia, Solo, 10/2007). Awod agreed and demonstrated his moral and political support by taking part in a mass rally conducted by Lamhot and his networks. Awod and his Hizbullah fellows did not only provide moral support but displayed their 'power' by joining the action riding in the special Brigade Hizbullah open jeep The clear message was sent to the public: Brigade Hizbullah was supporting Lamhot and friends, so anyone threatening violence should beware. The message worked: the threats against Lamhot ceased and the corruption case ended in victory for the anti-corruption movement: the public money that had been embezzled was returned to the public funds (Interview Lamhot, Solo, 4/2008).

Following the case, the relationship between Awod and Lamhot grew closer. Lamhot invited Awod and his friends to join his NGO, the KBH *Supremasi*, working on legal aid issues. Awod eventually decided to join, together with some other members of the Brigade Hizbullah. Since they were not legally trained, they worked as paralegal volunteers. From 2006 Awod was appointed as the NGO's

coordinator of volunteers for Solo and the surroundings, include Boyolali, Karanganyar, Sragen and Sukoharjo. As a legal aid NGO, *Supremasi* provides legal aid and associated legal assistance largely to the poor.

The involvement of Awod, the leader of the quite notorious Brigade Hizbullah, in a local NGO led by a Christian lawyer, raised some questions which I confronted him with during the interview: "Did you have any protests or complaints from other Muslim activists?"

He replied by asking another question: "What's wrong? What's odd? I don't see anything odd…" Here follows his arguments (Interview, Solo, 15/11/2007):

> …because we are doing *muamalah* (human relations), it's nothing to do with *aqidah* (theology). When we do *muamalah,* we are free to do business with anybody, that's my contention. I have explained to some friends with common sense and objective reasoning: I know Bares is somebody who is concerned with social issues (*kesosialan);* that's how it is.

Awod made an interesting and clear distinction between *muamalah* and *aqidah* in this case. Thus, for him, there is no prohibition for doing *muamalah* with people from different religions. It is an inclusive way of thinking since the domain of *muamalah* is very wide; it could cover anything except things that are classified as the domain of *aqidah.* Such an inclusive way of thinking facilitates the further development of his *extended-network* as reflected in his political choice and behavior in the next episode.

Episode Four: Endorsing the Secular Candidate

Awod demonstrated such flexibility during the election of the Solo Mayor in 2005. PBB, his party, had made a coalition with the National Mandate Party (PAN) to endorse the candidacy of Ahmad Purnomo and Istar Yuliadi. Interestingly, Awod and his Hizbullah fellows took a different stance: endorsing the candidacy of Joko Widodo and Hady Rudiyatmo, the pair who had been nominated

by the nationalist-secular party PDIP (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan*, the Indonesia and supported by the PKB. He presented a pragmatic rather than idealistic reason for the choice: based on political calculations in Solo, the coalition with the PDI-P as the biggest party was crucial to achieve political victory. On the other hand, he also admitted to being interested in the figure of Joko Widodo who was non-partisan, clean and professional.[21] Another important factor, although not mentioned by Awod, was the 'Heri Varia factor', the consultant of Joko Widodo during the campaign. [22]

Awod's political calculations were eventually proven to be true: Joko and Rudy were elected as Mayor and the Deputy Mayor of Solo for 2005-2010.[23] The victory of their candidates, however, did not seem to result in many apparent political or economic benefits in the life style of Awod and friends. Varia also eventually resigned from his position as special-staff of the new Mayor Joko Widodo, which meant loss of access to the top person of Solo.

Awod's story indicated his open-minded and pragmatic approach as a politician. He also had the courage to make the political choice to oppose the policy taken by party leadership. Through his actions he developed further his *extended-network.* The fact that he was not punished by the PBB for his political rebellion indicated at least two things: he played politics in a smart way and he had strong political support from the stronghold of the party, especially from the Brigade Hizbullah, his *core-network*. Probably these two factors eventually led him to be elected as the chairman of PBB Solo in 2009.[24]

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21) The Joko Widodo leadership was widely appreciated by the public, as reflected in his election as one of the smart and clean Heads of District by Tempo Magazine in a special edition in 2008: "10 Men of the Year 2008."

22) Through his personal approach, Varia persuaded Awod and his fellows to give support to Joko Widodo during the election. He also provided Awod personal access to Joko. Conversations with Heri Varia and Awod Umar, Solo, November 2007.

23) Joko-Rudy were elected as the Solo Mayor and Deputy Mayor after being voted by 99,747 people, followed by Purnomo-Istar by 79,213 votes. See: http://us.detiknews.com/index.php/detik.read/tahun/2005/bulan/06/tgl/28/time/061803/idnews/391254/idkanal/10 (14 August 2010).

24) In the Mayor Election in 2010, the PBB under Awod's leadership joined a coalition of small parties to support Eddy S Wirabhumi-Supradi Kertamenawi who were nomi-

• ***Abu Ayyash: the militia leader and the poet***

The 'after jihad' life of Abu Ayyash in certain way appears somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, his reputation as a Muslim activist has been prominent, especially following his role as the acting chairman of the FPI Pekalongan executive body in 2003, followed by his election for 2005-2010 and his recent reelection for 2010-2015. As the FPI Chairman, his name often appeared in the media, especially the new local newspaper *Radar Pekalongan.* He became a local celebrity. However, on the other hand, his economic life deteriorated, particularly following the sudden closure of his street stall selling *getuk goreng* in early 2007 due to the change of local government policy regarding street vendor management. He and his family live in an old house mostly constructed from weakened and rotten timber and bamboo located in a former slum area of Boyongsari. It looked a bit better when I made the last visit in late 2009: the front side of the house had been partially renovated and rebuilt from cement blocks. Ayyash said that it had been done by the social program of *bedah rumah (*fix the house*).*

His poor economic conditions did not prevent him from having a colorful and energetic social and religious life. He is a person with strong passions when it comes to religion. He stood up to defend the FPI when it was blamed and some groups even asked for its disbandment following the violent incident involving the attack by some FPI activists of some members of the Bhineka Tunggal Ika Alliance on 1 June 2008 in Monas Square, Jakarta.[25)] He also commanded a "security sweeping operation" action by the FPI toward a shop and liquor storage in Batang in 2008 which led to a violent incident. As a result, he and other two FPI activists were brought to court

nated by the Democrats Party and endorsed by Golkar. The election won unanimously by the incumbent Joko Widodo-Rudy with 90.09 percent of the vote. See the news at : http://cetak.kompas.com/read/xml/2010/05/21/03402631/kemenangan.fenomenal.jokowi-rudy (21-5-10).

25) A group of Islamic organizations in Pekalongan, mainly from the NU camp, organized a mass action to express their desire to disband the FPI following its violent action in Jakarta. See *Suara Merdeka, 6 June 2008, Ormas Islam Pekalongan Minta FPI Dibubarkan.*

and sentenced to six months jail (*Radar Pekalongan,* 28/8/2009). Being jailed did not stop him from conducting *da'wa.* He successfully converted his fellow prisoners from *aliran kepercayaan* (Javanese mysticism) to devout Muslims and taught them to read Al Qur'an. When he and his fellows were released from jail, FPI activists greeted and cheered them as heroes.

I will present my argument on the link between jihad experience, social background, social networks and life trajectory by discussing Ayyash's life story narrative in the post-jihad period in five episodes. *First,* was the early period immediately after his jihad participation until his election as the acting chairman of FPI Pekalongan. *Second,* was the period of his early engagement in local politics through FPUIS by endorsing the candidacy of Basyir Achmad-Abu Almafachir in the 2005 Mayor election. *Third,* was the period in 2007 when he became the 'victim' of a local change in policy regarding street vendors and he joined a mass protest against the policy. *Fourth* was the period when he led a security sweep of a liquor shop and storage in Batang which eventually brought him to jail. *Fifth* was the period after his release from prison.

Episode One: Becoming the FPI Leader

On his return from Maluku to Pekalongan, Ayyash continued his activism with the FPI Pekalongan. Besides a number of stories of his engagement with the jihad movement in West Ceram, he also bore a new identity after his jihad period: the alias Abu Ayyash—meaning the father of Ayyash, his second child who was just a few months old when he left for jihad. It was a new chapter in his life: as the more committed Muslim activist Abu Ayyash. Many more people began to forget his original name: Slamet Budiono and nickname Nano. In addition to the FPI, Ayyash was also involved in the PPMI (*Perhimpunan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia),* an Islamic labor movement led by Egy Sudjana.

There were five other FPI activists from Pekalongan who joined jihad in the same cohort as Ayyash. As the consequence of their shared jihad experiences, they developed strong emotional bonds among them and have became the core activists of FPI Pekalongan, together with Said Sungkar, a senior FPI member and the chairman of the FPI Pekalongan advisory board (*dewan syura)* in 2005-2010. During the conflict period, Sungkar had been actively involved in mobilizing Islamic activists to join jihad in Maluku and Poso. Sungkar is one of the founders of FPI Pekalongan, and is a leading ideologue and a key FPI hub to wider Islamist networks as briefly discussed in Chapter 3.

Following internal troubles due to the previous chairman, *ustadz* Nugroho, being unable to carry out his functions properly, Ayyash was elected as the acting chairman of FPI Pekalongan in 2003. It is interesting to notice that Abu Ayyash, a modest man and only a high school graduate, was elected as the FPI Pekalongan leader. The fact that he was then officially elected as its chairman of FPI in 2005 and reelected for the next term of 2010-2015 indicated that his leadership was seen as quite successful. As is the case of Awod, I contend that Ayyash's participation in jihad in Maluku and his status as a 'Maluku alumnus' gave him credentials for his leadership role in the FPI. After assuming and consolidating his leadership in the FPI, Ayyash expanded his role by becoming involved in the dynamics of local politics.

Episode Two: Playing A Role in Local Politics

Ayyash began to become involved in local politics through the FSUI (*Forum Silaturahmi Umat Islam,* Communication Forum of Muslim Community) Pekalongan, a network of a number of Islamic groups in Pekalongan including the Nahdhatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Al Irsyad, HMI, PII and FPI. Prior to the 2005 mayoral election in Pekalongan, FSUI held a discussion regarding Muslim politics in Pekalongan. They came to the conclusion that the Muslim community should be actively engaged in the election through the

FSUI. Following a series of discussions and debates, include some '*fit and proper test'* sessions by inviting the prospective candidates. The FSUI eventually decided to endorse the candidacy of Basyir Ahmad-Abu Almafachir; Ahmad was the chairman of the Golkar party Pekalongan while Almafachir was the chairman of NU Pekalongan. Besides being a medical doctor of Arabic descent, Ahmad is also an Islamist activist and the former chairman of Al Irsyad Pekalongan. Following the endorsement decision, some FSUI activists were involved in campaigning for these candidates during the election which ended in their successful election: Ahmad-Almafachir elected as Mayor-Deputy Mayor of Pekalongan in 2005.

What was interesting behind this successful political project was that the FSUI was initiated and mainly driven by young Muslim activists, including Aris Kurniawan, Muhammad Isrizal, and Ayyash himself. Both Kurniawan and Isrizal were former PII activists and they then become the leader of the alumni association of PII (KB-PII) Pekalongan. Aris Kurniawan, the chairman of PII Pekalongan in 1987-89, took the position of FSUI secretary until recently. Since the FSUI leadership was managed through a presidium, the role of secretary was crucial in driving the dynamics and direction of the organization. It was through this network of young Muslim activists that Ayyash began to engage with the dynamics of local politics in Pekalongan. The close relationship between Ayyash and Kurniawan developed since 1999 when the FPI Pekalongan had just been founded and the KB-PII gave space for the FPI to have an office at 66 Bandung Street Pekalongan, where both the PII and KB-PII were based. Kurniawan then became a PAN activist and was elected as secretary of PAN Pekalongan.

Through this period, Ayyash further expanded his social networks and began to be involved in the dynamics of local politics in Pekalongan more intensively. His good relationship with Aris Kurniawan was crucial in maintaining and expanding the network, especially in dealing with local politics. On the other hand, his close relationship with Said Sungkar warranted his strong position within the *core-network* of FPI.

Episode Three: Fighting Against the Mayor Policy

The new leadership in Pekalongan under Basyir Ahmad and Abu Almafachir launched several good programs which eventually won awards by various institutes and bodies.[26] However, their policy on restructuring street vendors was confronted by mass protest in Pekalongan. Among the protesters were Ayyash, who had become a victim of the policy after his small kiosk was moved by the officers of local government police (*Polisi Pamongprja).* In his efforts to protest the policy he joined in establishing the *Forum Komunikasi Pedagang Kakilima se-Pekalongan* (FKPK, the Communication Forum of Street Vendors in Pekalongan). It was an interesting step because it was a class and interest-based movement rather than a religious one. One of the critical collective actions they took was to hold a mass-action participated by hundreds of ex street vendors rallying to the local parliament and expressing their protest at the policy of local government. Ayyash took a leading role in the action together with Aris Kurniawan who worked in Public Area Service (PAS), a local NGO.[27] Interestingly, both Ayyash and Kurniawan had been supporters of Basyir during the election two years before.

Since Basyir's government did not respond properly to the protest, Ayyash and the group of protesters launched an action to close the north coast road, one of the major roads in Java. Tensions escalated and a calculated scenario of confrontation developed. Ayyash said that Basyir claimed the case had been manipulated and politicized by the political party, implicitly accusing Kurniawan and

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26) Among the awards were for housing for the poor by UN Habitat, community-based garbage management by the Department of Public Works, and bureaucratic reform by the Ministry of State Apparatus.

27) PAS is previously an abbreviation of Posko Amien-Siswono, a political group who supported the candidacy of Amien Rais and Siwono Yudohusodo in the 2004 presidential election. In the post 2004 election it transformed to be a local NGO working on public area issues, although closely linked to PAN (National Mandate Party). A news on the action by PAS was made available at Aris's blogspot: http://ariscenter.blogspot.com/2008/10/kebijakan-pemerintah-kota-pekalongan.html as part of his political campaign for his candidacy for provincial parliamentary set in the 2009 election. He, however, failed to get elected.

PAN. In such a deadlock, a breakthrough in negotiations was interestingly initiated by Said Sungkar, the chairman of advisory board of FPI and simultaneously an Al Irsyad activist. He proposed hold a dialog through the FSUI. "We are all in a brotherhood; what the hell is the party. The party can be disbanded someday, but not our brotherhood," Ayyash recalled the way Sungkar persuaded him and his friends.[28)] The dialog then happened: Ayyash and his groups requested the government to review the policy while Basyir requested they not close the road. Both two sides agreed. But, for Ayyash, the protest group lost his way since government continued with business as usual as the morale of the protesters began to drop.

Through this period, Ayyash moved beyond the traditional boundaries of Islamist movements by taking part in a street vendor protest based on class and interest. However, his *core network* remained powerful thus he was prevented from continuing to confrontational stages.

Episode Four: Leading a 'Sweeping', Being a Prisoner

FPI has been prominent as a militia group that frequently carries out what they call 'sweeping operations' or security sweeps of places of 'vice', especially led by the paramilitary group *Laskar Pembela Islam (*LPI, Islamic Defender Troops) (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004; Yunanto, 2003, Jahroni 2008). Ayyash quite often led such actions, for instance an action to ban the New Year Party planned to be held in Pekalongan in 2005. By using the excuse of the recent earthquake tsunami which had happened in Aceh, the FPI insisted on banning any form of New Year celebrations in Pekalongan even though the organizers agreed to turn the event into collective prayers and mobilized solidarity fund for Aceh. "If you want to run the event, it's up to you, but our masses are ready to conduct sweeping. Let the

28) The quote originally in Javanese reads as follows: "*Dewe kih sedulur kabeh; opo partai? Partai kih iso bubar, tapi seduluran kan ora bubar*."

police be the referee [for the clash]," he told the organizers as quoted by *Jawa Pos* (2 January 2005).

But a 'sweeping operation' held on 27 August 2008 led to a different story: a period of imprisonment. The action, which targeted a shop and liquor storage belong to Kwi Ren Jie alias Cece located in R. E. Martadinata Street in the district of Batang, led to violence. As a result, Ayyash and two other FPI activists were brought to trial and sentenced to six months jail (*Radar Pekalongan*, 28/8/2009). Why did he conduct such violent actions? What was the ideological view and conviction behind such actions? He answered such questions in his 38 page hand-written defense entitled *Membuka Mata Hati* (Opening the Conscience).

He situated what he had done as part of "the struggle to uphold the Islamic faith (*aqidah)* and simultaneously fulfill the rights and responsibility as a citizen to defend the state (*bela negara)* through *amaliyah* or eradicating vices." (2009: 2). He argued that his action which was based on "the logic of power" (*logika kekuatan)* should be understood as an option in the context of the collapse of law due to collusion between certain personnel of the state apparatus (*oknum-oknum)* and agents of vice (2009: 4). He refused the allegation that his actions were expressions of anarchism and an infuriated soul (*kebengisan hati)*, calling them instead expressions of firm attitudes (*ketegasan sikap)* and robust principles (*ketegaran prinsip)* (2009: 6). He furthermore asserted: "Islam is the religion of peace, but it does not mean weakness against vices. Islam is the religion of tolerance, but it does not mean silence toward the domination of wrongdoings"[29] (2009: 8-9).

Living in jail for six months did not stop him from conducting *da'wa*. By using his skills and capability to conduct *rukyah*, a spiritual method of healing, and his human approach to conduct *da'wa*, he successfully approached Koret, a petty criminal and a follower of Javanese mysticism, and converted him into a devout Muslim. Ko-

29) The original quote: *Islam adalah agama damai, tapi bukan berarti pasrah kepada kemaksiatan. Islam adalah agama kelembutan, tapi bukan berarti diam terhadap merajalelanya kemungkaran.*

ret was the leader of a youth group in the remote village of Toso, in Batang, Central Java, who was jailed for leading collective lynching with three other friends of a *preman* family. Koret and his friends became pupils of Ayyash in jail. During his period in jail Ayyash also wrote several poems, for his beloved mother and children as well as about his new friend and pupil in jail, Koret.[30)]

Ayyash is a unique profile, both the leader of Islamic militia group and a poet. Two of his poems were included in the book *Antologi 101 Puisi tentang Kota Pekalongan* published in 2008. A prominent poet born in Pekalongan, Taufik Ismail, mentioned him in his foreword: "Feeling anxious due to of the many advertisement billboards and banners in his surrounding, Abu Ayyash, the chairman of FPI Pekalongan, expressed his anxiety in the poem *Langitku* (My sky)." When *Radar Pekalongan* reported the verdict of his case entitled *Six Months Sentence for Abu Ayyash Cs* (30/01/2009), it also printed his poem on the front page alongside a picture of him in Islamic dress, including skull cap and *selendang (*scarf*)*, smiling while holding onto the bars of the cell. The poem, which explained metaphorically his 'sweeping' court case, was entitled *Sajak Dua Berhala* (A poem of two idols).[31)]

Through the 'sweeping' action and the consequent six-month imprisonment, Ayyash has developed and further consolidated his identity as an Islamist activist. A period in prison provided him ample opportunity to reflect on his own experience with Islamist activism and to formulate some profound arguments for their actions—as presented in his *pledoi (*court defense*)*. On the other hand, his experience in prison has sharpened his sense of justice due to "illegal but licit" practices of extorting money from prisoners at any every occasion, including visits by family and friends.[32)] He claimed to have

30) I was given some pages of his handwritten poems.

31) Another article published on the same date by *Radar Pekalongan* entitled "Ayyah is making poems in jail" (30/1/2009) implied that through the poem Ayyash was attempting to display an ironic view of the case. While Ayyash was doing 'sweeping' action, similar sort of action had been conducted by the police to seize illegal liquor as commonly happened before *Ied Fithri.*

32) Interview in Pekalongan, 5 November 2009.

meaningful experiences from interacting with different personalities and characters in prison who all had problems with the law. Finally, Ayyash utilized his period in jail as a way to expand his social network, as is evident in the case of Koret and friends.

Episode Five: On Release From Prison

It was a special Friday for Ayyash. After spending six months in the Rowobelang prison, Batang, on Friday morning the 27th of February 2009, Ayyash and two other FPI activists were released from jail. Hundreds of FPI activists from Batang and Pekalongan, who had been waiting outside the prison complex since early morning, expressed their relief and happiness by cheering their release shouting "Allahu Akbar". Soon they moved in a convoy of cars and motorbikes to Ayyash's house in Boyongsari, Pekalongan, accompanied by police car. A sort of ceremony and a mass preaching had been prepared in Ayyash's house attended by hundreds of FPI activists and sympathizers wearing their Islamic dress and attributes. In a press conference with journalists, Ayyash said that he would still not stop carrying out 'sweeping' against vices.[33)] The event itself was quite unique given the location of Ayyash's house just a few hundred meters from the ex prostitution complex.

I contend that his period in jail led to social pride rather than shame. As Jasper (1997: 83) suggests, spending time in jail may be seen as a 'badge of honor' for some groups of activists. With such a 'badge of honor' he looked become more confident in doing his *da'wa* and social activism. Another factor which I observed to crucially build his self-esteem and social role was his capability and skill in the spiritual method of healing which called *ruqyah.*[34)] It was

33) The description is based on news published by *Radio Kota Batik*, 27 February 2009, entitled "Ketua FPI Dibebaskan" mixed with my conversation with Ayyash. In a photo provided with the news, some of Ayyash's house appears and it has been renovated with a medium-sized FPI sign placed on the front wall.

34) Al Iedan (2006: 23) defines *ruqyah* as a method of healing based on Al Qur'an and As Sunnah to heal spiritual ilness or other sickness caused by the bad influence of '*ain*

by using this skill and method that Ayyash succeeded in winning the sympathy and respect of Koret by exorcising the bad spirits from his body, which caused him to bleed from his mouth. Even on the day of his police arrest Ayyash asked permission to go to Petung Kriono, a remote place in the District of Pekalongan about 30 kilometers from Pekalongan, to perform *ruqyah.* As a consequence, three policemen accompanied him by car there till 10pm before returning to the police station to start his interrogation. During one of my interviews, he was called by somebody seeking his help in conducting *ruqyah*i.

It seems likely that Ayyash has some qualities which make him quite exceptional as an Islamist activist: he is a militia leader, a preacher, a poet and a healer; a person with multiple capabilities and social identities. In addition to his attachment with the FPI as his *core-network*, he has also developed quite a large *extended-network:* the FSUI, the local NGO PAS, KB-PII, as well as his personal relationship with many social and political activists, including the Mayor of Pekalongan. During my last interview in Pekalongan on 1 January 2010, he was dealing with a land dispute involving a poor family and local government. The case was advocated by a local freelance activist, Bahruddin, who is an ex PII activist. Ayyash was attempting to facilitate a dialogue between the two sides by utilizing his good relationship with the Mayor, Basyir Ahmad, as well as his position as the FPI leader. The case was still running, and the results were still unpredictable, as is the life trajectory of Abu Ayyash, the leader of the FPI Pekalongan.

- ***Surahman: the preacher and the politician***

The "after jihad" life of Surahman seemed not much different from the jihad period: he continued working as a *da'i* while simultaneously running a small shop and a small motorbike taxi business. His new life trajectory as a politician seemed to be the fruit of his hard work and successful job as a preacher during the (post) con-

(evil eye) of man and *jin*, magic, and other physical illness.

flict period in Maluku. As the consequence of his successful *da'wa* in Maluku, particularly in Southeast Maluku, he was recruited as a politician by PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)* in the province of Maluku. In fact he had gone to Ambon for the jihad as a *da'i* through the PKPU (*Posko Keadilan Peduli Umat),* the humanitarian agency that was part of the Tarbiyah movement with a strong link to the PKS. Therefore, it was as if he was just moving into a different room in the same house: from *da'wa* to *politics*. These two realms can be distinguished conceptually but can blur in reality, especially for the PKS that calls itself the "*da'wa* party".

I present my argument on the link between jihad experience, social background, social networks and life trajectory by discussing the life story narratives of Surahman in three episodes of the after jihad period. *First* was the crucial episode of crucial shift from *da'wa* activities in Maluku on a temporary and *ad hoc* basis to a living there with a fixed address. *Second* was the episode of his shift from *da'wa* activism to *political* activism. Although less problematic from an institutional point, such identity transformation can have particular and meaningful effects depending on the subjectivity of the actor. *Third* was the episode of Surahman's new role as a non-local politician as he continued to play his role as a *da'i.* It is unclear if there are any problems or tensions between his social role (as a politician and preacher) and his non-native social identity.

Period One: Choosing Maluku as the new field of life

After finishing his first term working as a *da'i* in Maluku in late 2000, Surahman said that he felt pity for the people of Maluku for their lack of religious teachings. His reflection was particularly based on his experience of *da'wa* in remote areas of Southeast Maluku, particularly in Tual Island and its surroundings. Thus he decided to apply for an extension of his stay, living and doing *da'wa* in Maluku to the PKPU. It was not an easy matter. As he had been born and raised in a Jakarta Betawi family, his wife quickly expressed

her disagreement: "why should we live so far away from Jakarta?" His mother also expressed her concerns and disapproval: "don't go to live in such a dangerous place, you could be killed there..." But Surahman convinced his mother by saying that death is in the hands of God, thus it could happen anywhere. "My life is in the hands of Allah, not in your hand, Mother," he argued conclusively. He said that he was very passionate at that time, and his parents knew well that if he already had the determination to do something it would be very difficult to stop him.

He eventually returned to Maluku for a longer period in 2001, still posted in Southeast Maluku. He said that in that period, many PK activists, even its functionaries, were smokers and did not pray regularly. He expressed his sad feelings concerning this state of affairs. The PK leadership in Maluku asked him to conduct intensive *da'wa* for internal groups of its activists. He then began by studying the PK *da'wa* curriculum and making personal approaches by meeting and gathering with many activists and functionaries. He began his work by building a strong foundation in the *core-network* of PK activists.

As a non-native, he started by studying the local values and traditions of Tual from a leading *adat* (customary law) figure who, interestingly, was a Golkar activist. Golkar, a military-sponsored party, has been a very powerful political force in Tual, even until the present. Surahman's status as a non-partisan preacher was an advantage in the period. He learnt a lot about various aspects of *adat* Tual, include its concept of social stratification with its highly hierarchical caste-like system. By learning about Tual traditional beliefs and values Surahman began to develop his strategy for *da'wa*, such as by taking into account the social status of people he met and talked with. He also tried to keep the topics of his preachings and sermons relevant and up to date. As a result, many people became interested in his preachings and sermons and he began to receive many invitations from local people. Here he began to develop his *extended-network.*

He also attempted to develop his social networks in Tual by building contacts with the local elites. In cooperation with the local police chief, for instance, he held regular preaching programs for kids. Surahman made use of his network with Islamic publishers in Jakarta, such as Gema Insani Press, Rabbani Press and Al Kautsar, and asked them to send their 'social books' to Maluku. These books were then distributed to local elites for free for expanding their co-operation.

Through this period, it seemed that Surahman had been quite succesful in learning the local culture and developing his *extended-networks*, particularly among the local elites. He was also able to mobilize support from his networks among Jakarta-based Islamic publishers, partly linked with his *core-network* of the Tarbiyah movement which thus improved his reputation among local elites. It was this combination of consolidation in both his *core-network* and *extended-network* which provided him a strong base for further success in *da'wa* and, eventually, politics.

Periode Two: From Da'wa to Businessman and Political Activist

In 2003, as a consequence of the good progress of his *da'wa* programs in Tual and its surroundings, Surahman was asked by the chairman of the PK Maluku, Sudarmo, to move to Ambon Island. This was perhaps a promotion for his successful job in Tual while, at the same time, part of the leadership consolidation in the wake of the 2004 elections. Living in the capital city of Ambon, one of the biggest cities in eastern Indonesia, meant economic demands since his PKPU salary was less than suficient. Thus, he began to run a motorbike taxi small business. In the aftermath of the protracted violent conflict, in response to the collapse of public transportation inside the city, motorbike taxis had become very popular in the city of Ambon. He bought five motorbikes from a good business contact in Jakarta through a credit scheme. In addition, his second wife also had a small business selling clothing.

"I used the salary from the PKPU, which was paid once every three months, firstly to buy clothing, then the profits from the clothing business we used for daily needs," he explained. The business improved gradually, enabling them to open a clothing shop and political party attributes, enabled him able to buy a house in BTN Kanawa, Ambon, in 2004 and to buy ticket to go on the *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca) for him and his first wife in 2010 (Interview, Ambon, 20/11/2009).

Although living in Ambon he remained involved with *da'wa* and political issues in Tual, since he had developed a vast social network in the area which had become his political capital. So he went back and forth from Ambon to Tual at least once a month. The distance between the two locations is quite far, it takes a whole day by ship. A private plane is available but once or a few times per week and it is very costly. His specific engagement in Tual was terminated in 2004 when he was assigned to handle *da'wa* and political issues in the broader area of Maluku, including Seram and Buru. "I made trips to many places in Maluku even much more than the PKS chairman," he claimed in an interview.

In the 2004 elections PKS achieved a great victory by winning five seats in the provincial parliament from only one seat in the 1999 election. A similar achievement was reached in the city of Ambon as described by Kotarumalos (2007: 1): from 1,455 votes and zero seats in parliament in 1999 to 12,714 votes and four seats in parliament in 2004. The huge PKS success in Maluku was certainly linked to the sucesss of its *da'wa* activities, considered the very heart of PKS as the "*da'wa* party". In the aftermath of the 2004 election, Surahman was elected First Deputy of PKS Maluku in charge of cadre development. His main job and responsibility was to take care of and to develop the quality of PKS cadres. Since PKS claims itself to be a cadre-based rather than mass-based party his position was crucial from the point of view of PKS as a political institution.

During the interviews, Surahman did not explicitly discuss his feelings regarding the shift from *da'wa* to politics. I think the blurred distinction between the two in daily life, as well the similar nature

of the PKS and PKPU from within, led him not to feel any major changes. Although from the outside the name and structure of the two institutions are dissimilar, in practice both work very closely, overlapping and intertwining each other's roles and actions.

Period Three: The Politics of Being a Local Politician

How did Surahman, of Betawi Jakarta background, play the role of a political actor against the emerging trend of the primacy of 'putra daerah' (the son of the soil) in local politics? From its early foundation and development within the PKS (previously the PK) the role of non-Ambonese people has been quite important. Yet Kotarumalos (2007: 106) stated the PK in Maluku was founded by former *da'wa* activists from local Ambonese universities such University of Pattimura, University of Darussalam and the State Academy of Islamic Studies of Ambon. Among the local PK founders were Ahmad Zaki, Muhammad Fathoni, Muhammad Kasuba and Sudharmo.[35] Interestingly, Sudharmo, of Javanese descent, was then elected to be the first chairman of the PK Maluku executive board. The important role played by non-Ambonese people was also reflected in the election of KH. Azis Arbi, a *da'i* originally from Jakarta (a Betawi), as the chairman of the PK advisory body. He was a graduate from King University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, who had been elected member of national parliament in 2004 and then lived in Jakarta. Later in 2006 Sudharmo was replaced by Muzakkir Assegaf, a young Ambonese activist of Arabic descent who graduated from Makassar.

Against the backdrop of the crucial role played by non-native activists and the rising primacy of the 'local', Surahman quite deliberately adopted some 'rules' symbolically expressing the supremacy of the local. Surahman, for example, urged the PKS members of parliament to wear jackets made from Maluku traditional textile during their ceremonial sessions. During the 2009 election he had ordered

35) I have no information on Zaki and Fathoni, but Kasuba is a local Malukan whereas Sudharmo is of a Javanese descent.

special batik uniforms with Maluku traditional motifs from the batik center of Pekalongan, Central Java. He also promoted the use of local terms in naming PKS activities or facilities, such as *maren* (a local word meaning to work together) to name the PKPU clinic in Tual. He said that PKS should adopt more local terms and symbols in order to be able to integrate with the local community. "Don't do things that make us perceived to be extremist or terrorist; it's dangerous!"

Having been involved in many activities at the grassroots level, Surahman learned a lot about the importance of appreciating local culture, and even religious pluralism. In order to embrace various groups in society and expand both *da'wa* and political influence, the PKS Maluku has made some progressive efforts to accommodate non-Muslims as its candidates. During the 2009 election, following the permit given by the *Dewan Syariah (the* judiciary board), two non-Muslims were selected as PKS political candidates although neither were elected. Surahman also claimed that the PKS Maluku had also asked the *Dewan Syariah* PKS to decide on the legal status of non-Muslims as functionaries and candidates in the predominantly non-Muslim area. Surahman was once asked by a PKS activist in Tual if it were permissible for him to provide assistance to the church because some of his family and relatives were Christians and they supported him during election. Surahman replied firmly that it was justified: "*Antum* (you) should help their church because *antum* were supported by them as well."

By being a local politician *not* in his area of origin, Surahman apparently learned how to adapt local culture and traditions to his involvement in politics. His large *extended-network* has also influenced him to be more sensitive and adaptive to local issues and development. Through his wide experience in conducting *da'wa* in the highly pluralistic area of Tual and its surroundings Surahman seemed to be trying to play politics in a moderate way by relaxing the boundaries of collective group and identity rather than fixing them.

Conclusion

I have provided in this chapter the life story narratives of the *political* jihadist trio in three stages: *before*, *during*, and *after* the jihad period and through their narratives I have presented my arguments on the three main research questions. I will end this chapter by highlighting some important research findings as reflected in the life story narratives of the JI jihadist trio.

How did they become jihadists? Through the life story narratives of the *political* jihadist trio, I have argued that they become jihadists after experiencing a process of 'radical reasoning'. I have demonstrated, through a micro-sociological approach, that it began with a period of identity crisis which happened in different ways for different actors in the same period of personal development, namely in the rites of passage to adulthood: in late adolescence for Awod and Ayyash, and in his early twenties for Surahman. Their personal identity crisis, interestingly, took place during the period of political crisis: in the early 1990s for both Ayyash (when he began to feel alienated in the early phase of his migration to Jakarta) and Surahman (when he became more radicalized and eventually found the PII to be 'too liberal') and in 1998 for Awod (when he suddenly wanted to abandon his 'bad boy' culture). Following a period of identity crisis, they experienced 'cognitive opening' where they began to adopt the new perspective of more radical Islamic activism: joining the paramilitary group Brigade Hizbullah in the case of Awod, engaging with the BKPMI in the case of Surahman, and becoming involved in Islamist movements concerned with transnational Islamic issues in the case of Ayyash.

The next critical step for their decision to become a *jihadist* was the presence of 'moral shocks' aroused by the news of persecution of hundreds of Muslims in religious violence incidents, either in Maluku or in Poso. However, the impact of moral shocks on them was different: it impacted quite directly on Awod and Ayyash who were eventually moved to join the jihad; it impacted on Surahman as a mirror-effect of his own preachings and sermons which called on

people to join the jihad. I argue that their decision to become a jihadist can be seen as *act of identity* because it happened in the context of, or in response to, drastic changes due to the political transition in Indonesia. However, it had a different significance for the informants: it was an action to confirm his identity as the leader of an Islamic paramilitary group for Awod; it was an action to fulfill his moral and eschatological duty as a Muslim for Ayyash; and it was an action to fulfill his own words and calls to others as a preacher for Surahman.

What did the jihad experience mean to the actors? I argued that the jihad was experienced as a 'radical experience' bringing about 'a pivotal meaning structure' to the actors that organizes the other activities in a person's life. As shown through the life story narratives of the actors, the jihad experience as a pivotal event was reflected in different ways to them: in the "the battle fronts" narratives of Awod; in the "teacher for children of the conflict" narratives of Ayyash; in the "preacher in a remote area" narratives of Surahman. Although the informants had a variety of roles and experiences, as well as period and duration, during the jihad period, I argue that they all had 'radical experiences' which shaped their later life trajectories. In the cases of the *political* jihadists, jihad participation had particular meaning producing special credentials for the participants in this 'high risk' activism.

How did the jihad experience influence their lives? I argue that jihad participation as a 'radical experience' informed the later life trajectory of the actors in combination with two main factors, namely their biographical traits and their social networks. Through an analytical framework of three different kinds of social networks, namely, *core-network*, *tactical-network* and *extended-network*, I have shown that the dynamic engagement of informants with different social networks has influenced their choice of life-trajectory in the post-jihad period. In the case of informants in this chapter, their *core-network* was different, namely the Brigade Hizbullah for Awod, the FPI for Ayyash and the Tarbiyah movements for Surahman. Their *tactical-network* was also different: KOMPAK for Awod

and Ayyash and the PKPU for Surahman. Their *extended-network* was also variable following the nature of *multiple affiliation* membership.

In the case of Awod, in addition to his engagement with other Islamist movement, include the MMI, DDII and an alliance of Islamist movements in Solo, he was also involved with a local legal aid NGO led by a Christian lawyer. In the case of Ayyash, in addition to his engagement with other Islamic movements, including the FSUI and PPMI, he also joined in establishing the *Forum Komunikasi Pedagang Kakilima se-Pekalongan* (FKPK), a social movement based on class and economic interests rather than religious ones. In the case of Surahman, as a Muslim politician living in a predominantly Christian area, he has engaged with many inter-religious and multicultural issues. Based on his experience at the grass root levels, he endorsed a 'pluralistic policy' to allow non-Muslims to be functionaries and parliamentary candidates through his Islamic party, PKS.

Finally, all the three of them played a bigger role and were promoted as leader of their Islamic groups: Awod was elected as the chairman of PBB Solo in 2009; Ayyash was elected as the acting chairman of FPI Pekalongan in 2003 and then elected as the FPI chairman for two periods (2005-2010 and 2010-2015); and Surahman was appointed as the deputy chairman of PKS Maluku in 2004 until the present.***

Part Three:

Conclusions

Photo 12: 'Holy Kampong': Kampung Muhajirin, Ambon, 2009

Photo: taken by author

CHAPTER 7

After Jihad: Concluding Remarks

This dissertation is a collection of life stories of *ordinary people* who carried out *extraordinary actions* during an *extraordinary period* of Indonesian modern history. Furthermore, it presents and discusses in depth their life stories in the aftermath: the 'after jihad'.

The informants who narrated their life stories in this dissertation are ordinary people—perhaps with the exception of Doctor Fauzi for two reasons: he was a leading local politician in Yogyakarta and his late father, A.R. Fachruddin, the former Chairman of National Board of Muhammadiyah, was a prominent figure in Indonesian politics in his time.[1)] The rest of the informants are *ordinary people* in the truest sense of the word: young men of 20-30 years of age from ordinary, mostly middle and lower-middle class and some lower class, families (namely sons of farmers, laborers, rural teachers, simple preachers, company employees, small-medium traders), none of them famous or otherwise remarkable in their own careers

1) The late Abdul Rozak Fachruddin was the Chairman of the National Board of Muhammadiyah in 1968-1990. During his life, he was well known for his modest life, for example, selling petrol in liter containers in front of his house in Yogyakarta. His modest lifestyle ironically made him 'extraordinary' among members of the elite of the time. On Fachruddin's modest life, see Cahyono and Purwowiyadi (2010). Fauzi himself, during his jihad period, was the chairman of the PPP Islamic party, in Yogyakarta, which made him quite well known at the local level. As a leading politician, his decision to join jihad eventually made him 'extraordinary' compared to the majority.

(being high school or university graduates or dropouts, religious teachers, humble preachers, or petty traders).

Some of them later became well known for their jihad action and its repercussions, such as Ali Imron, especially after his role in the first Bali bombing in 2002. To a much lesser extent and merely at the local level, Awod Umar and Abu Ayyash, leaders of Islamic paramilitary groups in Solo and Pekalongan respectively, also became somewhat prominent, especially after their imprisonment for their role in leading vigilante activism in their respective towns. Surahman, a *tarbiyah* activist from Jakarta who joined the PKPU *da'wa* program in the Maluku conflict area who was later appointed as one of the PKS Maluku leaders also became somewhat prominent locally. But other jihad activists remain unknown except to their limited circles.

However, these *ordinary young men* had carried out *extraordinary actions* by taking part in the jihad movement in Indonesia. As discussed throughout this dissertation, especially in Chapter 1, the jihad movement was a response to the 'religious war' between Muslims and Christians that unfolded in eastern Indonesia, particularly in Ambon-Maluku and Poso-Central Sulawesi, during *an extraordinary time* in modern Indonesian history: the period of the so-called 'political transition' following the collapse of the New Order authoritarian regime, a critical juncture in Indonesian modern history. Following the reports of the persecution of hundreds of Muslims in the area, a call for jihad was launched: more than five thousand Muslims from various places in the archipelago were moved to join the jihad movement, the 'holy war' against the Christians, in the two regions.

Their participation in the jihad movement involved *extraordinary actions* in various senses. First, from a historical perspective, such a massive mobilization for 'holy war' was unprecedented in Indonesia's post-independence period. Secondly, from a social movement study perspective, it was a particular kind of 'repertoire of collective action', characterized by the use of religious symbols, which successfully mobilized a huge number of people to take part over a certain period of time. Thirdly, when viewed from a risk and cost assessment perspective, it was a 'high-risk activism' that required a

high level of risks and costs to participate, thus making greater demands on those activists who decided to participate. In short, jihad is 'passionate politics': an instance of social movement involving strong passions and both emotional and cognitive processes. These are not the rational and instrumental calculations required by a rational choice approach. The chapters in this dissertation are structured and informed by the 'passionate politics' approach of social movement theory.

So: this dissertation is a bundle of stories of the *jihad* and its *aftermath* as 'passionate politics'. In this concluding chapter, I will briefly review the research findings while revisiting my main arguments from throughout this dissertation. Rather than summarize the life story narratives of the individual informants as already provided in Chapters Four-Six, I will discuss and compare the different types of Islamic activism across the three different stages of jihad*: before, during* and *after*. I will then continue by highlighting some empirical contributions produced by this research in two areas, namely communal violence and Islamic movements. I then continue to formulate the modest theoretical contribution of this research to the 'passionate politics' approach of social movement theory and, finally, conclude this chapter by presenting some reflections from my personal involvement with radical and *jihadi* activism during my teenage years.

Research findings: main arguments and discussions

- ***Three ways of becoming a jihadist***

Through the thesis I have developed an argument explaining how the informants became jihad activists through a process which I have termed 'radical reasoning'. Informed by the 'passionate politics' approach of social movement theory, what I mean by 'radical reasoning' is a set of micro-sociological processes that constitute the decision-making to join jihad, involving both cognition and emotion through either 'moral shocks' or 'cognitive opening' or both. I have

also suggested that the decision to join jihad can be seen as an *act of identity* because it takes place in the context of, or in response to, an identity crisis experienced by the actor. So, jihad as act of identity is a way to resolve the identity crisis experienced by the actor through 'radical reasoning' which ruptures the 'normal life' of the actor and marks a new phase in his life.

The summarized life story narratives of the individual informants have already been presented in the previous chapters. Here I intend to highlight the research findings on the different styles of radical reasoning of the three different types of Islamic activism: *pious, jihadi* and *political*. As presented in Chapter 4, *pious* activists usually began their radical reasoning through a cognitive opening which led them to join Salafi activism. After becoming attached to Salafi activism, they were later moved to join the jihad following the *fatwa* issued by leading Salafi clerics stating it was the personal obligation (*fardh 'ain)* for Indonesian Muslims to conduct jihad in Maluku. So, their participation in the jihad movement was mainly motivated by, and due to their compliance with the Salafi issued *fatwa* for jihad. I maintain that the discourse of these *fatwa* was the typical motivating factor to join the jihad movement evident in *pious* narratives, a factor not apparently present in the narratives of the *jihadi* and *political* activists. Of the four *pious* jihadists only Doctor Fauzi did not place great emphasis on the role of *fatwa* in motivating him to join jihad. With regard to the impact of moral shocks, three *pious* jihadists (Fauzi, Reza and Adang) spoke of how moral shocks influenced them to join jihad. However, Taufan, claimed *not* to have experienced moral shocks, alleging that the *fatwa* were his main, if not only, reason to join jihad.

Like *pious* activists, the *jihadi* activists commonly began their radical reasoning through cognitive opening which led them to join *jihadi* activism. However, moral shocks were also crucial elements in recruiting them as *jihadi* activists: the display and the screening of pictures and videos of Muslims being persecuted in places, such as Palestine and Afghanistan, were a basic part of the *jihadi* activist religious sessions. As presented in Chapter 5, Fauzan and Ali Imron

took part in such religious sessions before they decided to join jihad through the *jihadi* network. Hendro did not explain to me his process of becoming a *jihadi* activist but it is unlikely to be much different than that of Fauzan and Imron. The *fatwa* discourse was absent in the narratives of *jihadi* activists since the use of violence had already been justified as an integral part of *jihadi* ideology or *jihadism*. What was needed by *jihadi* activists to join jihad actions was simply an order from their leader (as in the cases of Ali Imron and Hendro) or just the impulse triggered by news reports and the coordination of other *jihadi* fellows (in the case of Fauzan).

Unlike *pious* and *jihadi* activism which is characterized by an exclusive movement network based on relatively strict discipline and structure, *political* activism usually has *multiple affiliations* with a relatively loose structure, doctrine and organization. Thus, instead of being influenced by the organization, as presented in Chapter 6, the process of moral shocks was a crucial factor for *political* activists to join the jihad movement, although in different ways. In the cases of Umar and Ayyash, it was moral shocks triggered by the reported persecution of hundreds of Muslims that influenced them to join jihad. On the other hand, in the case of Surahman, it was moral shocks triggered as a reflection of his own preaching and sermons calling on people to join *jihad* which eventually moved him to join jihad. The discourse of *fatwas* was also absent in their narratives, replaced by the strong moral emotions of solidarity toward Muslims as the victims of religious violence.

- ***Jihad experience as a radical experience***

I have argued throughout the chapters that the jihad experience signified a 'radical experience' that brought about 'a pivotal meaning structure' for the jihad actor that organized the other activities in actor's life. The jihad experience was a 'radical experience' for the actor because, I argue, it consisted of two key elements, namely, *firstly*, the nature of 'high-risk' activism, which involves high levels of 'costs' and 'risks' in its participation that bring a strong significance to the

actor's actions through engaging high level emotions; and *secondly,* through the use of religious symbols and meanings in the actions, as reflected in the use of the term *jihad*, that impact powerfully on the actor. The combination of both elements resulted in the creation of 'a pivotal meaning structure' as reflected in the use of the marker referring to those who participated in the movement as jihadist or jihad actor/activist or *mujahid* (Arabic: plural, *mujahidin).* It also marked the key life phase of the jihad actor/activist by symbolically distinguishing between their life *before* and *after* the jihad.

The informants joined jihad in different locations and periods of the conflict and spent different amounts of time, playing different roles in it (see Table 2 in the Appendices). Instead of summarizing the life story narratives of the individual informants, which have already been presented in the previous chapters, I will discuss the different ways in which the jihad experience was narrated by the different types of actors. For *jihadi* activist informants combat and related violence was the main theme of their narratives as presented in Chapter 5, either from their 'first jihad' abroad or in the 'second jihad' in Indonesia. Whereas the narratives of the *pious* and the *political* jihadists were varied; some of them took part in combat while others did not. In the case of *political* jihadists, only Umar took part in actual battle whilst of the *pious* jihadists it was Taufan and Fauzi who narrated their involvement in real battles. The remainder narrated their non-combat roles and experiences, mainly in *da'wa* and education programs for local children.

While battle experiences were among the most dramatic stories from the *jihadi,* as discussed in Chapter 4 (by Taufan and Fauzi) and Chapter 5 (by Hendro and Fauzan), it does not mean that the non-battle narratives were less meaningful to the actors. As shown in Chapter 5 in the case of Ayyash, his relationship with local children in a remote village of West Ceram became so close and intimate that his transfer to another location depressed them and him. His non-battle experiences also shaped his later life trajectory, commencing from his change of name after his jihad period to Abu Ayyash from his original name of Slamet Budiono. A comparable story was also

narrated by Adang, the *pious* jihadist from West Java, in Chapter 4, regarding the significance for him of participating in religious gatherings with his Salafi fellows in Poso during the jihad. His (non-battle) experience also strongly shaped his later life trajectory as indicated by his return to Poso after spending about six months in his hometown and other cities in Java.

While combat narratives were typical of *jihadi* activists, amongst *pious* activists narratives of strong reciprocal emotional bonds among Salafi jihadists were common. In addition to Adang, as mentioned earlier, quite similar stories were also narrated by Taufan and Reza, the exception being Dr. Fauzi who spent only one month in the land of jihad. The fact that *pious* jihadists spent a relatively long period of time during jihad, namely more than one year for Reza and Adang and more than two years in the case of Taufan in Ambon, seems likely to have contributed to the strong emotional bonds that developed among them. It further encouraged the exclusive tendencies of their life style, also due to deployment to the area in of large numbers of people in single groups of Laskar Jihad. This was different to the cases of the *political* jihadists: Ayyash and Umar who joined jihad through KOMPAK as a *tactical-network (*not through their *core-network*), while Surahman joined jihad as a single activist through PKPU. The JI activists also joined jihad through different networks, including KOMPAK which at times were even 'rivals' of the JI network as occurred in Poso, as discussed in Chapter 5.

How do the highly emotional experiences of jihad participation link to the dynamics of identity of the jihad actors? I have argued that the highly emotional experiences during the jihad affect significantly the consolidation of both collective identity and movement identity of the actors. Identity consolidation is linked closely with a particular type of Islamic activism network through which the activists joined the movement.

Thus, jihad experiences were interpreted through the particular ideological framework of a certain Islamic activism network: it was an action and expression of *pietism* for the *pious* activists*;* it was action and expression of *jihadism* for the *jihadi* activists*;* it was an

action and expression of *political* Islamism for the *political* activists. Therefore, jihad participation was seen in different ways by actors of different types of Islamist activism and gave birth to different kinds of actor in its aftermath: the creation of *pious* actors by the *pious* activism*;* the creation of *jihadi* actors by the *jihadi* activism*;* the creation of *political* actors by the *political* activism. As shown through the life story narratives in this dissertation, jihad participation resulted in the creation of the different Islamist activists: Reza, Fauzi, Taufan and Adang as *pious* activists; Fauzan, Ali Imron and Hendro as *jihadi* activists; and Awod Umar, Abu Ayyash and Surahman as *political* activists.

- ***After Jihad: the life trajectory of the three types of Islamists***

I have argued that the jihad experience is 'a pivotal event' informing the later life trajectory of the actors in combination with two other main factors, namely biographical traits and social networks. Through an analytical framework of three kinds of social networks, namely, *core-network*, *tactical-network* and *extended-network*, I have also shown that the dynamic engagement of informants with different social networks influences the choice of life trajectory in the post-jihad period. Besides a variety of life choices among post-jihadists (for example, either to stay on or to return a typical pattern of 'after jihad' life trajectory emerged for the jihadists from the three types of Islamic activism: *pious* activists began to live in a sort of 'enclave community' or 'holy kampong'; *jihadi* activists continued to carry out terrorist actions and were eventually sentenced to prison for months or years; *political* activists became further involved and took up larger roles in local politics.

I will describe briefly the pattern of 'after jihad' life trajectory of the post-jihadists as reflected in their life story narratives before discussing further why such pattern emerged. As related in Chapter 4, *pious* activists tended to disengage from public issues, withdrawing to live in 'enclave communities', characterized by an exclusive

way of life in the post-jihad period. Taufan and Adang both live in a Salafi compound in Ambon and Poso, respectively, while Reza lives in a small complex of Salafi dwellings in Yogyakarta. The exception to the rule is Dr. Fauzi who lives in a upper-middle class housing complex in Yogyakarta and continues to be involved in political affairs, although indirectly and covertly. On the other hand, the *jihadi* activists tended to continue to be engaged in 'terrorist' activities and eventually remained, or at least served some time, in prison. This was reflected in the life story narratives of Ali Imron and Hendro who continue to serve time in prison and Fauzan who was released after serving more than three years in prison, as related in Chapter 5. Finally, the *political* activists tended to become further involved in public issues and played larger public roles, as reflected in the cases of Awod Umar, Abu Ayyash and Surahman. As presented in Chapter 6, these three *political* activists have been promoted to higher positions within their own groups: Umar was elected chairman of the PBB in Solo in 2009; Ayyash was elected chairman of the FPI Pekalongan in 2005 and was then re-elected in 2010; Surahman was elected vice chairman of the PKS Maluku in 2004.

I have argued that the pattern of the 'after jihad' life trajectory is linked to three factors, namely, first, the post-jihadists' ideological stance on the legitimacy of participation in public issues through democratic frameworks and processes; second, their ideological stance on the justification of the use of violence in public issues; and finally, their different types of membership affiliation. On the first issue, the three types of Islamic activism are divided into two camps: the *political* activists who believe in legitimate participation in the institutions and processes of democracy while *pious* and *jihadi* activists reject it. On the second issue, they are divided into three camps: *jihadi* activism that basically justifies the use of violence and terrorist actions in most cases; *pious* activism which basically rejects the use of violence unless supported by *fatwa* issued by leading Salafi clerics; whereas *political* activists are divided into two groups: those who basically reject the use of violence and others who justify the use of limited violence for vigilante action against 'moral vices'. On

the third issue of diverse membership affiliations, the three activist types are divided into two camps: those who apply *exclusive affiliation*, namely the *pious* and the *jihadi* activists, and those who have *multiple affiliations*, namely the *political* activists.

I argue that these three linked factors produce a particular pattern of life trajectory in the post-jihad period. If one examines the case of *pious* activists, it is clear that due to their rejection of participation in public affairs through democratic frameworks and processes, *pious* activists have largely disengaged from public issues and political processes. They do not commonly participate in political elections or other public political occasions, such as discussions and deliberations on particular political issues and policies. On the other hand, they reject the use of violence actions unless supported by Salafi clerical *fatwa*. The *pious* activists were among the fiercest critics of terrorist actions by *jihadi* activists. Finally, due to their *exclusive affiliation* membership, they tend to focus on the Salafi *core-network* and have only a limited *extended-network.* As a repercussion of these three factors, *pious* activists tend to live in an 'enclave community' or sort of 'holy kampong'. There was, however, the one exception of Dr. Fauzi, a maverick Salafi post-jihadist. As discussed in Chapter 4, his unique situation was due to his strong pre-existing social profile and extensive social networks prior to his involvement with Salafism and joining the jihad movement. So he is not a typical Salafi with *exclusive affiliation* and, in fact, his profile was more similar to that of a *political* activist, particularly before he officially withdrew from the political party.

Jihadi activists share two aspects of the way of life of *pious* activists: their rejection of participation in public affairs through democratic frameworks and processes and their *exclusive affiliation* membership. So these two types of Islamic activists basically share more commonalities than differences across these three factors. Where they do stand at odds and sometimes conflict, is their contradictory stance on the justified use of violence for achieving goals: unlike *pious* activists, *jihadi* activists basically justify the use of violence to achieve their political goals, including, but not limited

to, the establishment of the Islamic state, as discussed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, some of the JI activists who became informants in this research were involved in *global jihadi* activism, such as Ali Imron's participation in the first Bali bombing in 2002 and Fauzan's role in the Philippines Embassy bombing in 2000. Fauzan was also involved in the protracted religious conflict in Poso, as was Hendro in the later stage of the conflict. These cases led to their imprisonment in the post-jihad period.

Political activists differ from *pious* and *jihadi* activists in not one but two aspects: their *multiple affiliations* and their participation in public affairs through democratic frameworks and processes. This contrast is also reflected in their large *extended-networks* in the post-jihad period. If one examines the cases of Awod Umar and Abu Ayyash, they both joined jihad through the *tactical network* of KOMPAK, but came from different *core-networks,* namely Umar from PBB's Brigade Hizbullah and Ayyash from the FPI. They both returned to their respective *core-networks,* but also expanded their social networks beyond the 'conventional' Islamist movement; Umar worked with a legal aid NGO led by a Christian lawyer while Ayyash took part in a mass protest against local government policy on reorganizing street vendors, establishing the interest and class-based *Forum Komunikasi Pedagang Kakilima se-Pekalongan* (FKPK, Communication Forum of Street Vendors in Pekalongan). Both Umar and Ayyash were also actively involved in local politics through campaign support during local political elections.

Interestingly, as the leader of an Islamic paramilitary group affiliated with the Islamic PBB party, Umar endorsed a candidate pair nominated by the PDI-P, a secular nationalist party, in the Solo elections in 2005. This could be termed a form of political desertion as his own party, the PBB, had endorsed another candidate pair. Umar's endorsement reflected sound judgment as Jokowi-Rudy, his endorsed candidate pair, won the election. Ayyash, as an FPI leader, on the other hand, became indirectly involved in local politics through the FSUI (*Forum Silaturahmi Umat Islam,* Communication Forum of Muslim Community) Pekalongan, a network of Islamic

groups in Pekalongan. Basyir Achmad-Abu Mafachir, the candidate pair endorsed by the FSUI, also won the election in 2005. As mentioned earlier, both subsequently had bright activist careers: Ayyash was re-elected of the FPI Pekalongan in 2010 and Umar was elected chairman of the PBB Solo in 2009.

Surahman, a jihad activist who joined jihad through the PKPU as a *tactical network*, also revealed an interesting story from Maluku. The PKPU was a charity and humanitarian organization associated with the Tarbiyah movement and the PKS. Following his successful *da'wa* program in the Tual village in Southeast Maluku from 2001, Surahman was recruited as a leading figure of the PKS Maluku in the wake of the 2004 election. In that election PKS reaped a great success, by successfully gaining five seats in provincial parliament compared to the one seat it won in the 1999 election. The success of the PKS in Maluku was certainly linked with its sucessful *da'wa* activities, the very heart of PKS as the self-claimed "*da'wa* party". In the aftermath of the 2004 election, Surahman was elected First Deputy of the PKS Maluku in charge of cadre development. His strong position and links to the PKS *core-network* was reflected in one of my interviews with him in Ambon: he called some PKS members of local parliament just to verify some data I had requested on the results of local elections. During another interview, I happened to meet the Head of the Central Maluku district, Abdullah Tuasikal, who had come to meet K.H. Azis Arbi, a senior figure of the PKS Maluku.

On the issue of the justification of violence to deal with public issues, *political* activists in this research were divided into two camps: Surahman, who basically rejected the use of violence, and Umar and Ayyash, who justified the use of limited violence for vigilante action against what they perceived as 'moral vices'. How can one explain this different stance towards violence among *political* activists? I argue that it is due to the different nature and culture of Islamic activism in which they were engaged: both Umar and Ayyash were involved with, and even led, an Islamic paramilitary group and were familiar with a culture of violence; while Surahman was in-

volved with the PKS and a *da'wa* movement which is commonly disassociated with the culture of violence. Their familiarity with a culture of violence, enabled both Umar and Ayyash to take part in, and even lead, a 'sweeping operation' against a liquor business which led to their imprisonment. Both received short sentences: one month for Umar and six months for Ayyash. Yet instead of feelings of shame, their prison sentence was viewed as a badge of honor among their *core-network* as later indicated by their promotion as leaders.

- ***On three types of Islamism: a reflective note***

I would like to reflect here on the distinction between the three types of Islamic activism used in this research: *pious, jihadi* and *political*. This categorization was not intended to be treated as a fixed and final classification, but rather a loose taxonomy to guide analysis, but could be subject to change as needed. In discussion of the research findings there indeed appears to be some fluidity on the part of certain members and their membership of a certain type of activism at certain stages of their life.

Dr. Fauzi is one example of the porous boundaries between the categories of Islamic activists. I have categorized him as a *pious* jihadist since he identified himself as a Salafi, a perception supported by his simple life style, his dress and his long beard. He has also held Salafi preaching sessions at his house for many years. However, his 'official' status as a politician, during his *jihad* period, and his 'unofficial' political involvement in the post-jihad period puts him at odds with his fellow Salafi. Furthermore, his sympathetic views of the *jihadi* activists in the post-jihad period, as indicated by his two visits to Imam Samudra in prison, also puts him in a strange position in between categories.

It is also difficult to fit political activists Umar and Ayyash into one fixed category. Their engagement with KOMPAK during jihad caused confusion since Mujahidin KOMPAK was recruiting *jihadi* activists during the movement, include Fauzan and Ali Imron. The fact that KOMPAK's Solo branch was led by 'Afghan alumnus' Aris

Munandar complicated the story further. However, I tried to resolve this problem by categorizing KOMPAK as their *tactical-network* rather than *core-network*, signaling their participation without necessarily sharing its ideological framework. However, this does not mean that it would be impossible for *political* activists to shift alliances, becoming *jihadi* activists for example—or vice versa.

A similar alliance shift is also apparent in the case of Ali Imron who changed his ideological view and conviction after his term in prison. While claiming to remain committed to the doctrine of jihad, the breakdown in his relationship with JI and his friendly relations with the police made him somewhat anomalous among *jihadi* activists. Likewise Fauzan, the *jihadi* activist similarly had problems with some JI activists after his term in prison, who suspected he had disclosed the JI network and members to the police. Whilst he still identified himself as a JI member, his troubled relationship with his JI fellows and his good relationship with the police somewhat estranged him from *jihadi* activists. Furthermore, he developed quite a vast *extended-network*, including *political* activists, foreign journalists and researchers, which was uncommon among *jihadi* activists. So it would not be surprising should he shift to become a *political* activist in the near future.

Contributions and reflection

This research contributes to two levels of academic research: empirical and theoretical. Empirically, it enriches academic studies at the intersection of two research areas: communal violence and Islamic movements in Indonesia. Theoretically, it contributes by helping to shape a new approach in social movement research: the so-called 'passionate politics' approach. I discuss these two levels of academic contribution below, and end by presenting personal reflections.

- ***The Voices of the 'Foot Soldiers': Empirical Contribution***

This research enriches academic study empirically at the intersection of communal violence and Islamic movements in four ways: by focusing on *non-local* actors/activists; by comparing different networks of *non-local* actors/activists; by following the trajectory of actors/activists in the post-jihad period; and by giving voice to the *non-local* actors/activist 'foot soldiers'. There is an intersection between communal violence and Islamic movements study in this research: those viewed as *non-local actors* from the perspective of the study of communal violence are viewed as *non-local activists* from an Islamic movements study perspective.

By focusing on *non-local* actors/activists, this research contributes to an understanding of the nexus between the *local-national-global* networks of actors/activists. Thus, the local communal violence in Ambon-Maluku and Poso-Central Sulawesi cannot merely be seen as a *local conflict* phenomenon (although it indeed has deep local factors and roots) as *non-local* actors/activists were involved and played remarkable roles. Understanding the nexus between *local-national-global* networks enriches an understanding of the dynamics of social networks of Islamic movements at three levels of analysis. For example, the strong *local-national-global* networks of the Salafi activists in the post-jihad period, were manifest in the participation of Salafi activists from different areas, including Ambon and Poso, in the annual Salafi national gathering (*daurah*) in Yogyakarta. During the *daurah* some leading Salafi clerics from the Middle East were invited to give sermons. After the *daurah* the clerics sometimes made preaching trips to some Salafi stronghold areas.

Another critical empirical contribution of this research is its focus on the three different types and networks of Islamic activism, namely, *pious, jihadi,* and *political.* Since most of the research is focused on a single Islamic network, it enriches the understanding of the different nature of Islamic activism, particularly in connection with the processes of *participation*, *meaning-making*, and different *life trajectories* taken in the post-*jihad* period. As discussed previous-

ly, this research found three distinct ways of *becoming a jihadist* and three kinds of *life trajectory* Islamic activists in the post-jihad period.

The next contribution of this research is its focus on the *post*-conflict or *post*-jihad period. While much research has been focused on the mobilization and conflict period, few have been able to reveal the situation and the dynamics in the post-jihad period. This research enriches understanding of both the *post-conflict* dynamics and situation in the post-conflict areas, namely in Ambon and Poso, and the *post-jihad* dynamics and situation of three types of Islamic activisms: *pious*, *jihadi*, and *political.*

Finally, this research contributes to academic study of both communal violence and Islamic movements by giving voice to the *non-local* actors/activist 'foot soldiers'. Whilst much research into both communal violence and Islamic movements has focused on elite actors, this research chose to collect the life story narratives of the jihadist 'foot soldiers' from the three types of Islamic activism. I used their life story narratives to critically engage with dominant accounts of both communal violence and Islamic movement studies, based on the 'structural approach' and 'rational choice approach'.

I begin this discussion by examining the main thesis of the 'structural/post-structural' approach which basically contends that the underlay of communal violence and *jihad* mobilization in Indonesia was a sort of collective anxiety. Bertrand (2004: 114-5) suggested that the collapse of Soeharto regime, followed by President Habibie's launch of political reform of state institutions and the electoral mechanism, made Muslims "anxious about the likelihood of losing their recent gains"; or as Sidel (2006a: xii) suggested in the later stage of political reform when "the Islamist networks…began to lose…[their] position of influence, access, and security within the national political class." Although these observations were common in the macro-sociological context, they were interestingly almost absent in the narratives of informants in that period. The only informant to reveal such anxiety was Awod Umar, an activist of the PBB's Brigade Hizbullah in Solo who spoke of "the red-threat" during the Habibie period. What he meant by "the red-threat" were suspicions

of a sort of conspiracy of nationalist-secularist-communist movements against Islamic forces during the Habibie period. The fact that he was a *political* activist who had taken part in paramilitary training held by the military during the period, as part of the *Pamswakarsa* program, might help explain his suspicions.

This discourse was not evident among the Salafi activists who were basically apolitical and distanced from political affairs. Interestingly, such concerns were also not visible among the *jihadi* activists. Instead of concerns over losing access or gains, they were more concerned at the news of persecution of Muslims, in Ambon on 19 January 1999 in Tobelo on 26 December 1999 and in Poso in May-June 2000. It may be because the *jihadi* activists did not received political access or gains during the political transition period as some *political* activists did. Ayyash, the *political* activist in Pekalongan, in fact made use of the political opportunity during *reformasi* to mobilize collective action to close down prostitution complex located next to his house in Boyongsari, Pekalongan. So, instead of collective anxiety, on the contrary Ayyash spoke of the rising confidence of Muslim politics at the local level in Pekalongan, the Central Java town well known as a base of Muslim traders.

I continue by examining the main thesis of the 'rational choice approach' of social movement theory applied by Noorhaidi (2005) and Van Klinken (2007) that basically contends that participation in social movement was based on an evaluation of costs and benefits or, as prominently formulated in a statement, as "politics by other means".

While Noorhaidi successfully described the rational and political dimensions of the elite of the Laskar Jihad, especially its leader Ja'far Umar Thalib, it appears hard to grasp the narratives of its foot soldiers by merely using a costs and benefits calculation. In the case of Reza, the UGM Engineering student who joined jihad in his second year at university after attending a mass gathering to mobilize recruits, Reza gained little, if any, benefit from his participation in jihad in Ambon. It even caused tensions with his mother, who came all the way from Sulawesi to Yogyakarta to prevent him from joining

the movement. The costs and benefits calculation also fail to explain his later decision to quit a top faculty of UGM, one of the best universities in Indonesia, to study Salafi teaching in a small pesantren in rural Muntilan, in the post-jihad period.

Similarly this approach fails to cover the reasons why Dr. Fauzi, the medical specialist and chairman of the Yogyakarta PPP, took part in the movement. If 'politics' in its narrow meaning was his main motive for the action, he would have gone to Jakarta to mobilize support or raise funds as done by some local Maluku politicians during the conflict. It is also an inadequate explanation for his involvement in the battlefront in Saparua which led to his slight injury to his buttocks, despite his participation in Maluku as a member of the medical team. In short, instead of simple rational 'costs and benefits' calculations, the narratives of the Laskar Jihad foot soldiers have revealed participation in passionate collective action.

In his work, Van Klinken eloquently portrayed key roles played by local elites in towns outside Java in mobilizing resources through patronage networks to capture political opportunities to achieve their political goals. Such a rational and instrumental approach, however, seems at odds with the narratives of *political* activists collected in this research. As discussed earlier, *political* activist narratives of becoming a *jihadist* were characterized by strong dimensions of moral emotions triggered by a sort of moral shock. In the case of the narrative of Awod Umar, the activist and leader of the Solo PBB Brigade Hizbullah paramilitary group, rather than benefitting from jihad mobilization campaigns, he claimed he spent his own money to go to Maluku fed up with the long bureaucratic delay in sending volunteers to the land of jihad. His decision to join jihad was initially opposed by his mother and some of his fellow activists, but his passions drove him to leave, even with no friends to join him.

An even more passionate story was related by Abu Ayyash, a *political* Islamist activist from a lower class background who was married with two little children when he joined the jihad. As a married man with family responsibilities Ayyash fits the category of someone with no "biographical availability" to join 'high-risk' ac-

tivism—to refer McAdam (1988). But his religious convictions and strong feelings of solidarity toward Muslims in Maluku moved him to leave his family in Pekalongan. The life story narratives of these foot soldiers on joining the jihad movement led me to abandon the rational choice approach and view them instead as an instance of 'passionate politics' activism.

The life story narratives of the foot soldiers, particularly in the post-jihad period, also helped me to dismiss some simplistic alarming theses from Abuza (2007) on the recent dynamics of Islamist movements in contemporary Indonesia. His view of Laskar Jihad as an example of a "high violence" movement is certainly out of date and misleading. Following the life trajectory of ex Laskar Jihad activists who live together in a sort of 'holy kampong' in the post-jihad period proves that such a thesis is not supported by the facts. His classification of KOMPAK as a group aimed at establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia also appears exaggerated and inaccurate. As evident in the various life trajectories of the KOMPAK post-jihadists in this research, namely, some being *jihadi* activists engaged with terrorism actions and others being *political* activists actively involved in local politics, it would appear that KOMPAK could be more accurately described as a *tactical-network* rather than a movement with a solid ideological framework.

- ***The 'passionate politics' theoretical contribution***

The modest contribution of this research has been to follow theoretical developments in the literature of social movement and the new endeavor to return emotions to the study of social movements (Goodwin, Jasper, Poletta 2000, 2001b, 2004c). Applying a 'passionate politics' approach to this research was a risky and challenging trajectory, since it is a relatively new approach to social movement theory with no ready-made toolbox available. Thus this research has experimented by combining a passionate politics approach with life history. By incorporating the two approaches I have attempted to develop a research framework sensible to the dynamics

of identity and emotions of the actors as reflected in their life story narratives as collected during the fieldwork.

In linking the two approaches, I formulated three mechanisms in three stages of jihad movements, namely, *before*, *during* and *after*, based on, or at least informed by, the passionate politics approach as follows. First, in the process of becoming a jihadist, I have argued that the informants underwent a series of micro-sociological processes which I call 'radical reasoning'. Radical reasoning involves both cognitive and affective process, particularly through 'cognitive opening' (Wiktorowicz 2005) and 'moral shocks' (Jasper 1997, 1998), which eventually brought about the decision to join jihad. I highlighted the critical role of two processes, namely, cognitive opening and moral shocks, to produce ideological acceptance and moral emotions in mobilizing people to join jihad movement. In the second stage, I have argued that jihad experience becomes a 'pivotal event' that brings about a new 'pivotal meaning structure' (Sartre 1971/1981 as cited by Denzin 1989) to the actor through two of its elements: highly emotional experiences and the use of a powerful religious symbol: *jihad.* It also marks the life of the actor with a powerful symbolic marker: by joining the jihad movement and becoming a jihad activist, the actor distinguishes the life in two distinctive periods: *before* and *after* jihad. Finally, in the third stage, I have argued that the jihad experience is 'a pivotal event' that informs the later life trajectory of the actor in combination with two other main factors, namely biographical traits and social networks. I have also proposed an analytical framework of the dynamic role of social networks to influence the actors' life trajectories in the post-jihad period through three kinds of social network: *core-network*, *tactical-network*, and *extended-network.* This framework was able to help explain how the actors took different life trajectories in the post-jihad period, either to *sustain* or *exit* or *neglect* the movement. Its focus on demobilization and disengagement has also contributed to fill this somewhat neglected area in the study of social movement as suggested by some scholars (McAdam 1999, Klandermans & Stragenberg 2002, Koopmans 2004, Giugni 2004).

- ***Personal reflections***

This dissertation consists of a collection of (life) stories, reflecting not only the informants but also myself, the researcher. In some stages of my life story, I met, befriended, and even took part in the same movement and events as some of the informants, the (post-) jihadists. In this final section of the dissertation, I would like to reflect personally on my biographical intersection with the radical Islamic movements and why my chosen life trajectory differs from that of the informants.

Born and raised in a *santri* family in Pekalongan I began to participate in Islamic activism in my early adolescence when I was in junior high school. Following the trajectory of my older brothers and sisters, I became involved with the PII, a youth Islamic movement associated with Masyumi. It was in the early 1980s when Islamic movements began to reflower in Indonesia (as discussed in Chapter 1), especially reflecting the cultural atmosphere of the post Iran Revolution in 1979. I still remember that I enjoyed reading the translated books of Ali Syariati, the leading Islamic scholar from Iran who had played a key role during the Iran Revolution, such as *Sosiologi Islam* (Islamic Sociology) and *Sesat pikir Marxisme dan Kapitalisme (*The Fallacy of Marxist and Capitalist Thinking). When the Soeharto regime launched the draconian policy of "Asas Tunggal Pancasila" in 1985 I was the chairman of the Pekalongan branch of the PII and the PII was one of the few organizations to bravely oppose the policy. Jodi (see Chapter 6), who then joined jihad in Afghanistan, was my high school friend and fellow PII activist during the period. Nizam (see Chapter 4), who then joined jihad in Ambon through Laskar Jihad, was at my junior high school.

It was during this period of revival of Islamic activism that I participated in the *Studi Islam Intensif* (formerly named *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah*) program held by the Masjid Salman ITB Bandung, a pioneer of Islamic movements on university campus. I met Sughandi alias Abdullah Uzair, a fellow SII participant, who was imprisoned for his role in terrorist related actions in Palembang when I did my

fieldwork in the 'terrorist block' of the detention center of the Jakarta Police Headquarters in October 2009. During the same period in early 1980s I took part in *pesantren kilat* held by LP3K, a movement referred to as the Young DI movement, led by Mursalin Dahlan. Fauzan, who joined jihad in Afghanistan and then became a JI activist, told me that he had also taken part in the same training program when he was in high school in Tasikmalaya (Chapter 5). I was also familiar with the names mentioned by Fauzan in his engagement with LP3K, also cited in some reports by the ICG. The LP3K was a group linked with Abdullah Sungkar, then a DI activist who eventually founded the JI with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 1993.

In short, I coud have become a jihadist when I was a teenager. So the question is: why did I take a different trajectory in my Islamic activism career unlike my former fellows such as Jodi, Sughandi, and Fauzan? Why did I not become a jihadist? There are many underlying factors of course. Here I will highlight two things: social networks and counter-ideas.

I would say that my involvement with the PII during my adolescence led me to become an Islamic militant activist. Being the local chairman of an organization opposed to the state policy during the Soeharto authoritarian regime was obviously not without risk. It was quite common among us, PII activists, to use terms such as *thaghut* (anti-Islamic) and *Fir'aun* (Pharaoh) to refer to the Soeharto regime, especially in covert sessions. Thus, by being a leading activist of such a radical Islamic movement during the period, I had to prepare myself for questioning, even arrest in the extreme case by government security forces, especially the military. My participation in *pesantren kilat* held by LP3K enhanced my spirit of Islamic militancy by adopting the primacy of the doctrine of jihad as holy war against the *thaghut* regime as the outcome of a series of sessions structured to induce experiences of 'cognitive opening' and 'moral shocks', either through religious sermons or interactive discussions or viewing the pictures of misery of Muslim fellows in Palestine and Afganistan.

My decision not to stay involved with the LP3K and became a *jihadi* activist, I think, can be explained by at least two main factors: the multiple social networks and various kinds of other counter-discourse in which I became engaged. So while continuing to engage with LP3K in early post-*pesantren kilat* programs I also maintained my involvement with various kinds of social groups and discourses, including the 'free group discussion' with ex PII activists in Pekalongan. It was through this group that I continued to be involved in critical discussions on various Islamic issues and literatures, including controversial ideas by vibrant Indonesian Islamic scholars such as Ahmad Wahib, Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Kuntowijoyo. So I confronted the 'absolutist and literal ways of thinking' taught by *jihadi* groups with 'relativism and liberal ways of thinking' promoted by liberal Islamic scholars. As a result, while I continued to reject the 'Asas Tunggal' policy for its anti-democratic character, I refused to view the state ideology "Pancasila as the opponent of Islam" as was common by PII activists at the time.

Finally, by reflecting personally on my past engagement with radical Islamic and *jihadi* activism, I would simply say that the best way to combat radical Islamic and *jihadi* activism is by employing the twofold strategy of confronting it with other vibrant ideas and promoting multiple social relations and networks.***

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Appendices

Table I:
List of Life History Informants

No	Name/Age	Origin/Location	Movement/ Network	Note
1	**Fauzi/40s**	**Yogya/Yogya**	**PPP/Pious**	**S**
2	**Awod/30s**	**Solo/Solo**	**PBB/Political**	**S**
3	**Ayash/30s**	**Pekalongan/Pekalongan**	**FPI/Political**	**S**
4	**Fauzan/40s**	**Jakarta/Poso/Jakarta**	**JI/Jihadi**	**S**
5	Nizam/30s	Pekalongan/Pekalongan	Al-Irsyad/Pious	S
6	Baghdad/40s	East Java	NU/Political	S
7	Jodi/40s	Pekalongan/Jakarta	Political	S
8	Anshor/30s	Kendal/Ambon	Pious	QS
9	**Reza/30s**	**Jepara/Yogya**	**Muhammadi-yah/Pious**	**QS**
10	**Taufan/30s**	**Blora/Ambon**	**Abangan/Pious**	**QS**
11	**Adang/30s**	**Kuningan/Poso**	**NU/Pious**	**QS**
12	**Ali Imron/40s**	**Lamongan/Jakarta**	**JI/Jihadi**	**QS**
13	**Hendro/30s**	**Wonogiri/Poso/Jakarta**	**JI/Jihadi**	**QS**
14	Arman/30s	Aceh/Poso	JI?/Jihadi	QS
15	**Surahman/40s**	**Jakarta/Ambon**	**PKPU/Political**	**QS**
16	*Sulaiman/30s*	*Purwokerto/Poso/Yogya*	*DI?/Jihadi*	*US*
17	*Imran/30s*	*Yogya/Poso*	*JI?/Jihadi*	*US*

No	Name/Age	Origin/Location	Movement/ Network	Note
18	*Harun/30s*	*Ponorogo/Poso*	*DI?/Jihadi*	*US*
19	*Amri/40s*	*Madiun/Solo*	*Pious*	*US*
20	*Abim/40s*	*Ponorogo/Poso*	*Pious*	*US*
21	*Azzam/30s*	*Madura/Ambon*	*DI?/Jihadi*	*US*

Note:
Bold letters indicate the life history informants who are presented and discussed as the life story narrators in the dissertation. *Italic* letters indicate the list of life history informants who are not presented and discussed in this dissertation because their interviews were classified as unsuccessful. Discussion on the selection of the informants were presented in Chapter 3.

S = successful
QS = quite successful
US = unsuccessful

Table II:
Age, Background & Education

No	Name/ Network/City	Born/ Background	Engagement/ Education
1	Reza/LJ/Yogya	1981/Middle-class, urban, santri-modernist (Jepara)	Early university year (dropout), peer-network
2	Taufan/LJ/Yogya	1976/Middle-class, rural, abangan (Blora)	Early university year (graduated), peer-network
3	Adang/LJ/Kuningan	1982/Lower-middle class, rural, santri	High school (graduated), peer-network
4	Fauzi/LJ/Yogya	1956/Middle-class, urban, santri-modernist	Political dissappointment, 1998, social-peer network Master's Degree
5	Ali Imron/ JI/ Lamongan	1970/Middle-class, rural, santri	High school (graduated), peer-network
6	Fauzan/JI/Jakarta	1966/Lower-middle class, urban, santri	High school (graduated), family-network

No	Name/ Network/City	Born/ Background	Engagement/ Education
7	Hendro/JI/Solo	1976/Lower-class, abangan, rural (Wonogiri)	Early university year (dropout), peer-network
8	Awod Umar/ KOMPAK-PBB/Solo	1980/Lower-middle class, urban, santri	High school (dropout), family-network
9	Abu Ayyash/ KOMPAK-PBB/ Pekalongan	1973/Lower-class, urban, abangan	High school (graduated), peer-network
10	Surahman /PKPU/ Jakarta	1967/Middle-class, urban, santri	Junior high school, peer-network, college (graduated)

Table III:
Period, Location & Tasks

No	Name/Network	Period/Duration/ Location	Main Roles/Tasks
1	Reza (LJ)	2001-2/1,5 years/ Ambon	Education-Da'wa for children
2	Taufan (LJ)	2000-2/2,5 years/ Ambon (stayed on)	Military-Management
3	Adang (LJ)	2001-2/1,5 years/Poso (stayed on)	Education-Da'wa for Children Communication
4	Fauzi (LJ)	2000/1 month/Ambon	Health-Military
5	Ali Imron (JI)	1992-1996/4 years/ Afghanistan	Mujahidin-Military cadet
		1999-2000/1-2 month (2x)/Ambon & Poso	Paramilitary-Logistics
		2000-2002/the Christmas & Bali bombings	Executor & Field-coordinator
6	Fauzan (JI)	1988-1992/ 4 years/ Afghanistan	Mujahidin-Military cadet, combatant
		1999/3 months/Ambon 2000-2004/4 years/Poso	Paramilitary-Logistics Paramilitary-Logistics (jailed 2000-1 & 2002-2004)

No	Name/Network	Period/Duration/ Location	Main Roles/Tasks
7	Hendro (JI)	1998-2002/4 years/ Mindanao	Mujahidin-Military cadet, combatant
		2002-2006/4 years/Poso	Paramilitary-Da'wa-Leadership (jailed from 2006)
8	Awod Umar (KOMPAK-PBB)	2000/6 months/Ambon	Paramilitary trainer-combatant
9	Abu Ayyash (KOMPAK-FPI)	2001/4 months/ Ceram-Maluku	Education-Da'wa for children
10	Surahman (PKPU)	2001-2/2 years/Tual-Maluku (stayed on)	Da'wa-education

Table IV:
Post-Jihad Trajectory, Occupation & Network

No	Name/ Network	Trajectory	Occupation/Network
1	Reza (LJ)	Back to Yogya, left university	Works in Salafi publisher; limited network
2	Taufan (LJ)	Stayed on in Ambon, running Salafi foundation	Manager of Salafi business; developing social network
3	Adang (LJ)	Back to Kuningan, Returned & stayed on in Poso	Works part-time in fire brigade office in Poso; limited network
4	Fauzi (LJ)	Back to Yogya, left political party	Medical specialist; very vast social & political network
5	Ali Imron (JI)	Back to Lamongan, carried out Bali bombing in 2002	Received life jail sentence; collaborative with police

No	Name/ Network	Trajectory	Occupation/Network
6	Fauzan (JI)	Sentenced twice for 3.5 years in Palu, back to Jakarta	Works casual jobs, from business to security assessment; quite wide social network
7	Hendro (JI)	Arrested in Palu in 2006 for his role in terrorism in Poso	Jailed for 20 years; no collaboration with police
8	Awod Umar (KOMPAK-PBB)	Back to Solo, jailed for vigilantism in 2003, joined a legal aid NGO, elected as Chairman of PBB Solo in 2009	Works casual jobs, just opened a restaurant in Solo; vast social & political network
9	Abu Ayyash (KOMPAK-FPI)	Back to Pekalongan, elected as Chairman of FPI (2005-2015), jailed for vigilantism in 2009	Works casual jobs, active preaching & organizational activities; vast social & political networks
10	Surahman (PKPU)	Stayed on in Ambon, appointed as Vice Chairman PKS Maluku	Runs motobike taxi business & a shop in Ambon; vast social & political networks

Interview Guide: After Jihad

Personal background

1. Personal data: name, date and place of birth, ethnic; etc
2. Family: members of family; sex; occupation; education;
3. Parents: occupation, ethnic, education, religious and political affiliation;
4. Childhood: locations of growing up; social-economic-cultural environment; important-dramatic experiences;
5. Youth period: locations of growing up; social-economic-cultural environment; important-dramatic experiences; group affiliations; major interests; deliquency;
6. Education: basic-university; formal-informal; 'religious-secular';
7. Religious group affiliation: youth-recent; similarity and differences to parents' affiliations
8. Political group affiliation: youth-recent; similarity and differences to parents' affiliations
9. Idols: social, political and/or religious idols? Why?
10. Favorite books/films: what and why?
11. Hobbies: personal hobbies; stories; group affiliations

Pre jihad

12. What was the decision-making process?
13. Chronology of making the decision to join jihad?
14. What was the influence and inspiration to join jihad? Newspapers? Videos? Preachings?
15. Who influenced and/or persuaded you to join jihad? Friends? Relatives? Teachers?
16. Did you do consult with family, friends, relatives, and/or teachers before making the decision?
17. What were the important reasons/considerations for joining jihad?
18. How long did the decision making process take? Feelings after making the decision?
19. Were there doubts and anxieties before going jihad?
20. Channel to jihad: which group? Why? How did you know the group?

Jihad experiences

21. Preparation for jihad: physical, mental, technical? How long? Where?
22. First day experience on location? First week and month?
23. Chronology of daily activities during jihad?
24. Main jobs and roles during jihad; changing jobs and roles?
25. Dress on jihad? Different dress at home and in battle?
26. Romantic and sexual things during jihad? Sexual and romantic affairs among jihadists? Sexual and romantic affairs among locals?
27. Relationship with other jihadist groups? Relationship with locals? (friendship, rivalry, tension, etc)
28. Sickness or wounds during jihad?
29. Most meaningful and inspiring events/experiences?
30. Most boring and less meaningful events/experiences?
31. Happiest and most joyful events/experiences?
32. Most depressing and miserable events/experiences?
33. Reflection on violent events/experiences? Wrong decision to join jihad? Worthwhile decision to join jihad?
34. Reflection on religious events/experiences during violent conflict? Divine experience during jihad? Banal violent experience during jihad?

Post Jihad trajectories

A. Decision to return/become 'local'

35. What was the decision making process?
36. What was the influence and inspiration to make the decision? Preaching? Experiences? Readings? Discussions?
37. Who influenced and/or persuaded you to make the decision? Friends? Relatives? Teachers? Local people?

38. Did you consult with family, friends, relatives, and/or teachers before making the decision?
39. What were the important reasons/considerations for making decision?
40. How long did the decision making process take?
41. Feelings after making the decision?
42. Were there doubts and anxieties before executing the decision?

B. Post jihad trajectory

43. Current path of life? Descriptions on current daily life and work?
44. Influences of jihad experiences on current life?
45. Shared network with (previous) jihad movement and personnel?
46. Shared identity with (previous) jihad movement and personnel?
47. Ideological link with jihad movement and personnel
48. Participation in recent political processes (Pilkada, Pemilu, Pilpres)
49. Reflection on jihad's influence on personal life?
50. Reflection on jihad's influence on general social and political life?
51. Reflection on jihad's influence on ummat life?
52. Reflection on jihad's influence on peace and democracy?

Major historical events

This section was aimed at capturing perceptions, personal situation and experience of informants regarding various historical events at the global, national or/and local level, and the events were linked with their own experiences during jihad or their post jihad lives.

A. Global

53. September 11, 2001
54. US attack on Iraq and the fall of the Sadam regime
55. US attack on Iraq and the fall of the Taliban regime
56. Palestine-Israel protracted conflict
57. Afghan war against the Soviets
58. Bosnian war
59. Iran revolution in 1979

B. National

60. The fall of Soeharto's New Order in 1998
61. The May riots in May 1998
62. Presidency of Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati
63. The election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) as the President in 2004
64. General elections during the New Order
65. General elections post New Order
66. Bali Bombing I and II and other terrorist activities (bombing of Marriot Hotel, Australian Embassy, churches, etc)
67. "Asas tunggal Pancasila"
68. Tanjung Priok incident

69. Aceh protracted conflict and the current peace process
70. East Timor independence

C. Local

71. Malino Peace agreement
72. Local political elections (Pilkada)
73. Syari'a-based local law (Perda Syariah)

Other General Issues

This section was aimed at capturing perceptions, personal situation and experience of informants regarding some other general issues, and how the issues were linked with their own experiences during jihad or their post jihad lives..

74. Perceptions of the causes of the conflict in Ambon and Poso: root causes, trigger factors, prolongation factors
75. The role of the military during the conflict and reformasi era: partisanship; professionalism; favoring Muslims/Christians;
76. The role of Soeharto's forces during the conflict and reformasi era
77. Reflections on democracy and democratization; national and local elections: Is Islam winning or losing in the democratic era?
78. Reflections on Islamist movements: about mainstream groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU; about 'radical groups' such as MMI, FPI, Jamaah Islamiyah, etc.

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Summary

This dissertation studies the biographies of non-local jihad actors who participated in the religious communal conflict that took place in eastern Indonesia, namely in Ambon-Maluku and Poso-Central Sulawesi, during the early stages of Indonesia's democratic transition. Jihad mobilization during that period successfully recruited several thousand Muslims from many areas of the archipelago, as well as from various Islamic activism networks, to take part in the conflict, which they viewed as a 'religious war'. This study, in contrast to most studies that have focused exclusively on conflict situations and mobilization processes, dedicates its attention to the situation and networks in the post jihad period by observing the life trajectory of the actors. Unlike many studies that have centered on one single group or movement network, it examines and compares three types of Islamic activism, namely *pious, jihadi,* and *political.*

Through extensive fieldwork in various places in Indonesia, from the (post) conflict areas of Ambon and Poso to the hometowns of the informants in East and Central Java, and also correctional institutions in Jakarta where some post-jihadists are imprisoned, this study has selected ten life history informants for discussion: four ex Laskar Jihad activists represent the *pious* ideological stream; three Jama'ah Islamiyah activists represent the *jihadi* stream; whilst three FPI, PKS and PBB activist informants represent the *political* stream. Applying an interpretive biographical method, this study analyzes

the life story narratives of the informants in three different stages of jihad participation: *before*, *during*, and *after*. Informed by the 'passionate politics' approach of social movement theory, it discusses three sets of research questions, namely: How did they become jihadists? What did the jihad experience mean to the actors? How did the jihad experience influence the life trajectories of the actors?

Through discussing the life story narratives of the post-jihadist informants, the dissertation has developed three main arguments as follows. First, it is argued that the informants became jihadists after experiencing 'radical reasoning', a set of micro-sociological decision-making processes to join jihad, involving both cognition and emotion through either 'cognitive opening' or 'moral shocks' or both. It is also argued that the decision to join jihad can be seen as an *act of identity* because it takes place in the context of, or as a response to, identity crisis experienced by the informants. So, jihad as an act of identity is a way of resolving the identity crisis experienced by its actors through 'radical reasoning', which ruptures the 'normal life' of the actor and marks a new phase in the actor's life.

It is interesting, however, to notice that these three types of Islamic activism produce different narratives of becoming a jihadist. For *pious* activists, *fatwas* by leading Salafi clerics are a crucial part of their narratives, while, conversely, such discourse is almost absent in *jihadi* and *political* narratives. While 'moral shocks' are experienced by many informants, it is particularly strongly narrated by *political* activists. For *jihadi* activists, who joined jihad firstly abroad and later in their home country, 'moral shocks' and 'cognitive opening' are firstly experienced in a 'package' through a recruitment training, while their later engagement with jihad actions are merely a continuation of their involvement with *jihadi* activism.

Second, it is argued that jihad experience was interpreted as a 'radical experience' bringing about a 'pivotal meaning structure' to the jihad actor that restructured the other activities in the actor's life. It is furthermore argued that the jihad experience was a 'radical experience' for the actor because it consisted of two key elements, *first*, 'high-risk' activism, that by its nature involves high levels of

participation 'costs' and 'risks' that bear powerful meanings for the actor through triggering a high level of emotions; and *second*, religious symbols and meanings, as reflected in the use of the term jihad, which have a powerful effect on the actor. These two elements combine to produce 'a pivotal meaning structure' as reflected in the use of the marker *jihadist* to refer to those who participate in the movement, which eventually marks the life phase of the actor by symbolically distinguishing between *before* and *after* the *jihad*.

It is interesting, however, to note that the different types of jihad activists narrated the jihad experience in different ways. Fighting and combat narratives are the constant main themes of *jihadi* activists, while *pious* and *political* activists narrate a variety of themes reflecting various roles during jihad: from combat to *da'wa,* from public relations to children's education. It is argued that jihad experience is interpreted through a particular ideological framework from a certain Islamic activism network as: action and expression of *pietism* for *pious* activists*;* action and expression of *jihadism* for *jihadi* activists*;* action and expression of *political Islamism* for *political* activists. Thus, *jihad* participation brings about different kinds of actor in its aftermath: the creation of *pious* actors for *pious* activism, *jihadi* actors for *jihadi* activism and *political* actors for *political* activism.

Third, it is argued that the jihad experience is 'a pivotal event' that informs the subsequent life trajectory of the actor in combination with two main factors, namely biographical traits and social networks. Through an analytical framework of three kinds of social networks, namely, the *core-network*, *tactical-network* and *extended-network*, it is argued that the dynamic engagement of informants with different social networks influence the choice of life-trajectory in the post-jihad period. *Core-network* is defined as a social network through which the actor joins the jihad; *tactical-network* as a social network of jihadist networks which occur temporarily during the jihad period; and *extended-network* as an extension of the social networks, which develop in the aftermath of jihad participation. It is contended that the narratives indicate a sort of pattern of 'after

jihad' life trajectory for the *jihadists* from the three types of Islamic activism: *pious* activists tend to become involved in a 'enclave community' or 'holy kampong'; *jihadi* activists tend to continue carrying out terrorism actions and are eventually subject to a prison sentence; *political* activists tend to become further involved and to take a bigger role in local politics.

Such life trajectory patterns appear to be related to the membership affiliation patterns which characterize each particular type of Islamic activism: *pious* and *jihadi* activists usually follow *exclusive-affiliation*, meaning they usually affiliate only with their own activism network, whereas *political* activists usually follow *multiple-affiliation*, meaning they usually affiliate with more than one activism network. Thus this study suggests that the more extensive the *extended-network* of the *political* activist the more likely it is the actor will play a larger role within the *core-network*, whereas conversely the more extensive the *extended-networks* of the *pious* or *jihadi* activist the more likely the actor will experience trouble within the *core-network*.

The study contributes a theoretical shaping to a new approach in social movement research: the so-called 'passionate politics' approach. Empirically, this dissertation enriches academic study in the intersection of communal violence and Islamic movements in four ways: by focusing on *non-local actors*; by comparing *different networks* of non-local actors; by following the trajectory of actors in the *post-jihad period*; and by emphasizing and giving voice to the *'foot soldier'* actors.***

Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift behandelt de levensloop van niet-lokale jihad-strijders die deelnamen aan het religieuze geweld dat plaatsvond in Oost-Indonesië (Ambon in de Molukken en Poso in Centraal Sulawesi) tijdens de eerste fase van Indonesië's democratische transitie. In de jaren na de val van Suharto werden door verschillende Islamitische netwerken uit verschillende delen van Indonesië duizenden Moslims gerekruteerd om deel te nemen aan een 'religieuze oorlog' tussen Christenen en Moslims. In tegenstelling tot de meeste andere studies die focussen op mobilisatieprocessen en conflict-dynamiek tijdens het geweld, richt deze studie zich op de levensloop van jihadi's na de deelname aan dit geweld. Deze studie onderzoekt en vergelijkt drie soorten Islamitisch activisme, namelijk vroom, jihadistisch en politiek activisme.

Op basis van uitgebreid veldwerk in verschillende plaatsen in Indonesië – van de (post)conflict gebieden in Ambon en Poso en de woonplaatsen van informanten in Oost en Centraal Java tot de gevangenissen in Jakarta waar sommige ex-jihad strijders vast zitten – richt deze studie zich op de levensgeschiedenissen van tien informanten: vier ex-Laskar Jihad activisten als vertegenwoordigers van een vrome stroming, drie Jama'ah Islamiyah activisten die een jihadistische stroming vertegenwoordigen en drie activisten van de FPI, PKS en PBB als representanten van een politieke stroming. Door middel van een interpretatieve biografische methode analyseert deze studie de wijze waarop informanten verhalen over hun ervaringen

voor, tijdens en na hun Jihad-deelname. Geïnspireerd door een 'passionate politics' benadering binnen de social movement literatuur behandelt deze studie drie onderzoeksvragen: hoe zijn deze activisten jihadisten geworden? Wat betekende de jihad-ervaring voor hen? Hoe heeft de jihad-ervaring hun levensloop beïnvloed?

Op basis van een analyse van de wijze waarop de ex-jihadisten over hun levensloop verhalen, ontwikkelt dit proefschrift drie hoofdargumenten. Ten eerste betoogt dit proefschrift dat de informanten jihadisten werden na een ervaring met 'radicaal redeneren': zij maakten een micro-sociologisch besluitvormingsproces door, wat gekenmerkt werd door cognitieve en emotionele processen en 'morele schokken'. Daarnaast betoogt dit proefschrift dat het besluit om deel te nemen aan jihad ook ingegeven wordt door een identiteitscrisis die informanten in deze fase vaak ervaren. Jihad is een 'identiteitsdaad' die dient om deze identiteitscrisis te doorbreken. Het 'radicaal redeneren' in deze fase biedt een doorbreking van het 'normale leven' en een start van een nieuwe fase.

Het is echter interessant om op te merken dat de genoemde drie soorten Islamitisch activisten op verschillende wijze spreken over hun keuze om jihadist te worden. Voor vrome activisten zijn fatwas uitgesproken door leidende Salafi geestelijken van cruciaal belang, terwijl jihadistische en politieke activisten niet door dergelijke fatwas geïnspireerd lijken te zijn. Voor de politieke activisten waren vooral de 'morele schokken' van belang, terwijl de jihadistische activisten – die vaak eerst in het buitenland deelnamen aan een jihad – dergelijke 'cognitieve openingen' en 'morele schokken' vooral tijdens trainingskampen opdeden.

Ten tweede betoogt dit proefschrift dat de jihad-ervaring geïnterpreteerd wordt als een 'radicale ervaring' dat als een 'pivotal meaning structure' grote gevolgen heeft voor het wereldbeeld en het dagelijkse leven. De deelname aan jihad was een 'radical experience' omdat, ten eerste, dit soort 'high-risk activisme' zeer betekenisvol voor actoren is doordat het met sterke emoties gepaard gaat. En ook omdat de religieuze symbolen en betekenissen achter de term jihad een krachtig effect op betrokkenen hebben. Deze twee elementen

samen brengen een 'pivotal meaning structure' voort, waardoor actoren hun leven gaan bezien in termen van voor en na jihad.

De verschillende soorten activisten spraken op verschillende manieren over hun jihad-ervaring. De strijd en het geweld worden vooral benadrukt door de jihadi activisten, terwijl de vrome en politieke activisten meer verhalen over niet gewelddadige thema's, zoals da'wa, public relations en onderwijs aan kinderen. De geweldservaring wordt dus geïnterpreteerd vanuit de ideologische achtergrond van de jihadist, de vrome jihadisten bezien deelname aan het geweld als een uiting van vroomheid. Jihadistische activisten zien het als uiting van jihadisme en de politieke activisten zien deelname als een uiting van hun politiek activisme. Zo heeft jihad achteraf ook een verschillende uitwerking op deelnemers: jihad-deelname creëert vrome, jihadistische en politieke actoren.

Ten derde betoogt dit proefschrift dat de impact die de jihadervaring heeft op de verdere levensloop samenhangt met de achtergrond en de persoonlijke netwerken van de jihadist. Het soort netwerk waarin de actor ingebed is, beïnvloedt zijn keuzes in de post-jihad periode. Drie soorten netwerken worden onderscheiden: het corenetwork is het sociale netwerk dat de actor in staat stelde aan de jihad deel te nemen; het tactical network is een sociaal netwerk dat tijdelijk bestond ten tijde van de jihad; en het extended-network is een extensie van deze netwerken, dat ontstaat in de post-jihad periode. Vrome activisten raken na hun jihad deelname meer betrokken bij een 'enclave community' of 'holy kampong'; jihadistische activisten gaan vaak door met het uitvoeren van terroristische acties waarvoor ze vaak in de gevangenis terechtkomen, terwijl politieke activisten vaker actief worden in locale politiek.

Dergelijke patronen in de levensloop van ex-jihadisten lijken samen te hangen met het 'membership affiliation pattern' van elk van de drie soorten Islamitisch activisme: de vrome en jihadistische activisten volgen meestal een 'exclusive-affiliation' patroon, in de zin dat ze meestal alleen contacten onderhouden met mensen van hun eigen activistische netwerk. De politieke activisten volgen juist een 'multiple-affiliation' patroon, zij onderhouden contacten met

meerdere netwerken. Op deze manier concludeert de studie dat een uitgebreid extensive network juist de positie van politieke activisten in hun core-network versterkt, terwijl zo'n uitgebreid netwerk voor vrome en jihadi activisten juist voor spanningen binnen het eigen core network leidt.

Deze studie beoogt bij te dragen aan het ontwikkelen van een 'passionate politics' benadering binnen de social movement literatuur. In empirische zin beoogt deze studie op vier manieren bij te dragen aan de bestaande literatuur over communaal geweld en Islamitische bewegingen: door te focussen op niet-lokale actoren, door verschillende netwerken van deze actoren te vergelijken, door de levensloop van actoren na hun deelname aan jihad te bestuderen, en door aandacht te schenken aan de foot soldiers.***

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When religious communal conflict took place in Ambon-Maluku and Poso-Central Sulawesi during the early stages of Indonesia's democratic transition, several thousand Muslims from outside of the area were mobilized to take part in the conflict, which they viewed as a 'holy war' (jihad). When the conflict had deescalated most of non-local jihadists left the area, while few of them decided to stay on. What do they do after their jihad participation? What did the jihad experience mean to the actors? How did the jihad experience influence the life trajectories of the actors?

This book, in contrast to most studies that have focused exclusively on conflict situations and mobilization processes, dedicates its attention to the situation and networks in the post jihad period by observing the life trajectory of the actors. Informed by the 'passionate politics' approach of social movement theory, it examines and compares three types of Islamic activism, namely pious, jihadi, and political in three different life story periods: before, during, and after jihad.

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